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DRDC  Toronto  No.  CR  2008-019 


EFFECTS-BASED  APPROACHES  TO  OPERATIONS:  CANADIAN 

PERSPECTIVES 

by 

Allan  English  and  Howard  Coombs 


KMG  ASSOCIATES 

83  Gore  St. 

Kingston  ON 
K7L  2L4 

PWGSC  Contract  No.  TOR-4-00125 
Call-Up  7908-13 


On  behalf  of 

DEPARTMENT  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENCE 


As  represented  by 

Defence  Research  and  Development  Canada  -  Toronto 
1133  Sheppard  Avenue  West 
Toronto,  Ontario,  Canada 
M3M  3B9 


DRDC  Scientific  Authority 
Carol  McCann 
(416) 635-2190 


Edited  by 


Allan  English 


Approved  by 


Carol  McCann 

Head,  Adversarial  Intent  Section 


Approved  for  release  by 


Kim  Wulterkens 

For  Chair,  Document  Review  and  Library  Committee 


This  study  was  prepared  for  the  Canadian  Department  of  National  Defence  but  the  views 
expressed  in  it  are  solely  those  of  the  authors.  They  do  not  necessarily  reflect  the  policy 
or  the  opinion  of  any  agency,  including  the  Government  of  Canada  and  the  Canadian 

Department  of  National  Defence 


©  Her  Majesty  the  Queen  as  represented  by  the  Minister  of  National  Defence,  2007 
©  Sa  majeste  la  reine,  representee  par  le  ministre  de  la  Defense  nationale,  2007 


11 


Abstract 


There  are  currently  three  major  theoretical  approaches  that  dominate  analyses  and 
descriptions  of  military  operations.  They  are  Operational  Art,  Network  Centric  Warfare 
(NCW)  (or  Network  Enabled  Operations  (NEOps)  in  the  Canadian  context),  and  Effects 
Based  Operations  (EBO).  The  concept  of  EBO  is  currently  having  a  significant  influence 
on  Operational  Art  and  NCW,  as  well  as  how  operations  are  conceptualized  in  the  new 
security  environment.  The  EBO  concept  is  emerging  through  discussions  and  papers 
within  Defence  Research  and  Development  Canada  (DRDC)  jointly  with  other 
stakeholders  in  the  Department  of  National  Defence  (DND);  however,  there  are  many 
ways  of  describing  EBO  in  the  literature  and  in  practice.  In  order  to  fully  understand  the 
nature  of  EBO  today  and  how  it  might  evolve  in  the  future,  it  is  essential  to  understand 
the  theoretical  and  historical  origins  of  this  subject,  as  well  as  how  EBO  is 
conceptualized  and  practiced  by  the  CF.  Since  there  has  been  no  comprehensive 
examination  of  these  concepts  in  a  Canadian  context,  the  Command  Effectiveness  and 
Behaviour  Section  at  DRDC  Toronto  co-sponsored  with  the  Canadian  Forces  Aerospace 
Warfare  Centre  (CFAWC)  a  two-day  workshop  to  identify  the  issues  related  to  EBO  and 
to  begin  to  establish  the  agenda  for  better  understanding  EBO.  This  report  is  the  product 
of  that  workshop  and  it  includes  not  only  the  main  conclusions  of  the  workshop,  but  also 
essays  on  EBO  by  workshop  participants,  and  others. 


Resume 


II  y  a  actuellement  trois  approches  theoriques  principales  qui  dominent  les  analyses  et  les 
descriptions  d’operations  militaires.  II  s’agit  de  l’art  operationnel,  de  la  guerre 
reseaucentrique  (GR)  (ou  Operations  facilities  par  reseaux  [OFR]  au  Canada)  et  des 
operations  basees  sur  les  effets  (OBE).  Le  concept  des  OBE  a  actuellement  une  incidence 
importante  sur  l’art  operationnel  et  la  GR,  ainsi  que  sur  la  maniere  dont  on  concoit  les 
operations  dans  le  nouvel  environnement  de  securite.  Le  concept  des  OBE  apparait  dans 
le  cadre  de  discussions  qui  ont  eu  lieu  entre  Recherche  et  developpement  pour  la  defense 
Canada  (RDDC)  et  d’autres  intervenants  du  ministere  de  la  Defense  nationale,  ainsi  que 
de  documents  rediges  en  collaboration  avec  ces  derniers;  cependant,  il  y  a  de  nombreuses 
facons  de  decrire  les  OBE  dans  la  documentation  et  la  pratique.  Afin  de  comprendre  la 
nature  des  OBE  aujourd’hui  et  la  facon  dont  elles  peuvent  evoluer  a  1’avenir,  il  est 
essentiel  de  comprendre  les  origines  theoriques  et  historiques  du  sujet,  ainsi  que  la 
maniere  dont  les  OBE  sont  con?ues  et  menees  par  les  FC.  Puisqu’il  n’y  a  pas  eu 
d’examen  exhaustif  de  ces  concepts  dans  un  contexte  canadien,  la  Section  de  l'efflcacite 
du  commandement  et  du  comportement  de  RDDC  Toronto  a  coparraine  avec  le  Centre  de 
guerre  aerospatial  des  Forces  canadiennes  (CGAFC)  un  atelier  de  deux  jours  en  vue  de 
cerner  les  questions  liees  aux  OBE  et  de  commencer  a  etablir  le  programme  pour  mieux 
comprendre  les  OBE.  Le  present  rapport  est  le  produit  de  cet  atelier  et  comprend  non 
seulement  les  conclusions  principales  de  F  atelier,  mais  aussi  des  essais  sur  les  OBE  par 
des  participants  a  l’atelier  et  d’autres  personnes. 


Executive  Summary 


There  are  currently  three  major  theoretical  approaches  that  dominate  analyses  and 
descriptions  of  military  operations.  They  are  Operational  Art,  Network  Centric  Warfare 
(NCW)  (or  Network  Enabled  Operations  (NEOps)  in  the  Canadian  context),  and  Effects 
Based  Operations  (EBO).  The  concept  of  EBO  is  currently  having  a  significant  influence 
on  Operational  Art  and  NCW,  as  well  as  how  operations  are  conceptualized  in  the  new 
security  environment.  However,  there  are  many  variants  of  EBO  and  each  alternative  has 
been  shaped  by  national  and  organizational  cultures.  Some  aspects  of  Canadian 
approaches  to  EBO  have  been  published,  but  no  comprehensive  or  integrated  Canadian 
approach  to  EBO  has  yet  been  documented.  Given  the  importance  of  EBO  in  current 
operations  and  in  CF  transformation  initiatives,  it  is  essential  that  we  have  a  clearer 
picture  of  what  this  concept  means  in  a  Canadian  context. 

The  concept  of  EBO  is  emerging  through  discussions  and  papers  within  Defence 
Research  and  Development  Canada  (DRDC)  jointly  with  other  stakeholders  in  the 
Department  of  National  Defence  (DND);  however,  there  are  many  ways  of  describing 
EBO  in  the  literature  and  in  practice.  In  order  to  fully  understand  the  nature  of  EBO 
today  and  how  it  might  evolve  in  the  future,  it  is  essential  to  understand  the  theoretical 
and  historical  origins  of  this  subject,  as  well  as  how  EBO  is  conceptualized  and  practiced 
by  the  CF.  Since  there  has  been  no  comprehensive  examination  of  these  concepts  in  a 
Canadian  context,  the  Command  Effectiveness  and  Behaviour  Section  at  DRDC  Toronto 
co-sponsored  with  the  Canadian  Forces  Aerospace  Warfare  Centre  (CFAWC)  a  two-day 
workshop  to  identify  the  issues  related  to  EBO  and  to  begin  to  establish  the  agenda  for 
better  understanding  EBO.  This  report  is  the  product  of  that  workshop  and  it  includes  not 
only  the  main  conclusions  of  the  workshop,  but  also  essays  on  EBO  by  workshop 
participants,  and  others.  Tenns  related  to  EBO  have  a  variety  of  meanings  and  are 
understood  in  a  number  of  ways.  No  attempt  is  made  here  to  reconcile  these  differences, 
but  presents  the  differences  so  that  readers  can  get  a  better  idea  of  how  effects-based 
tenninology  is  currently  being  used  by  Canadians. 

The  second  part  of  this  report,  following  the  introduction  in  part  one,  consists  of  two 
essays  which  examine  the  origins  of  EBO,  the  context  in  which  effects-based  approaches 
exist,  and  the  meaning  of  some  concepts  related  to  EBO.  The  first  essay  is  an  analysis  of 
the  origins  and  evolution  of  EBO  by  Colonel  J.F.  Cottingham,  the  Commandant  of  the 
CFAWC.  He  argues  that  there  are  currently  two  principal  versions  of  EBO,  one  of  which 
can  be  viewed  as  revolutionary  while  the  other  cannot.  The  next  essay  is  a  monograph  by 
Canadian  defence  scientist  Robert  Grossman- Vermaas  on  the  Effects  Based  Approach  as 
an  alternative  means  to  pursue  foreign  and  defence  policy  objectives. 

The  third  section  presents  a  summary  of  the  views  of  the  workshop  participants  on 
various  aspects  of  EBO  as  expressed  in  syndicate  and  plenary  discussions  and  as 
documented  by  syndicate  facilitators  and  recorders.  The  workshop  discussion  was  based 
on  six  questions  provided  by  the  organizers:  1)  what  is  an  “effect”  in  the  context  of  EBO? 
2)  what  is  EBO  in  a  Canadian  context?  3)  what  are  the  linkages  between  EBO  and 


v 


Networked  Enabled  Operations,  Network  Centric  Warfare,  and  Operational  Art?  4)  how 
might  EBO  affect  future  force  employment?  5)  how  might  EBO  affect  future  force 
development?  6)  how  might  EBO  affect  future  force  generation? 

The  contributions  in  parts  four  and  five  of  this  book  that  assess  effects  based  approaches 
were  written  after  the  workshop,  and  are,  therefore,  presented  after  the  workshop 
proceedings.  The  fourth  section  of  this  volume  presents  three  assessments  of  EBO  from 
different  perspectives.  The  first  essay  here  by  Commander  Ken  Hansen,  who  is  on  the 
faculty  of  the  Centre  for  Foreign  Policy  Studies  at  Dalhousie  University,  discusses  the 
relevance  of  EBO  to  navies.  He  argues  that  naval  historical  context  and  theories  of  naval 
warfare  suggest  that  an  EBO-based  approach  to  the  conceptualization,  planning,  and 
conduct  of  naval  operations,  would  be  unwise.  The  second  essay  in  this  section  by  LCol 
Colin  Magee,  Chair  of  the  Department  of  Military  Planning  and  Operations  at  the 
Canadian  Forces  College  (CFC),  was  written  after  the  workshop.  In  it  he  argues  that, 
because  of  the  lack  of  precision  in  EBO  tenninology,  current  joint  doctrine  constructs 
should  not  be  wholly  supplanted  by  EBO  concepts  and  methodologies  for  the  planning 
and  conduct  of  operations.  The  final  essay  in  this  section,  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Craig 
Dalton,  an  international  planner  on  the  Strategic  Joint  Staff  at  National  Defence 
Headquarters  (NDHQ),  considers  whether  or  not  application  of  the  effects-based 
approach  could  enhance  the  practice  of  strategic  art.  He  concludes  that  the  effects-based 
approach  does  not  enhance  the  practice  of  strategic  art  because  it  offers  no  improvement 
over  existing  methods. 

The  fifth  section  of  this  book  assesses  the  suitability  of  EBO  for  application  in  practice. 

In  the  first  essay  in  this  section  provides  observations  by  Robert  Vokac,  a  former 
instructor  at  CFC  and  a  graduate  of  the  US  Army’s  School  of  Advanced  Military  Studies, 
on  effects  based  operations  as  used  in  Canadian  Land  Force  exercises  and  simulations. 

He  concludes  that  while  an  effects-based  approach  to  operations  is  consistent  with 
existing  practice,  it  has  not  yet  been  articulated  in  formal  doctrine.  Draft  Canadian  Army 
doctrine  that  incorporates  the  effects-based  approach  in  the  application  of  combat  power 
is  included  at  Annex  B  to  this  volume.  This  draft  doctrine  presents  the  Army’s  views  on 
how  effects-based  concepts  should  be  applied  in  its  operations.  Finally,  Vokac  observes 
that,  given  the  increasing  complexity  of  planning,  knowledge  requirements  for  military 
professionals  are  greater  than  ever.  The  second  essay  in  this  section,  by  Colonel  Randy 
Wakelam,  Director  of  Curriculum  at  CFC,  examines  where  the  study  of  effects  based 
operations  could  best  be  situated  within  the  continuum  of  Professional  Military  Education 
and  the  most  effective  options  for  professional  military  education.  The  final  part  of  this 
section  is  an  essay  by  Robert  Grossman- Vermaas  which  explores  the  effects-based 
concept  within  a  multinational  and  inter-agency  context.  He  concludes  that  all  those  who 
are  partners  in  a  campaign,  military  and  civilian,  should  be  directly  involved  in  the 
operational  planning  and  execution  stages  of  a  coalition  effort  so  that  capabilities  and 
efforts  towards  stability,  development  and  resolution  of  the  conflict  can  be  co-ordinated. 

Concluding  material  is  in  section  six  and  the  Annexes  in  section  seven  provide  an 
Annotated  Bibliography  by  James  McKay,  the  draft  Army  doctrine  described  above,  a  list 
of  abbreviations  and  a  list  of  contributors  to  this  volume. 


vi 


Sommaire 


II  y  a  actuellement  trois  approches  theoriques  principales  qui  dominent  les  analyses  et  les 
descriptions  d’ operations  militaires.  II  s’agit  de  l’art  operationnel,  de  la  guerre 
reseaucentrique  (GR)  (ou  Operations  facilities  par  reseaux  [OFR]  au  Canada)  et  des 
operations  basees  sur  les  effets  (OBE).  Le  concept  des  OBE  a  actuellement  une  incidence 
importante  sur  l’art  operationnel  et  la  GR,  ainsi  que  sur  la  maniere  dont  on  concoit  les 
operations  dans  le  nouvel  environnement  de  securite.  Cependant,  il  y  a  beaucoup  de 
variantes  des  OBE  et  chaque  version  a  ete  fa^onnee  par  les  cultures  nationales  et 
organisationnelles.  Certains  aspects  des  approches  canadiennes  aux  OBE  ont  ete  publies, 
mais  aucune  approche  canadienne  globale  ou  integree  n’a  encore  ete  documentee. 

Compte  tenu  de  1’ importance  des  OBE  dans  les  operations  actuelles  et  les  initiatives  de 
transformation  des  FC,  il  est  essentiel  d’avoir  une  idee  plus  claire  de  ce  que  ce  concept 
signific  dans  un  contexte  canadien. 

Le  concept  des  OBE  apparait  dans  le  cadre  de  discussions  qui  ont  eu  lieu  entre  Recherche 
et  developpement  pour  la  defense  Canada  (RDDC)  et  d’autres  intervenants  du  ministere 
de  la  Defense  nationale,  ainsi  que  de  documents  rediges  en  collaboration  avec  ces 
demiers;  cependant,  il  y  a  de  nombreuses  fa?ons  de  decrire  les  OBE  dans  la 
documentation  et  la  pratique.  Afin  de  comprendre  la  nature  des  OBE  aujourd’hui  et  la 
fa?on  dont  elles  peuvent  evoluer  a  l’avenir,  il  est  essentiel  de  comprendre  les  origines 
theoriques  et  historiques  du  sujet,  ainsi  que  la  maniere  dont  les  OBE  sont  concucs  et 
menees  par  les  FC.  Puisqu’il  n’y  a  pas  eu  d’examen  exhaustif  de  ces  concepts  dans  un 
contexte  canadien,  la  Section  de  l’efficacite  du  commandement  et  du  comportement  de 
RDDC  Toronto  a  coparraine  avec  le  Centre  de  guerre  aerospatial  des  Forces  canadiennes 
(CGAFC)  un  atelier  de  deux  jours  en  vue  de  cerner  les  questions  liees  aux  OBE  et  de 
commencer  a  etablir  le  programme  pour  mieux  comprendre  les  OBE.  Le  present  rapport 
est  le  produit  de  cet  atelier  et  comprend  non  seulement  les  conclusions  principales  de 
F atelier,  mais  aussi  des  essais  sur  les  OBE  par  des  participants  a  F atelier  et  d’autres 
personnes.  Les  termes  lies  aux  OBE  ont  diverses  definitions  et  sont  compris  de 
differentes  facons.  Nous  n’essayons  pas  ici  de  rapprocher  ces  differences,  mais  de 
presenter  les  differences  pour  que  les  lecteurs  puissent  mieux  comprendre  comment  la 
tenninologie  des  operations  basees  sur  les  effets  est  actuellement  utilisee  par  les 
Canadiens. 

La  deuxieme  partie  du  present  rapport,  apres  F  introduction  de  la  premiere  partie, 
comprend  deux  essais  qui  portent  sur  les  origines  des  OBE,  le  contexte  dans  lequel  les 
approches  basees  sur  les  effets  existent  et  la  signification  de  certains  concepts  lies  aux 
OBE.  Le  premier  essai  est  une  analyse  de  l’origine  et  de  F evolution  des  OBE  par  le 
Colonel  J.F.  Cottingham,  commandant  du  CGAFC.  Il  affirme  qu’il  y  a  actuellement  deux 
versions  principales  des  OBE,  dont  une  peut  etre  percuc  comine  revolutionnaire  et  l’autre 
ne  peut  pas  l’etre.  L’essai  suivant  est  une  monographic  de  Robert  Grossman- Vermaas, 
scientifique  de  la  Defense  canadien,  sur  F  approche  basee  sur  les  effets  comme  mesure  de 
rechange  pour  atteindre  les  objectifs  en  matiere  de  politique  etrangere  et  de  politique  de 
defense. 


vii 


La  troisieme  section  presente  un  resume  des  points  de  vue  des  participants  a  1’ atelier  sur 
divers  aspects  des  OBE  tels  qu’ils  ont  ete  exprimes  dans  le  cadre  de  discussions  en  atelier 
ou  de  discussions  plenieres  et  consignes  par  les  facilitateurs  et  secretaires  des  ateliers.  La 
discussion  en  atelier  reposait  sur  six  questions  fournies  par  les  organisateurs  :  1)  Qu’est 
qu’un  effet  dans  le  contexte  des  OBE?  2)  Que  sont  les  OBE  dans  un  contexte  canadien? 

3)  Quels  sont  les  liens  entre  les  OBE  et  les  operations  facilities  par  reseaux,  la  guerre 
reseaucentrique  et  l’art  operationnel?  4)  De  quelle  maniere  les  OBE  pourraient-elles 
toucher  l’emploi  futur  d’une  force?  5)  De  quelle  maniere  les  OBE  toucheraient-elles  le 
developpement  futur  des  forces?  6)  De  quelle  maniere  les  OBE  toucheraient-elles  la  mise 
sur  pied  future  d’une  force? 

Les  contributions  dans  les  quatrieme  et  cinquieme  parties  du  present  document  qui 
evaluent  les  approches  basees  sur  les  effets  ont  ete  redigees  apres  1’ atelier  et  sont  done 
presentees  apres  les  procedures  de  l’atelier.  La  quatrieme  section  de  ce  volume  presente 
trois  evaluations  des  OBE  effectuees  de  points  de  vue  differents.  Le  premier  essai  a  ete 
redige  par  le  Capitaine  de  fregate  Ken  Hansen,  qui  fait  partie  du  corps  professoral  du 
centre  d’etudes  des  politiques  etrangeres  a  l’Universite  Dalhousie,  et  porte  sur 
rimportance  des  OBE  pour  les  forces  maritimes.  L’auteur  indique  que  le  contexte 
historique  de  la  marine  et  les  theories  de  la  guerre  maritime  laissent  entendre  que  le 
recours  a  une  approche  basee  sur  les  OBE  pour  la  conceptualisation,  la  planification  et  la 
conduite  d’ operations  maritimes  serait  imprudent.  Le  deuxieme  essai  dans  cette  section, 
par  le  Lcol  Colin  Magee,  president  du  departement  de  la  planification  et  des  operations 
militaires  au  College  des  Forces  canadiennes  (CFC),  a  ete  redige  apres  l’atelier.  L’auteur 
y  avance  qu’en  raison  du  manque  de  precision  dans  la  tenninologie  des  OBE,  les 
concepts  actuels  de  la  doctrine  interarmees  ne  doivent  pas  etre  completement  remplaces 
par  les  concepts  et  methodologies  des  OBE  pour  la  planification  et  la  conduite  des 
operations.  Le  dernier  essai  dans  cette  section,  du  Lieutenant-colonel  Craig  Dalton, 
planificateur  international  de  l’etat-major  interarmees  strategique  au  Quartier  general  de 
la  Defense  nationale  (QGDN),  examine  si  l’application  de  l’approche  basee  sur  les  effets 
peut  accroitre  la  pratique  de  l’art  strategique.  L’auteur  conclut  que  l’approche  basee  sur 
les  effets  n’accroit  pas  la  pratique  de  l’art  strategique  parce  qu’elle  n’offre  aucune 
amelioration  par  rapport  aux  methodes  existantes. 

Dans  la  cinquieme  section  du  document,  on  evalue  le  caractere  approprie  des  OBE  pour 
l’application  pratique.  Dans  le  premier  essai  de  la  section,  on  fournit  des  observations  de 
Robert  Vokac,  ancien  instructeur  au  CFC  et  diplome  de  la  School  of  Advanced  Military 
Studies  de  l’armee  americaine,  sur  les  operations  basees  sur  les  effets  telles  qu’elles  sont 
utilisees  dans  le  cadre  des  exercices  et  des  simulations  de  la  Force  terrestre  du  Canada. 
L’auteur  conclut  que  meme  si  une  approche  des  operations  basees  sur  les  effets  est 
conforme  a  la  pratique  existante,  elle  n’a  pas  encore  ete  exposee  dans  la  doctrine 
officielle.  L’ebauche  d’une  doctrine  des  Forces  canadiennes  qui  comprend  l’approche 
basee  sur  les  effets  dans  l’application  de  la  puissance  de  combat  se  trouve  a  l’annexe  B 
du  present  volume.  Cette  doctrine  provisoire  presente  les  points  de  vue  de  l’Annee  de 
terre  sur  la  maniere  dont  les  concepts  bases  sur  les  effets  doivent  etre  appliques  aux 
operations.  Enfin,  Vokac  indique  que,  compte  tenu  de  la  complexity  grandissante  de  la 


viii 


planification,  les  exigences  en  matiere  de  connaissances  pour  les  professionnels  militaires 
n’ont  jamais  ete  aussi  grandes.  Le  deuxieme  essai  dans  cette  section,  par  le  Colonel 
Randy  Wakelam,  directeur  du  programme  de  cours  au  CFC,  examine  l’endroit  ou  l’etude 
des  operations  basees  sur  les  effets  peut  etre  situee  dans  le  continuum  de  l’instruction 
militaire  professionnelle  et  les  options  les  plus  efficaces  pour  1’ instruction  militaire 
professionnelle.  La  demiere  partie  de  cette  section  comprend  un  essai  de  Robert 
Grossman-Vermaas  qui  se  penche  sur  le  concept  base  sur  les  effets  dans  un  contexte 
multinational  et  interinstitutionnel.  L’auteur  conclut  que  tous  les  partenaires  qui 
participent  a  une  campagne,  militaires  et  civils,  doivent  participer  directement  aux  etapes 
de  planification  operationnelle  et  d’execution  d’un  effort  de  la  coalition  pour  que  l’on 
puisse  coordonner  les  capacites  utilisees  et  les  efforts  deployes  en  vue  d’apporter  de  la 
stabilite,  de  contribuer  au  developpement  et  de  resoudre  le  conflit. 

La  conclusion  se  trouve  dans  la  sixieme  partie,  et  les  annexes  dans  la  septieme  partie 
fournissent  une  bibliographic  commentee  de  James  McKay,  la  doctrine  provisoire  de 
l’Armee  de  terre  susmentionnee,  une  liste  d’abreviations  et  une  liste  des  personnes  qui 
ont  contributes  au  present  document. 


IX 


Table  of  Contents 


Abstract . ii 

Resume . iv 

Executive  Summary . v 

Sommaire . vii 

Table  of  Contents . x 

Part  I  -  Introductory  Material . 1 

Chapter  1  -  Introduction . 2 

Allan  English  and  Howard  Coombs 

Part  II  -  Origins,  Concepts  and  Context . 5 

Chapter  2  -  Effects-Based  Operations:  An  Evolving  Revolution . 6 

Colonel  Jim  Cottingham 


Chapter  3  -  Future  Perfect:  Effects  Based  Operations,  Complexity  and  the  Human 


Environment . 62 

Robert  Grossman- Vermaas 

Part  III  -  Canadian  Perspectives  from  the  EBO  Workshop . 81 


Chapter  4  -  Summary  of  Conclusions  from  the  Effects  Based  Operations  Workshop  ....82 


Howard  Coombs  and  Allan  English 

Part  IV  -  Assessing  Effects-Based  Approaches . 90 

Chapter  5  -  The  History  and  Theory  of  Naval  Effects-Based  Operations . 91 

Commander  Ken  Hansen 

Chapter  6  -  “Don’t  Drink  the  Kool  Aid” . 99 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Cohn  Magee 

Chapter  7  -  “Putting  Lipstick  on  a  Pig” . 106 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Craig  Dalton 

Part  V  -  Applying  Effects-Based  Approaches . 114 

Chapter  8  -  The  Canadian  Land  Force  and  Effects  Based  Operations . 115 

Bob  Vokac 

Chapter  9  -  Effects-Based  Military  Education . 120 

Colonel  Randy  Wakelam 


x 


Chapter  10  -  “A  Bridge  Too  Far?”:  The  Theory  and  Practice  of  the  Effects-Based 

Concept  and  the  Multinational  Inter-Agency  Role . 126 

Robert  Grossman- Vermaas 

Part  VI  -  Concluding  Material . 147 

Chapter  1 1  -  Concluding  Remarks  from  the  Editors . 148 

Allan  English  and  Howard  Coombs 

Part  VII  -  Annexes . 158 

Annex  A  -  Annotated  Bibliography . 159 

James  McKay 

Annex  B  -  Land  Force  Doctrine  and  Training  System  Directorate  of  Army 
Doctrine  Conduct  of  Land  Operations  -  Operational  Level  Doctrine  for  the 
Canadian  Army  (B-GL-300-001/FP-000)  “Chapter  5  -  Application  of  Combat 
Power  "DRAFT . . . Ill 

Annex  C  -  Abbreviations . 237 

Annex  D  -  Contributors . 240 


xi 


PART  I  -  INTRODUCTORY  MATERIAL 


1 


Chapter  1 

Introduction 

Allan  English  and  Howard  Coombs 


There  are  currently  three  major  theoretical  approaches  that  dominate  analyses  and 
descriptions  of  military  operations.  They  are  Operational  Art,  Network  Centric  Warfare 
(NCW)  (or  Network  Enabled  Operations  (NEOps)  in  the  Canadian  context),  and  Effects 
Based  Operations  (EBO).  The  concept  of  EBO  is  currently  having  a  significant  influence 
on  Operational  Art  and  NCW,  as  well  as  how  operations  are  conceptualized  in  the  new 
security  environment.  However,  there  are  many  variants  of  EBO  and  each  alternative  has 
been  shaped  by  national  and  organizational  cultures. 1  Some  aspects  of  Canadian 
approaches  to  EBO  have  been  published,2  but  no  comprehensive  or  integrated  Canadian 
approach  to  EBO  has  yet  been  documented.  Given  the  importance  of  EBO  in  current 
operations  and  in  CF  transformation  initiatives,  it  is  essential  that  we  have  a  clearer 
picture  of  what  this  concept  means  in  a  Canadian  context. 

The  concept  of  EBO  is  emerging  through  discussions  and  papers  within  Defence 
Research  and  Development  Canada  (DRDC)  jointly  with  other  stakeholders  in  the 
Department  of  National  Defence  (DND);  however,  there  are  many  ways  of  describing 
EBO  in  the  literature  and  in  practice.  In  order  to  fully  understand  the  nature  of  EBO 
today  and  how  it  might  evolve  in  the  future,  it  is  essential  to  understand  the  theoretical 
and  historical  origins  of  this  subject,  as  well  as  how  EBO  is  conceptualized  and  practiced 
by  the  CF.  Since  there  has  been  no  comprehensive  examination  of  these  concepts  in  a 
Canadian  context,  the  Command  Effectiveness  and  Behaviour  Section  at  DRDC  Toronto 
co-sponsored  with  the  Canadian  Forces  Aerospace  Warfare  Centre  (CFAWC)  a  two-day 
workshop  to  identify  the  issues  related  to  EBO  and  to  begin  to  establish  the  agenda  for 
better  understanding  EBO.  This  book  is  the  product  of  that  workshop  and  it  includes  not 
only  the  main  conclusions  of  the  workshop,  but  also  essays  on  EBO  by  workshop 
participants,  and  others.  Tenns  related  to  EBO  have  a  variety  of  meanings  and  are 
understood  in  a  number  of  ways.  No  attempt  is  made  here  to  reconcile  these  differences, 
but  presents  the  differences  so  that  readers  can  get  a  better  idea  of  how  effects-based 
tenninology  is  currently  being  used  by  Canadians. 

The  second  part  of  this  book,  following  the  introduction  in  part  one,  consists  of  two 
essays  which  examine  the  origins  of  EBO,  the  context  in  which  effects-based  approaches 
exist,  and  the  meaning  of  some  concepts  related  to  EBO.  The  first  essay  is  an  analysis  of 
the  origins  and  evolution  of  EBO  by  Colonel  J.F.  Cottingham,  the  Commandant  of  the 
CFAWC.  He  argues  that  there  are  currently  two  principal  versions  of  EBO,  one  of  which 
can  be  viewed  as  revolutionary  while  the  other  cannot.  The  next  essay  is  a  monograph  by 
Canadian  defence  scientist  Robert  Grossman- Vermaas  on  the  Effects  Based  Approach  as 
an  alternative  means  to  pursue  foreign  and  defence  policy  objectives. 


2 


The  third  section  of  this  book  presents  a  summary  of  the  views  of  the  workshop 
participants  on  various  aspects  of  EBO  as  expressed  in  syndicate  and  plenary  discussions 
and  as  documented  by  syndicate  facilitators  and  recorders.  The  workshop  discussion  was 
based  on  six  questions  provided  by  the  organizers:  1)  what  is  an  “effect”  in  the  context  of 
EBO?  2)  what  is  EBO  in  a  Canadian  context?  3)  what  are  the  linkages  between  EBO  and 
Networked  Enabled  Operations,  Network  Centric  Warfare,  and  Operational  Art?  4)  how 
might  EBO  affect  future  force  employment?  5)  how  might  EBO  affect  future  force 
development?  6)  how  might  EBO  affect  future  force  generation? 

The  contributions  in  parts  four  and  five  of  this  book  that  assess  effects  based  approaches 
were  written  after  the  workshop,  and  are,  therefore,  presented  after  the  workshop 
proceedings.  The  fourth  section  of  this  volume  presents  three  assessments  of  EBO  from 
different  perspectives.  The  first  essay  here  by  Commander  Ken  Hansen,  who  is  on  the 
faculty  of  the  Centre  for  Foreign  Policy  Studies  at  Dalhousie  University,  discusses  the 
relevance  of  EBO  to  navies.  He  argues  that  naval  historical  context  and  theories  of  naval 
warfare  suggest  that  an  EBO-based  approach  to  the  conceptualization,  planning,  and 
conduct  of  naval  operations,  would  be  unwise.  The  second  essay  in  this  section  by  LCol 
Colin  Magee,  Chair  of  the  Department  of  Military  Planning  and  Operations  at  the 
Canadian  Forces  College  (CFC),  was  written  after  the  workshop.  In  it  he  argues  that, 
because  of  the  lack  of  precision  in  EBO  tenninology,  current  joint  doctrine  constructs 
should  not  be  wholly  supplanted  by  EBO  concepts  and  methodologies  for  the  planning 
and  conduct  of  operations.  The  final  essay  in  this  section,  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Craig 
Dalton,  an  international  planner  on  the  Strategic  Joint  Staff  at  National  Defence 
Headquarters  (NDHQ),  considers  whether  or  not  application  of  the  effects-based 
approach  could  enhance  the  practice  of  strategic  art.  He  concludes  that  the  effects-based 
approach  does  not  enhance  the  practice  of  strategic  art  because  it  offers  no  improvement 
over  existing  methods. 

The  fifth  section  of  this  book  assesses  the  suitability  of  EBO  for  application  in  practice. 

In  the  first  essay  in  this  section  provides  observations  by  Robert  Vokac,  a  former 
instructor  at  CFC  and  a  graduate  of  the  US  Army’s  School  of  Advanced  Military  Studies, 
on  effects  based  operations  as  used  in  Canadian  Land  Force  exercises  and  simulations. 

He  concludes  that  while  an  effects-based  approach  to  operations  is  consistent  with 
existing  practice,  it  has  not  yet  been  articulated  in  formal  doctrine.  Draft  Canadian  Army 
doctrine  that  incorporates  the  effects-based  approach  in  the  application  of  combat  power 
is  included  at  Annex  B  to  this  volume.  This  draft  doctrine  presents  the  Army’s  views  on 
how  effects-based  concepts  should  be  applied  in  its  operations.  Finally,  Vokac  observes 
that,  given  the  increasing  complexity  of  planning,  knowledge  requirements  for  military 
professionals  are  greater  than  ever.  The  second  essay  in  this  section,  by  Colonel  Randy 
Wakelam,  Director  of  Curriculum  at  CFC,  examines  where  the  study  of  effects  based 
operations  could  best  be  situated  within  the  continuum  of  Professional  Military  Education 
and  the  most  effective  options  for  professional  military  education.  The  final  part  of  this 
section  is  an  essay  by  Robert  Grossman- Vermaas  which  explores  the  effects-based 
concept  within  a  multinational  and  inter-agency  context.  He  concludes  that  all  those  who 
are  partners  in  a  campaign,  military  and  civilian,  should  be  directly  involved  in  the 


3 


operational  planning  and  execution  stages  of  a  coalition  effort  so  that  capabilities  and 
efforts  towards  stability,  development  and  resolution  of  the  conflict  can  be  co-ordinated. 

Concluding  material  is  in  section  six  and  the  Annexes  in  section  seven  provide  an 
Annotated  Bibliography  by  James  McKay,  the  draft  Army  doctrine  described  above,  a  list 
of  abbreviations  and  a  list  of  contributors  to  this  volume. 


1  See  Allan  English,  Richard  Gimblett,  and  Howard  Coombs,  “Beware  of  Putting  the  Cart  before  the  Horse: 
Network  Enabled  Operations  as  a  Canadian  Approach  to  Transformation,”  DRDC  Toronto,  Contract 
Report  CR  2005-212  (19  July  2005)  for  a  detailed  discussion  of  these  issues.  Available  at  http://pubs.drdc- 
rddc.gc.ca/inbasket/CEBsupport. 050720  0917.CR%202005-212.pdf.  Accessed  6  Sep  2007. 

2  See  for  example  C.R.  Kilford,  “On  21st  Century  Operational  Art”,  James  Simms,  “Keeping  the 
Operational  Art  Relevant  for  Canada:  A  Functional  Approach”,  Craig  King,  “Effects  Based  Operations: 
Buzzword  or  Blueprint?”,  Pierre  Lessard,  “Reuniting  Strategy  with  Policy,”  in  Allan  English,  et  ah,  eds., 
The  Operational  Art:  Canadian  Perspectives  -  Context  and  Concepts  (Kingston,  ON :  Canadian  Defence 
Academy  Press,  2005),  and  Howard  Coombs  and  Rick  Hillier,  “Command  and  Control  During  Peace 
Support  Operations:  Creating  Common  Intent  in  Afghanistan,”  in  Allan  English,  ed.,  The  Operational  Art: 
Canadian  Perspectives  -  Leadership  and  Command  (Kingston,  ON:  Canadian  Defence  Academy  Press, 
2006). 


4 


PART  II  -  ORIGINS,  CONCEPTS  AND  CONTEXT 


5 


Chapter  2 

Effects-Based  Operations:  An  Evolving  Revolution1 

Colonel  J.F.  Cottingham 


Military  revolutions  have  taken  place  throughout  history,  and  one  of  the 
greatest  may  be  underway  now.  They  involve  major  changes  in  the  conduct 
of  war  and  in  military  organization  and  administration,  both  reflecting  and 
further  influencing  wider  technological,  political,  administrative,  and  social 
change. 


2 

Christopher  Bellamy" 


INTRODUCTION 

While  it  may  be  said  that  change  is  constant,  revolutionary  change  is  not.  Indeed,  while 
military  revolutions  that  meet  the  criteria  of  the  Bellamy’s  definition  (above)  have  taken 
place  in  the  past,  they  have  been  rare.  Some  examples  of  military  revolutions  are  the 
introduction  of  the  chariot  and  heavy  cavalry,  the  adoption  of  firearms,  the  emergence  of 

3 

standing  annies  in  Europe,  and  the  advent  of  nuclear  weapons. 

Since  the  1980s,  many  have  claimed  that  we  are  in  the  midst  of  another  military 
revolution.  In  1981,  futurist  Alvin  Toffler  advanced  the  thesis  that  there  had  been  only 
two  military  revolutions  to  that  date  (the  agricultural  and  the  industrial)  and  that  the 
world’s  militaries  were  about  to  embark  on  a  “third  wave”  of  revolution  with  the  dawning 
of  the  information  age.4  In  1984,  Soviet  military  professional  journals  noted  that  the 
rapid  development  and  advancement  of  new  non-nuclear  technologies  was  “engendering 
a  new  military-technical  revolution  in  military  affairs.”5  In  the  aftermath  of  the  1991 
Persian  Gulf  War,  many  commentators  declared  that  the  US  military  was  also 
experiencing  a  military-technical  revolution  and,  by  the  mid-1990s,  the  term  “revolution 
in  military  affairs”  or  RMA  had  been  coined.  The  existence  of  the  RMA  was  accepted  in 
American  official  circles  and  became  a  matter  of  policy  when,  in  1997,  the  US 
Department  of  Defense  (DoD),  in  its  Quadrennial  Defense  Review  (QDR),  announced 
that  it  had  been  “involved  in  a  concerted  effort  to  ‘transform’  the  US  military”  based  on 
four  main  objectives: 

•  “To  achieve  the  operational  goals  outlined  in  Joint  Vision  2010  (JV2010) 
(dominant  maneuver,  precision  engagement,  full-dimensional  protection,  focussed 
logistics) 

•  To  bring  about  the  cost  savings  necessary  to  pay  for  force  modernization 

•  To  achieve  a  new,  affordable  force  structure  that  can  be  maintained  in  the  future 


6 


•  To  take  advantage  of  the  revolution  in  military  affairs  currently  ongoing  -  the 
‘RMA.’”6 

To  the  US  defence  establishment,  the  RMA  was  not  just  about  the  introduction  of  new 
technologies.  The  importance  of  the  RMA  instead  rested  with  the  changes  that  resulted 
from  adoption  of  a  new  technology.  As  Jeffery  Barnett  noted  in  his  1996  assessment  of 
probable  future  aerospace  campaigns,  “RMAs  occur  only  when  militaries  fundamentally 
change  their  concepts  of  operations  (CONOPS)  and  their  organizational  structures  to  best 
employ  radical  new  technologies.  RMAs  are  underwritten  by  technology  but  realized 
through  doctrinal  change.”7  Accordingly,  the  US  DoD’s  highly  influential  internal  think 
tank,  the  Office  of  Net  Assessment,  defined  RMA  as  follows: 

A  Revolution  in  Military  Affairs  (RMA)  is  a  major  change  in  the  nature  of 
warfare  brought  about  by  the  innovative  application  of  new  technologies 
which,  combined  with  dramatic  changes  in  military  doctrine  and  operational 
and  organisational  concepts,  fundamentally  alters  the  character  and  conduct 
of  military  operations.8 

Following  the  1997  QDR,  and  especially  after  Donald  Rumsfeld  was  installed  as 
Secretary  of  Defense  in  2001  in  the  George  W.  Bush  administration,  considerable  effort 
was  expended  to  explore  and  exploit  the  so-called  RMA  to  transform  the  US  military.9 
Other  nations  soon  followed  with  their  own  programs. 10 

One  of  the  results  of  this  effort  was  the  creation  of  a  concept  that  has  come  to  be  known 
as  effects-based  operations  or,  more  commonly,  EBO.  In  retrospect,  the  tenn  EBO 
seemed  to  pop  up  out  of  nowhere.  In  the  late  1990s,  a  few  articles  were  published  in  US 
military  professional  journals  that  used  the  term  “effects”  or  “effects-based,”  but  no 
comprehensive  treatment  of  EBO  as  a  concept  existed.  However,  by  2000,  EBO  was 
included  as  a  subject  of  study  in  the  curriculum  of  the  US  Air  Force  Air  Command  and 
Staff  College  (ACSC). 1 1  In  the  following  year,  Maris  MCrabb  wrote  “effects-based 
operations  seem  to  be  on  everyone’s  lips  these  days,”  as  a  flood  of  books,  articles  and 
study  reports  appeared  on  the  subject. 13  The  tenn  then  began  to  appear  in  US  Air  Force, 
US  Navy  and  US  Army  transformation  plans14  as  well  as  in  US  Air  Force  and  joint 
doctrine  publications.15  Not  surprisingly,  references  to  EBO  then  began  to  appear  in 
doctrinal  publications  and  policy  statements  of  major  US  allies  such  as  the  UK16  and 

Australia.17  By  2004,  even  the  Canadian  Forces  seemed  “poised  to  adopt  Effects  Based 

1 8 

Operations  (EBO)  as  its  modus  operandi  for  future  defence  and  security  operations.” 
Thus,  it  would  appear  that,  in  the  words  of  RAND’s  Paul  Davis,  “it  is  undeniable  that  an 
EBO  movement  is  well  underway  and  is  influential.”19 

The  central  thesis  of  EBO  is  best  captured  in  the  following  quote: 

In  the  . . .  effects-based  contest,  the  objective  is  to  break  the  will  or  otherwise 
shape  the  behaviour  of  the  enemy  so  that  he  no  longer  retains  the  will  to 
fight,  or  to  so  disorient  him  that  he  can  no  longer  fight  or  react  coherently. 
Although  physical  destruction  remains  a  factor  in  EBO,  it  is  the  creation  of 


7 


such  a  psychological  or  cogitative  effect  that  is  the  primary  focus  of  the 
effects-based  approach.20 

A  number  of  commentators  recognize  that  ideas  similar  to  the  statement  above  have 
appeared  before  in  the  warfare  theory  and  history  literature;  therefore,  they  assert  that 
EBO  is  therefore  merely  repackaging  of  an  old  idea.  Others,  however,  contend  that  EBO 
is  a  fundamental  and  revolutionary  change  in  the  nature  of  war.  The  purpose  of  this 
essay  to  contribute  to  this  debate  by  offering  a  thesis  that  both  characterizations  of  EBO 
are  correct  because  there  are  two  versions  of  EBO,  one  of  which  can  be  viewed  as 
revolutionary  while  the  other  cannot  -  at  least  so  far.  The  first  version,  which  operates  in 
what  Edward  Mann  describes  as  a  conquest  paradigm,”  has  mated  new  technologies  to 
an  old  idea  to  produce  what  can  be  argued  is  a  revolutionary  change  in  war  fighting.  The 
second  version  operates  within  a  broader  context  than  war  fighting,  and,  while  this 
second  version  of  EBO  development  has  the  potential  to  be  revolutionary,  it  awaits  the 
introduction  of  technologies  and  tools  that  will  make  it  practical.  Thus,  it  does  not  yet 
qualify  as  an  RMA. 

This  essay  is  divided  into  three  sections.  In  the  first,  the  discussion  will  outline  the 
development  of  the  central  idea  that  generated  EBO  -  that  being  primarily  the  evolution 
of  US  thinking  on  airpower  theory  -  in  order  to  establish  the  intellectual  foundations 
from  which  EBO  sprang.  Next,  the  essay  will  trace  the  development  of  the  first  version 
of  EBO  development  into  what  has  become  a  relatively  mature  and  widely  accepted 
concept  for  war  winning.  Finally,  the  essay  will  demonstrate  that  a  second  version  of 
EBO  development,  aimed  at  a  broader  range  of  applications  using  all  instruments  of 
national  power,  has  emerged  and  is  progressing  toward  maturity  as  a  concept. 

SETTING  THE  SCENE  -  THE  UNDERLYING  THEORY 

The  EBO  movement  and  the  passion  of  its  advocates  stem  from  wartime 
experiences  of  young  US  Air  Force  officers  who  were  appalled  by  the 
frequently  mindless  and  ineffective  use  of  airpower  in  Vietnam.  When  their 
turn  to  lead  came,  they  were  determined  to  do  better.  The  Gulf  War  was 
their  first  great  opportunity  and,  in  fact,  joint  fires  (not  just  Air  Force  fires) 
were  applied  with  decisive  effectiveness  as  the  result  of  sound  thinking 
about  affecting  systems,  not  just  servicing  targets.  Operations  were 
dramatically  different  from  anything  previously  seen.  At  that  moment  in 
history,  a  great  many  concepts  and  capabilities  came  together  after  years  of 
evolution.”” 

In  order  to  understand  EBO,  it  is  first  necessary  to  understand  its  origins.  The  young  air 
force  officers  who  first  conceived  of  EBO  did  so  based  on  their  experience,  formed  from 
their  first-hand  operational  observations  and  their  professional  military  education.  In  the 
US  Air  Force  then  and  now  (and  in  other  services  and  in  other  nations)  much  of  an 
officer’s  professional  education  is  directed  to  understanding  theories  of  war  and,  in  the 
case  of  air  forces,  the  theories  affecting  the  application  of  airpower.  It  follows  then  that, 
to  understand  EBO,  it  is  necessary  to  understand  the  theoretical  baseline  from  which 


8 


EBO  thinking  emerged.  Accordingly,  this  section  will  review  the  development  of 
airpower  and  other  theory  that  would  have  influenced  the  generation  of  US  Air  Force 
officers  who  started  the  EBO  movement. 

As  Carl  Builder  observed,  in  the  United  States  airpower  was  originally  conceived  as  a 
“theory  composed  of  three  axioms: 

1 .  Air  power  can  be  employed  decisively  in  war  by  striking  at  the  heart  of  the 
enemy. 

2.  To  use  air  power  decisively,  command  of  the  air  (i.e.,  air  supremacy  or 
superiority  is  a  prerequisite). 

3.  To  gain  command  of  the  air  and  to  use  air  power  decisively  in  war,  air 
power  must  be  centrally  and  independently  controlled.”23 

The  roots  of  the  first  axiom  can  be  traced  to  the  end  of  the  19th  century.  In  parallel  to  our 
present  time,  this  was  a  time  of  technical  innovation  and  invention.  Successive  waves  of 
industrial  revolution  had  transfonned  western  societies  and  had  produced  a  general 
expectation  that  humankind  could  achieve  any  goal  through  the  application  of  science 
and  technology.  It  was  a  time  of  inquiry  and  exploration,  yet  there  were  no  new  frontiers 
on  land  left  to  conquer.  It  was  also  a  time  when  tabloid  newspapers  were  becoming 
popular  with  increasingly  enfranchised  electorates  who  were  experiencing  a  wave  of 
nationalistic  sentiment.  24  Thus,  both  the  means  and  the  opportunity  was  provided  for  the 
promise  and  then  the  reality  of  powered  flight  to  capture  the  imagination  of  an  informed 
and  influential  public  who  accordingly  demanded  that  their  governments  and  their 
military  forces  embrace  and  foster  aviation  development  for  the  sake  of  national  pride. 

Not  surprisingly,  the  popular  sentiment  that  embraced  aviation  also  revived  an  age-old 
idea  of  waging  war  from  the  air.  '  Perhaps  the  most  conspicuous  example  of  the 
popularization  of  this  idea  and  the  degree  to  which  an  apocalyptic  vision  of  air  warfare 
could  be  readily  accepted  by  the  public  was  H.G.  Wells’  The  War  in  the  Air  (1908),  a 
novel  that  depicted  the  destruction  of  civilisation  as  the  result  of  great  air  battles. 
Moreover,  it  was  not  just  the  common  citizenry  that  accepted  the  inevitability  of 
devastating  air  bombardment;  diplomats  and  politicians  seemed  to  have  accepted  the  idea 
well  before  publication  of  The  War  in  the  Air.  In  1899,  before  the  first  flight  of  a 
Zeppelin  airship  and  nearly  five  years  before  the  Wright  brothers’  first  flight  at  Kitty 
Hawk,  the  delegates  to  the  Hague  Conference  agreed  to  ban  air  bombardment  for  five 
years  in  a  de  facto  recognition  that  air  bombardment  would  need  to  be  regulated  by  the 
laws  of  war  but  that  it  could  not  be  prohibited  outright  because  it  might  “decrease  the 
length  of  combat  and  consequently  the  evils  of  war  as  well  as  the  expenses  entailed 
thereby.”-  Further  deliberations  resulted  in  “[Ajnnexes  to  the  Second  Hague  convention 
of  1908  [that]  explicitly  prohibited  air  attacks  on  towns,  villages,  houses,  churches, 
hospitals  and  the  like,  even  though  the  capability  to  do  so  scarcely  existed.”28 

However,  the  first  bombing  mission  by  powered  aircraft  was  not  flown  until  191 1,  by  the 
Italian  Army  over  Tripoli  against  the  Turkish  Army;  therefore,  it  was  not  the  substance 


9 


9Q 

but  “the  idea  of  airpower  ...which  was  so  compelling.”  The  small  group  of  Italian 
aviators  started  their  bombing  experiments  with  the  pilot  tossing  hand  grenades  and 
eventually  they  devised  a  bomb  rack  capable  of  carrying  10  bombs  that  could  be  released 
singly  or  in  10  bomb  salvoes.  “The  effect  (of  the  Italian  bombing)  was  probably  greater 
on  the  press  than  on  the  Turks.  Immediately,  the  moral-humanitarian  issue  was  raised. 
The  Turks  claimed  that  a  hospital  had  been  hit,  though  the  bombs  used  were  basically 
hand  grenades  lobbed  from  a  somewhat  abnormal  distance.”30  This  first  use  of  aerial 
bombardment  was  widely  covered  in  the  press  and  was  noticed  by  France,  Germany  and 
Britain.  The  press  coverage  of  the  bombing  seemed  to  reinforce  the  notion  that  attack 
from  the  air  was  particularly  devastating  and  that  the  aircraft  were  already  sufficiently 
developed  to  pose  a  serious  threat. 

When  the  First  World  War  began  three  years  later,  the  British  public  believed  that  air 
attacks  would  immediately  commence.  Indeed,  there  had  been  several  Zeppelin  scares  in 
Britain  beginning  in  1912,  but  when  war  broke  out  “Zeppelinitis”  gripped  the  citizens  of 
London.  Kenneth  Poohnan  aptly  describes  the  attitude  at  the  time: 

Londoners  watched  the  sky  uneasily,  lay  awake  at  night  waiting  for  the 
new  terror  of  twentieth-century  war  to  come,  snarling  and  roaring 
overhead.  ‘Zepp’  was  an  altogether  new  shape  of  fear  in  British  hearts. 

There  had  been  no  threat  like  it  since  Napoleon’s  invasion  barges,  and 
then  there  had  been  the  Navy  for  protection,  and  the  Militia  if  ‘Boney’  had 
landed.  Now... what  was  there  to  prevent  these  monsters  from  scorching 

32 

London  with  their  breath  of  fire? 

The  “Zepps”  did  not  appear  because  the  German  Navy’s  airship  division  ( Marine - 
Luftshiffe)  did  not  have  the  means  to  engage  in  strategic  bombing  in  the  earliest  stages  of 
the  war.  However,  the  advocacy  of  the  naval  staff  for  a  strategic  bombing  role  during  the 
initial  German  attack  in  the  west  indicates  that  they  believed  that  a  strategic  attack  at  the 
heart  of  Britain  would  create  physical  and  psychological  effects  that  might  break  British 
will  to  continue  the  war. 

The  fleet  commander  who  controlled  the  Marine-Luftshiffe,  in  a  20  August  1914  letter  to 
the  Chief  of  Naval  Staff,  Admiral  Behncke,  argued  for  a  strategic  bombing  campaign 
with  London  as  the  primary  target  because  of  its  docks  and  because  it  was  the  location  of 
the  Admiralty,  the  “nerve-centre”  of  the  Royal  Navy.  He  wrote: 

The  bombing  attacks  ‘may  be  expected,  whether  they  involve  London  or 
the  neighbourhood  of  London,  to  cause  panic  in  the  population  which  may 
possibly  render  it  doubtful  that  the  war  can  be  continued.  ...  In  general,  air 
attacks  with  airplanes  and  airships  from  the  Belgian  and  French  coasts, 
particularly  with  airships,  promise  considerable  material  and  moral  results. 

They  must,  therefore,  be  considered  an  effective  means  of  damaging 
England.  ’ 33 

Accordingly,  the  fall  of  1914  saw  the  production  of  the  first  joint  air  campaign  plan  in 
history.  The  army  and  navy  staffs  collaborated  to  conduct  a  target  analysis  and  to 


10 


produce  what  today  would  be  called  a  “master  air  attack  plan.”  As  Ernst  Lehmann,  one 
of  the  army’s  airship  captains  recalled  after  the  war,  the  intent  of  the  plan  was  bring 
Britain  to  her  knees  by  attacking  her  strategic  war  making  capability,  her  economy  and 
the  morale  of  the  British  people.  The  targets  “lay  scattered  throughout  England  -  docks, 
arsenals,  munitions  factories,  warehouses,  railway  yards,  and  not  least  in  importance,  the 
Bank  of  England.  ...  If  it  (the  Bank)  could  be  destroyed  England’s  entire  monetary 
system  might  be  thrown  into  confusion,  and  that  would  be  one  way  of  paralyzing  the 
auxiliary  industries  in  a  war  of  this  magnitude.”34  The  German  staffs  who  prepared  the 
plan  were  well  aware  of  the  British  press  reports  of  various  Zeppelin  scares  and  reasoned 
that,  if  imaginary  airships  produced  such  reactions  then  real  Zeppelins  dropping  real 
bombs  would  surely  produce  mass  panic.  As  Admiral  Behncke  concluded  in  one  of  his 
communications,  “we  dare  not  leave  untried  any  means  of  forcing  England  to  her  knees, 
and  successful  air  attacks  on  London,  considering  the  well-known  nervousness  of  the 

35 

public,  will  be  a  valuable  measure.” 

As  it  turned  out,  the  Zeppelin  bombing  campaign  was  a  failure.  The  defending  British 
Royal  Flying  Corps  (RFC)  and  the  Royal  Naval  Air  Service  (RNAS)  soon  learned  that 
the  slow,  hydrogen-fdled  airships  were  highly  susceptible  to  fire  damage  and  quickly 
adopted  the  use  of  incendiary  bullets.  The  resulting  combat  losses  in  the  Marine- 
Luftshiffe  were  not  sustainable  and,  in  proportion,  exceeded  those  of  the  submarine 
service.36  However,  by  1917,  the  Gennans  Army  Air  Service  had  developed  the  Gotha 
G-4  and  the  Staaken  R-6  “Giant”  bombers,  capable  of  delivering  bomb  loads  of  1000  lbs 
and  2000  lbs  respectively  and,  beginning  in  May  1917,  formations  of  20  or  more  bombers 
were  launched  in  daylight  raids  against  England/ 

On  13  June,  a  formation  of  18  Gothas  attacked  London,  killing  574  people.  Ninety-two 
aircraft  from  home  defence  squadrons,  training  units  and  the  RNAS  responded  to  the 
attack  but  no  Gothas  were  shot  down.  A  similar  attack  on  7  July  resulted  in  250 
Londoners  killed  with  the  loss  of  only  1  Gotha  to  British  fighters.  “The  bombing  of 
London  in  broad  daylight  on  13  June  and  7  July  caused  intense  excitement,  almost 
amounting  to  hysteria,  in  governmental  and  official  circles.”38  Panicked  Londoners  were 
reported  to  have  assaulted  “Royal  Flying  Corps  officers  in  the  street  for  alleged  failures 
to  do  their  duty.”39 

These  events  were  certainly  not  lost  on  the  US  Air  Service  officers  serving  in  France. 

One  of  these  men  was  Lieutenant-Colonel  Edgar  Gorrell,  the  head  of  “Strategical 
Aviation,  Zone  of  Advance,  US  Air  Service.”  During  his  tenure  in  this  position,  Gorrell 
came  to  be  an  advocate  for  the  US  acquisition  of  a  force  of  between  3000  and  6000 
bombers  to  be  used  in  a  night  bombing  campaign  against  Germany,  and  it  is  clear  from 
the  historical  record  that  Italian  and  British  thinking  on  the  subject  influenced  him. 

Gorrell  actively  corresponded  with  the  Italian  aircraft  manufacturer  Caproni  on  this  topic 
and  sometime  in  October  1917  “Caproni  collaborated  with  his  friend  Captain  Guilio 
Dohet40  in  the  preparation  of  a  “Memorandum  on  the  Air  War  for  the  US  Air  Service,” 
which  urged  that  mass  attacks  made  at  night  by  long-range  Allied  bombers  against 
industrial  targets  deep  within  Gennany  and  Austria  definitely  could  overwhelm  the 
enemy  by  substantially  reducing  his  war  production  at  the  same  time  that  Allied 


11 


production  was  increasing.  That  same  month  Caproni  gave  Gorrell  a  little  book  signed 
by  Nino  Salveneschi  and  entitled  Let  Us  Kill  the  War:  Let  Us  Aim  at  the  Heart  of  the 
Enemy.  Evidently  written  by  a  journalist  to  represent  Caproni ’s  views,  this  small, 
English-text  book  was  a  further  exposition  of  the  concept  of  strategic  bombardment.”41 

Gorrell  also  collaborated  with  Major  Lord  Tiverton,  who  became  the  British  Air 
Ministry’s  expert  on  bombing  “target  selection  and  related  technical  questions.”  While 
Tiverton  was  serving  with  the  naval  section  of  the  British  Aviation  Commission  in  Paris 
in  September  1917,  he  authored  a  paper  that  laid  out  a  detailed  conceptual  plan  for  long- 
range  bombing.  His  work  identified  target  sets  aimed  at  crippling  the  German  war 
economy,  and  included  the  location  of  bomber  bases,  numbers  of  aircraft  required, 
expected  sortie  rates,  weather  considerations,  navigation  problems  and  logistical  issues.43 
He  shared  his  thoughts  and  his  paper  with  Gorrell  who  was  also  serving  in  Paris  at  the 
time.  In  November,  Gorrell  produced  a  bombing  plan  for  the  use  of  American  air  power 
for  General  Pershing,  commander  of  the  American  Expeditionary  Force  (AEF),  and  his 
incoming  head  of  the  AEF’s  Air  Service,  General  Foulois.  Gorrell’s  plan,  an  almost 
verbatim  copy  of  the  Tiverton  plan,  ironically,  “came  to  be  known  as  the  ‘Gorrell  Plan’ 
[and]  was  later  considered  paradigmatically  American:  the  ‘earliest’  and  ‘clearest’ 
statement  of  the  ‘American  conception  of  the  employment  of  airpower.’”44 

Gorrell’ s  plan  was  not  the  only  manifestation  of  evolving  American  thinking  on  the 
employment  of  air  power.  The  German  collapse  in  the  fall  of  1918  provided  additional 
food  for  thought,  as  Lee  Kennett  observed: 

Despite  all  the  sophisticated  gadgetry  of  the  war,  it  had  been  at  the  bottom  a 
contest  of  wills  and  of  endurance.  Gennany’s  defeat  offered  eloquent  proof, 
which  the  Germans  themselves  were  the  first  to  accept.  The  German  Navy 
had  scarcely  seen  action;  not  a  single  foot  of  German  territory  had  been 
invaded.  Yet,  at  the  end  of  1918,  the  whole  country  suffered  a  sort  of 
collapse  -  a  massive  disintegration  of  confidence,  of  resolve,  of  belief  in 
victory  -  which  compelled  the  German  government  to  sue  for  peace.45 

The  apparent  psychological  collapse  of  the  German  population  certainly  had  an  effect  on 
those  attempting  to  analyze  the  British  aerial  bombardment  of  Germany  in  the  initial 
period  after  the  war.  For  a  number  of  reasons,  the  British  post  war  reports  placed  great 
emphasis  on  the  “moral”  (meaning  psychological)  effect  of  bombing  on  civilian 
populations46.  Indeed,  Hugh  Trenchard,  the  first  chief  of  the  Royal  Air  Force  (RAF) 
claimed  that  “the  moral  effect  of  bombing  stands  undoubtedly  to  the  material  effect  in  a 
proportion  of  20  to  1  .”47  On  the  other  hand,  the  American  study  of  the  same  bombing 
campaign,  while  it  also  recognized  the  presence  of  a  moral  effect  on  German  populations, 
concluded  that:  “The  three  kinds  of  bombing  that  are  of  most  importance  are,  first,  that 
directed  against  war  industries;  second,  that  against  railroad  lines;  and  third,  that  against 
an  enemy's  troops  in  the  field.”48 

The  American  report  went  on  to  say: 


12 


In  considering  the  first  [bombing  war  industries]  a  careful  study  should  be 
made  of  the  different  kinds  of  industries  and  the  different  factories  of  each. 

This  study  should  ascertain  how  one  industry  is  dependent  on  another  and 
what  the  most  important  factories  of  each  are.  A  decision  should  be  reached 
as  to  just  what  factories  if  destroyed  would  do  the  greatest  damage  to  the 
enemy's  military  organization  as  a  whole.  On  these  factories  the  entire 
available  bombing  force  should  be  concentrated  until  it  is  satisfied  that  the 
factory  is  sufficiently  crippled.  Once  the  plan  of  bombardment  is  chosen  it 
should  be  held  to  religiously  and  a  choice  of  immediate  targets  affected  only 
by  weather  conditions  and  airplanes  available.  Factories  should  be  bombed 
night  and  day  successively  as  far  as  the  weather  will  pennit  until  the  desired 
results  are  thought  to  have  been  accomplished.49 

Thus,  by  the  end  of  the  war,  although  they  had  not  had  the  time  to  commence  a  bombing 
campaign  of  their  own,  Gorrell  and  other  American  airmen  in  the  AEF  had  developed  a 
conviction  that  aircraft  should  be  used  to  conduct  tactical  actions  (i.e.,  bomb  industrial 
targets)  that  would  have  a  strategic  impact  (cripple  the  war  economy  that  would  in  turn 
shorten  or  end  the  war).  Gorrell  produced  a  History  of  the  American  Expeditionary 
Forces  Air  Service,  1917-1919  that  included  a  copy  of  his  plan.50  This  document, 
together  with  a  copy  of  the  US  Bombing  Survey  Report  were  held  at  the  Air  Corps 
Tactical  School  (ACTS)  at  Maxwell  Field  after  the  war  and  were  often  quoted  in  the 
tactical  manuals  produced  by  the  School  and  in  the  lectures  delivered  by  its  staff.  In 
addition  to  American  documents,  the  ACTS  staff  also  had  ready  access  to  translated 
copies  of  extracts  of  Douhet’s  Command  of  the  Air 4  and  German  accounts  of  the  war  in 
the  air.52 

By  1926,  ACTS  instructors  had  postulated  that  the  US  could  use  bombers  to  strike  at  the 
“vital  points  of  a  nation’s  structure”  to  achieve  victory  quickly  and  at  the  least  cost.  In 
1933,  Major  Donald  Wilson  began  to  advocate  a  concept  that  called  for  the  attack  of  very 
specific  targets  that,  if  destroyed,  would  result  in  a  collapse  of  the  enemy’s  economy  and 

53 

strategic  war  making  ability. 

The  ACTS  conviction  that  modem,  industrial  societies  were  vulnerable  to  bombing  was 
later  strengthened  further  by  the  experiences  of  the  Great  Depression.  As  Malcolm  Smith 
noted: 


The  supposed  ability  of  the  bomber  to  bring  a  war  directly  to  the  home 
front,  and  to  win  the  war  there  rather  than  in  simply  military  conflict, 
made  frightening  sense  in  a  period  of  economic  dislocation,  mass 
unemployment  and  political  dissent... The  idea  that  the  bomber  would  be 
the  decisive  weapon  in  any  renewed  war  rested  on  a  depressed  faith  in  the 
future  of  advanced  industrial  society,  with  its  economic  recessions  and 
social  divisions.  If  indeed  industrial  societies  were  inherently  unstable, 
how  could  they  withstand  the  rain  of  high  explosive?  It  was  easily  argued 
that  an  attack  on  important  sectors  of  the  economy  could  bring  the  entire 
structure  crashing  down  under  the  cumulative  weight  of  its 
interdependence.  54 


13 


Additionally,  the  ACTS  staff  reasoned  that  in  order  to  attack  specific  targets  with 
efficiency  and  certainty  of  destruction,  excellent  bombing  accuracy  was  required. 
Studies  at  ACTS  found  that  night  bombing  could  not  achieve  the  required  accuracy  to 
destroy  single,  factory-sized  targets  and  the  school’s  staff  concluded  that  “precision 
targets”  could  only  be  successfully  attacked  during  daylight.  Since  the  danger  to  the 
bomber  from  anti-aircraft  fire  was  greater  during  the  day  at  lower  altitudes,  it  was 
theorized  that  US  bombers  should  attack  from  high  altitudes  in  order  to  reduce  combat 
losses.  Thus,  the  doctrine  of  the  high  altitude,  daylight  precision  bombing  evolved  from 
ACTS’s  work  in  the  early  1930s  to  the  point  where  Air  Corps  doctrine  in  1939  could  be 
summarized  as  follows: 

The  most  efficient  way  to  defeat  an  enemy  is  to  destroy,  by  means  of 
bombardment  from  the  air,  his  war-making  capacity;  the  means  to  this  end  is 
to  identify  by  scientific  analysis  those  particular  elements  of  his  war 
potential  the  elimination  of  which  will  cripple  either  his  war  machine  or  his 
will  to  continue  the  conflict;  these  elements  having  been  identified,  they 
should  be  attacked  by  large  masses  of  bombardment  aircraft  flying  in 
formation,  at  high  altitude,  in  daylight,  and  equipped  with  precision 
bombsights  that  will  make  possible  the  positive  identification  and 
destruction  of  ‘pinpoint’  targets;  finally,  such  bombing  missions  having 
been  carried  out,  the  enemy,  regardless  of  the  strength  of  his  armies  or 
navies,  will  lack  the  means  to  support  continued  military  action.55 


In  1941,  in  anticipation  of  US  entry  into  the  Second  World  War,  a  small  group  of  former 
instructors  from  ACTS  was  given  the  task  of  producing  an  overarching  air  war  plan  upon 
which  to  base  American  mobilization  for  war.56  They  were  given  little  time  for  study 
and  preparation  and,  not  surprisingly,  they  turned  to  their  experience  for  answers  and 
produced  a  plan  that  was  strongly  reminiscent  of  the  First  World  War  Gorrell  plan  and 
the  US  bombing  survey  of  1919. 57  Indeed,  the  goal  of  the  Air  War  Plans  Division’s  Plan 
No.  1  (AWPD-1)  was  “to  conduct  a  sustained  and  unremitting  Air  Offensive  against 
Germany  and  Italy  to  destroy  their  will  and  capability  to  continue  the  war  and  to  make 
invasion  either  unnecessary  or  feasible  without  excessive  cost.”  In  order  to  accomplish 
this  task,  the  planners  realized  that  they  would  need  to  determine  as  the  first  order  of 
business  “a.  Target  systems  in  Germany  whose  destruction  would  accomplish  the 
objective,  and  to  establish  them  in  order  of  desirability. . .  [and]  b.  Targets  within  target 
systems,  and  estimate  the  effect  of  target  destruction  in  terms  of  contribution  toward  the 
objective.”59 

The  planning  team  determined  that  before  anything  else  could  be  done,  it  would  first  be 
necessary  to  defeat  the  German  Luftwaffe  and  accordingly  identified  this  task  as  “an 
overriding  immediate  objective.”  Their  next  priorities  for  attack  were  electric  power,  the 
transportations  system,  petroleum  production  and  distribution,  and  morale,  in  that  order. 

AWPD- 1  was  later  updated  and  became  known  as  AWPD-42  (for  the  year  of  its 
promulgation  -  1942).  Once  the  US  had  entered  the  war,  however,  it  was  realized  that,  in 


14 


the  interests  of  unity  of  allied  effort,  the  US  bombing  plan  would  need  to  be  co-ordinated 
with  the  RAF’s  bombing  campaign  that  was  already  underway. 


The  result  was  the  Combined  Bomber  Offensive,  which  received  its  formal  political 
direction  from  the  Casablanca  conference,  which  began  on  14  January  1943.  The  British 
and  American  air  staffs  that  attended  the  conference  to  work  out  their  combined  strategy 
were  prepared  to  hotly  debate  and  defend  their  individual  doctrines  to  ensure  that  the 
combined  strategy  would  fit  their  national  political  realities.  In  the  end,  a  compromise 
was  reached  whereby  the  US  Army  Air  Forces  (USAAF)60  would  continue  its  daylight 
precision  raids  and  the  RAF  would  continue  its  night  area  attacks,  and,  thus  neither  nation 
would  be  forced  to  change  its  doctrine  in  order  to  conduct  the  bomber  offensive.  In 
essence  then,  the  combined  offensive  strategy  was  that  the  two  nations  would  attempt  to 
ensure  that  their  operations  each  complemented  the  other.  With  both  day  and  night 
bombing,  it  was  argued,  Germany  could  be  attacked  “around-the-  clock,”  and  the  final 
wording  of  the  Casablanca  directive  reflected  the  compromise.  The  RAF’s  Bomber 
Command  and  the  USAAF’s  8th  Air  Force  were  told: 

Your  primary  objective  will  be  the  progressive  destruction  and  dislocation 
of  the  German  military,  industrial  and  economic  system,  and  the 
undennining  of  the  morale  of  the  Gennan  people  to  a  point  where  their 
capacity  for  anned  resistance  is  fatally  weakened.61 

Although  the  directive  went  on  to  provide  a  tentative  order  of  priority  for  targets,  the 
deliberate  ambiguity  of  the  wording  allowed  each  of  the  participants  to  interpret  the 
directive  in  their  own  way.  The  US  interpretation  is  outlined  in  Table  2-1,  which  depicts 
the  evolution  of  the  priority  of  targeted  systems  by  American  planners  from  AWPD- 1  to 
AWPD-42  to  the  Combined  Bomber  Offensive  strategy.  In  each  list  it  is  possible  to  see 
the  echoes  of  the  American  interpretation  of  the  lessons  from  the  First  World  War  in  that 
the  plan  is  directed  toward  key  German  industrial  “nodes,”  where  tactical  action  by 
individual  (or  groups  of)  aircraft  would  have  the  maximum  effect  on  the  overall  conduct 
of  the  war. 


AWPD-1 

Target  Priorities 

AWPD-42 

Target  Priorities 

Combined  Bomber 

Offensive 

Target  Priorities 

1 .  Gennan  Air  Force 

Aircraft  Factories 
Aluminium  Plants 
Magnesium  Plants 
Engine  Factories 

2.  Electric  Power 

Power  Plants 
Switching  Stations 

3.  Transportation 

1 .  German  Air  Force 

-  Aircraft  Factories 

-  Aircraft  engine 
plants 

-  Aluminium  plants 

2.  Submarine  building 

yards 

3.  Transportation 

Rail 

1 .  Gennan  Air  Force 
Fighter  aircraft 
factories 

Aircraft  engine 
plants 

Combat  attrition 

2.  Submarine  building 
yards  and  bases 

3.  Ball  Bearings 

15 


Rail 

Water 

4.  Petroleum  Refineries 
and  synthetic  plants 

5.  Morale 


Water 

4.  Electric  Power 

Power  Plants 
Switching  Stations 

5.  Petroleum  Refineries 
and  synthetic  plants 

6.  Rubber  synthetic  plants 


4.  Petroleum  Refineries 
and  synthetic  plants 

5.  Rubber  synthetic  plants 

6.  Military  Transportation 

Armoured  vehicle 
factories 
Motor  vehicles 
factories 


Table  2-1  -  Progression  of  Targeted  Systems  from  AWPD-1  to  the  Combined 
Bomber  Offensive  Strategy62 

The  outcome  of  the  Second  World  War  bombing  campaigns  is  a  subject  of  debate  to  this 
day.63  As  Builder  observed,  “the  AAF  [US  Army  Air  Forces]  leadership  came  out  of  the 
Second  World  War  with  the  air  power  theory  intact,  despite  considerable  evidence  that  it 
was  flawed  and  incomplete.  It  was  as  though  the  Second  World  War  had  never  occurred 
and  the  spectre  of  the  First  World  War  still  haunted  its  survivors.”64 

Following  the  war,  the  USAAF  each  set  up  commissions  to  study  the  results  of  the 
European  and  Pacific  bombing  campaigns.63  In  the  final  analysis,  neither  study  was  able 
offer  conclusive  proof  of  the  theory  that  airpower  could  deliver  a  “knockout  blow”  that 
would  compel  an  enemy  to  sue  for  peace.66  However,  the  positive  spin  placed  on  the 
United  States  Strategic  Bombing  Survey  by  those  who  were  committed  to  the  concept  of 
an  independent  air  force,  coupled  with  the  introduction  of  nuclear  weapons  into  the 
theoretical  equation,  ensured  that,  at  least  for  some,  the  theory  of  strategic  bombing  was 
vindicated  and,  therefore,  carried  into  the  Korean  War  by  the  newly-fonned,  and  fully 
independent  US  Air  Force. 

The  US  Air  Force  realized  that  the  Korean  conflict  would  be  seen  by  some  to  be  the  first 
test  of  the  usefulness  of  the  new  service  and  the  theory  on  which  it  was  based. 
Accordingly,  when  that  war  was  over,  the  US  Air  Force  attempted  to  tread  softly  in 
determining  its  “lessons  learned”  and  concluded  that  the  Korean  conflict  was  “unusual” 
and  was  “a  very  poor  model  for  planning  future  operational  requirements.”  '  In  fact,  the 
experience  of  the  Korean  War  seemed  to  invalidate  the  assumption  that  industrial 
societies  were  vulnerable  to  strategic  bombing.  Moreover,  the  Korean  War  presented 
evidence  that  another  underpinning  of  the  strategic  bombing  theory  -  an  assumption  that 
all  future  wars  would  be  total  wars  -  did  not  always  hold  true.  For  a  new  service  whose 
existence  was  based  on  the  theory  of  strategic  bombing  in  total  war,  the  experience  of  the 
Korean  War  was  difficult  to  accept.  Perhaps  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  US  Air  Force 
dismissed  Korea  as  an  anomaly  and  only  grudgingly  accepted  the  lessons  learned  about 
the  employment  of  tactical  air  power  in  that  war.69 

In  the  decade  that  followed  the  Korean  War,  the  idea  of  the  air-delivered  knockout  blow 
was  entrenched  ever  deeper  in  the  psyche  of  the  US  Air  Force.  At  the  dawn  of  the 
Vietnam  conflict,  the  US  Secretary  of  the  Air  Force,  Eugene  Zuckert,  observed,  “. .  .there 


16 


were  myths  that  died  hard  -  especially  the  myth  of  Air  Force  omnipotence.  A  lot  of  blue- 
suiters  simply  refused  to  believe  that  there  was  any  war  that  couldn’t  be  won  by  air  power 
alone.”70 

Tami  Davis  Biddle  noted  that  post-Korean  War  manuals  reflected  the  idea  of  the 
omnipotence  of  air  power.  Drawing  upon  previous  American  air  power  theory  and  a 
particular  interpretation  of  Second  World  War  II  experience,  they  asserted  that  “long- 
range  bombers  would  strike  the  enemy  nation  itself  so  as  to  collapse  the  enemy’s  capacity 
and  will  to  fight.”  Davis  Biddle  observed  that  even  though  nuclear  weapons  soon  made 
the  concept  of  precision  bombing  “absurd,  the  industrial  fabric  theory  still  took  pride  of 
place”  as  shown  by  this  extract  from  US  Air  Force  doctrine  published  in  1954  and  that 
was  not  revised  until  1965: 

‘The  fabric  of  modern  nations  is  such  a  complete  interweaving  of 
major  single  elements  that  the  elimination  of  one  element  can  create 
widespread  influence  on  the  whole.  Some  of  the  elements  are  of 
such  importance  that  [their]  complete  elimination  ...  would  cause 
collapse  of  the  national  structure  ...  Others  exert  influence,  which 
while  not  immediately  evident,  is  cumulative  and  transferable,  and 
when  brought  under  the  effects  of  air  weapons,  results  in  general 
widespread  weakening  and  collapse.’ 71 

Accordingly,  it  was  not  surprising  that,  when  President  Lyndon  Johnson  solicited  advice 
on  the  conduct  of  the  Vietnam  War  from  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  in  1964,  the  Air  Force 
Chief  of  Staff,  General  Curtis  LeMay,  recommended  a  massive  aerial  assault  against  94 
targets  in  North  Vietnam.  "  His  recommendation  assumed  that  a  largely  unrestrained 
attack  on  North  Vietnam  was  politically  possible  and  that  it  was  an  inherently  unstable 
industrial  society  that  was  vulnerable  to  attack  from  the  air.  Unfortunately  for  the  US  Air 
Force,  what  Johnson  wanted  from  the  military  were  solutions  that  would  prevent 
expansion  of  the  war,  not  its  intensification. 

In  the  end,  however,  there  were  three  major  bombing  campaigns  mounted  by  the  US 
military  during  the  Vietnam  War:  Rolling  Thunder,  Linebacker  I  and  Linebacker  II.  The 
first,  Rolling  Thunder,  which  began  in  March  1965,  was  intended  to  gradually  increase 
pressure  on  the  North  by  attacking  selected  infrastructure  below  the  19th  parallel  and  by 
interdicting  supplies  flowing  from  the  North  to  the  Viet  Cong  in  the  South.  The 
operation  was  a  failure  for  several  reasons,  including  the  fact  that  “the  industrial  sector  of 
North  Vietnam’s  economy  was  not  a  highly  valued  asset”  '  and  that  the  Viet  Cong  were 
not  susceptible  to  an  interdiction  campaign.  As  a  popular-based  guerrilla  force,  the  Viet 
Cong’s  re-supply  requirements  from  the  North  were  small  and  they  were  able  to  control 
the  pace  of  their  operations  to  meet  the  availability  of  materiel.  The  Viet  Cong’s  entire 
war  requirements  were  34  tons  per  day,  less  than  one  percent  of  the  total  imported  into 
North  Vietnam.74 

Linebacker  I,  which  began  in  May  1972,  had  essentially  the  same  objective  as  Rolling 
Thunder;  however,  by  this  time,  two  main  conditions  had  changed  that  affected  its 
results.  First,  with  improved  US  relations  with  China  and  detente  with  the  Soviets, 


17 


President  Nixon  was  confident  that  neither  country  would  enter  the  war  on  North 
Vietnam’s  side,  and,  therefore  his  use  of  force  in  the  conflict  was  essentially  limited  only 
by  US  domestic  public  opinion.  Secondly,  after  the  1968  Tet  offensive,  the  Viet  Cong 
had  virtually  ceased  to  exist  and  the  style  of  war  had  switched  from  a  guerrilla  war  to  a 
conventional  war  fought  against  regular  North  Vietnamese  Anny  (NVA)  troops.  The 
NVA  was  dependent  on  secure  lines  of  communications  to  its  rear  for  re-supply  and 
reinforcement,  and  Nixon  therefore  approved  attacks  on  targets  north  of  the  20th  parallel 
as  well  as  the  mining  of  Haiphong  harbour.  The  bombing  campaign  had  an  effect  on  the 
NVA’s  ability  to  continue  operations  in  the  field  and  forced  it  to  discontinue  its  Easter 
offensive.  However,  Linebacker  I  did  not  end  the  war. 

The  final  bombing  campaign  of  the  war,  Linebacker  II,  has  frequently  been  cited  as  a 
good  indication  that  victory  can  be  achieved  by  strategic  bombing  in  accordance  with  the 
US  Air  Lorce’s  guiding  airpower  theory.  Also  referred  to  as  the  “Christmas  bombing 
campaign,”  it  was  launched  on  18  December  1972  in  an  attempt  to  force  the  North  back 
to  the  Paris  peace  talks.  Linebacker  II  lasted  eleven  days  during  which  20,000  tons  of 
high  explosive  were  dropped  on  vital  targets  throughout  North  Vietnam  in  2,852  sorties. 
Using  new  technologies  such  as  terrain  following  radar  and  precision  guided  munitions 
(PGMs),  B-52  bombers,  supported  by  F-  111  fighter-bombers,  conducted  strikes  at  night 
while  US  Air  Lorce  and  US  Navy  tactical  aircraft  conducted  bombing  by  day.  The 
bombing  caused  considerable  destruction  to  North  Vietnam’s  economic  sector  and 
military  infrastructure,  and,  on  29  December,  when  Hanoi  indicated  a  willingness  to 
return  to  serious  negotiations,  the  bombing  ceased. 

Lor  the  US  Air  Lorce  and  its  supporters,  Linebacker  II  was  seen  as  a  vindication  of  the 
idea  that  had  been  the  raison  d’etre  for  the  formation  of  an  independent  air  force  in  the 
US.  Many  air  power  advocates,  shortly  after  the  conclusion  of  Linebacker  II  asserted 
that,  if  only  President  Johnson  had  unleashed  air  power  to  do  its  job  in  accordance  with 
airpower  theory  in  the  mid-1960s,  then  the  costly  Vietnam  War  could  have  been  ended 
much  sooner.  Immediate  post-war  US  Air  Lorce  analyses  typically  concluded:  “That  the 
air  weapon  was  successfully  employed  in  countless  battles  and  campaigns  is  beyond 
question.  Whether  or  not  air  power  could  have  ended  the  war  on  satisfactory  terms  was 
not  tested.”75 

Indeed,  new  generations  of  US  Air  Lorce  officers  were  taught  that  the  blame  for  the 
Vietnam  debacle  was  to  be  placed  on  squarely  President  Johnson: 

Tearing  escalation  to  a  nuclear  confrontation,  President  Johnson  took 
personal  control  of  the  Rolling  Thunder  bombing  campaign  (1965-1968), 
selecting  not  only  targets  but  also  often  dictating  timing,  ordnance  loads, 
sorties,  and  alternate  targets.  In  a  sense  Johnson’s  action  was  centralized 
control  run  amuck  with  all  strategic,  most  operational,  and  many  tactical 
decisions  emanating  from  the  president’s  now  infamous  Tuesday  lunch 
meetings.  The  result  was  a  campaign  unresponsive  to  local  conditions;  a 
campaign  that  lacked  both  operational  and  tactical  flexibility.  More 
importantly,  the  campaign  was  a  failure  despite  the  expenditure  of  three 
years  of  intensive  effort,  much  American  blood,  and  uncounted  treasure. 


18 


The  Vietnam  War  also  completed  a  splintering  of  the  US  Air  Force  that  had  commenced 
with  the  introduction  of  inter-continental  ballistic  missiles  to  the  American  military 
inventory  in  the  1950s  and  1960s.  As  Carl  Builder  observed: 

As  an  institution,  the  Air  Force  started  to  fractionate  once  it  shifted  its 
devotion  from  the  unifying  ends  or  mission  of  air  power  to  its  separate 
(and  unequally  statured)  means.  Missiles  and  space  were  not  the  only 
areas  accepted  as  different  means  and  careers  in  the  Air  Force.  If  they 
could  coexist  along  side  the  aviators,  then  so  too  could  the  long- 
suppressed  fighter  (pursuit)  pilots.  Tactical  air  power  as  another 
independent  means  and  career  grew  rapidly  under  the  limited  war  theories 
of  the  1960s.  The  Vietnam  War  brought  TAC  [Tactical  Air  Command] 
into  full  bloom  and  put  TAC  pilots  into  the  senior  leadership  of  the  Air 
force  for  the  first  time. 

The  fighter  aviators  ...  were  suddenly  released  to  pursue  their  own 
interests.  ...  Not  only  air  power  theory  was  neglected,  the  people  who 
were  now  running  the  Air  Force  had  no  roots  in  the  theory.  Indeed  the 
fighter  pilots  were  knights  of  the  air  who  were  prepared  to  battle  for 
control  of  the  air,  but  who  had  lesser  interests  in  supporting  the  ground 
war  or  striking  at  the  heart  of  the  enemy. 

With  the  ascendancy  of  TAC  over  SAC  [Strategic  Air  Command]  to  the 
leadership  of  the  Air  Force,  the  application  of  the  theory  of  air  power 
came  increasingly  from  the  Anny  and  its  ‘AirLand’  battle  doctrine.  Air 
power  theory  had  now  devolved  into  deterrence  theory,  AirLand  battle 
doctrine,  and  the  dictum  of  air  supremacy.  The  first  had  to  be  shared  with 
the  civilian  strategists  and  the  Navy,  the  second  yielded  the  initiative  to 
the  Army,  and  the  third  was  of  interest  only  to  the  aviators.77 

Therefore,  by  the  1980s,  the  US  Air  Force  had  for  all  intents  and  purposes  abandoned  the 
theory  that  had  guided  its  development  and  operation  since  the  First  World  War.  Its 
doctrine  stagnated  and  the  institution  became  more  preoccupied  with  defending  its  force 
structure  in  budget  battles  than  it  did  with  preparing  the  institution  with  the  next 

no 

conflict.  Working  in  this  environment  of  intellectual  stagnation  was  a  generation  of 
young  officers  stinging  from,  what  was  in  their  view,  an  entirely  avoidable  defeat  in 
Vietnam.79  They  were  ready  for  a  new,  guiding  vision  of  airpower  to  be  articulated.  It 
was  in  this  fertile  environment  that  the  first  version  of  what  is  now  known  as  EBO 
occurred. 

Resurrection  -  The  First  Version  of  EBO 

The  main  catalyst  for  what  would  become  a  renaissance  of  air  power  theory  was  Colonel 
John  Warden,  who  first  gained  notice  in  1988  with  the  publication  of  his  book  The  Air 
Campaign.  Based  on  Warden’s  thesis  written  while  he  was  a  student  at  the  National  War 


19 


College  in  the  late  1980s,  The  Air  Campaign  was  written  before  the  fall  of  the  Soviet 
Union  when  military  thinking  was  primarily  directed  toward  the  most  likely  scenario  of  a 
European  war  between  NATO  and  the  Warsaw  Pact.  Moreover,  since  Warden  wrote  his 
thesis  in  a  time  of  US  Air  Force  doctrinal  neglect,  his  thinking  was  “heavily  influenced 
by  the  most  doctrinally  prolific,  if  not  up-to-date,  service  -  the  US  Army.”  He  therefore 
introduced  the  Anny  concepts  of  centre  of  gravity  (CoG)  and  operational  art  to  air  power 
thinking. 

Warden  argued  that  theatre  air  effort  should  be  planned  and  executed  as  a  single-service, 
all-encompassing  air  campaign  aimed  at  directly  accomplishing  objectives  at  the 
operational  and  strategic  levels  of  war.  He  said  that  had  thought  through  “the  problems 
confronting  an  air  commander  or  staff  officer  in  preparation  for  planning  and  executing 
an  air  campaign,”  and  he  reasoned  that  a  successful  air  campaign  is  contingent  on  a 
good  plan  and  a  good  plan  is  the  result  of  a  sound  understanding  of  basic  theory. 
Therefore,  he  began  the  book  with  the  basics,  developing  a  general  theory  of  how 
airpower  could  and  should  be  employed,  and  then  gradually  transitioning  to  a  theoretical 
discussion  of  principles  that  must  be  applied  in  the  planning  of  an  air  campaign. 

Warden’s  thesis  may  be  summarized  with  four  major  points.  First,  the  primary  objective 
in  an  air  campaign  is  air  superiority,  for  air  superiority  permits  freedom  of  action  for 
one’s  own  air,  land  and  naval  forces.  Second,  after  air  superiority  is  gained,  airpower  is 
best  employed  on  the  offence,  to  strike  behind  the  enemy  front  lines  and  interdict  his 
ability  to  make  war.  Interdiction  is  the  most  efficient  use  of  airpower  because  it  is  more 
efficient  to  destroy  an  enemy  air  force  on  the  ground  than  to  seek  fighter  engagements  to 
gain  air  superiority.  Interdiction  attacks  mounted  against  the  enemy’s  critical  nodes  or 
“centres  of  gravity”  (such  as  fuel  supplies)  can  ground  air  forces  as  well  as  bring 
mechanized  armies  to  a  halt.  Moreover,  not  only  can  interdiction  cut  off  enemy  fielded 
forces  from  their  sources  of  sustenance,  but  it  can  also  strike  directly  at  the  enemy 
strategic  centres  of  gravity.  Thus,  airpower  may  be  the  “key  force”  in  a  joint  theatre 
campaign.  Third,  close  air  support  is  the  least  efficient  and  therefore  least  desirable  role 
for  airpower.  If  a  lack  of  resources  compels  commanders  to  use  air  assets  in  the  close  air 
support  role,  this  diversion  of  effort  from  air  superiority  and  interdiction  should  only  take 
place  when  the  situation  on  the  ground  is  desperate.  Fourth  and  finally,  numbers  of 
aircraft  matter;  therefore,  to  ensure  numerical  superiority  at  the  culminating  points  in  the 
campaign,  air  commanders  should  consider  holding  air  assets  in  an  operational  reserve. 
Thus,  in  The  Air  Campaign  it  is  possible  to  see  a  resurrection  of  the  American  theory  of 
air  power  that  began  to  be  formulated  in  the  First  World  War,  albeit  expressed  in  the 
anny  language  of  operational  art. 

After  publication  of  The  Air  Campaign,  Warden  continued  to  refine  his  ideas  on  the  use 
of  air  power,  and  he  published  them  in  a  1995  article  titled  “The  Enemy  as  a  System.”82 
Echoing  Gonell’s  1917  plan  and  ACTS  and  USAAF  thinking,  Warden  asserted  that  any 
enemy  might  be  viewed  as  a  system  of  systems,  and  he  visualized  these  systems  as  five 
concentric  rings  (see  Figure  2-1).  The  innermost  ring  is,  in  Warden’s  view,  the  most 
important.  It  comprises  the  leadership  of  the  enemy  organization  or,  as  he  describes  it, 
the  brains,  and  eyes  and  nerves  that  allows  the  organization  to  be  purposely  directed. 


20 


Next  to  the  centre  is  a  ring  comprising  those  “organic  essentials”  critical  to  the  existence 
of  the  organization.  In  a  state  these  would  include  energy  and  food  supplies,  physical 
resources  and  economic  means.  The  third  ring,  or  the  infrastructure  ring,  contains  the 
transportation  networks.  The  fourth  ring  is  the  enemy  population  as  a  whole  and  the  fifth 
and  outer  ring  is  comprised  of  the  enemy  armed  forces.  Warden  also  states  that  war  can 
be  reduced  to  a  single  equation  where  OUTCOME  =  (PHYSICAL)  X  (MORALE).  He 
argues  that,  traditionally,  war  has  been  focussed  on  attacks  against  the  outermost  rings, 
elements  that  he  considers  to  be  the  least  important  and  the  most  easily  reconstituted 
elements  of  an  enemy  system.  Moreover,  he  argues  that  in  past  wars  too  much  effort  was 
wasted  working  on  the  morale  factor  of  the  equation,  a  factor  that  he  considers  too  fickle 
to  be  realistically  attacked.  In  essence,  his  thesis  is  that  an  enemy  should  be  attacked 
from  his  innermost  ring  outward  rather  than  from  the  outside  in,  and  that  the  attacks 
against  the  rings  can  (and  should)  be  aimed  at  physical  targets  in  order  to  produce  the 
desired  outcome.  Thus,  with  the  exception  of  leadership  as  a  system  category,  Warden’s 
model  bears  an  uncanny  resemblance  to  the  categorization  of  target  sets  identified  in 
AWPD-1  and  AWPD-42. 


NULDE  b  LM-TAPY 

NiFMiisrHutrunc 


Ligure  2-1  Warden’s  Live  Ring  Theory 


21 


Warden’s  thinking  was  also  influenced  by  Colonel  John  Boyd,  the  originator  of  “the 
OODA  (Observe,  Orient,  Decide  and  Act)  loop”  concept.83  Boyd  noticed  from  his 
experience  in  air  combat,  that  victory  usually  went  to  the  pilot  who  was  able  to  maintain 
superior  situational  awareness  and  make  the  faster  decisions.  He  theorized  that  there 
was,  in  each  engagement,  a  continuous  process  whereby  each  combatant  gathered 
information  (observed),  made  sense  of  the  data  (oriented),  chose  an  appropriate  course  of 
action  (decided)  and  then  carried  it  out  (acted).  In  Boyd’s  experience,  the  victor  in  air 
combat  was  the  combatant  who  was  able  to  make  his  OODA  loop  move  faster  (and  thus 
stay  “inside”)  that  of  his  adversary.  Boyd  later  applied  his  observations  of  tactical  air 
engagements  to  the  higher  levels  of  war,  and  he  “hypothesized  that  this  continuously 

84 

operating  cycle  was  at  play”  at  all  levels  of  war. 

Boyd’s  notion  of  exploiting  time  to  force  an  adversary  into  decision  paralysis  prompted 
Warden  to  think  of  how  to  achieve  a  similar  state  of  paralysis  with  an  air  campaign.  The 
result  was  Warden’s  concept  of  “parallel  attack,”  where  he  hypothesized  that: 

If  a  significant  percentage  [of  critical  targets]  is  struck  in  parallel,  the 
damage  becomes  insuperable.  Contrast  parallel  attack  with  serial  attack  in 
which  only  one  or  two  targets  are  under  attack  in  a  given  day  (or  longer). 

The  enemy  can  alleviate  the  effects  of  serial  attack  by  dispersal  over  time, 
by  increasing  defenses  of  targets  that  are  likely  to  be  attacked,  by 
concentrating  his  resources  to  repair  damage  to  single  targets,  and  by 
conducting  counter  offensives.  Parallel  attack  deprives  him  of  the  ability  to 
respond  effectively,  and  the  greater  the  percentage  of  targets  hit  in  a  single 

85 

blow,  the  more  nearly  impossible  his  response. 

Warden’s  concept  bore  an  eerie  resemblance  to  the  US  Air  Force’s  1954  doctrine  for 
strategic  attack: 

Modem  weapons  permit  us  to  deliver  attacks  against  all  activity  within  a 
given  area  simultaneously.  Modern  firepower  has  so  compressed  the  time 
element  that  attacks  on  all  vital  targets  of  an  enemy  nation  can  be  made 
almost  simultaneously  by  relatively  small  forces.  Thus,  the  capability  exists 
to  deliver  attacks  which  horizontally  will  destroy  or  seriously  reduce  the 
total  war  making  capacity  of  a  modern  nation.  These  effects  will  not  be 
confined  to  any  one  segment  of  the  enemy  nation  but  will  disrupt  his  entire 
capability.  Control  of  the  population  and  military  forces  will  become 
virtually  impossible  through  loss  of  communication  and  organized  control 
mechanisms.  Provided  that  the  attack  is  delivered  in  sufficient  weight  in  the 
shortest  possible  time,  collapse  of  the  nation  for  war  purposes  will  be 

inevitable.  The  rapidity  of  the  collapse  will  be  directly  proportional  to  the 

86 

timing  and  weight  of  the  attack. 

Following  the  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait,  Warden  and  a  small  “think  tank”  group  of 
Pentagon  planners  known  as  “Checkmate”  were  called  upon  to  prepare  an  air  plan  for  the 
upcoming  US-led  counter  attack  against  Iraqi  forces.  Warden  based  his  plan  on  the  five- 


22 


R7 

ring  model  he  had  developed  two  years  previously.  To  assist  his  team’s  planning 
efforts,  Warden  recruited  Lieutenant-Colonel  David  Deptula,  who  “had  fallen  under 
Warden’s  influence  a  year  or  so  earlier  when  he  had  worked  for  him  in  the  Air  Force 
Doctrine  Division  at  the  Pentagon.  Together,  they  had  explored  the  high  and  low  ground 
of  aerospace  doctrine  and  war- fighting  strategy.  Deptula,  an  F-15  pilot  and  Fighter 
Weapons  School  graduate,  was  a  fast  learner  and  quickly  rose  to  the  top  of  Warden’s 
inner  circle.”88  After  initial  development  of  the  plan  (code-named  Instant  Thunder), 
Warden  and  the  majority  of  the  Checkmate  team  were  effectively  fired  following  a 
disastrous  session  with  Lieutenant  General  Homer,  the  Joint  Force  Air  Component 
Commander  (JFACC)  for  the  coalition.  Deptula,  however,  remained  in  theatre  and 
became  the  lead  strategic  attack  planner,  under  Brigadier  General  “Buster”  Glossen,  of 
the  team  (known  as  “The  Black  Hole”)  that  completed  development  of  the  Instant 
Thunder  plan. 

The  Instant  Thunder  plan  that  was  finally  executed  was  a  compromise  between  Warden’s 
purely  strategic  plan  and  a  more  tactically  oriented  approach  that  was  in  accordance  with 
the  AirLand  battle  doctrine  with  which  the  Air  Force’s  Tactical  Air  Command  was  more 
familiar.  However,  from  an  examination  of  the  target  sets  that  were  attacked,  it  is  easy  to 
see  among  them  those  that  suggest  aspects  of  the  industrial  fabric,  or  web,  approach  to  air 
attacks  against  an  enemy  that  guided  development  of  AWPDs  1  and  42  and  the  CBO 
plan.  The  final  Instant  Thunder  target  sets  were: 

(1)  Leadership  and  command  facilities 

(2)  Electricity  production  facilities 

(3)  Telecommunications  and  command,  control  and  communications  (C  ) 
nodes 

(4)  Strategic  Integrated  Air  Defence  Systems 

(5)  Air  forces  and  airfields 

(6)  Nuclear,  Biological,  and  Chemical  research,  production  and  storage 
facilities 

(7)  Scud  missiles,  launchers,  and  production,  and  storage  facilities 

(8)  Naval  and  port  facilities 

(9)  Oil  refining  and  distribution 

(10)  Railroads  and  bridges 

(11)  Army  units,  including  Republican  Guards 

(12)  Military  storage  and  production  sites.90 

The  name  of  the  plan  provides  a  hint  to  its  intent  to  achieve  strategic  paralysis.  It  was 
“called  Instant  Thunder  to  contrast  it  with  Operation  Rolling  Thunder’s  prolonged, 
gradualistic  approach  to  bombing  North  Vietnam  during  the  1960s.  Instead  of  piecemeal 
attacks  designed  to  send  signals  to  enemy  leaders.  Instant  Thunder  was  designed  ...  in  a 
single  week  . . .  [to]  paralyze  Iraqi  leadership,  degrade  their  military  capabilities  and 


23 


neutralize  their  will  to  fight.”91  It  was  intended  to  deliver  death  by  a  thousand  cuts  - 
simultaneously. 92 

However,  despite  its  apparently  devastating  effects,  the  strategic  paralysis  that  the 
planners  hoped  to  generate  was  intended  to  be  temporary.  The  aim  was  to  be  able  to 
rapidly  rebuild  Kuwait  and  (a  hopefully  free)  Iraq  after  the  conflict93 ;  however,  in  order 
to  accomplish  this  aim  while  at  the  same  time  inducing  strategic  paralysis,  the  team 
recognized  that  it  would  be  necessary  to  depart  from  the  accepted  nonns  of  targeting.  In 
the  preceding  three  decades,  the  focus  of  attack  was  on  destruction,  and  this  focus  is 
understandable  when  one  considers  that  for  much  of  that  time  the  means  of  attack  was 
with  nuclear  warheads.  Moreover,  the  reasoning  went  that,  in  the  past,  the  pace  of  war 
dictated  the  destruction  of  targets  to  prevent  their  return  to  service  for  the  duration  of  the 
conflict.  However,  in  the  strategic  paralysis  construct,  it  was  only  necessary  to  achieve 
the  effect  of  destruction  for  a  period  of  time  long  enough  to  induce  the  collapse  of  the 
enemy  through  paralysis.  Thus,  planners  wanted  to  measure  success: 

. .  .not  by  the  amount  of  damage  inflicted  but  by  the  effect  produced  (e.g.,  is 
the  SOC  [sector  operations  center]  operating  or  not?).  SOCs  still  operating 
after  the  first  attack  or  returning  to  operation  later  could  be  re-attacked  as 
necessary.  This  proposal  entailed  an  important  conceptual  shift  from 
‘destruction-based’  to  ‘effects-based’  planning.  Furthermore,  using  two 
bombs  instead  of  the  eight  recommended  by  the  targeteers  (note  that  both 
numbers  apply  to  precision  weapons  delivered  by  a  precise,  stealth  platform) 
freed  six  bombs  for  other  targets  and  reflected  a  second  conceptual  shift: 
one  should  apply  economy  of  force  and  at  the  operational  level  as  opposed 
to  the  tactical,  because  of  the  additional  leverage  gained  through 
simultaneous,  parallel  attack  [emphasis  added].94 

Success  in  the  Gulf  War  was  quickly  attributed  in  large  measure  to  the  innovative  use  of 
air  power,95  as  President  George  Bush  declared,  “Gulf  lesson  one  is  air  power. . .  (it)  was 
right  on  target  from  day  one.”96  It  is  therefore  not  surprising  that  the  victory  promoted 
examination  and  study  of  the  air  campaign.  Shortly  after  the  war,  Warden  became  the 
Commandant  of  the  US  Air  Force  Air  Command  and  Staff  College  at  Maxwell  Air  Force 
Base,  Alabama  (the  fonner  home  of  the  Air  Corps  Tactical  School).  It  was  not  long 
afterward  that  the  ACSC  included  “effects-based  operations”  as  a  subject  of  study,  and, 
in  1995,  Warden’s  “The  Enemy  as  a  System”  and  Deptula’s  Firing  For  Effect:  Change  in 

Q7  1 

the  Nature  of  Warfare  were  published.  Interest  in  EBO  began  to  grow  and, 
accordingly,  Deptula  re-published  both  an  updated  version  of  Firing  for  Effect  and  an 
expanded  version  entitled  Effects-Based  Operations:  Change  in  the  Nature  of  Warfare  in 

no 

2001.  Notwithstanding  the  updates  and  additions  in  the  successive  iterations  of  his  first 
essay,  Deptula’s  argument  remained  essentially  the  same. 

Deptula’s  work  is  based  on  the  idea  of  parallel  warfare,  which  he  also  describes  as  rapid 
decisive  operations  (RDO),  a  term  that  was  introduced  into  the  US  joint  lexicon  in 
2001.99  Using  the  analogy  of  series  and  parallel  electrical  circuits,  he  relates  how  in 
“old”  war  operations  were  conducted  in  a  sequential  fashion.  In  order  to  attack  a  target 


24 


of  value,  leadership  for  example,  it  was  first  necessary  to  conduct  a  series  of  attacks  to 
gain  access  to  the  intended  target.  One  had  first  to  destroy  the  enemy  early  warning 
radars,  then  his  sector  operating  centres  (SOCs),  followed  by  his  airfields  where  his 
defensive  interceptor  aircraft  were  based  and  finally  his  surface-to-air  missile  (SAM) 
systems  before  it  was  possible  to  attack  the  final  high  value  target  (or  target  set). 

With  parallel  attack,  however,  all  of  the  targets  (e.g.,  radars,  SOCs,  airfields,  SAMs  and 
targets  of  value)  are  attacked  simultaneously.  He  notes  that  hitting: 

...all  elements  of  an  air  defense  system  simultaneously  facilitates  attacks  on 
high  value  targets,  but  this  still  leads  to  a  somewhat  sequential  application  of 
force.  . . .  This  . . .  can  be  accomplished  with  large  force  packages  of  non- 
stealthy  aircraft  in  discrete  areas  of  a  theatre  or  on  a  one-time  attack  against 
a  limited  target  set.  However,  the  large  force  packages  required  to  suppress 
enemy  air  defences  tends  to  limit  the  total  number  of  areas  struck  in  this 
manner.  To  hit  an  entire  theatre  wide  set  of  high  priority  targets  requires 
many  attacks  in  a  similar  fashion. 100 

In  other  words,  a  parallel  attack  against  defending  systems  is  possible,  but  it  is  inefficient. 
On  the  other  hand,  an  attack  that  bypasses  the  defences  and  simultaneously  strikes  on  all 
classes  of  high  value  targets  is  the  ideal: 

The  capacity  for  a  simultaneous  attack  on  the  entire  array  of  high  value 
objectives  with  little  or  no  need  to  suppress  enemy  air  defenses  opens  the 
door  to  monumental  changes  in  the  conduct  of  war  -  enables  surprise  at  a 
tactical  level,  a  larger  span  of  influence,  fewer  casualties,  paralyzing  effects, 
and  shorter  time  to  impose  effective  control  over  the  enemy. 101 

Deptula  observes  that  traditionally,  war  has  been  regarded,  in  a  Clauswitzian  context,  to 
be  a  “decision  by  force  of  arms”  whose  highest  aim  is  always  “the  destruction  of  the 
enemy’s  anned  forces.”  ~  He  reminds  us  that  the  object  of  war  is,  however,  to  achieve  a 
positive  political  outcome,  and  that,  if  a  method  of  compelling  a  favourable  political 
outcome  could  be  found  that  did  not  require  the  destruction  of  the  enemy  anned  forces, 
then  costly  force-on-force  strategies  could  be  avoided.  The  alternative  method  to  force- 
on-force  strategies,  he  argues,  is  a  strategy  of  control,  whereby  if  one  is  able  to  control 
the  enemy’s  instruments  of  power  or,  “the  essential  systems  on  which  an  enemy  relies  to 
exert  control,”  then  the  desired  political  end-state  may  be  achieved  with  significantly  less 
force. 104  To  this  familiar  argument,  Deptula  adds  a  new  twist  -  if  less  force  is  required  to 
achieve  control,  then  more  forces  are  freed  up  and  available  to  undertake  more 
controlling  actions,  and  this  in  turn  eventually  leads  to  the  strategic  paralysis  where  “the 
enemy  has  no  choice  but  acquiesce  to  the  will  of  the  controlling  force  or  face  ever 
increasing  degrees  of  loss  of  control.”105 

Deptula  acknowledges  that  the  idea  of  targeting  systems  to  achieve  strategic  results  is  not 
a  new  one.  What  has  changed  is  the  introduction  of  new  technology  that  has  made  viable 
the  air  power  theory  that  was  developed  in  the  first  half  of  the  20th  century.  Precision 
weapons106  with  accuracies  in  the  order  of  single  meters,  resolve  the  major  difficulty 


25 


encountered  by  American  and  British  strategic  bomber  forces  in  the  Second  World 
War. 107  By  1999,  a  single  B-2  bomber,  armed  with  16  independently  targeted  GPS 
guided  munitions,  could  do  what  would  have  taken  16,000  B-17  bombers  dropping 
144,000  bombs  in  1943.  Similarly,  stealth  technology  effectively  negates  the  growing 
effectiveness  of  SAMs  and  other  air  defence  systems  that  have  emerged  since  the  Second 
World  War.  The  result  of  the  two  technologies  is  an  efficiency  gain  of  significant 
proportions: 

A  comparison  of  the  first  non-stealth  aircraft  attack  in  the  Basrah  area  with  a 
wave  of  F-117  [commonly  known  as  ‘stealth  fighters’]  strikes  at  the  same 
time  illustrates  the  enormous  leverage  of  the  stealth/precision  combination. 

The  non-stealth  package  consisted  of  41  aircraft  attacking  one  target  with 
three  aimpoints.  The  force  package  consisted  of:  four  A-6s  and  four 
Tornados  dropping  bombs  on  target;  four  F4-Gs  providing  suppression  for  a 
particular  type  of  SAM;  5  E-6Bs  jamming  Iraqi  early  warning  and 
acquisition  radars;  17  F/A-18  fighters  carrying  radar-homing  missiles  to 
suppress  SAMs;  four  other  F/A-18s  providing  air-to-air  protection,  and  three 
drones  to  excite  the  air  defenses  -  4 1  aircraft,  so  eight  could  drop  bombs  on 
three  aimpoints.  At  the  same  time,  20  stealth  aircraft  (F-l  17s)  were  targeted 
against  37  aimpoints  in  other  areas  with  an  equal  and  even  higher  threat 
intensity  -  a  1 ,200  percent  increase  in  target  coverage  using  fewer  than  half 
the  number  of  aircraft.109 


Thus,  according  to  Deptula’s  reasoning,  the  revolutionary  technologies  of  precision  and 
stealth  create  additional  means  to  conduct  a  paralyzing  parallel  attack.  These  means  are 
multiplied  by  then  adding  a  concept  that  seeks  only  effects  instead  of  destruction.  What 
he  means  by  effects  are  those  actions  that  “achieve  effective  control  over  an  enemy, 
including;  render  ineffective,  negate,  disable,  prevent,  neutralize,  limit,  reduce,  stop, 
etc.”110  He  offers  an  example  of  this  multiplication  factor  from  his  Gulf  War  planning 
experience. 

Deptula  and  his  team  were  trying  to  figure  out  a  way  to  render  the  Iraqi  air  defence 
system  ineffective  in  the  lead  up  to  the  coalition  air  attack.  Intelligence  had  determined 
that  there  were  significantly  more  C2  nodes  than  originally  thought.  Using  previous 
methods,  where  strikes  would  have  been  conducted  to  destroy  each  facility,  Deptula  and 
his  planners  would  not  have  had  enough  stealth  aircraft  available  to  knock  them  all  out  in 
a  single  blow  as  desired.  However,  he  pointed  out  to  his  colleagues  that  it  was  not 
necessary  to  destroy  a  system  to  render  it  ineffective.  He  recalled  the  discussion  in  a  later 
interview: 

The  point  I’m  trying  to  make  is  that  you  can’t  just  rack  them  [targets]  up  and 
prioritize  them  and  go  from  top  to  bottom.  You  have  to  look  at  what  you 
want  to  achieve  in  each  one  of  those  individual  target  sets,  and  maybe  you 
don’t  have  to  kill  the  target  to  achieve  your  objective.  Maybe  absolute 
damage  and  levels  of  destruction  ought  not  to  be  your  measure  of  merit  and, 


26 


in  fact,  might  not  be  what  you  really  wanted  to  happen.  ...  You  know,  a 
2,000  pound  bomb  can  go  off  down  the  hall,  it  will  make  a  heck  of  a  lot  of 
noise  and  we  won’t  be  dead,  but  I  can  guarantee  you  we  ain’t  gonna 
continue  to  sit  here  and  drink  coffee  and  carry  on  this  conversation.  ... 

You’re  going  to  get  out  of  there.111 

Based  on  this  reasoning,  the  plan  was  rewritten  to  drop  only  one  2,000-pound  bomb  on 

each  of  the  C2  nodes.  Not  only  did  this  method  work  as  planned  and  render  the  air 

defence  system  ineffective,  but  it  also  “multiplied  the  number  of  stealth/precision  strikes 

for  use  against  other  targets  -  IOCs  [interceptor  operating  centers],  biological  and 

112 

chemical  weapons  storage  facilities,  and  other  critical  targets.” 

This  merging  of  new  technologies  with  old  ideas  pennits,  in  Deptula’s  analysis,  the 
ability  for  military  forces  to  employ  control  strategies  rather  than  the  more  traditional 
strategies  of  attrition  or  annihilation.  Moreover,  he  argues  that  control  strategies  call  for 
a  re-examination  of  traditional  force  structures  and  overall  war  planning.  Forces  aimed  at 
attrition  or  annihilation  war  are  by  necessity  large,  complex  and  expensive.  They  must  be 
moved  into  theatre,  supported  and  built  up  to  war  fighting  strength  with  sufficient 
numbers  and  stocks  of  supplies  and  materiel  on  hand  before  they  can  be  committed. 

Once  committed,  they  must  be  sustained,  reinforced  and  regenerated.  Then,  when  their 
job  is  done,  they  must  be  redeployed  and  reconstituted.  Therefore,  they  take  time  and 
great  cost  to  achieve  their  objective.  On  the  other  hand,  Deptula  argues  that  light,  easy  to 
support,  rapidly  deployable  forces  can  achieve  the  same  strategic  and  operational  effect 
in  a  much  shorter  period  of  time.  There  is  little  question  in  the  reader’s  mind  that 
Deptula’s  effects-based  force  is  based  around  aerospace  forces.  Indeed,  while  Deptula 
argues  that  such  a  force  should  be  truly  joint  in  nature  (and  not  just  meaning  that  each 
service  is  equally  represented),  he  strongly  implies  that  it  would  require  core 
competencies  in  rapid  global  mobility,  precision  engagement,  global  attack,  air  and  space 
superiority,  information  superiority,  and  agile  combat  support  -  precisely  the 
characteristics  called  for  in  the  US  Air  Force’s  1996  vision  statement,  Global 
Engagement:  A  Vision  of  the  21st  Century  Air  Force. 1 13 

In  essence,  Deptula’s  work,  modified  over  time,  is  aimed  at  war  fighting  and  operates 
within  a  conquest  paradigm.  He  is  offering  a  new  strategy  aimed  at  controlling  an 
adversary,  primarily  through  military  means.  He  does  raise  the  possibility  of  employing 
other  instruments  of  national  power  -  such  as  economic  and  diplomatic  -  but  he  always 
considers  these  other  instruments  within  a  framework  of  conflict  aimed  at  conquest.  His 
emphasis  on  the  end-state  or  the  objective  and  the  search  for  ways  to  create  desired 
effects  is  essentially  a  discussion  of  targeting  philosophy  and  methodology.  While  he 
most  likely  did  not  develop  the  idea  on  his  own,  his  published  works,  speeches  and 
interviews  provide  the  best  idea  of  this  first  iteration  of  EBO.  There  are,  however, 
several  other  works  that  view  EBO  in  a  manner  similar  to  Deptula  or  which  offer 
supporting  arguments  for  his  viewpoint. 

One  of  the  earliest  works  in  this  vein  is  Jason  Barlow’s  Strategic  Paralysis:  An  Airpower 
Theory  for  the  Present  (1992). 114  His  analysis  of  targeting  strategies  introduces  the  tenn 


27 


national  elements  of  value  (NEV),  a  tenn  that  he  defines  as  representing  a  cross  section 
of  an  enemy’s  strength  (as  opposed  to  a  centre  of  gravity  that  is,  at  least  in  the  American 
literature,  normally  thought  of  as  a  critical  vulnerability).  He  raises  four  important  points 
concerning  NEVs.  First,  they  vary  from  country  to  country  and,  accordingly,  careful 
case-by-case  analysis  is  required  to  ensure  that  an  adversary’s  NEVs  are  properly 
understood.  Second,  that  NEVs  are  inter-connected  in  a  self-compensating  manner  such 
that  the  weakening  of  one  will  tend  to  be  compensated  for  by  the  others.  Therefore,  since 
attack  on  a  single  NEV  yields  little  probability  of  success,  an  attack  on  all  NEVs  is 
necessary  to  achieve  strategic  paralysis  and  compel  conflict  termination.  Third,  the 
concept  of  NEVs  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  adversary  will  react  in  a  rational 
manner  (and  capitulate)  in  the  face  of  simultaneous  attack  on  his  NEVs.  The  final  point 
(and  related  to  the  first)  is  the  importance  of  accurate  and  timely  intelligence.  Barlow 
hints  at  Deptula’s  effects  concept  by  stating  that  the  point  of  an  attack  is  to  paralyse,  not 
obliterate,  but  he  does  not  explore  this  concept  in  depth.  Instead  he  develops  seven  NEV 
categories  that  bear  strong  similarities  to  Warden’s  five  rings. 

In  an  article  published  in  2000,  Thomas  Tighe  et  al.  also  support  the  concept  of  strategic 
paralysis. 15  They  contend  that  the  enemy  is  a  system  of  OODA  loops  and  advocate 
conducting  actions  to  create  direct  and  indirect  effects  within  this  system  through  among 
other  things  use  of  information  warfare.  In  other  works  exploring  aspects  of  EBO,  David 
Pendall  and  Robert  Freniere  et  al.  discuss  the  possibilities  of  emerging  technologies  and 
advocate  the  creation  and  use  of  lethal  and  non-lethal,  kinetic  and  non-kinetic  weapons  to 
achieve  desired  effects.116 

In  other  EBO-related  works,  David  Fadok  concludes  that  economic  warfare  is  giving  way 

to  control  warfare. 117  He  observes  that  the  infonnation  revolution  may  work  against 

Warden’s  emphasis  on  leadership  as  the  prime  target  of  if  an  adversary  exploits  the 

possibility  of  distributed  command  architectures.  He  also  observes  that  information 

dominance  is  a  prerequisite  to  effective  control  warfare.  Expanding  on  this  latter  idea, 

Satterly  et  al.  describe  in  detail  a  process  -  intelligence  preparation  of  the  battlespace  - 

118. 

that  is  essential  to  information  dominance.  Discussing  both  intelligence  and 
information  flow,  Price  Bingham  advocates  adopting  distributed  architectures  to  manage 
the  intelligence  information  flow  and  to  permit  realistic  simulation  and  training  in  effects- 
based  scenarios.119 

In  discussing  EBO  and  CoGs,  K.  Noedskov  provides  a  somewhat  simplistic  listing  of 

effects-based  CoGs,  but  also  points  to  the  need  for  a  top-down  planning  and  analysis 

process.  Edgar  Knouse  explores  the  idea  of  EBO  and  targeting,  and  offers  a  template 

(or  checklist)  for  operational  planners  explaining  what,  when,  where,  and  how  effects- 

121 

based  targeting  should  be  used. 

A  critical  anny  perspective  on  Deptula’s  work  is  provided  by  Gary  Cheek  in  an  article 
entitled  “Effects-Based  Operations:  The  End  of  Dominant  Maneuvre?”  In  it,  he  argues 
that  the  origins  of  effects-based  thinking  lie  in  air  power  theory.  He  concludes  that 
“attempts  to  vindicate  Guilio  Douhet  and  strategic  bombing  under  the  mantle  of  strategic 
attack,  effects-based  operations  and  control  warfare  . . .  may  be  an  effective  strategy  for 


28 


122 

airpower  procurement,  but  is  the  antithesis  of  joint  warfighting.”  He  also  concludes 

that  effects-based  targeting  has  a  place  when  used  with  dominant  manoeuvre  and  that 
effects-based  thinking,  as  an  analytical  approach  to  war  can  offer  insights  to  ground 
commanders.  Finally,  he  observes  that:  “the  proliferation  of ‘effects-based’  tenninology 
into  doctrinal  products  without  regard  to  a  defining  construct  makes  it  more  problematic, 
if  not  dangerous.”  Allen  Batchelet  agrees  that  the  lack  of  a  proper  lexicon  hampers 
meaningful  debate  on  the  utility  of  EBO;  however,  he  argues  that  elements  of  EBO  can 
be  found  in  army  AirLand  Battle  doctrine,  and,  therefore  EBO  is  a  “refining  and 
broadening  evolution  of  current  Anny  doctrine.”  124  He  believes  that  the  US  Army  should 
fully  embrace  the  concept  of  EBO  in  its  own  thinking  and  take  the  lead  in  defining  it  in 
the  joint  arena. 

Cheek’s  suspicion  that  EBO  jargon  was  being  used  to  justify  procurements  and  to  support 
the  US  Air  Force  in  inter-service  rivalries  in  Washington  is  probably  valid.  Nevertheless, 
his  acceptance  of  the  concept  of  effects-based  thinking  and  of  effects-based  targeting  as 
an  adjunct  to  manoeuvre,  as  well  as  Batchelet’s  view  that  EBO  is  an  extension  of  current 
doctrine  should  not  be  surprising.  EBO  and  manoeuvre  theory  share  many 
commonalities.  As  Martin  van  Creveld  notes,  the  elements  of  manoeuvre  warfare  are 
tempo,  Schwerpunkt  (meaning  focal  effort  at  the  centre  of  gravity),  surprise,  combined 
anns,  flexibility  and  decentralized  command,  and  that  tempo  is  defined  best  by  Boyd’s 
OODA  loop  theory. 125  Furthermore,  EBO  is  used  to  attack  centres  of  gravity  to  achieve 
end  states  and  objectives,  and  surprise  is  to  a  large  extent  a  significant  part  of  strategic 
paralysis.  Moreover,  EBO  concepts,  such  as  economy,  induced  paralysis  and  attacking 
the  adversary’s  will  rather  than  his  men  and  machines,  can  be  found  in  the  manoeuvrist 
approach: 

British  Defence  Doctrine,  published  in  1996,  defines  the  manoeuvrist 
approach  to  war  as  ‘one  in  which  shattering  the  enemy’s  overall  cohesion 
and  will  to  fight,  rather  than  his  materiel,  is  paramount.’  Manoeuvre 
warfare  ...  aims  to  apply  strength  against  identifiable  weaknesses; 
significant  features  are  momentum  and  tempo  which  in  combination  lead  to 
shock  action  and  surprise.  Emphasis  is  on  the  defeat  and  disruption  of  the 
enemy  -  by  taking  the  initiative  and  applying  constant  and  unacceptable 
pressure  at  the  times  and  places  the  enemy  least  expects  -  rather  than 
attempting  to  seize  and  hold  ground  for  its  own  sake.  . . .  Such  an  approach 
offers  the  prospect  of  rapid  results  or  of  results  disproportionately  greater 
than  the  assets  applied.  Hence  it  is  attractive  to  a  numerically  inferior  side, 
or  to  a  stronger  side  which  wishes  to  minimize  the  resources  committed.  A 
key  characteristic  of  the  manoeuvrist  approach  is  to  attack  the  enemy 
commander’s  decision-making  process  by  attempting  to  get  inside  of  his 
decision  making  cycle.  This  involves  presenting  him  with  the  need  to  make 

decisions  at  a  faster  rate  than  he  can  cope  with,  thereby  paralysing  his 

1 26 

capability  to  react. 

In  order  to  address  some  of  the  confusion  resulting  from  the  lack  of  a  common 
understanding  of  EBO  raised  by  Cheek  and  others,  Maris  “Buster”  McCrabb  authored,  in 


29 


2001,  a  seminal  paper  entitled  “Explaining  ‘Effects’:  A  Theory  for  an  Effects-based 
Approach  to  Planning,  Executing  and  Assessing  Operations.” 

The  first  task  McCrabb  undertakes  is  to  define  and  explain  objectives,  actions,  effects  and 
mechanisms: 

An  object  is  the  focus  of  attention;  the  purpose,  aim  or  goal  of  a  specific  action. 
For  example,  a  desired  effect  of  ‘isolate  the  battlefield’  has  ‘isolation’  as  the  effect 
and  ‘battlefield’  as  the  object.  Objects  always  lie  in  context.  By  specifying  the 
object,  planners  also  provide  the  boundary  between  phenomena.  This  is  essential 
. . .  because  otherwise  the  problem  space  can  become  huge  and  intractable.  Indeed 
‘isolating  the  battlefield’  in  a  context  such  as  the  Gulf  War  would  be  daunting. 
Better  to  seek  ‘isolation  of  the  KTO’ ... 127 

An  effect  is  the  result  of  some  action.  In  other  words,  actions  cause  effects.  Now 
the  action  can  be  direct  or  indirect.  . . .  Whether  an  effect  is  a  direct  effect  or  an 
indirect  effect  depends  generally  upon  point-of-view.  An  effect  is  a  direct 
effect  if  it  directly  results  from  a  direct  action.  It  is  an  indirect  effect  if  it 

i  ?o 

results  from  the  effect  of  some  previous  set  of  actions. 

McCrabb  explains  how  point-of-view  generally  determines  whether  an  effect  is  direct  or 
indirect  by  using  an  example  of  observing  a  bridge  being  destroyed.  It  is  easy  to  link  a 
bomb  detonation  to  the  bridge  collapsing  as  a  direct  action-effect  relationship.  However, 
linking  a  disrupted  transportation  system  to  the  morale  of  frontline  troops  is  difficult. 
“Ultimately,  it  is  very  difficult  to  measure  the  extent  to  which  the  relationships  under 
consideration  have  caused  desired,  or  altered  undesired,  preferences  in  the  absence  of 
overt  action.  Therefore,  a  statement  of  direct  effect  would  be,  ‘If  A  is  done  then  Z  will 
result.’  However,  the  statement  ‘If  A  is  done,  then  Z  will  result  and  this  will,  in  turn, 

129 

cause  X  to  result’  is  a  statement  about  a  direct  effect  causing  an  indirect  result.” 

McCrabb  continues: 

A  mechanism  is  the  explanation  on  how  an  action  causes  an  effect.  Mechanism 
explains  cause.  For  example,  ‘if  A  is  done,  then  Z  will  result  because  of  P 
and/or  Q’  is  a  statement  of  direct  action  (A)  and  its  direct  effect  (Z)  as  well  as  its 
mechanism  (P)  or  mechanisms  (and/or  Q).  A  complex  effect  is  a  combination 
or  intertwining  of  effects  in  an  instance  of  time.  For  example,  ‘If  A  is  done  then 
B  will  result  ’  is  a  statement  of  direct  effect.  ‘If  C  is  done  then  D  will  result’  is  a 
statement  of  a  different  direct  effect.  ‘If  A  is  done  then  B  will  result  and  the  effect 
of  B  will,  in  turn,  lead  to  E'  is  a  statement  of  direct  effect  (B)  and  indirect  effect 
(E). 

Combining  two  direct  effects  produces  a  complex  effect  (F)  - 
‘The  impact  ofB  +  the  impact  of  D  will  lead  to  F’ 


30 


Combining  a  direct  effect  (B)  and  an  indirect  effect  (E)  also  produces  a  complex 
effect  (G)  - 

‘The  impact  ofB  +  the  impact  of  E  will  lead  to  G.  ’ 

Note  that  a  mechanism  or  mechanisms  can  be  added  to  each  of  these  statements 
by  adding  ‘because  of _ ’ 

McCrabb  then  goes  on  to  say  that  a  cumulative  effect  is  a  complex  effect  that  occurs 
over  time.  The  statement  of  complex  effect  used  as  an  example  above  is  now  modified  to 
indicate  a  period  of  time  and  cause  and  therefore,  becomes  a  statement  of  cumulative 
effect  and  mechanism: 

‘The  impact  ofB  +  the  impact  of  D  will  lead  to  F  over  the  next  five  days 
because  of  1,  2  and  3.  ’ 

It  is  important  to  note  that  the  temporal  aspect  of  an  effect  applies  to  each  primitive. 
A  direct  effect  can  be  ‘delayed’  in  the  sense  that  it  is  not  instantaneous  just  as 
indirect  and  cumulative  effects  are  delayed  by  definition.  This  is  another  example 

1 32 

of  the  point  made  often:  effects  are  point-of-view  dependant. 

McCrabb  argues  that  “Cascading  effects  are  direct,  indirect,  complex  or  cumulative 
effects  that  ripple  through  a  system.”  This  idea  presumes  that  an  adversary,  when 
viewed  from  a  system  level,  is  the  system  of  systems  that  Warden  described.  If  all  sub¬ 
systems  (and  sub-sub-systems  and  so  on)  are  interlinked  as  per  Barlow’s  NEV  model  or 
Tighe’s  system  of  inter- linked  OODA  loops,  then  an  effect  created  in  one  subordinate 
system  can  create  effects  in  all  other  systems  within  the  whole. 

In  addition  to  clarifying  the  terminology  of  EBO,  McCrabb  also  makes  another  important 
contribution  to  an  understanding  of  EBO  by  reminding  us  that  EBO  is  an  approach  to 
operations,  which  overlaps  with  the  two  more  familiar  approaches  to  planning  and 
executing  operations.  “Taking  a  ‘top  down’  approach  starting  from  a  theater  commander 
and  ending  at  the  executing  elements,  an  effects-based  approach  is  synonymous  with  an 
objectives-based  approach  [strategy  to  task]  at  the  top  (assuming  the  theater  commander 
is  concerned  with  strategic  objectives,  goals,  or  aims)  and  synonymous  with  a  targets- 
based  approach  at  the  bottom.”134  As  he  stated  in  a  later  oral  presentation: 

Target-based  approaches  identify  the  enemy  entities  or  targets  and  sets  out 
to  destroy  them.  The  focus  is  on  the  physical  effects  at  the  target  level  only. 

It  has  been  the  traditional — and  bloody — approach  to  warfare  for  millennia. 

Objectives-based  approaches  look  at  the  strategy  at  one  level  and  turn  that 
strategy  (such  as  the  national  security  level)  into  objectives  at  the  next  lower 
level  (such  as  the  theater  or  campaign  level).  The  focus  here  is  on 
objectives  to  satisfy  the  higher  level  strategies.  This  became  a  commonly 
used  approach  for  planning,  assessing,  and  executing  warfare  at  all  levels 
over  the  past  decade  in  the  US  Air  Force. 


31 


With  an  effects-based  operations  approach  one  explicitly  examines  and 
models  the  causes  between  actions  and  effects.  Both  physical  and 
behavioral  direct  and  indirect  effects.  Effects  are  the  main  focus.  EBO 
encompasses  and  supplements  both  target-based  and  objectives-based 
approaches.  The  goal  is  to  model  the  enemy  as  a  system  and  provide 
dynamic  real-time  assessment  as  opposed  to  the  other  approaches  where  no 
dynamic  assessment  is  made.  135  [Emphasis  added.] 

This  overlap  of  approaches  is  graphically  represented  in  Figure  2-2  below. 

Figure  2-2136 

McCrabb’s  Comparison  of  Effects-Based,  Objectives-Based  and  Target-Based  Operations 


Target-Based  (TB01 


ID  enemy  entities,  destroy  them 
Focus:  physical  effects  at  target  level 
Looks  at  1st  and  2nd  order  effects  only 

No  dynamic  assessment 
No  explicit  timing  considerations 


Obiectives-Based  (OBO)  (Strategies-to-Task) 

■  Strategies  at  one  level  become  objectives  for  next 

•  Focus:  objectives  at  every  level 

•  Considers  linkages  between  objectives  and 
strategies  to  achieve  those  objectives 

•  No  dynamic  assessment 

-  No  explicit  timing  considerations 

Effects-Based  (EBO) 

•  Address  causality  between  actions  and  effects 
■Focus:  desi  red  effects  (physicalandbehavioral) 

■  Encompass  both  target  and  objective-based  methods 

■  Models  the  enemy-as- a- system  w  adversary  reaction 

•  Considers  Direct,  Indirect,  Complex  (synergistic), 
Cumulative  &  Cascading  effects 

■  Timing  explicitly  considered 

■  “Overcoming”  mechanism  stated  &  assessed 


As  stated  earlier  in  this  essay,  the  ETS  Air  Command  and  Staff  College  began  to  teach 
EBO  and  an  effects-based  planning  process  in  the  late  1990s.  Reflecting  McCrabb’s 
observations,  this  is  a  top-down,  integrated  approach  that  begins  and  ends  with  a 
desired/achieved  end  state. 

As  may  be  seen  in  Figure  2-3,  the  entire  planning  process  takes  place  within  the  context 
of  the  desired  end  state.  First,  the  strategic  objective  is  determined  and  from  it,  the 
military  objective(s).  Objective  (both  strategic  and  military)  determination  is 
accomplished  taking  the  appropriate  contextual  elements  (political,  international,  socio¬ 
cultural,  economic,  leadership  and  environment)  into  account.  From  there  the  planning 
process  enters  the  realm  of  operational  art,  where  centres  of  gravity  are  identified,  desired 
tactical  effects  are  determined,  targets  identified  and  matched  to  assets  available  for 
employment  to  produce  a  number  of  courses  of  action,  from  which  the  best  would  be 
selected  for  execution.  The  selected  course  of  action  would  then  be  turned  into  a  master 


32 


air  attack  plan  (a  detailed  plan)  and  issued  as  an  air  tasking  order  (a  formatted  order  for 
the  detailed  execution  of  the  plan).  Measures  of  success  are  monitored  and  analyzed 
during  the  execution  phase  to  verify  that  the  end-state  has  been  (or  is  in  the  process  of 
being)  achieved.  If  it  is  not  achieved,  in  whole  or  in  part,  the  new  situation  becomes  the 
starting  point  for  a  repetition  of  the  process. 

137 

Figure  2-3  -  An  Effects-Based  Campaign  Planning  Model 


END  STATE 


Contextual  Elemorts 

Operational  Art 

Political 

International 

Logistics 

Targeting  Sdence 

Sod  o- cultural 

T  echnology 

Deception 

Economic 

Information 

Measuring  Success 

Leadership 

Environmental 

Carter  of  Desired  ^ 

Target 

r 

Gravity  ”  Effects 

Systems 

1  t 

Strategic 

Objective 


Military 

Objective 


Couiseof  Mister  Ai  Att.1ckPI.1n 

Action  AikI  Air  Tasking  Order 


Forces 

Available 


At  this  point,  the  development  of  the  idea  of  EBO  seemed  to  be  complete.  The  mating  of 
the  newly  available  revolutionary  technologies  of  stealth  and  precision  to  the  old  ideas  of 
air  power  theory  with  a  few  updates  in  the  form  of  parallel  attack  seemed  to  have 
provided  a  complete  solution  for  war  fighting.  From  initial  rumbles,  EBO  became  a 
regular  subject  of  discussion  in  professional  journals  and  attracted  academic  study.  The 
concept  then  began  to  be  expressed  in  air  force  doctrine  publications,  and  next  crept  into 
other  service  and  US  joint  publications.  As  part  of  this  process  EBO  was  included  in  the 
curriculum  of  US  Air  Force  professional  military  education  schools.  However,  as  will  be 
shortly  demonstrated,  development  of  the  EBO  concept  did  not  stop  there.  In  fact,  almost 
as  soon  as  this  first  iteration  of  EBO  hit  the  street,  a  second  version  of  EBO  was  being 
developed. 


Evolution  -  The  Second  Iteration  of  EBO 


The  melding  of  stealth,  precision  and  air  power  theory  to  create  the  effects-based  concept 
seemed  for  many  to  be  a  fundamental  change  in  the  way  war  was  to  be  fought  in  the 
future.  For  many  officers  in  the  US  Air  Force,  parallel  war,  effects-based  targeting  and 
the  Gulf  War  victory  had  finally  eliminated  the  stigma  of  the  Vietnam  War  and  assured 


33 


air  power  a  place  of  prominence  in  the  American  military  pantheon.  Effects  Based 
Operations  was  a  change  in  the  nature  of  warfare.  However,  while  change  did  occur,  it 
was  not  in  the  way  that  some  expected. 

For  nearly  all  of  the  20th  century,  war  had  been  waged  by  ever  larger,  ever  more  complex 
military  forces.  At  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  Western  militaries  emerged  from  a  long 
period  of  expansion  to  find  themselves  without  a  competitor  that  was  capable  of 
successfully  fighting  the  kind  of  war  that  they  had  prepared  for.  When  Iraq  invaded 
Kuwait  and  attempted  to  fight  a  conventional  war  with  the  United  States  and  its  allies, 
there  was  no  doubt  as  to  who  would  be  the  victor.  What  was  surprising  to  some  was  the 
speed  and  efficiency  with  which  victory  was  achieved.  The  scale  of  the  victory  made  it 
abundantly  clear  that  no  single  nation  or  combination  of  non-Western  nations  could  ever 
hope  to  defeat  the  United  States  in  a  conventional  war.  For  opponents  of  the  West, 
conventional  war  had  joined  nuclear  war  as  an  irrational  act  and  a  guarantee  of  self- 
destruction. 

In  the  post-Gulf  War  period,  the  United  States,  NATO  and  various  other,  often  ad  hoc, 
coalitions  used  their  military  forces  on  peace  enforcement  operations  such  as  Somalia, 
Haiti  and  the  Former  Republic  of  Yugoslavia.  These  operations  presented  new  and 
largely  unforeseen  problems  to  the  soldiers  on  the  ground  and  their  commanders,  as  the 
tools,  structures  and  doctrines  of  conventional  war  were  not  necessarily  transferable  to 
the  “three-block  wars”138  that  marked  the  turn  of  the  21st  century. 

The  experience  of  the  use  of  air  power  in  the  former  Republic  of  Yugoslavia  posed  a 
problem  similar  to  the  one  faced  by  proponents  of  conventional  war.  Attempts  to 
conduct  control  warfare  within  a  conquest  paradigm  did  not  seem  to  work  in  the  new 
situations  at  hand.  It  was  in  this  environment  that  the  concept  of  EBO  began  to  shift  from 
operating  within  a  conquest  paradigm  to  a  success  paradigm  with  a  broader  approach 
applicable  in  pre-  and  post-conflict  situations  as  well  as  in  war. 

In  many  ways,  the  second  iteration  of  EBO  stems  from  the  coercion  theories  that  had 
been  debated  since  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War.  Modem  coercion  theory  descends 
from  deterrence  theory  that  emerged  in  the  early  years  of  the  Cold  War;  in  particular,  it 
can  trace  its  roots  to  Thomas  Schelling’s  ideas  concerning  the  use  of  coercive 
diplomacy.  Schelling  begins  his  work  with  two  very  important  observations.  The  first 
is  that  diplomacy  and  armed  force  are  different  means  that  may  be  used  to  achieve  a 
common  end.  His  second  observation  is  that  there  is  a  difference  between  brute  force  and 
coercive  force,  i.e.,  between  unrestrained  violence  and  violence  that  is  controlled  to 
achieve  the  interests  of  the  state  by  forcing  the  enemy  to  submit  to  the  will  of  the  state. 
From  these  principles,  Schelling  reasons  that,  since  the  power  to  hurt  is  what  makes 
coercive  diplomacy  possible,  then  it  is  the  threat  of  violence  (or  latent  violence)  that  is 
important.  Therefore  the  incremental,  controlled  application  of  violence  with  an 
accompanying  threat  of  much  further  destruction  is  the  best  method  to  apply  force  to 
compel  an  adversary  to  submit  to  the  will  of  the  coercing  state. 


34 


In  Bombing  to  Win  (and  subsequent  works)  Robert  Pape  builds  on  Schelling’s  work.140 
Pape  conducts  an  analysis  of  the  history  of  strategic  bombing  and  concludes  that  it  has 
failed  in  the  past  because  those  who  have  used  it  sought  to  coerce  regimes  to  change  their 
behaviour  by  punishing  its  civilian  populations,  through  direct  attack  against  civilians 
themselves  or  indirectly  through  the  destruction  of  infrastructure,  economy,  food  supplies 
and  the  like.  Instead,  he  argues  that  coercion  will  only  work  if  a  denial  strategy  is  used  in 
place  of  a  punishment  strategy: 

Denial  strategies  target  the  opponent’s  military  ability  to  achieve  its 
territorial  or  other  political  objectives,  thereby  compelling  concessions  in 
order  to  avoid  futile  expenditure  of  further  resources.  Unlike  counter 
civilian  strategies,  denial  strategies  make  no  special  effort  to  cause 
suffering  to  the  opponent’s  society,  only  to  deny  the  opponent  hope  of 
achieving  the  disputed  territorial  objectives.  Thus,  denial  campaigns  focus 
on  the  target  state’s  military  strategy. 141 

Pape  identities  three  main  methods  by  which  an  enemy’s  military  strategy  may  be 
defeated  (denied):  direct  attack  against  the  enemy’s  fielded  forces;  strategic  interdiction, 
involving  either  isolating  the  enemy’s  fielded  forces  from  their  sources  of  weapons  and 
supplies  or  destroying  these  sources  outright;  and  finally,  operational  interdiction,  a 
strategy  that  seeks  to  disrupt  an  enemy’s  combat  support  functions  and  hence,  his  ability 
to  concentrate  his  forces  at  decisive  points.  Pape  weighs  the  positive  and  negative 
characteristics  of  each  method  and  concludes  that,  while  each  method  can  produce 
favourable  results,  it  is  those  strategies  that  can  be  implemented  by  theatre  air  power 
(namely  operational  interdiction  and  direct  attack)  that  are  more  likely  to  be 
successful.142 

Pape  has  his  critics,  but  he  has  made  an  important  contribution  to  the  development  of 
coercive  airpower  theory  in  situations  that  include  operations  other  than  war. 143  In 
essence,  he  has  presented  the  problem  as  one  involving  the  complex  interaction  of  a 
number  of  variables.  The  great  value  of  his  theory  is  that  it  is  not  necessarily 
prescriptive,  but  it  establishes  a  framework  for  analysis  of  each  situation  on  its  own 
merits. 

In  the  aftermath  of  NATO’s  attempts  at  the  use  of  coercive  airpower  in  Bosnia  and 
Kosovo,  much  effort  went  into  understanding  what  happened  and  why.  The  British  and 
American  governments,  as  well  as  RAND,  all  produced  reports  on  the  NATO  effort. 144 
However,  the  analysis  Daniel  Byman,  Matthew  Waxman  and  Eric  Larson  is  of  most 
interest  to  the  subject  at  hand. 145 

Byman,  Waxman  and  Larson  see  air  power  as  a  natural  coercive  device  for  several 
reasons.  First,  the  unique  combination  of  speed  and  lethality  afforded  by  aerospace 
forces  allows  coercing  nations  to  act  and  react  quickly  before  they  are  presented  with  an 
irreversible  fait  accompli.  Moreover,  the  force  wielded  by  air  forces  can  be,  if  necessary, 
both  limited  and  precise,  thereby  allowing  for  a  controlled  escalation  of  violence.  As 
well,  the  long  range  and  global  reach  of  air  forces  (especially  the  US  Air  Force)  can 


35 


permit  the  application  of  force  without  having  to  rely  on  forward  operating  bases. 

Finally,  not  only  can  air  forces  deploy  into  a  theatre  of  operations  quickly,  but  they  can 
also  be  withdrawn  just  as  quickly.146  Therefore,  the  authors  conclude  that  successful 
coercion  is  the  result  of  the  complex  inter-action  of  three  factors  -  escalation  dominance, 
military  denial,  and  the  magnification  of  third  party  threats.  Each  of  these  will  be 
discussed  in  turn  below. 

Escalation  dominance  is,  as  the  name  implies,  the  ability  to  adjust  one’s  level  of  coercive 
force  while  at  the  same  time  denying  one’s  adversary  the  same  freedom.  There  are  three 
components  to  escalation  dominance.  The  first  is  that  the  coercing  power  must  have  both 
the  ability  to  increase  coercive  force  as  well  as  the  will  to  do  so.  For  example,  it  would 
be  pointless  to  consider  a  strategy  requiring  real  or  threatened  escalation  of  force  if  one 
had  neither  the  means  nor  the  will  do  so.  Second,  the  coercer  must  have  the  ability  to 
prevent  the  subject  of  his  coercion  from  escalating.  This  can  be  accomplished  through 
offensive  action  (destruction  of  the  coerced  party’s  capability  to  escalate)  or  defensive 
action  (mount  such  an  effective  defence  that  the  coerced  party  cannot  conduct  escalatory 
attacks)  or  a  combination  of  both.  Third,  and  finally,  the  coercer  must  be  able  to 
neutralize  his  targeted  party’s  counter-coercion  activities.  For  example,  the  propaganda 
resulting  from  unintended  casualties  due  to  collateral  damage  or  from  making  unarmed 
peacekeepers  hostages  (as  was  done  in  Bosnia)  can  be  used  to  counter  coercive  purposes. 
Accordingly,  the  coercer  must  be  aware  of  his  potential  vulnerabilities  and  adopt 
measures  to  avoid  or  minimize  the  likelihood  of  presenting  the  targeted  party  with 

.  .  147  ^ 

counter  coercion  opportunities. 

The  second  factor,  military  denial,  borrows  heavily  from  the  work  of  Robert  Pape.  With 
military  denial,  the  intent  is  to  use  air  power  to  threaten  the  targeted  party  with  outright 
military  defeat  or  at  least  to  prevent  him  from  achieving  his  military  objectives.  This  aim 
is  accomplished  by  denying  his  means  to  success  -  his  fighting  forces.  It  is  critical  to 
recognize  that  there  are  some  instances  where  air  power  may  be  an  inappropriate  to 
accomplish  this  task  because  there  are  some  irregular  fighting  forces  (such  as  insurgents) 
that  may  be  very  difficult  if  not  impossible  to  target  with  air  forces.  However,  when  the 
targeted  party  is  counting  on  conventional  forces  to  achieve  military  objectives,  then  air 
power  can  play  a  significant  denial  role. 

The  final  factor  is  magnification  of  “other  threats  to  the  adversary,  such  as  external 
military  and  internal  threats.”  A  good  example  of  the  application  of  this  factor  was 
during  Operation  Deliberate  Force  when  destruction  of  the  Bosnian  Serb  Army  heavy 
weapons  and  denial  of  their  theatre  mobility  altered  the  local  balance  of  power  and  made 
the  Bosnian  Serbs  vulnerable  to  the  Croatian  anny  offensive.  The  use  of  air  power  to 
magnify  internal  threats  might  not  involve  attack  and  destruction,  but  might  instead 
include  the  use  of  air  transport  to  deliver  food  and  arms  to  internal  disaffected 
populations,  or  it  may  be  used  for  something  as  simple  as  dropping  leaflets  as  part  of  a 
psychological  operations  campaign  aimed  at  undermining  the  targeted  party’s  moral 
influence. 


36 


At  this  point,  it  is  worth  emphasizing  that  Byman,  et  al.  did  not  conclude  that  coercion 
could  only  be  conducted  by  air  forces,  as  they  stated  that,  while  air  power  is  an  attractive 
coercive  tool,  it  is  “like  any  other  instrument  of  statecraft.”149  Accordingly,  while  air 
power  can  play  an  important  and  perhaps  even  a  decisive  role  in  successful  coercion, 
coercion  theory  cannot  justify  the  independence  of  air  forces.  And  Byman,  et  al.  noted 
that  airpower  should  be  applied  as  part  of  an  overall  co-ordinated  strategy  that  includes 
diplomacy,  and  perhaps  other  forms  of  military  force  that  are  both  lethal  and  non-lethal. 

The  work  on  coercion  theory  is  important  because  it  recognizes  that  the  intent  of  coercive 
actions  is  to  change  behaviour  and  not  to  force  a  military  defeat.  In  fact  coercion  might 
not  involve  the  active  use  of  military  force  at  all  (although  the  threat  of  its  use  could  be  a 
factor),  but  might  involve  military  capabilities  in  humanitarian  or  good  will  operations  to 
“win  hearts  and  minds.”  Coercion  theory  accepts  a  high  level  of  complexity  and  the  need 
for  the  close  co-ordination  of  all  instruments  of  national  power  to  create  the  desired 
strategic,  or  grand-strategic,  effects  across  the  entire  spectrum  of  conflict. 

Coercion  theory  is  also  supported  by  a  growing  understanding  that,  “war,  many 
contingency  operations  short  of  war,  and  even  foreign  affairs  generally  occur  in  a 
complex  adaptive  system  (CAS),”  because  any  system  involving  humans  will  be  complex 
and  adaptive. 150  Simple  systems  are  linear  where  a  single  input  will  produce  a 
proportional  and  predictable  output.  Compound  systems  are  those  in  which  two  or  more 
external  inputs  force  a  selection  of  a  range  of  possible  and  predictable  outputs.  On  the 
other  hand,  complex  systems  react  not  only  to  external  inputs  from  a  given  system,  but 
they  also  interact  within  themselves  and  with  all  other  external  systems.  Adaptive 
systems  are  those  that  change  (either  temporarily  or  pennanently)  in  reaction  to  stimuli 
and  therefore  may  react  differently  in  one  instance  than  they  do  in  another. 15  Therefore 
working  with  CAS  “requires  adopting  a  systems  perspective.  Behaviours  ...  of  CAS 
depend  more  on  the  interactions  between  agents  as  they  adapt  to  their  environment  and 
one  another  than  the  actions  of  any  given  agent  or  set  of  agents.  . . .  [T]he  ‘whole  is 
greater  than  the  sum  of  its  parts’  leads  to  the  concept  of  emergence  or  the  systemic 
behaviour  not  identifiable  from  studying  the  behaviour  of  the  parts.”  "  Thus,  work  with 
CAS  re-emphasizes  the  need  to  develop  an  approach  that  accepts  complexity  and  seeks  a 
“top  down”  approach  from  the  highest  level  possible. 

Recently,  alongside  the  work  on  coercion  theory,  debate  within  military  circles  has 
produced  an  entirely  different  view  of  one  of  the  essential  components  of  the  first 
iteration  of  EBO  -  the  concept  of  the  centre  of  gravity. 

As  used  in  today’s  military  context,  the  concept  of  the  centre  of  gravity  originated  in  the 
writings  of  Clausewitz.  “The  original  text  of  Vom  Kriege  (On  War)  reveals  that 
Clausewitz  used  the  term  CoG  -  expressed  primarily  as  Schwerpunkt  -  more  than  50 
times,  although  not  all  of  them  refer  to  the  military  concept.”  Since  the  rediscovery  of 
Clausevitz  by  Western  militaries,  and  in  particular  the  US  military,  in  the  1950s,  most 
have  incorporated  the  CoG  concept  into  their  doctrine. 154  However,  since  doctrinal  work 
in  the  US  has  relied  almost  exclusively  on  translations  of  Clausewitz,  there  is  some 
confusion  as  to  his  precise  meaning  based  on  differing  translations  of  his  work. 155  As  a 


37 


result,  the  doctrine  of  individual  US  services  has  used  differing  definitions  of  a  CoG  that 
suited  their  own  particular  needs: 

The  US  Marine  Corps  -  a  relatively  small  force  designed  for  expeditionary, 
ship-to-shore  operations  -  prefers  to  strike  at  enemy  weaknesses. 
Accordingly,  it  tends  to  equate  enemy  CoGs  with  key  vulnerabilities.  In 
contrast,  the  US  Army,  which  has  the  role  of  fighting  large-scale  battles  and 
winning  major  wars,  sees  the  enemy  CoG  as  a  ‘source  of  strength.’  It  tends 
to  look  for  a  single  CoG,  normally  the  principal  capability  -  the  opponent’s 
land  force  -  that  stands  in  the  way  of  marching  on  the  enemy’s  capital. 
Likewise,  charged  with  the  mission  of  winning  maritime  wars,  the  Navy 
initially  had  a  concept  of  the  CoG  that  resembled  the  Army’s.  Navy  doctrine 
defined  a  CoG  as  ‘something  the  enemy  must  have  to  continue  military 
operations  -  a  source  of  his  strength,  but  not  necessarily  strong  or  a  strength 
in  itself.  There  can  be  only  one  center  of  gravity.’ 

In  keeping  with  the  views  espoused  by  some  of  the  early  air  power  theorists, 
such  as  Billy  Mitchell  and  others  at  the  Air  Corps  Tactical  School  at 
Maxwell  Field,  Alabama,  the  US  Air  Force  tends  to  see  CoGs  as  ‘vital 
centers’  located  deep  in  the  enemy’s  heartland.  In  fact,  John  Warden, 
arguably  the  most  well-known  modem  air  power  theorist,  has  gone  so  far  as 
to  say  CoGs  exist  within  each  of  the  five  component  parts  (or  rings)  - 
leadership,  organic  essentials,  infrastructure,  population,  and  fielded  forces 

-  that  describe  any  strategic  entity.  Warden  defines  a  CoG  as  ‘that  point 
where  the  enemy  is  most  vulnerable  and  the  point  where  an  attack  will  have 
the  best  chance  of  being  decisive.’  His  principal  argument  is  that  airpower 
has  the  unique  capability  to  strike  at  CoGs  simultaneously  through  ‘parallel’ 

-  as  opposed  to  serial  -  attacks,  which  can  overwhelm  and  paralyse  an 
opponent  and  thereby  prove  decisive.  Thus,  the  theory  of  parallel  attack 
goes  hand  in  hand  with  the  view  that  multiple  CoGs  exist.  The  one  tends  to 
reinforce  the  other.  Air  Force  Doctrine  followed  suit.156 

The  divergence  in  definitions  of  CoG  posed  a  problem  for  universal  acceptance  of  EBO, 
since,  in  its  first  iteration,  it  was  based  upon  the  US  Air  Force’s  understanding  of  a  CoG. 
However,  the  disagreement  over  whether  a  CoG  was  a  source  of  strength  or  of  weakness 
was  not  the  only  important  difference  in  interpretation  among  the  US  services.  Writing 
from  an  Army  perspective,  Milan  Vego  in  a  2000  article  observed  that,  “a  CoG  is  also 
often  confused  with  the  military  objective  to  be  accomplished.  Experience  clearly  shows 
that  focussing  on  the  objective  without  identifying  and  attacking  the  enemy’s  CoG  will 
invariably  result  in  unnecessary  losses  of  personnel,  materiel  and  time  -  even  despite 
overwhelming  combat  power.”157  While  Air  Force  doctrine  agreed  that  objectives  and 
CoGs  were  different,  the  Anny  interpretation  of  CoG  tended  to  take  attention  away  from 
objectives  -  the  key  to  EBO  -  and  overly  emphasize  an  adversary’s  fielded  forces. 

US  joint  doctrine  attempted  to  develop  an  “authoritative  consensus”  on  the  concept  of 
CoG  in  1995,  but,  according  to  Echivarria,  wound  up  defining  “CoGs  too  broadly  and 


38 


158 

offered  no  real  method  for  determining  them.”  Recognizing  the  problem,  the  joint 
doctrine  writers  turned  to  Joseph  Strange’s  “CG-CC-CR-CV”  approach  to  CoGs,  which 
was  described  by  Echevarria  as  follows: 

Strange  correctly  showed  that  the  Joint  (and  individual  service)  definitions 
of  CoGs  were  flawed  and  lacked  precision.  They  tended  to  equate  CoGs 
with  vulnerabilities  or  strengths  and  paid  too  little  attention  to  the 
psychological  centers  of  power.  To  rectify  that,  he  offered  a  ‘fix’  that 
redefined  CoGs  as  ‘dynamic  agents  of  action  or  influence’  or,  more 
specifically,  ‘moral,  political  and  physical  entities  which  possess  certain 
characteristics  and  capabilities,  or  benefit  from  a  given  location/terrain. 
Accordingly,  his  CG-CC-CR-CV  approach  defined  a  CoG,  such  as  a  key 
combat  force,  by  those  critical  capabilities  (CCs)  that  enabled  it  to  function 
as  a  CoG.  Those  CCs  -  the  ability  to  shoot,  move  and  communicate  -  in 
turn,  have  critical  requirements  (CRs)  -  such  as  open  lines  of 
communication  and  supply  -  that  enable  the  CCs  to  keep  functioning.  A  CR 
that  is  inadequately  protected  . . .  constitutes  a  critical  vulnerability  (CV).  If 
attacked  and  neutralized,  these  CVs  would  contribute  to  defeating  the 
enemy’s  CoG.159 

The  resultant  US  joint  doctrine  mixed  the  US  Army’s  preference  to  engage  the  enemy’s 
fighting  force  with  Strange’s  model. 160  However,  different,  more  EBO-friendly 
definitions  of  a  CoG  have  since  challenged  the  US  joint  doctrine  definition  of  a  CoG. 

However,  Echevarria  contends  that  Clausewitz’s  idea  of  a  CoG  was  not  a  capabilities- 
based  concept  as  Strange  suggests,  but  was,  in  fact,  an  effects-based  idea.  While  the  two 
approaches  to  thinking  about  a  CoG  are  linked,  they  are  decidedly  different,  he  argues: 

Attacking  specific  capabilities  produces  certain  effects.  Achieving  certain 
effects  often  requires  attacking  certain  capabilities.  Indeed,  one  could  say 
that  these  approaches  represent  the  proverbial  two  sides  of  the  same  coin.  In 
the  capabilities-based  approach,  the  first  step  is  to  identify  the  key  enemy 
strength  that  could  prevent  us  from  achieving  our  objective.  In  the  effects- 
based  approach,  the  first  step  is  to  identify  the  effect  we  want  to  achieve  and 
then  determine  what  actions  we  should  take  to  achieve  it.  Frequently  those 
actions  might  go  well  beyond  merely  neutralizing  or  destroying  specific 
capabilities.  In  a  manner  of  speaking,  the  capabilities-based  approach  seeks 
a  negative  aim,  destruction  of  a  certain  capability.  The  effects-based 
approach,  on  the  other  hand,  pursues  a  positive  aim  because  it  seeks  to 
create  a  definite  effect. 161 

In  other  words,  unlike  the  traditional  anny  view  of  CoG  voiced  by  Vega  that  the  focus  of 
attention  should  be  on  the  capabilities  of  the  adversary,  Ecehevarria’s  argument  swings 
attention  back  to  the  objective  and  effects.  That  is  not  to  say  that  objective  and  effect  are 
the  same.  In  fact,  they  are  not,  because  the  effect  is  deduced  from  the  objective  and  not 
from  the  CoG.  “  This  distinction  is  quite  important  when  one  considers  that  sometimes 


39 


CoGs  may  not  exist  at  all  and,  when  they  do,  they  may  be  difficult  to  detennine  and/or 
may  be  irrelevant  to  the  objective.  Moreover,  this  focus  on  the  objective,  instead  of  an 
adversary’s  capability,  shifts  the  emphasis  of  analysis  from  destruction  to  creation  of  a 
condition  or  an  effect.  And  it  was  this  shift  that  helped  create  the  intellectual  pre¬ 
conditions  for  a  paradigm  shift  from  one  of  conquest  to  one  of  success. 

It  was  against  the  backdrop  of  the  development  of  these  ideas  about  CoG  and  the 
changing  strategic  realities  of  the  post-Gulf  War  world  (accelerated  by  the  1 1  September 
2001  terrorist  attacks  on  the  US)  that  the  second  version  of  EBO  development  began  to 
emerge  at  almost  the  same  time  as  the  first  version  was  gaining  popular  attention. 

In  June  2001,  the  Institute  for  Defense  Analysis  (IDA)  released  its  New  Perspectives  on 
Effects-Based  Operations,  a  significant  US  DoD-sponsored  study  of  the  subject.  The 
authors  of  the  report  recognized  that  America  was  facing  a  new  strategic  context,  and 
acquiring  new  capabilities  that  necessitated  a  change  in  thinking  about  military 
operations.  They  recognized  that  the  international  challenges  facing  the  US  in  the  future 
would  be  asymmetric  in  nature,  where  neither  America’s  national  survival  nor  its  vital 
interests  would  be  directly  at  stake,  but  that  survival  or  vital  interests  would  be  an  issue 
for  the  other  involved  parties.  Accordingly,  they  concluded  that  the  US’s  traditional 
focus  on  developing  and  employing  strong  offensive  capabilities  in  response  to 
traditional  conventional  threats  would  no  longer  always  be  militarily  appropriate  or 
politically  acceptable.  Thus,  they  concluded  that  emphasis  would  need  to  be  broadened 
from  war  winning  to  include  “conflict  prevention  and  producing  the  desired  post-conflict 
environment  (winning  the  peace  as  well  as  the  war).”  Consequently,  they  advocated  a 
version  of  EBO  that  was  aimed  at  this  broader  spectrum  of  uses. 

On  the  surface,  the  concept  that  they  visualized  was  not  much  different  from  that 
developed  in  the  first  version  of  EBO  development.  The  subtle  distinction  between  the 
two  can,  however,  be  understood  with  an  examination  of  the  following  quote  from  the 
study  report: 

Effects-based  thinking  emphasizes: 

•  the  importance  of  linking  all  actions  (political,  diplomatic,  economic,  and 
military)  to  operational  and  strategic  outcomes; 

•  continuous  assessment  of  the  effect  and  adaptation,  as  needed,  of  plans  and 
actions  to  the  reality  of  conflict; 

•  thinking  about  the  implications  of  actions  and  operations  in  terms  of  their  second- 
,  third-,  and  nth-order  effects;  and 

•  thinking  about  the  implications  and  consequences  of  effects  over  time. 164 

In  the  first  point,  the  inclusion  of  all  elements  of  national  power  (diplomatic,  economic 
and  military)  seems  similar  to  the  thinking  in  the  first  EBO  version.  However,  with  the 
inclusion  of  conflict  prevention  and  long  term  post-conflict  end  states,  the  importance  of 
the  non-military  instruments  of  national  power  increase  in  prominence,  arguably  by  a 
significant  margin.  Coming  from  an  institution  (DoD)  that  at  the  time  saw  its  purpose  as 


40 


fighting  and  winning  the  nation’s  wars,  this  deliberate  inclusion  in  EBO  theory  of  other 
instruments  of  national  power  on  a  co-equal  basis  with  military  power  was  a  significant 
change. 165  Moreover,  since  the  aim  in  pre-conflict  situations  is  usually  not  conquest  but 
behaviour  change,  the  application  of  coercion  strategies  would  arguably  be  more 
effective  in  pre-conflict  situations.  Accordingly,  the  work  in  coercion  theory  that  points 
toward  the  co-ordinated  application  of  all  forms  of  national  power  contributes  to  a 
broader  interpretation  of  this  first  point. 

The  second  point  also  illustrates  a  subtle  change  in  emphasis.  The  first  version  of  EBO 
recognizes  that  without  a  continuous  process  to  find  out  “ what  has  happened,  what  is 
happening  and  what  needs  to  be  done,"  “and  a  willingness  and  ability  to  adapt, 
operations  [would]  remain  based  on  pre-conflict  rules  and  assumptions.”166  However,  in 
an  expanded  concept  of  EBO,  the  level  of  complexity  that  this  assessment  process  must 
cope  with  is  orders  of  magnitude  greater  than  it  would  be  if  it  were  just  part  of 
conducting  the  relatively  simple  task  of  monitoring  the  progress  and  results  of  a  battle. 
Instead  of  conducting  assessment  by  using  familiar  metrics  such  as  sortie  rates,  kill  ratios, 
body  counts,  tons  of  ordnance  delivered,  etc,  the  report’s  authors  noted  that  it  will 
become  necessary  to  find  a  means  to  monitor  the  linkage  between  actions  and  outcomes. 
Therefore,  in  an  expanded  EBO  concept  the  assessment  would  not  be  focussed  on  the 
easily  measured  and  more  readily  understood  physical  domain,  but  would  be  aimed  at  the 

1  f\l 

information  and  cognitive  domains. 

The  third  and  fourth  points  could  also  be  said  to  hold  true  in  the  first  version  of  EBO. 
However,  if  one  thinks  of  pre-  and  post-conflict  instead  of  conflict  itself,  then  the 
temporal  perspective  and  scope  of  possible  actions  and  effects  changes.  Pre-  and  post- 
conflict  effects  may  take  a  very  long  time  to  materialize  and  will  probably  tend  to  be 
cumulative  or  cascading  in  nature  rather  than  complex,  direct  effects.  Again,  the  subtle 
change  is  not  the  task  per  se  but  its  complexity. 

To  be  sure,  the  IDA  report  recognized  that  the  ability  to  conduct  accurate  and  timely 
assessments  of  complex  adaptive  systems  has  been  to  date,  and  will  continue  to  be  for  the 
foreseeable  future,  the  limiting  factor  in  EBO.  However,  the  report  also  concluded 
(perhaps  naively)  that  emerging  intelligence,  surveillance  and  reconnaissance 
technologies,  networks  and  networking  would  be  able  to  meet  this  challenge  sooner 
rather  than  later. 

Also  in  2001,  Paul  Davis  echoed  the  IDA  report’s  views  on  the  inadequacy  of  current 
analytical  tools  for  EBO  and  therefore  the  importance  of  developing  new  ones.  He 
indicated  that  much  classified  development  work  was  in  progress,  and  said  that  this 
developmental  work  should  be  guided  by  five  broad  principles.  First,  analytical  tools 
supporting  defence  planning  should  focus  on  mission  system  capability  to  determine  the 
range  of  circumstances  in  which  a  mission  system  would  be  able  to  accomplish  missions 
and  to  what  level  of  confidence.  Second,  the  tools  should  fully  consider  the  scope  and 
magnitude  of  uncertainty  and  deal  explicitly  with  probability  and  chance  using  low- 
resolution  exploratory  analysis  and  a  family  of  models  and  games  approach.  Third, 
development  effort  should  be  placed  in  qualitative  modelling  including  cognitive 


41 


modelling  of  decision  makers,  key  players  and  influential  groups.  Fourth,  the  tools  should 
exploit  a  new  base  of  empirical  information  -  produced  through  historical  analysis  and  a 
combination  of  gaming,  realistic  simulation  and  experimentation  -  instead  of  “best 
estimate”  databases  that  tend  to  be  misleading.  Finally,  modelling  should  be  based  around 
C  and  decision-making  in  the  complex  adaptive  system  rather  than  around  mass  and 

physical  characteristics  of  forces.  Davis  concluded  by  stating  that  the  necessary 

168 

improvements  are  feasible  but  further  in-depth  work  is  still  required. 

In  2002,  Edward  Smith  published  a  lengthy  work  on  the  subject  of  EBO.  His  view  of 
EBO  was  similar  to  that  expressed  in  the  IDA  report.  He  also  recognized  the  problems 
posed  by  the  analytical  challenges  and  by  the  need  for  unprecedented  levels  of  situational 
awareness.  In  his  view,  the  solution  for  problems  with  analytical  tools  for  EBO  lies  in 
enabling  EBO  through  the  exploitation  of  network  centric  warfare  (NOW),  which  he 
defined  as  “the  concept  of  linking  all  aspects  of  warfighting  into  a  shared  situation 
awareness  and  shared  understanding  of  command  intent  so  as  to  achieve  unity  and 
synchronicity  of  effects  that  multiplies  the  power  of  military  forces.”169 

Smith  pointed  out  that  NOW  operations  are  not  new  and  used  the  US  Navy’s  1987 
operation  off  Libya  as  a  historical  example  of  how  the  concept  has  already  been 
employed.170  In  the  past,  however,  Smith  contended  that  network  centric  operations  were 
configured  to  provide  situational  awareness  for  combat  operations  and  not  for  EBO, 
which  is  focussed  on  objectives  rather  than  means  and  on  human  behaviour  and  decision¬ 
making  rather  than  on  things.  Thus,  he  argues  that  it  is  possible  to  mate  EBO  concepts 
with  existing  NOW  technologies  to  conduct  EBO  now.  However,  he  also  points  out  that 
the  technologies  supporting  NOW,  namely  sensor,  infonnation  and  weapons 
technologies,  are  in  the  midst  of  revolutionary  change  and,  accordingly,  the  increasing 
power  of  NOW  will  make  EBO  more  and  more  feasible. 171 

In  shifting  from  traditional  NOW  to  EBO,  Smith  tells  us  that  the  combat  situational 
awareness  presently  available  in  network  centric  systems,  where  all  sensors,  shooters  and 
decision  makers  have  the  same  tactical  “picture”  and  situational  awareness,  must  be 
expanded  to  produce  what  he  terms  “effects-based,  shared  situational  awareness.”  This 
capability  would  provide  two  major  additions  to  the  tactical  picture,  according  to  Smith: 

•  First,  in  effects  based  operations  we  must  deal  with  human  beings  and 
their  responses  to  the  stimuli  presented  by  our  actions.  That  means  that 
our  awareness  must  somehow  integrate  large  numbers  of  imprecise,  often 
subjective  data  and  information  containing  complex  variables  into  a 
picture  that  includes  all  of  the  elements  of  the  tactical  and  operational 
picture... 

•  Second,  because  many  of  the  inputs  needed  to  fashion  an  effects-based 
awareness  are  imprecise,  subjective,  and  meaningless  without  a  context, 
we  must  also  create  and  maintain  a  knowledge  base  to  provide  that 
context. 


42 


The  knowledge  base  to  which  Smith  refers  consists  of  three  major  categories.  The  first  is 
knowledge  of  the  adversary.  This  knowledge  is  much  more  than  statistical  databases  of 
inventories,  locations,  and  so  forth  that  are  used  today.  Instead,  this  is  knowledge  of  how 
the  adversary  will  perceive  actions  taken,  orient  them  into  his  system  of  heuristics  and 
biases  and  formulate  a  response  (essentially  understanding  his  OODA  process).  This 
subjective  knowledge  will  best  come  from  sound  “local  knowledge”  provided  by  well- 
informed  regional  analysts,  local  commanders  on  the  ground,  and  the  like.  The  second 
category  is  knowledge  of  self.  This  includes  the  same  understanding  of  the  protagonist’s 
OODA  processes  and  also  the  protagonist’s  objectives  and  intent.  As  Smith  points  out,  in 
the  inter-agency  and  often  multi-national  environment  where  EBO  will  be  undertaken, 
this  knowledge  of  self  will  need  to  be  constantly  updated  because  objectives  and  intent 
frequently  evolve  over  time  in  reaction  to  stimuli.  Finally,  knowledge  of  the  situation 
provides  the  ability  to  know  when  something  has  changed  and  how  that  change  might 
produce  cascading  physical  and  psychological  effects  in  the  targeted  opponent  and  other 
players  in  the  region.  Here  again  expert  advice  will  be  the  key  to  developing  this 
knowledge. 

Thus,  by  combining  the  current  NCW  tactical  pictures  with  expert  advice  into  an  effects- 
based  way  of  thinking  and  planning,  EBO-based  activities  are  currently  possible  to  a 
degree,  Smith  argues.  However,  he  points  out  that  the  weakest  area  of  the  EBO  process 
is  in  providing  feedback  -  particularly  feedback  on  the  status  of  behavioural  change  -  an 
assessment  in  common  with  the  IDA  analysis.  Nevertheless,  Smith  contends  that  finding 
practical  solutions  to  problems  with  EBO  will  not  be  insurmountable  and,  when  solved, 
NCW  will  further  facilitate  EBO  by  increasing  the  number  of  options  available  to 
decision  makers.  These  solutions  will  increase  access  to  significant  amounts  of 
knowledge  rather  than  information,  thus  permitting  co-ordinated  actions  focussed  on  the 
creation  of  the  right  effect  at  the  right  time. 

The  points  made  by  the  IDA  report,  by  Davis  and  by  Smith  are  echoed  in  other  sources. 
Most  of  them  agree  that  the  main  challenge  is  to  develop  the  analytical  tools  to  enable 
EBO.  Some  take  the  position  that  it  is  possible  to  do  so, 172  while  others  do  not. 173 

In  examining  the  organizational  aspects  of  EBO,  Charles  Miller  recognized  that,  to 
properly  employ  of  all  forms  of  national  power  in  an  EBO  concept,  unprecedented  levels 
of  inter-agency  co-ordination  would  be  required.  In  order  to  implement  this  co¬ 
ordination,  he  advocated  significant  organizational  changes  in  the  US  defence  and 
security  system.  At  the  national  level,  he  called  for  the  creation  of  a  Secretary-General 
for  National  Security  Affairs  that  would  have  the  funds  and  the  mandate  to  orchestrate 
inter-agency  co-ordination  at  the  executive  level  of  US  government.  He  also  argued  that 
“military/civil  commands,  departments,  agencies,  and  foreign  bureaus  should  be 
regionally  aligned  as  similarly  as  possible  to  simplify  regional  co-ordination  and  planning 
problems  and  to  maximize  efficiency  in  the  execution  of  interagency  crisis  operations.” 

174  At  the  theatre  level,  he  suggested  that  focussed  inter-agency  planning,  co-ordination 
and  execution  cells  should  be  established  at  each  regional  Combatant  Command  to  help 
ensure  that  the  military  effort  is  planned  and  executed  in  co-ordination  with  the  overall 
national  effort.  He  also  observed  that,  to  achieve  true  inter-agency  co-ordination,  all 


43 


players  would  need  to  follow  a  common  planning  process  and,  accordingly,  he  advocated 
that  the  US  military’s  Joint  Planning  and  Execution  System  (JOPES)  planning  process 
(similar  to  the  Canadian  Forces’  operational  planning  process  or  CFOPP)  should  be 
adopted  by  the  “State,  Treasury,  Justice,  and  other  US  government  departments,  agencies 
and  bureaus.”175 

The  subject  of  a  common  planning  process  has  also  been  discussed  by  Edward  Mann  et 
al.  They  also  recognized  that  any  military  action  would  require  close  inter-agency  co¬ 
ordination  at  the  national  level;  therefore,  Mann  et  al.  proposed  linking  the  military  joint 
planning  process  (JOPES)  to  a  strategic  planning  process  as  shown  in  Figure  2-4.  In  this 
model,  the  strategic  cycle  begins  and  ends  with  continuous  research  concerning  the 
strategic  environment,  which  is  followed  by  the  development  of  political  goals,  effects 
and  desired  outcomes.  Next,  an  overall  national  strategy  is  determined  and  then  each 
applicable  government  agency  is  given  its  tasks.  In  this  example,  the  tasks  assigned  to 
the  military  are  then  taken  and  analyzed  using  its  own  specific  planning  process. 
However,  if  Miller’s  logic  is  extended  to  this  model,  the  military  planning  process  could 
be  used  by  any  government  agency  and,  ideally,  all  would  use  roughly  the  same  planning 
process  to  analyze  their  tasks.  Once  each  agency  has  completed  their  first  cycle  of 
analysis,  they  then  feed  back  into  the  central  strategic  ring,  for  the  re-evaluation  and 
integration  of  the  various  plans.  The  goal  is  that,  with  multiple  repetitions,  the  plans 
should  become  increasingly  co-ordinated  and  remain  absolutely  focussed  on  high-level 
effects  and  objectives. 


Figure  2-4  -  Mann’s  Idealized  Functional-Planning  Process 


177 


3  Strategy 
Dtr/etapmenl 


4  Misskm  Parang' 
Integration 


2  Potcy  Goals' 
DfectsOesred 
OJcomee 


1  Strai^ic -Ervironroenl 
Research 


Operations  Envronmori 
Fv  Research 


2.  Millar# 


ObiecftvesOecte 


>  3.  Idortiicatcn  of 
Mil-ary  Strategy 


5.  Ckwetopmenl  of 
Joinl  Operations  Plan  4.  MMItBnllMI  Of 

Carters  of  GriMfy 


44 


Almost  all  of  the  ideas  presented  above  were,  to  varying  degrees,  incorporated  into  US 
joint  doctrine  publications.  The  first  significant  document  to  incorporate  them  was  the 
final  draft  of  US  Joint  Forces  Command’s  2001  white  paper  on  Rapid  Decisive 
Operations. 178  This  document  presented  effect-based  concepts  as  an  enabler  of  RDO  and 
recognized  the  need  for  knowledge  of  self,  adversary  and  environment,  as  well  as 
network-centric  tools  such  as  operational  net  assessment  (ONA),  common  relevant 
operational  pictures  (CROP)  and  joint  Intelligence,  Surveillance  and  Reconnaissance 
(ISR)  systems  to  achieve  RDO’s  effects-based  goals. 

The  Joint  Forces  Command  RDO  white  paper  also  described  how  effects-based  decisive 
operations  could  only  be  accomplished  through  close  co-ordination  of  the  various 
instruments  of  national  power  enabled  by  the  following  conditions: 

•  A  coherent  interagency  planning  mechanism  under  the  oversight  of  the 
National  Security  Council.  Supported  by  appropriate  agencies,  this 
planning  process  will  produce  a  broad  range  of  options  to  apply  DIME 
instruments  of  national  power. 

•  A  secure  and  fluid  collaborative  information  environment  that 
integrates  the  strategic  and  regional/operational  levels  for  planning, 
execution,  and  transition  operations.  Regional  and  functional  CINC’s 
[Commanders-in-Chief  -  now  called  Combatant  Commanders]  will 
participate  in  the  development  of  political-military  plans  for  crisis 
response.  Information  will  flow  from  the  operational  level  as  readily  as  it 
flows  to  it.  This  process  must  be  supported  by  appropriate  collaborative 
planning  tools. 

•  A  comprehensive,  operational  net  assessment  for  selected  adversaries. 

With  these  ONAs,  we  will  generate  a  wide  range  of  feasible  and 
innovative,  ways  and  means  to  resolve  a  crisis. 

•  A  virtual  or  actual  interagency  staff  element  to  collaborate  with 
agencies  at  the  strategic  and  regional/operational  levels  assigned  to  each 
regional  CINC.  Non-military  agencies  will  collaborate  with  the  warfighter 
to  develop  plans  to  produce  desired  effects.179 

Moreover,  the  white  paper  also  proposes  coordinating  all  effects  within  a  theatre  through 
the  use  of  an  Effects  Tasking  Order  (ETO),  which  specifies  for  all  those  US  and  coalition 
actors  in  the  theatre  (military  or  otherwise)  the  specific  effects  desired  by  the  theatre 
commander,  including  who  will  create  the  effects  and  at  what  time.  The  all-encompassing 
inter-agency  nature  of  a  document  such  as  an  ETO  is  supposed  to  ensure  that  all  players 
are  aware  what  the  others  are  doing  and  contribute  to  a  common  understanding  of  the 
commander’s  intent. 


45 


With  the  publication  in  2004  of  the  US  Joint  Forces  Command,  Joint  Warfighting 
Center’s  pamphlet,  Operational  Implications  ofEffects-Based  Operations,  it  became 
apparent  that  EBO  has  moved  out  of  the  shadow  of  RDO  and  was  being  examined  in  the 
joint  area  as  a  stand-alone  construct.  The  description  of  EBO  in  the  pamphlet  shows  that 
the  concepts  from  the  first  version  of  EBO  development  had  been  supplemented  with 
concepts  from  the  second  version: 

Effects-based  operations  seek  to  promote  synchronized,  overlapping,  near 
simultaneously  executed  actions  conducted  by  US  forces  in  joint  operations 

closely  integrated  with  multinational  and  interagency  partners  to  achieve 

180 

national  and  theatre  objectives. 

In  this  statement,  the  overlapping  and  near  simultaneity  of  the  operations  recall  the 
parallel  war  and  strategic  shock  provided  in  the  first  version  of  EBO,  and  the  inclusion  of 
theatre  objectives  is  also  a  hallmark  of  the  first  version.  However,  the  inclusion  of 
national  objectives,  interagency  partnering  and  synchronicity  all  point  to  the  expansion  of 
the  original  EBO  concept  into  the  second  version.  The  new  definition  of  EBO  also 
demonstrated  the  broadened  application  of  the  concept: 

Operations  that  are  planned,  executed,  assessed,  and  adapted  based  on  a 

holistic  understanding  of  the  operational  environment  in  order  to  influence 

or  change  system  behavior  or  capabilities  using  the  integrated  application  of 

181 

selected  instruments  of  power  to  achieve  directed  policy  aims. 

From  this  definition  it  is  clear  that  EBO  is  no  longer  limited  to  warfighting  scenarios  and 
is  aimed  instead  at  altering  the  behaviour  of  some  system.  It  is  important  to  note  here  that 
neither  the  word  enemy  nor  nation  is  used  in  the  definition.  Thus,  the  door  is  open  to  use 
EBO  to  influence  adversaries,  neutral  parties  or  allies,  whether  they  are  nations,  non¬ 
governmental  organizations  or  trans-national  groups.  Further,  it  is  clear  that  all  or  only 

some  instruments  of  national  power  could  be  used  as  required  to  achieve  the  desired 

1 82 

political  objectives  and  effects. 

The  major  components  of  EBO  are  described  in  the  pamphlet  as  effects-based  planning, 
effects-based  execution  and  effects-based  assessment.  All  reside  within  a  collaborative 
information  environment  and  are  linked  by  adaptation  and  operational  net  assessment. 

The  collaborative  information  environment  (CIE)  is  the  network-centric  environment, 
discussed  by  Smith  (above),  since  it  includes  networks,  knowledge  management,  decision 
support  capabilities  and  the  like.  ONA  is  an  operational  level  process  and  product  that  is 
used  to  conduct  top-down  analysis  of  a  Political,  Military,  Economic,  Social, 
Infrastructure,  and  Infonnation  (PMESII)  system.  The  key  to  this  analysis  is  the  location 
and  understanding  of  the  linkages  and  nodes,  which  can  be  behavioural,  physical  or 
functional,  in  the  targeted  system  of  systems. 

The  effects-based  planning  methodology  described  in  the  joint  pamphlet  is  designed  to 
integrate  the  use  of  all  instruments  of  power  in  time,  space  and  purpose  in  order  to  create 
the  desired  effects,  which  will  in  turn  bring  about  the  attainment  of  objectives.  Working 


46 


from  the  objectives,  EBO  planners  determine  what  effects  will  produce  the  directed 
objectives  and  then  use  ON  A  tools  to  determine  what  actions  taken  on  which  nodes  are 
likely  to  produce  these  effects.  These  are  then  coupled  with  resources  or  forces  to 
complete  the  effects-nodes-actions-resources  (E-N-A-R)  linkages.  Once  these  linkages 
are  understood,  then  various  courses  of  action  can  be  considered  and  tested  before  one  is 
selected  for  execution. 


The  expansion  of  EBO  to  include  pre-and  post  conflict  situations  is  abundantly  clear  in 
the  simple  planning  example  given  in  the  pamphlet.  The  figures  from  this  planning 
example  (see  Figures  2-5  and  2-6  below)  are  shown  to  illustrate  the  use  of  EBO  in  a 
conflict  avoidance  situation  where  conquest  does  not  produce  success.  Indeed,  it  is  a 
situation  where  the  use  of  military  force  to  achieve  overall  success  would  be  construed  as 
a  partial  failure.  (Note  that  in  the  Figures  MOE  is  measure  of  effectiveness  and  MOP  is 
measure  of  performance.) 

Figure  2-5  -  EBO  Planning  -  Objectives  and  Effects183 


SITUATION:  Two  regional  countries 
are  cortesting  ownership  of  a  set  of 
islands.  Both  state  that  they  have  longstanding 
historical  basis  for  their  d  si  ms. 

Both  are  relatively  equal  in  military 
capability,  and  Country  X  has  placed 
limited  military  forces  cn  one  of  the 
islands.  Courtly  Y  is  threatening  a 
military  response.  A  war  between  the 
two  couitrieswoUd  destabilize  the 
regon,  which  the  President  considers  a 
threat  to  US  vital  interests.  He  has 
dedded  to  intervene  and  has 
established  several  strategic  objedi  ves 
that  contribute  to  the  desired  end  stdte. 
Opposite  is  one  objective,  two  sample 
effects  related  to  Country  X,  and 
assodated  MOE  a  Figure  5  expands 
the  example  to  indude  sample  nodes, 
actions,  and  related  measures  of 
perform  ance  (M  OP  s) . 


Desired  End  State:  Long-term  peace  and 
stability  in  the  region. 

US  Objective:  Countries  X  and  Y 
resolve  disputed  islands  issue 
peacefully. 

Effect  1:  Country  X  engages 
Country  Y  in  diplomatic  effortsto 
resolve  crisis. 

MOE:  Level  of  inflammatory 
rhetoric. 

Effect  Z  Country  X  withdraws 
military  forces  from  the  island. 

MOE:  Level  of  forces  on  the 
island. 


In  this  rather  simple  example  beginning  at  Figure  2-5,  planning  begins  from  the  top 
down.  First  the  desired  end-state  is  identified  and  the  national  objective  is  deduced. 

After  analysis,  two  effects  are  identified  (in  this  example)  that  will  fulfil  the  objective. 
Next,  at  Figure  2-6,  nodes  are  identified  and  again,  after  analysis,  actions  that  can  work 
on  or  through  that  node  are  identified.  While  this  example  has  not  gone  so  far  as  to 
identify  resources,  it  does  identify  measures  of  performance  that  hint  at  what  the  resource 
allocations  would  be.  Again,  this  is  a  very  simple  example  but  its  importance  here  is  to 
illustrate  that  nothing  in  the  example  is  about  parallel  war,  strategic  shock  or  precision 
weaponry  as  would  be  expected  in  an  EBO  version  one  scenario,  because  this  is  an 
example  of  an  EBO  version  two  scenario. 


47 


Figure  2-6  -  Nodes,  Actions  and  MOPs 


184 


US  Objective:  Comtries  X  and  Y  resolve  cisputed 
islands  issue  peacefidly. 


Effect  1:  Couitry  X  engages  Country  Y  in  diplomatic 
efforts  to  resolve  crisis 

Nodes  A  &  B:  Courtry  X  and  Y  foreign  ministries. 

Action:  US  Department  of  State  delivers 
demarches. 

MOP:  Demarche  delivered  by  US  Ambassador 
and  cortent  acknov\ledged  by  F  oreign  Ministers 

Effect  2:  Courtry  X  with  (taws  military  forces  from  the 
island. 

II  ode  A:  Courtry  X  foreign  ministry. 

Action:  US  Department  of  State  delivers 
demarche. 

MOP:  Demarche  delivered  by  US  Ambassador 
and  cortent  acknowledged  by  F oreign  Minister 

II ode C:  Courtry  X  forces  on  isiard. 

Action:  Joint  force  overtly  moritors  withdrawal. 

Nodes  D  &  E:  Country  X  and  Y  defense  ministries 

MOP:  Lowlevel  recon  over  flights  conducted  by 

US  and  observed  by  Country  X. 

Action:  JFC  mairtains  viside  US  military 
presence. 

MOP:  Forces  positioned  and  activities  conducted 
byJFCandobservedbyC  ourtries  X  and  Y. 

Little  is  said  in  the  pamphlet  about  effects-based  execution  other  than  that  it  is  normal 
military  execution  co-ordinated  with  the  other  elements  of  national  power.  However, 
since  the  document  calls  for  the  establishment  of  a  Joint  Interagency  Coordination  Group 
at  the  Joint  Force  Commander’s  headquarters,  it  would  appear  that  this  entity  would  be 
expected  to  facilitate  or  even  conduct  this  co-ordination  during  the  execution  and 
planning  phases.  Effects-based  assessment  receives  little  attention  in  the  pamphlet, 
considering  the  depth  of  discussion  in  the  literature.  However,  this  too  is  understandable 
since  this  is  a  concept  paper  that  assumes  that  the  technical  challenges  can  be  overcome. 

The  pamphlet  acknowledges  that  there  are  many  challenges  yet  to  be  overcome  to  make 
this  second  version  of  EBO  workable.  In  fact,  the  pamphlet  recognizes  that  this  version 
of  EBO  may  never  be  workable  as  it  is  currently  envisioned.  Nevertheless,  the  pamphlet 
concludes  that,  “as  EBO  matures,  the  joint  community  can  expect  significant  refinements 
to  the  concept.  This  maturation  is  likely  to  transpire  over  a  number  of  years.  But  no 
matter  the  scope  or  rapidity  of  these  developments,  EBO  will  likely  be  judged  as  an 

185 

important  stimulus  to  operational  art.” 

As  Plato  sagely  stated,  “necessity  is  the  mother  of  invention.”  In  the  aftermath  of  the 
Gulf  War,  it  appeared  that  war  had  fundamentally  changed  from  a  pattern  of  increasingly 
total  war  to  one  of  asymmetric  war  waged  over  a  spectrum  of  conflict  that  ranged  from 


48 


peace  to  full-scale  war.  The  first  iteration  of  EBO,  which  was  based  on  an  assumption  of 
traditional  modes  of  armed  conflict  and  which  operated  with  the  paradigm  of  military 
conquest,  had  only  limited  application  in  this  new  environment.  Accordingly,  some 
analysts  began  to  conceive  of  a  new  twist  to  EBO  that  would  make  it  applicable  in  a 
much  broader  range  of  situations  where  conquest  was  not  the  only  means  to  achieve 
success. 

This  shift  in  thinking  was  aided  by  the  body  of  work  that  had  been  built  around  coercion 
theory,  which  held  that  action  short  of  armed  conflict  could  produce  strategic  results. 
Coercion  theory  also  introduced,  among  other  things,  an  appreciation  for  the  complexity 
of  the  new  problems,  the  multifaceted  interplay  of  many  variables,  the  need  for  careful 
analysis  of  each  situation  on  its  own  merits,  and  the  acceptance  that  all  instruments  of 
national  power  were  relevant  to  finding  desired  solutions.  Moreover,  re-examination  of 
the  centre  of  gravity  concept  within  military  circles  permitted  a  change  in  focus  from 
destruction  as  an  end  to  attainment  of  objectives,  using  a  variety  of  means,  as  an  end. 

Much  has  been  written  on  this  more  widely  focussed,  second  version  of  EBO 
development.  The  idea  has  caught  hold  and  appears  to  have  surpassed  the  original  version 
of  EBO,  as  US  joint  publications  are  currently  reflecting  the  conduct  of  EBO  within  a 
broader  paradigm  of  success  rather  than  conflict.  However,  much  work  remains  to  be 
done  to  create  the  necessary  analytical  and  situational  awareness  tools  to  make  the  second 
version  of  EBO  truly  practical. 

Conclusion 

The  purpose  of  this  essay  was  to  contribute  to  the  current  debate  over  whether  effects- 
based  operations  is  or  is  not  a  revolution  in  military  affairs.  The  question  is  complicated 
by  the  fact  that  there  are  two  versions  of  EBO,  one  that  seeks  success  in  armed  conflict 
and  one  that  seeks  success  in  a  much  broader  application. 

What  we  now  know  as  EBO  began  with  a  very  old  notion  that  shaped  the  development  of 
the  US  Air  Force,  the  organization  from  which  EBO  suddenly  seemed  to  spring  in  the 
1990s.  The  central  idea  behind  EBO  at  that  time  was  that  there  was  a  better,  cheaper  and, 
in  the  long  run,  a  more  humane  way  of  winning  than  to  wage  the  total  wars  that 
characterized  much  of  the  20th  century.  To  many,  the  aeroplane  offered  the  means  to 
achieve  this  dream. 

Germany  and  Great  Britain  both  developed  the  idea  of  strategic  bombing  during  the  First 
World  War  as  a  means  to  sap  the  will  of  their  adversaries  and  to  force  them  out  of  the 
fight  by  striking  at  their  strategic  heart.  The  idea  of  attacking  certain  key  targets  by  air 
was  passed  to  the  US  through  Lieutenant-Colonel  Edgar  Gorrell  of  the  US  Air  Service 
while  he  was  in  France.  His  writings  then  inspired  the  members  of  the  Air  Corps  Tactical 
School  in  the  inter-war  years,  who  then  developed  an  airpower  theory  based  on  attacking 
key  nodal  targets  within  the  industrial  web  of  the  enemy  nation.  The  theory  that  they 
developed  became  the  raison-d’etre  of  the  Army  Air  Corps  in  its  struggle  for 
independence  from  its  parent  service,  and,  thus  this  idea  was  deeply  ingrained  in  its 


49 


members  as  an  enduring  truth.  Indeed,  the  concept  was  so  deeply  ingrained  in  US  Air 
Force  culture  that  it  survived  the  experiences  of  the  Second  World  War,  which  provided 
inconclusive  data  to  support  existing  air  power  theory,  and  the  Korean  and  Vietnam  wars, 
which  appeared,  in  some  ways,  to  contradict  existing  air  power  theory. 

The  stinging  -  and  for  many,  the  unnecessary  -  American  defeat  in  Vietnam  provided 
fertile  conditions  for  the  resurrection  of  the  idea  that  airpower  could  strike  at  the  strategic 
heart  of  an  enemy,  sap  his  will  and  force  his  capitulation.  An  update  of  this  idea  by 
Colonel  John  Warden  and  the  addition  of  manoeuvre  warfare-like  ideas  such  as  Colonel 
John  Boyd’s  OODA  loop,  produced  a  revised  version  of  the  original  concepts  of  strategic 
bombing  using  terms  such  as  “parallel  war”  and  “strategic  paralysis.”  Up  until  the  1990s, 
however,  the  means  to  practically  implement  these  concepts  did  not  exist. 

In  the  Persian  Gulf  War,  or  first  Gulf  War,  these  concepts  were  mated  with  new 
technology  in  the  form  of  stealth  and  precision  weaponry  with  promising  results.  In  the 
aftennath  of  that  war,  General  David  Deptula  introduced  the  term  “effects-based 
operations”  and  declared  that  EBO  was  a  fundamental  change  in  the  nature  of  war. 

Was  this  a  revolutionary  change?  Viewed  from  a  short-term  perspective,  it  was  not.  It 
could  be  seen  as  the  continued  evolution  of  an  idea  that  had  predated  the  introduction  of 
powered  flight.  However,  viewed  from  a  historical  perspective,  the  first  iteration  of  EBO 
did  seem  to  meet  the  requirements  of  an  RMA.  It  could  be  argued  that  the  technological 
innovations  developed  in  the  first  century  of  flight  had  finally  reached  the  point,  in  the 
first  Gulf  War,  where  they  could  be  successfully  applied  to  the  airpower  theory  that  had 
emerged  in  the  First  World  War  and  that,  over  the  course  of  the  century,  these 
innovations  had,  in  fact,  fundamentally  altered  the  manner  in  which  wars  were  fought. 
Accordingly,  whether  or  not  this  first  version  of  EBO  is  revolutionary  or  evolutionary  is  a 
matter  of  perspective. 

As  the  21st  century  dawned,  the  US  and  other  powers  were  faced  with  a  new  strategic 
reality  where  their  familiar  pattern  of  conflict  resolution  by  total  war  was  no  longer 
operative.  Success  was  no  longer  necessarily  achieved  by  military  conquest  and,  since 
EBO  as  it  was  originally  conceived  was  about  military  victory,  it  seemed  to  be  a  less 
useful  and  revolutionary  tool  than  it  first  appeared  to  be.  This  failing  of  EBO  gave  rise  to 
the  second  version  of  EBO  development,  which  is  intended  to  broaden  the  application  of 
EBO  into  areas  other  than  armed  conflict  between  nations. 

Does  this  second  version  of  EBO  qualify  as  an  RMA?  The  answer  to  this  question 
appears  to  be  “no”  because  this  new  version  of  EBO  evolved  from  the  original  thinking 
that  shaped  the  development  of  airpower  theory  and  has  been  supplemented  by  other 
ideas  to  create  a  new  way  of  thinking  about  how  to  achieve  national  objectives  in  peace 
and  in  war.  It  is,  to  paraphrase  Clausewitz,  a  continuation  of  policy  by  other  means 
rather  than  just  by  means  of  war.  However,  the  second  iteration  of  EBO  still  awaits  the 
development  of  the  practical  enabling  technologies  and  tools  such  as  those  promised  by 
the  proponents  of  network-centric  warfare.  Much  as  the  first  version  of  EBO  was  not 
practical  until  stealth  and  precision  weapon  technologies  had  matured  sufficiently,  the 


50 


second  version  of  EBO  will  not  be  practical  until  it  is  mated  with  the  new  technologies 
currently  under  development. 


1  This  chapter  was  originally  written  by  Colonel  Cottingham  as  a  directed  study  paper  for  the  War  Studies 
program  at  Royal  Military  College  of  Canada  in  July  2004. 

2  Christopher  Bellamy,  “Military  Revolution,”  in  Richard  Holmes,  ed.,  The  Oxford  Companion  to  Military ; 
History  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2001),  587. 

3  See  Gunther  E.  Rothenberg,  “Maurice  of  Nassau,  Gustavus  Adolphus,  Raimondo  Montecuccoli,  and  the 
‘Military  Revolution’  of  the  Seventeenth  Century,”  in  Peter  Paret,  ed.,  Makers  of  Modern  Strategy 
(Princeton,  NJ:  Princeton  University  Press,  1986),  32-63,  and  Martin  van  Creveld,  “Technology  and  War  I: 
To  1945,”  in  Charles  Townsend,  ed.,  The  Oxford  History  of  Modern  War  (Oxford:  Oxford  University 
Press,  2000). 

4  Alvin  Toffler,  The  Third  Wave  (New  York:  Bantam  Books, 1989),  and  Alvin  and  Heidi  Toffler,  War  and 
Anti-War:  Making  Sense  of  Today’s  Global  Chaos  (New  York:  Warner  Books, 1995). 

5  Richard  O.  Hundley,  Past  Revolutions,  Future  Transformations:  What  Can  the  History  of  Revolutions  in 
Military  Affairs  Tell  Us  About  Transforming  the  U.S.  Military?  (Santa  Monica,  CA:  RAND,  1999),  7. 
Available  at  http://www.rand.org/cgi-bin/Abstracts/ordi/getabbvdoc. r>r?doc=MR-1029&hilite=T&qs=rma. 
Accessed  24  Jul  2007. 

6  Ibid.,  75. 

7  Jeffery  R.  Barnett,  Future  War:  An  Assessment  of  Aerospace  Campaigns  in  2010  (Maxwell  Air  Force 
Base,  AL:  Air  University  Press,  January  1996),  13.  Emphasis  in  original. 

8  Andrew  Marshall,  Director  of  the  Office  of  Net  Assessments  in  the  Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense  as 
quoted  in  Lothar  Ibriigger,  The  Revolution  in  Military’  Affairs  (NATO  Parliamentary  Assembly  Report, 
Science  and  Technology  Committee,  Report  AR299STC-E,  November  1998),  np.  Available  at 
http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/nato/ar299stc-e.html.  Accessed  24  Jul  2007. 

9  For  an  indication  of  the  transformation  activities  being  examined  or  implemented,  see  the  US  DoD 
Transformation  website  at  http://www.dcfcnsclink.mil/transformation/ .  Accessed  24  Jul  2007. 

10  Elinor  C.  Sloan,  Allied  Approaches  to  the  Revolution  in  Military’  Affairs:  Britain,  France,  Germany  and 
Australia  (Ottawa:  Department  of  National  Defence,  Directorate  of  Strategic  Analysis,  Policy  Planning 
Division,  Policy  Group  Project  Report  No.  99.03,  February  1999). 

1 1  For  a  detailed  outline  of  the  ACSC  understanding  of  EBO  and  its  application  at  the  time,  see  Robert  D. 
Pollock,  “Roads  Not  Taken:  Theoretical  Approaches  to  Operation  Deliberate  Force,”  in  Robert  C.  Owen, 
ed.,  Deliberate  Force:  A  Case  Study  in  Effective  Air  Campaigning  -  Final  Report  of  the  Air  University 
Balkans  Air  Campaign  Study  (Maxwell  Air  Force  Base,  AL:  Air  University  Press,  January  2000),  440-5. 

12  Maris  “Buster”  McCrabb,  “Explaining  ‘Effects’:  A  Theory  for  an  Effects-based  Approach  to  Planning, 
Executing  and  Assessing  Operations,”  Version  2.0,  dated  7  August  2001,  3.  Available  at 
http://www.dtic.mil/iointvision/ideas  concepts/ebo.doc.  Accessed  24  Jul  2007. 

13  A  good  survey  of  the  published  literature  may  be  found  in  Z.  Zobaggy,  Literature  Survey  on  Effects- 
Based  Operations,  A  PhD  Study  on  Measuring  Military  Effects  and  Effectiveness  (The  Hague:  Netherlands 
Organization  for  Applied  Scientific  Research  (TNO)  2003).  Available  at 

http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/ebo/Literature  survey  on  Effects-Based  Operations.pdf.  Accessed 

24  Jul  2007. 

14  See  US  Air  Force,  The  US  Air  Force  Transformation  Flight  Plan  2004  (Washington,  DC:  HQ  USAF 
/XPXC  Future  Concepts  and  Transformation  Division,  2004),  US  Army,  2004  Army  Transformation 
Roadmap  (Washington,  DC:  Office  of  the  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff,  US  Army  Operations,  Army 
Transformation  Office,  July  2004),  and  US  Navy,  Naval  Transformation  Roadmap  2003:  Assured  Access 


51 


&  Power  Projection  ...  From  the  Sea  (Washington,  DC:  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  2003).  All  are  available  at 
http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/.  Accessed  24  Jul  2007. 

15  See  US  Air  Force,  Strategic  Attack,  Air  Force  Doctrine  Document  2-1.2  dated  30  September  2003. 
Available  at  http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/iel/service  pubs/afdd2  1  2.pdf.  Accessed  24  Jul  2007.  See  also 
US  Joint  Staff,  Joint  Doctrine  for  Targeting,  Joint  Publication  3-60,  dated  17  January  2002.  Available  at 
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/iel/new  pubs/jp3  60.pdf.  Accessed  24  Jul  2007. 

16  For  references  to  the  UK  doctrinal  publications  on  the  subject,  see  R.M.  Poole,  “Washing  the  Windows? 
The  Utility  of  Air  Power  in  Nation  Building,”  Advanced  Military  Studies  Course  Paper,  Canadian  Forces 
College,  dated  October  2004.  Available  at  http://wps.cfc.dnd.ca/papers/amsc/amsc7/poole.htm.  Accessed 

24  Jul  2007. See  also  United  Kingdom,  British  Defence  Doctrine  (Second  Edition),  Joint  Warfare 
Publication  0-01  (Shrivenham,  Swindon:  Joint  Doctrine  and  Concepts  Centre,  October  2001). 

17  Donald  Lowe  and  Simon  Ng,  Effects-Based  Operations:  Language,  Meaning  and  the  Effects-Based 
Approach  (Canberra,  Australia:  Defence  Science  and  Technology  Organization,  Department  of  Defence, 
2004). 

18  Craig  King,  “Effects  Based  Operations:  Buzzword  or  Blueprint?”  Advanced  Military  Studies  Course 
Paper,  Canadian  Forces  College,  dated  October  2004.  Available  at 
http://wps.cfc.dnd.ca/papers/amsc7/king.htm.  Accessed  24  Jul  2007. 

19  Paid  K.  Davis,  Effects  Based  Operations  (EBO):  A  Grand  Challenge  for  the  Analytical  Community 
(Santa  Monica,  CA:  RAND,  2001),  1.  Available  at 

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph  reports/MR1029/.  Accessed  24  Jul  2007. 

211  United  States,  Military’  Transformation:  A  Strategic  Approach  (Washington,  DC:  Director,  Force 
Transformation,  Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  Fall  2003),  36. 

21  Edward  Mann,  Gary  Endersby  and  Tob  Searle,  “Dominant  Effects:  Effects-Based  Joint  Operations,” 
Aerospace  Power  Journal  15,  no.  3  (Fall  2001),  np  (online  version).  Available: 

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/api/api01/fal01/vorfal01.html.  Accessed  24  Jul  2007. 

2_  Paid  K.  Davis,  Effects  Based  Operations,  2. 

23  Carl  H.  Builder,  The  Icarus  Syndrome:  The  Role  of Air  Power  Theory  in  the  Evolution  and  Fate  of  the 
US  Air  Force  (New  Brunswick,  NJ:  Transaction  Publishers,  2003),  207. 

~4  Robin  Higham,  Air  Power:  A  Concise  History’  (Manhattan,  KS:  Sunflower  University  Press,  1988),  9-11. 

25  The  idea  of  aerial  warfare  predates  the  introduction  of  aircraft  by  a  wide  margin.  See,  for  example,  David 
Wragg,  The  Offensive  Weapon:  The  Strategy’  of  Bombing  (London:  Robert  Hale,  1986),  18,  J.W.R.  Taylor, 
A  History’  of  Aerial  Warfare  (London:  Hamlyn,  1974),  7,  and  Manfred  Griehl  and  Joachim  Dressel, 
Zeppelin!:  The  German  Airship  Story’  (London:  Arms  &  Armour  Press,  1990),  chapter  1. 

2(1  Tami  Davis  Biddle,  “Air  Power,”  in  Andreopoulos  Howard  and  Shulman,  eds.  The  Laws  of  War: 
Constraints  on  Warfare  in  the  Western  World  (London:  Yale  University  Press,  1994),  141-2. 

27  W.  Hays  Parks,  “Air  War  and  the  Law  of  War,”  The  Air  Force  Law  Review  32,  no.  1  (1990),  1-226.  The 
quote  is  from  the  presentation  of  Captain  Crozier,  the  US  representative,  to  the  plenary  session  of 
Convention  1  from  Parks,  “Air  War  and  the  Law  of  War,”  12. 

~8  Alan  Stephens,  In  Search  of  the  Knock-Out  Blow:  The  Development  of  Air  Power  Doctrine  1911-1945 
(Canberra,  Australia:  RAAF  Air  Power  Studies  Centre  (APSC),  APSC  Paper  No.  61,  1998). 

29  Alan  Stephens,  “The  True  Believers:  Airpower  Between  the  Wars,”  Alan  Stephens,  ed.,  The  War  in  the 
Air:  1914-1994,  (Maxwell  Air  Force  Base,  AL:  Air  University  Press,  2001),  55. 

30  Higham,  Air  Power,  1 1 . 

’  In  reality,  this  was  far  from  the  truth  for  the  major  lesson  of  the  Libyan  campaign  was  the  airplane’s 
ability  to  conduct  battlefield  reconnaissance  and  develop  timely  and  accurate  intelligence  on  the  enemy. 

32  Kenneth  Poolman,  Zeppelins  Against  London  (New  York:  The  John  Day  Company,  1961),  27-8. 


52 


33  Quoted  in  Douglas  H.  Robinson,  “The  Zeppelin  Bomber:  High  Policy  Guided  by  Wishful  Thinking?” 

The  Airpower  Historian  3,  no.  3  (July  1961),  133. 

34  Ernst  A  Lehmann  and  Howard  Mingos,  The  Zeppelins:  The  Development  of  the  Airship  with  the  Story  of 
the  Zeppelin  Air  Raids  in  the  World  War  (New  York:  J.H.  Sears  and  Company,  1927),  38-9. 

35  Quoted  in  Robinson,  “The  Zeppelin  Bomber,”  135. 

36  Ibid.,  147. 

37  For  a  full  accounting  of  the  German  Gotha  raids  and  the  British  reactions  to  them,  see  Raymond  H. 
Fredette,  The  Sky  on  Fire:  The  First  Battle  of  Britain  1917-1918  (Washington,  DC:  Smithsonian  Institution 
Press,  1991). 

38  Basil  Collier,  A  1 1 is  lory  of  Air  Power  (London  Weidenfeld  &  Nicolson,  1974),  68. 

39  George  Quester  cited  in  Martin  L.  Fracker,  “Psychological  Effects  of  Aerial  Bombardment,”  Airpower 
Journal  6,  no.  3  (Fall  1992),  np  (online  version).  Available  at 

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/api/api92/fall92/fracker.htm.  Accessed  24  Jul  2007. 

40  Douhet  would  later  be  heralded  as  one  of  the  inter-war  air  power  prophets.  As  Richard  Hallion  explains 
in  his  introduction  to  Douhet’s  The  Command  of  the  Air,  “in  the  pantheon  of  air  power  spokesmen,  Guilio 
Douhet  holds  center  stage.  His  writings,  more  often  cited  that  perhaps  actually  read,  appear  as  excerpts  and 
aphorisms  in  the  writings  of  numerous  other  air  power  spokesmen,  advocates  -  and  critics.”  See  Guilio 
Douhet,  translated  by  Dino  Ferrari,  The  Command  of  the  Air  (Washington,  DC:  Air  Force  History  and 
Museums  Program,  1998). 

41  Robert  Frank  Futrell,  Ideas,  Concepts,  Doctrine:  Basic  Thinking  in  the  United  States  Air  Force,  1907- 
1960  (Maxwell  Air  Force  Base,  AL:  Air  University  Press,  December  1989,)  24. 

42  George  K.  Williams,  Biplanes  and  Bombsights:  British  Bombing  During  World  War  I  (Maxwell  Air 
Force  Base,  AL:  Air  University  Press,  1999),  149.  Before  becoming  a  Major  in  the  newly  formed  RAF, 
Tiverton  had  been  a  Lieutenant  in  the  RN. 

3  Tami  Davis  Biddle,  Rhetoric  and  Reality  in  Air  Warfare,  The  Evolution  of  British  and  American  Ideas 
About  Strategic  Bombing,  1914-1945  (Princeton,  NJ:  Princeton  University  Press,  2002),  38-9. 

44  Ibid.,  54. 

45  Lee  Kennett,  A  History  of  Strategic  Bombing  (New  York:  Charles  Scribner’s  Sons,  1982),  51. 

46  For  an  excellent  analysis  of  the  British  post-war  analysis  see  Chapter  6  of  Williams,  Biplanes  and 
Bombsights.  His  examination  uses  the  RAF  first-hand  reports,  which  are  corroborated  in  the  most  part  by 
independent,  US  first-hand  reports,  to  demonstrate  that,  during  and  after  the  war,  the  RAF  greatly 
exaggerated  the  effect  of  bombing  raids  on  Germany  and  sought  to  conceal  the  loss  rates  of  RAF  aircraft 
and  crews.  Williams  paints  a  picture  of  how  first  the  RNAS,  then  the  RFC  and  finally  the  RAF  consistently 
portrayed  a  rosy  picture  strategic  bombing  to  please  a  war  weary  British  public  and  government  during  the 
war.  After  the  war,  the  Air  Ministry  perpetuated  the  optimistic  viewpoint  in  an  effort  to  justify  the 
continued  independence  of  the  RAF.  While  the  positive  spin  was  successful  in  protecting  the  RAF  from  its 
sister  services  in  the  post-war  period,  it  also  denied  the  RAF  the  opportunity  to  learn  the  true  lessons  of  the 
First  World  War. 

47  Hugh  Trenchard  cited  in  Tami  Davis  Biddle,  “British  and  American  Approaches  to  Strategic  Bombing: 
Their  Origins  and  Implementation  in  the  World  War  II  Combined  Bomber  Offensive,”  Journal  of  Strategic 
Studies  18,  no.  1  (1995),  92. 

48  The  “US  Bombing  Survey,  WWI  (Summary)”  report.  Available  at 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/wwl/bbg-wwl.htm,  np.  Accessed  24  Jul  2007. 

49  Ibid. 


53 


50  "Col  Gorrell's  History  of  the  US  Army  Air  Service,"  is  held  at  The  National  Archives,  Washington  DC. 
While  copies  or  extracts  of  the  document  are  not  available  on  the  internet,  several  references  to  it  are. 

These  may  be  found  with  a  Google  search  for  “Gorrell’s  history.” 

51  Futrell,  Ideas,  Concepts  and  Doctrine,  39. 

52  The  Air  University  Library’s  only  English  language  copy  of  Ernst  Wilhelm  von  Hoeppner’s  Germany’s 
War  In  the  Air  (published  1921)  was  an  Air  Corps  Tactical  School  in-house  translation  from  the  original 
German  by  J.  Hawley  Larned,  Air  Corps  Reserve.  The  date  of  the  translation  is  not  indicated  on  the 
manuscript.  However,  the  library’s  catalogue  indicates  the  document  was  taken  on  charge  in  1940.  Copies 
of  the  same  book  in  German  and  French  were  available  in  the  1920s. 

53  Robert  T.  Finney,  History  of  the  Air  Corps  Tactical  School  1920-1940  (Air  Force  History  and  Museums 
Program,  1998),  63. 

54  Malcolm  Smith,  “The  Allied  Air  Offensive,”  Journal  of  Strategic  Studies  13,  no.  1  (1990),  69-70. 

55  Barry  D.  Watts,  The  Foundations  of  US  Air  Doctrine:  The  Problem  of  Friction  in  War  (Maxwell  Air 
Force  Base,  AL:  Air  University  Press,  1984),  18. 

56  A  number  of  persons  were  involved  in  the  production.  However  the  “Task  Force”  that  did  most  of  the 
detailed  work  consisted  of  four  officers.  They  were  Colonel  Harold  George,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Kenneth 
Walker,  Major  Laurence  Kuter  and  Major  Haywood  Hansell.  Hansell’s  account  of  the  development  of 
AWPD-1  can  be  found  in  Haywod  S.  Hansell,  The  Air  Plan  That  Defeated  Hitler  (Atlanta:  Higgins- 
McArthur/Longino  &  Porter,  Inc,  1972),  61-99. 

57  AWPD  received  the  task  on  4  August.  Hansell  is  unclear  on  when  the  first  briefing  on  the  plan  was  given 
to  Brigadier-General  Twaddle,  the  G-3  of  the  War  Dept  General  Staff  as  a  rehearsal.  It  was  presented  to 
the  Chief  of  the  Air  Corps  on  22  August  and  then  to  General  Marshall  on  30  August.  Thus  the  team  had  in 
the  order  of  2  weeks  to  produce  a  complete  war  plan  from  a  clean  sheet  of  paper.  Hansell,  The  Air  Plan 
That  Defeated  Hitler,  60,  90,  93,  94. 

58  Hansell,  The  Air  Plan  That  Defeated  Hitler,  76. 

59  Ibid. 

60  The  name  US  Army  Air  Forces  had  replaced  the  designation  US  Army  Air  Corps  in  December  1942. 

61  Quoted  in  Victor  B.  Anthony  and  R.A.  Mason,  The  Combined  Bomber  Offensive  In  Europe  (US  Air 
Force  Academy,  Colorado  Dept  of  History,  nd). 

62  Information  extracted  from  Hansell,  The  Air  Plan  That  Defeated  Hitler,  163. 

63  See  for  instance  Williamson  Murray,  “Did  Strategic  Bombing  Work?”  MHQ:  The  Quarterly  Journal  of 
Military’  History’  8,  no.  3  (Spring  1996),  28-41. 

64  Builder,  The  Icarus  Syndrome,  141. 

65  See  Franklin  D’Olier  et  al..  The  United  States  Strategic  Bombing  Survey  Summary  Report  (European 
War)  (30  September  1945),  reprinted  in  The  Unites  States  Strategic  Bombing  Surveys  (European  War) 
(Pacific  War)  (Maxwell  Air  Force  Base,  AL:  Air  University  Press,  1987). 

66  See  Alan  Stephens,  In  Search  of  the  Knock-Out  Blow. 

67  An  interesting  critique  of  the  structural  bias  of  the  USSBS  has  been  offered  by  Gian  Gentile  who  notes 
“[a]s  a  collection  of  documents,  as  an  establishment  organisation,  and  through  the  ideas  of  its  civilian  and 
military  analysts,  the  United  States  Strategic  bombing  survey  reflected  the  American  conceptual  approach 
to  strategic  bombing.  Two  fundamental  tenets  formed  the  American  conception:  strategic  air  power  should 
be  used  not  to  attack  ground  forces  in  battle  directly  but  instead  to  attack  the  vital  elements  of  the  enemy’s 
war  making  capacity,  and  the  air  force  must  be  independent  of  and  coequal  with  the  army  and  the  navy.” 
Gian  P.  Gentile,  How  Effective  is  Strategic  Bombing?:  Lessons  Learned  From  World  War  II  to  Kosovo 
(New  York:  New  York  University  Press,  2001),  e  quote  from  p.  5.  The  evidence  for  the  structural  bias  of 
the  USSBS  is  provided  in  chapter  2.  See  also  Tami  Davis  Biddle,  Rhetoric  and  Reality,  293. 


54 


68  In  fact,  the  Far  East  Air  Force  (FEAF)  report  paraphrased  the  comments  made  by  General  Stratemeyer  in 
1950  (at  the  beginning  of  the  war).  See  Robert  Frank  Futrell,  Ideas,  Concepts,  Doctrine,  346.  See  also 
M.J.  Armitage  and  R.A  Mason,  Air  Power  in  the  Nuclear  Age,  Second  Edition  (Chicago:  University  of 
Illinois  Press,  1985),  44. 

69  More  appropriately,  this  was  a  Second  World  War  lesson  re-discovered  in  Korea.  See  Futrell,  Ideas, 
Concepts,  Doctrine,  347-51. 

70  Eugene  M.  Zuckert,  “Some  Reflections  on  the  Military  Profession,”  Air  University  Review  27,  no.  1 
(November-December  1965),  4. 

71  Tami  Davis  Biddle,  Rhetoric  and  Reality,  296-7 .  Extract  from  US  Air  Force  Manual  1-8,  Strategic  Ait- 
Operations  (published  in  May  1954). 

72  Mike  Worden,  Rise  of  the  Fighter  Generals:  The  Problem  of  Air  Force  Leadership  1945-1982,  (Maxwell 
Air  Force  Base,  AL:  Air  University  Press,  March  1998),  140.  LeMay  was  only  offering  a  solution  that  he 
firmly  believed  was  correct  based  on  his  experience.  After  all,  he  was  the  last  of  a  generation  who  had 
helped  to  develop  the  original  USAAC  bombing  theory  in  the  inter- war  period  and  had  been  a  commander 
of  US  strategic  bombing  forces  in  the  Pacific  Theatre  at  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War. 

73  Robert  A.  Pape,  Bombing  to  Win:  Air  Power  and  Coercion  in  War  (Ithaca,  NY :  Cornell  University  Press, 
1996),  189. 

74  Mark  Clodfelter,  The  Limits  of  Air  Power:  The  American  Bombing  of  North  Vietnam  (New  York:  The 
Free  Press,  1989),  134. 

78  Ray  Bowers,  “Air  Operations  in  South  East  Asia:  A  Tentative  Appraisal,”  in  Hurley  and  Erhart,  eds.,  Ait- 
Power  and  Warfare:  The  Proceedings  of  the  8th  Military’  Histoiy  Symposium,  USAF  Academy  18-20 
October  1978  (Washington,  DC:  Office  of  Air  Force  History,  1979),  325. 

76  US  Air  Force,  Air  Force  Manual  1-1  Volume  II,  Basic  Aerospace  Doctrine  of  the  United  States  Air  Force 
(March  1992),  114. 

77  Builder,  The  Icarus  Syndrome,  179-180. 

78  See  James  A.  Mowbray,  “Air  Force  Doctrine  Problems  1 926-present,”  Airpower  Journal  9,  no.  4  (Winter 
1995),  21-41. 

79  Builder  estimates  that  approximately  one  third  of  the  officer  corps  was  seriously  disaffected.  See  Builder, 
The  Icarus  Syndrome,  22-23 

80  Bob  Martyn,  “Theories  of  Post-Cold  War  Air  Campaigning:  The  Development  of  Air  Power  Doctrine,” 
in  Allan  D.  English,  ed.,  Air  Campaigns  in  the  New  World  Order,  Siler  Dart  Canadian  Aerospace  Studies 
Series,  Vol.  2  (Winnipeg:  Centre  for  Defence  and  Security  Studies,  50. 

81  John  A.  Warden  III,  The  Air  Campaign:  Planning  For  Combat  (Washington,  DC:  National  Defense 
University  Press,  1988),  169. 

82  John  A.  Warden  III,  “The  Enemy  as  a  System,”  Airpower  Journal  9,  no.  2  (Spring  1995),  40-45.  The 
article  is  a  refinement  of  an  earlier  article  published  shortly  after  the  Gulf  War  -  see  John  A.  Warden,  III, 
“Employing  Air  Power  in  the  Twenty-first  Century,”  in  Richard  H.  Shultz,  Jr  and  Robert  L.  Pfaltzgraff,  Jr, 
eds.,  The  Future  of Air  Power  in  the  Aftermath  of  the  Gulf  War  (Maxwell  Air  Force  Base,  AL:  Air 
University  Press, 1992),  57-82. 

83  If  Warden  had  not  read  Boyd  earlier,  he  could  not  have  escaped  exposure  to  Boyd’s  work  while  he  was 
Commandant  of  the  Air  Command  and  Staff  College  after  the  1991  Gulf  War.  One  of  the  crescents  near 
the  college  makes  a  loop  around  a  B-52  bomber  mounted  on  a  pedestal.  The  crescent  is  signed  as  “OODA 
Loop.”  For  a  good  summary  of  Boyd’s  life  and  ideas,  see  Grant  T.  Hammond,  “The  Essential  Boyd,”  (nd, 
1997?).  Available  at:  http://www.belisarius.com/modern  business  strategy/hammond/essential  boyd.htm  . 
Accessed  27  Jul  2007.  See  also  Jeffery  L.  Cowan,  “From  Air  Force  Pilot  to  Marine  Corps  Warfighting: 
Colonel  John  Boyd,  His  Theories  on  War,  and  their  Unexpected  Legacy,”  a  Master  of  Military  Studies 


55 


thesis,  Marine  Corps  University,  academic  year  1999-2000,  available  http://www.d-n- 
i.net/fcs/boyd  thesis.htm.  Accessed  27  Jul  2007. 

84  Philllip  S.  Meilinger,  “Air  Strategy:  Targeting  for  Effect,”  Airpower  Journal  13,  no.  4,  (Winter  1999). 

85  Warden,  “The  Enemy  as  a  System.” 

86  US  Air  Force,  AFM  1-8,  Strategic  Air  Operations  (Department  of  the  Air  Force,  1  May  1954),  5. 

87  Richard  T.  Reynolds,  Heart  of  the  Storm:  The  Genesis  of  the  Air  Campaign  Against  Iraq  (Maxwell  Air 
Force  Base,  AL:  Air  University  Press,  January  1995),  17.  This  would  put  Warden’s  development  of  the 
model  in  1988. 

88  Information  on  Deptula’s  early  doctrinal  thinking  can  be  found  in  Barry  D.  Watts,  “Doctrine,  Technology 
and  War,”  a  paper  presented  to  the  Air  &  Space  Doctrinal  Symposium,  Maxwell  Air  Force  Base,  AL,  30 
April  -1  May  1996.  Available:  http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/watts.html.  Accessed 
27  Jul  2007.  Quote  from  p.  22. 

89  Ibid.,  120-30.  Reynolds  offers  a  detailed  account  of  Warden’s  final  briefing  of  the  INSTANT 
THUNDER  plan  based  on  interviews  and  notes  taken  by  the  Pentagon  briefing  team. 

90  Extracted  from  United  States,  “Conduct  of  the  Persian  Gulf  War:  Final  Report  to  Congress,”  (April 
1992),  148-151.  Available  at:  http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf.  Accessed  27  Jul  2007. 

91  Ibid.,  144. 

9~  Edward  C.  Mann,  Thunder  and  Lightning:  Desert  Storm  and  the  Air  Power  Debates  (Maxwell  Air  Force 
Base,  AL:  Air  University  Press,  April  1995),  100. 

93  Warden  believed  that  a  properly  executed  air  campaign  would  result  in  the  overthrow  of  the  Saddam 
regime  by  the  Iraqi  people.  All  members  of  his  original  planning  team  did  not  share  this  belief.  Moreover, 
there  was  concern  that  destroying  Iraq’s  infrastructure  would  inhibit  Iraq’s  ability  to  pay  war  reparations 
after  the  conflict.  See  Reynolds,  Heart  of  the  Storm,  18,  54. 

94  Mann,  Thunder  and  Lightning,  106-107. 

98  Subsequent  analysis  questioned  the  degree  of  success.  See  Grant  T.  Hammond,  “Myths  of  the  Gulf  War: 
Some  ‘Lessons’  Not  to  Learn,”  Airpower  Journal  (Fall,  1998).  Available  at: 

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/api/api98/fal98/hammond.pdf .  Accessed  27  Jul  2007. 

96  “Conduct  of  the  Persian  Gulf  War:  Final  Report  to  Congress,”  140. 

97  David  A.  Deptula,  Firing  For  Effect:  Change  in  the  Nature  of  Warfare  (Arlington,  VA:  Aerospace 
Education  Foundation,  1995). 

98  David  A.  Deptula,  “Firing  For  Effect:  Change  in  the  Nature  of  Warfare,”  Air  Force  Magazine,  Journal  of 
the  Air  Force  Association  84,  no.  4  (April  2001).  Available  at: 

http://www.afa.org/magazine/april2001/0401effect.asp.  Accessed  27  Jul  2007.  See  also  David  A.  Deptula, 
Effects-Based  Operations:  Change  in  the  Nature  of  Warfare  ((Arlington,  VA:  Aerospace  Education 
Foundation,  2001).  Available  at  http://www.aef.org/pub/psbook.pdf .  Accessed  27  Jul  2007. 

99  By  definition,  “Rapid  Decisive  Operations  is  a  joint  operational  concept  for  future  operations.  A  rapid 
decisive  operation  will  integrate  knowledge,  command  and  control,  and  effects-based  operations  to  achieve 
the  desired  political/military  effect.  In  preparing  for  and  conducting  a  rapid  decisive  operation,  the  military 
acts  in  concert  with  and  leverages  the  other  instruments  of  national  power  to  understand  and  reduce  the 
adversary’s  critical  capabilities  and  coherence.  The  United  States  and  its  allies  asymmetrically  assault  the 
adversary  from  directions  and  in  dimensions  against  which  he  has  no  counter,  dictating  the  terms  and 
tempo  of  the  operation.  The  adversary,  suffering  from  the  loss  of  coherence  and  unable  to  achieve  his 
objectives,  chooses  to  cease  actions  that  are  against  US  interests  or  has  his  capabilities  defeated.”  United 
States,  “A  Concept  for  Rapid  Decisive  Operations,”  RDO  White  Paper  Version  2.0,  US  Joint  Forces 
Command,  J9  Joint  Futures  Lab,  25  October  2001.  Available  at: 

http://www.globalsecuritv.org/militarv/librarv/report/2001/RDO.doc.  Accessed  27  Jul  2007. 


56 


100  Deptula,  Effects-Based  Operations ,  4. 

101  Ibid. 

102  Carl  von  Clausewitz,  On  War,  Michael  Howard  and  Peter,  eds.  and  trans.  (Princeton,  NJ:  Princeton 
University  Press,  1984),  99. 

103  In  Clausewitz’s  words,  “The  political  object  is  the  goal,  war  is  the  means  of  reaching  it,  and  means  can 
never  be  considered  in  isolation  from  their  purpose.”  Ibid.,  87. 

104  Deptula,  Effects-Based  Operations,  5. 

105  Ibid.,  6. 

106  Precision  weapons  were  not  a  new  development  in  the  Persian  Gulf  War;  however,  it  was  the  first  time 
that  they  were  available  in  large  numbers  and  used  to  dramatic  effect  (which  gave  the  impression  that  more 
PGMs  were  used  than  was  the  actual  case).  In  fact,  the  history  of  PGMs  dates  back  to  the  First  World  War. 
For  an  excellent  history  of  the  development  of  cruise  missiles,  see  Kenneth  P.  Werrell,  The  Evolution  of  the 
Cruise  Missile  (Maxwell  Air  Force  Base,  AL:  Air  University  Press,  September  1985).  An  assessment  of 
the  impact  of  PGMs  on  modern  warfare  is  offered  in  Richard  P.  Hallion,  Precision  Guided  Munitions  and 
the  New  Era  of  Warfare,  Paper  no.  53,  (Canberra,  Australia,  Air  Power  Studies  Center,  1995.  Available  at: 
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/smart/docs/paper53.htm.  Accessed  28  Jul  2007.  See  also  the  Smart 
Weapons  page  on  the  Federation  of  American  Scientists  for  a  good  overview  of  US  inventory  and  web 
based  articles  on  the  subject  of  PGMs  at:  http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/svs/smart/index.html.  Accessed 
28  Jul  2007. 

107  An  excellent  examination  of  these  problems  and  their  implications  may  be  found  in  Chapters  4  and  5  of 
Tami  Davis  Biddle,  Rhetoric  and  Reality. 

lns  This  uses  Deptula’ s  data  from  his  example  in  figure  4.  Deptula,  Effects-Based  Operations,  8. 

109  Ibid.,  10-11. 

110  Ibid.,  6. 

111  Quoted  in  Edward  Mann,  et  al.  “Dominant  Effects:  Effects-Based  Joint  Operations.” 

1 12  Deptula,  Effects-Based  Operations,  12. 

113  US  Air  Force,  Global  Vision:  a  Vision  for  the  21st  Century’  Air  Force  (Department  of  the  Air  Force, 
1996).  Available  at:  http://www.au. af.miEau/awc/awcgate/global/nuvis.htm.  Accessed  28  Jul  2007. 

114  Jason  B.  Barlow,  Strategic  Paralysis:  An  Airpower  Theory  for  the  Present  (Maxwell  Air  Force  Base, 
AL:  School  of  Advanced  Airpower  Studies,  May  1992)  Available  at: 

http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/SAAS  Theses/SAASS  Out/Barlow/barlow.pdf.  Accessed  28  Jul 
2007. 

115  Thomas  Tighe,  Raymond  Hill  and  Greg  McIntyre,  “A  Decision  For  Strategic  Effects:  A  Conceptual 
Approach  to  Effects  Based  Targeting,”  Air  &  Space  Power  Chronicles  (11  October  2000).  Available  at: 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/Hill.html.  Accessed  28  Jul  2007. 

116  David  W.  Pendall,  “Effects-Based  Operations  and  the  Exercise  of  National  Power,”  Military’  Review  84, 
no.l,  (January-February  2004);  and  Robert  W.  Freniere,  John  Q.  Dickmann  and  Jeffery  R  Cares, 
“Complexity-Based  Targetting:  New  Sciences  Provide_Effects,”  Air  &  Space  Power  Journal  (Spring  2003). 
Available  at:  http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/api/api03/spr03/freniere.html.  Accessed  28 
Jul  2007. 

1 17  David  S.  Fadok,  “John  Boyd  and  John  Warden:  Air  Power’s  Quest  for  Strategic  Paralysis,”  (Maxwell 
Air  Force  Base,  AL:  School  of  Advanced  Airpower  Studies,  February,  1995).  Available  at: 
http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/SAAS  Theses/Fadok/fadok.pdf.  Accessed  28  Jul  2007. 


57 


118  Mark  T  Satterly,  et  al.,  “Intelligence  Preparation  of  the  Battlespace,”  Air  &  Space  Power  Chronicles  (26 
July  1999).  Available  at:  http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/Satterly.html.  Accessed  28 
Jul  2007. 

1  |Q  Price  T.  Bingham,  “Transforming  Warfare  with  Effects-Based  Joint  Operations,”  Air  &  Space  Power 
Journal  17,  no.  4  (Spring  2001);  and  his  “Seeking  Synergy:  Joint  Effects-Based  Operations,”  Joint  Force 
Quarterly  no.  30  (Spring  2002);  and  his  “Air  Power  Targeting  Theory:  A  Key  Element  in  Transformation,” 
Military’  Review’  82,  no.  3  (May-June  2002). 

120  K.  Noedskov,  “Systemizing  Effects  Based  Air  Operations,”  Air  &  Space  Power  Chronicles  (24  May 
2000).  Available  at:  http://www.airpower.aii.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/noedskov.html.  Accessed  28  Jul  2007. 

121  Edgar  M.  Knouse,  “Effects-Based  Targeting  and  Operational  Art  in  the  21st  Century,”  (Newport,  RI:  US 
Naval  War  College,  5  February  1999).  Available  at:  http://handle.dtic.mi1/100.2/ADA363060  .  Accessed 
28  Jul  2007. 

122  Gary  H.  Cheek,  “Effects-Based  Operations:  The  End  of  Dominant  Maneuver?”  in  Williamson  Murray, 
ed.,  Transformation  Concepts  for  National  Security’  in  the  21s'  Century  (Carlisle,  PA:  US  Army  War 
College,  September  2002),  95. 

123  Ibid.,  96. 

124  Allen  W.  Batchelet,  “Effects-Based  Operations:  A  New  Operational  Model?”  in  Murray,  ed., 
Transformation  Concepts  for  National  Security’  in  the  21st  Century,  118. 

125  Martin  van  Creveld  with  Stephen  L  Canby  and  Kenneth  S  Brower,  Air  Power  and  Maneuver  Warfare 
(Maxwell  Air  Force  Base,  AL:  Air  University  Press,  July  1994),  3-7. 

126  Christopher  Bellamy,  “Manoeuvre  Warfare,”  in  Holmes,  ed.,  The  Oxford  Companion  to  Military’ 

History ,  544. 

127  McCrabb,  “Explaining  ‘Effects,’”  8. 

128  Ibid.,  10. 

129  Ibid. 

130  Ibid.,  12. 

131  Ibid.,  16. 

132  Ibid.,  17. 

133  Maris  ‘Buster’  McCrabb,  “Effects  Based  Operations:  An  Overview,”  PowerPoint  presentation,  undated, 
available:  http://www.au, af.miEau/awc/awcgate/af/ebo.ppt ,  slide  16.  Accessed  28  Jul  2007. 

134  McCrabb,  “Explaining  ‘Effects,’”  32-3. 

135  McCrabb,  “Effects  Based  Operations:  An  Overview,”  notes  to  slide  5. 

136  Ibid.,  slide  5  graphics. 

137  This  figure  is  my  own  kluge  of  work  presented  by  Deptula  and  by  Larry  Weaver  and  Robert  Pollock. 
Deptula’s  chart  can  be  found  in  Edward  C.  Mann,  Thunder  and  Lightning,  93.  The  Weaver-Pollock  model 
may  be  found  at  Owen,  ed.,  Deliberate  Force ,  441. 

138  This  phrase  is  attributed  to  General  Charles  ‘Chuck’  Krulak,  former  Commandant  of  the  US  Marine 
Corps.  Source:  BBC  new  report  30  March  2003,  Available: 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/middle  east/290 1423, stm  Accessed  28  Jul  2007. 

139  Thomas  Schelling,  Arms  and  Influence,  (London:  Yale  University  Press,  1966). 

140  For  example  see  Robert  A.  Pape,  “Coercion  and  Military  Strategy:  Why  Denial  Works  and  Punishment 
Doesn’t,”  Journal  of  Strategic  Studies  15,  no.  4  (December  1992),  423-475;  his  “The  Limits  of  Precision- 


58 


Guided  Air  Power,”  Security  Studies  7,  no.  2  (Winter  1997/98),  93-1 14;  and  his  “The  Air  Force  Strikes 
Back:  A  Reply  to  Barry  Watts  and  John  Warden,”  Security  Studies  7,  no.  2  (Winter  1997/98),  191-214. 

141  Pape,  Bombing  to  Win,  19. 

I4_  In  addition  to  punishment  and  denial  strategies,  Page  identifies  risk  and  decapitation  strategies  and 
dismisses  both.  Risk  is  based  on  Schelling  and  decapitation  on  Warden. 

143  Pape’s  critics  include  Barry  D.  Watts,  “Ignoring  Reality:  Problems  of  Theory  and  Evidence  in  Security 
Studies,”  Security  Studies  7,  no.  2  (Winter  1998/98),  115-71;  and  John  A.  Warden  III,  “Success  in  Modern 
War:  A  Response  to  Robert  Pape’s  Bombing  to  Win,”  Security  Studies  7,  no.  2  (Winter  1998/98),  172-90. 
See  also  Peter  Faber,  “Competing  Theories  of  Airpower:  A  Language  for  Analysis.”  Available  at: 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au/faber.htm.  Accessed  28  Jul  2007. 

Faber’s  critique  is  based  on  a  view  that  Pape’s  theory  is  just  an  update  of  the  traditional  “outside  in” 
approach  (he  uses  Warden’s  ring  model  where  Warden  is  advocating  an  “inside  out”  approach).  In  my 
view,  this  is  an  overly  literal  interpretation  of  Pape.  If  one  recalls  that  Pape’s  objective  is  to  deny/defeat  the 
enemy’s  strategy  rather  than  aim  to  destroy  the  enemy’s  fielded  forces,  then  Faber’s  argument  loses 
validity. 

144  For  Bosnian  operations  see  Owen,  ed.,  Deliberate  Force.  For  operations  in  Kosovo,  the  British  Survey 
is  Kosovo:  Lessons  From  the  Crisis  (Ministry  of  Defence,  June  2000),  available  at: 
http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/lessons/.  Accessed  28  Jul  2007.  The  US  Air  Force  Kosovo  report  is  The  Air 
War  Over  Serbia:  Aerospace  Power  in  Operation  Allied  Force  Initial  Report  (Headquarters,  United  States 
Air  Force,  25  April  2000). 

145  Benjamin  S.  Lambeth,  NATO ’s  Air  War  for  Kosovo:  A  Strategic  and  Operational  Assessment  (Santa 
Monica,  CA:  RAND,  2001);  Stephen  T.  Hosmer,  The  Conflict  Over  Kosovo:  Why  Milosevic  Decided  to 
Settle  When  Fie  Did  (Santa  Monica,  CA:  RAND,  2001);  and  Daniel  Byman,  Matthew  C.  Waxman,  Eric  V. 
Larson,  Air  Power  as  a  Coercive  Instrument  (Santa  Monica,  CA:  RAND,  1999). 

146  Byman,  et  al..  Air  Power  as  a  Coercive  Instrument,  3-4. 

147  Byman,  Waxman  and  Jeremy  Shapiro  present  a  thorough  list  of  adversary  counter  coercive  strategies  in 
Zalmay  Khalilzad  and  Jeremy  Shapiro,  eds.  Strategic  Appraisal:  United  States  Air  and  Space  Power  in  the 
21st  Century  (Santa  Monica,  CA:  RAND,  2002),  53-78.  Available: 
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1314/index.html.  Accessed  28  Jul  2007. 

148  Byman,  et  ah.  Air  Power  as  a  Coercive  Instrument,  39. 

I4Q  Daniel  L  Byman  and  Matthew  C.  Waxman,  “Kosovo  and  the  Great  Air  Power  Debate,”  International 
Security  24,  no.  4  (Spring  2000),  6. 

150  Paul  K.  Davis,  Effects  Based  Operations,  24. 

151  See  Christopher  D.  Kolenda,  “Transforming  How  We  Fight:  A  Conceptual  Approach,”  Naval  War 
College  Review’  56,  no.  2  (Spring  2003),  100-21. 

152  McCrabb,  “Explaining  ‘Effects,’”  18. 

153  Antulio  J.  Echivarria,  Clausewitz’s  Center  of  Gravity:  Changing  Our  Warfighting  Doctrine  -  Again! 
(Carlisle,  PA,  Strategic  Studies  Institute,  September  2002),  6.  Available  at: 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdffiles/PUB363.pdf.  Accessed  28  Jul  2007. 

154  See  the  introductory  essay  by  Michael  Howard,  “The  Influence  of  Clausewitz,”  in  Clausewitz,  On  War 
Howard  and  Paret,  eds.  and  trans.,  43. 

155  For  an  example  see  Echivarria,  Clausewitz’s  Center  of  Gravity,  9. 

156  Antulio  J.  Echivarria,  ‘“Reining  in’  the  Center  of  Gravity  Concept,”  Air  &  Space  Power  Journal  17,  no. 
2,  (Summer  2003).  Available  at: 

http://www.airpower.maxwelhaf.mil/airclTronicles/api/api03/sum03/echevarria.htmh  Accessed  28  Jul 
2007. 


59 


157  Milan  Vego,  “Center  of  Gravity,”  Military  Review  80,  no.  2  (March/ April  2000),  23-9. 

158  Echivarria,  Clausewitz’s  Center  of  Gravity,  3. 

159  Ibid.,  4. 

160  In  2002,  the  accepted  US  joint  definition  of  CoG  was,  “Those  characteristics,  capabilities,  or  sources  of 
power  from  which  a  military  force  derives  its  freedom  of  action,  physical  strength  or  will  to  fight.”  From 
the  glossary  of  United  States,  JP  3-60  Joint  Doctrine  For  Targeting,  dated  17  January  2002. 

161  Echivarria,  Clausewitz’s  Center  of  Gravity,  12-13.  Links  to  many  of  his  works  are  located  on  the 
Clausewitz.com  reading  list  page.  Available  at:  http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/Readings.shtml 
Accessed  28  Jul  2007. 

162  McCrabb,  “Explaining  ‘Effects,’”  11. 

163  Dennis  J.  Gleeson,  et  al..  New  Perspectives  on  Effects-Based  Operations:  Annotated  Briefing  -  IDA 
Document  D-2583  (Alexandria,  VA,  Joint  Advanced  Warfighting  Program,  Institute  for  Defense  Analyses, 
June  2001),  2  .  Available  at:  http://handle.dtic.mi1/100.2/ADA395129.  Accessed  28  Jul  2007. 

164  Ibid.,  6. 

165  That  the  US  Army’s  purpose  is  to  fight  and  win  the  nation’s  wars  is  a  common  saying  within  that 
institution  and  the  source  is  obscure.  Similar  thoughts  have  also  governed  the  US  Air  Force.  See  Builder, 
The  Icams  Syndrome,  265-8. 

166  Gleeson,  et  al„  New  Perspectives  on  Effects-Based  Operations,  8,  1 1 . 

167  See  Chapter  4  of  Edward  A.  Smith,  Effects  Based  Operations:  Applying  Network  Centric  Warfare  in 
Peace,  Crisis  and  War  (Washington,  DC:  DoD  Command  and  Control  Research  Program,  November 
2002).  Available  at:  http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/ebo/effects-based-ops.pdf  Accessed  28  Jul 
2007. 

168  Paul  K.  Davis,  Effects  Based  Operations,  29. 

169  Smith,  Effects  Based  Operations,  61. 

170  Ibid.,  506-15. 

171  Ibid.,  Chapter  2. 

172  See  for  instance  Desmond  Saunders-Newton  and  Aaron  B.  Frank,  “Effects  Based  Operations:  Building 
the  Analytic  Tools,”  Defense  Horizons  no.  19  (October  2002).  Available  at: 

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/DefHor/DH19/DH  19.htm.  Accessed  28  Jul  2007.  Kevin  B.Glen,  “The  Challenge 
of  Assessing  Effects-Based  Operations  in  Air  Warfare,”  Air  &  Space  Power  Chronicles  (24  April  2002). 
Available  at:  http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/bookrev/glenn.htmh  Accessed  28  Jul  2007.  Maris 
‘Buster’  McCrabb,  “Effects-based  Coalition  Operations:  Belief,  Framing  and  Mechanism,”  a  Paper 
presented  to  the  Knowledge  Systems  for  Coalition  Operations  (KSCO)  Conference,  April  2002.  Available 
at:  http://www.aiai.ed.ac.uk/proiect/coalition/ksco/ksco-2002/pdf-parts/S-ksco-2002-paper-02-mccrabb.pdf. 

Accessed  28  Jul  2007. 

Anthony  Alston,  “Network  Enabled  Capability  -  The  Concept,”  Journal  of  Defence  Science  8,  no.  3 
(September  2003);  and  David  S.  Alberts,  “Network  Centric  Warfare:  Current  Status  and  Way  Ahead,” 
Journal  of  Defence  Science  8,  no.  3  (September  2003). 

173  See  for  example  Carl  A.  Barksdale,  “The  Network  Centric  Operations  -  Effects-Based  Operations 
Marriage:  Can  it  Enable  Prediction  of  ‘Higher  Order’  Effects  on  the  Will  of  the  Adversary?”  (Newport,  RI: 
US  Naval  War  College,  13  May  2002);  and  Christopher  W.  Bowman,  “Operational  Assessment  -  The 
Achilles  Heel  of  Effects-Based  Operations?”  (Newport,  RI:  US  Naval  War  College,  13  May  2002). 
Available  at:  http://handle.dtic.miEl 00. 2/ADA405868  Accessed  28  Jul  2007. 

174  Charles  B.  Miller,  “Enhancing  the  Strategic  Application  of  Effects-Based  Operations  Concepts” 
(Carlisle,  PA:  US  Army  War  College,  2002),  20. 


60 


175  Ibid.,  21. 

176  Edward  Mann,  et  al.  “Dominant  Effects:  Effects-Based  Joint  Operations.” 

177  Ibid. 

I7S  United  States,  “A  Concept  for  Rapid  Decisive  Operations,”  RDO  White  Paper  Version  2.0. 

179  Ibid.,  40. 

180  United  States,  “Operational  Implications  of  Effects-based  Operations  (EBO),”  The  Joint  Warfighting 
Center  Joint  Doctrine  Series  Pamphlet  7,  United  States  Joint  Forces  Command,  17  November  2004,  1. 
Available  at:  www.dtic.mil/doctrine/iel/other  pubs/iwfcpam7.pdf.  Accessed  28  Jul  2007. 

181  Ibid.,  2. 

182  Ibid.,  3.  The  pamphlet  defines  “directed  policy  aims”  as  the  President’s  objectives  that  comprise  the 
desired  national  end  state. 

183  Ibid.,  13. 

184  Ibid.,  14. 

185  Ibid.,  30. 

186  E.  D.  Hirsch,  Jr.,  et  al.,  eds.,  The  New  Dictionary’  of  Cultural  Literacy,  3ld  ed.  (Boston:  Houghton 
Mifflin,  2002).  Available  at:  http://www.bartleby.eom/59/3/necessityist.html.  Accessed  28  Jul  2007. 


61 


Chapter  3 


Future  Perfect:  Effects  Based  Operations,  Complexity  And  The  Human 
Environment1 

Robert  Grossman-Vermass 


INTRODUCTION 

An  epigraph  in  a  recent  article  in  the  Economist  opens:  “Problems,  problems”  and  then 
describes  in  depth  the  litany  of  problems  that  have  developed  following  the  Coalition 
intervention  into  Iraq: 

Patchy  public  services,  continuing  guerrilla  attacks  on  coalition  troops, 

widespread  criminality,  confusion  over  oil  revenues  and  the  financing  of 

reconstruction,  and  still  no  sign  of  a  home-grown  government — just  some  of  the 

2 

problems  facing  Iraq’s  interim  leaders. 

The  article  continues,  “did  the  Bush  administration  spend  too  much  time  thinking  about 
how  to  secure  military  victory,  and  too  little  working  out  what  to  do  with  the  country 
once  Saddam  Hussein  had  been  removed?”3  Edward  Luttwak  amplifies  this  sentiment, 
calling  the  Coalition  strategy  in  Iraq  a  “childish  deception”  with  “hugely  ambitious  aims” 
and  “unwinnable  goals.”4  Furthermore,  former  US  Secretary  of  State  Madeline  Albright 
has  claimed  in  a  recent  article  in  Foreign  Affairs  that  the  Bush  Administration  has,  with 
its  expanded  war  in  Iraq,  alienated  many  potential  allies  and  has,  in  turn,  made  the  global 
fight  against  terrorism  all  the  more  difficult  to  win.5  At  their  core,  these  articles  question 
a  traditional,  and  decidedly  Western  “military,”  approach  to  warfare  and  its  immediate 
aftennath.  This  traditional  approach,  they  claim,  is  incapable  of  accurately  perceiving,  or 
forecasting,  the  results  of  such  an  approach  because  it  is  incapable  of  delivering  to  the 
decision  maker  the  desired  strategic  end-states,  or  “effects,”  on  selected  political, 
military,  economic,  and  social  systems.6 

This  chapter  is  based  on  a  Research  Note  written  for  the  Operational  Research  Division 
that  was  the  first  in  a  planned  series  of  monographs  on  the  Effects  Based  Approach.  It 
explores  the  developing  theory  of  the  Effects  Based  Approach,  introduces  Effects  Based 
Operations  (EBO)  as  a  concept  of  strategic  and  operational  planning  and  implementation, 
and  proposes  possible  applications  of  this  concept  in  the  human  and  virtual  environments 
of  the  future.  In  so  doing,  it  introduces  EBO  to  the  Canadian  Forces  and  the  wider 
operational  research  communities  and  explores  the  implications  for  the  Canadian 
government  in  adopting  such  a  concept. 

The  Effects  Based  Approach  offers  a  number  of  advantages,  but  to  realize  these 
advantages  a  number  of  difficult  challenges  must  be  met,  such  as  understanding  how  to 
effect  a  shift  in  the  psychological  mind-set  of  the  decision  maker,  and  how  to  apply 


62 


suitably  technology  to  the  overall  planning,  decision  making,  and  analysis  phases  of  an 
operation.  Indeed,  the  effective  management  and  manipulation  of  large  quantities  of 
irregular  data  is  necessary  to  maintain  a  shared  situational  awareness  both  within  and 
outside  of  an  area  of  operations  as  well  as  to  gain  an  understanding  of  what  effects  may 
be  achieved  and  how;  what  the  potential  unwanted  or  undesired  effects  may  be;  and,  what 
the  potential  secondary  and  tertiary  effects  may  be.  If  EBO  are  to  gain  acceptance  and 
function  with  the  appropriate  level  of  accuracy  and  speed,  there  is  a  requirement  for 
governments  and  armed  forces  to  adopt  alternative  thought  processes  to  assist  operational 
planners  in  recognizing  where  challenges  and  uncertainty  may  exist.7  In  Canada,  this 
may  require  a  series  of  marked  shifts  that  include:  1)  greater  inter-agency  cooperation 
and  co-ordination  of  planning  and  operations;  2)  greater  inclusion  of  academia, 
international  organizations  and  non-government  organizations,  and  private  industry  in 
planning  for  crises,  mitigating  threats,  planning  for  “effects,”  and  developing  a  robust 
Operational  Net  Assessment  (ONA);  3)  further  exploration,  both  nationally  and  with 
international  partners,  of  the  complex  nature  of  warfare  generally  and  EBO  specifically; 

4)  further  studies  of  the  requirements  needed  to  operationalize  EBO  over  the  long-term; 
and  5)  and  most  importantly,  a  cross-government  appreciation  of  the  advantages  of 
adopting  an  Effects  Based  Approach  as  a  major  operating  concept  of  the  future. 


This  chapter  has  three  sections,  each  of  which  will  be  explored  more  fully  in  subsequent 
Operational  Research  Division  publications.  The  first  section  provides  an  introduction  to 
the  concept  of  Effects  Based  Operations  and  Operational  Net  Assessment.  The  second 
section  analyzes  the  concept’s  foundations  in  complexity  theory,  complex  adaptive 
systems  theory  and  networking  theory.  The  reasons  for  the  inclusion  of  this  section  are 
two-fold.  First,  it  is  essential  that  one  is  able  to  conceptualize  the  logic  (and  at  times 
illogic)  behind  Effects  Based  Planning  before  one  attempts  to  operationalize  it.  Second, 
EBO  require  a  rigourous  understanding  of  complexity,  causality  theory  and  the 
complexity  of  actions  over  time  and  space.  Thus,  the  operationalization  of  EBO  has,  as  a 
functional  requirement,  a  compelling  need  to  codify  that  which  is  traditionally  non-linear, 
i.e.,  war.  This  is  a  daunting  task.  The  third  section  of  this  chapter  expands  the  second’s 
logical  stream.  Even  though  Effects  Based  Operations  are  complex  in  nature,  “operators” 
(often  military  professionals)  often  wish  to  quantify  that  which  is  unquantifiable  in  order 
to  act  (and  react)  in  sufficient  time  to  produce  the  desired  effects.  This  being  the  case, 
this  last  section  explores  technological  requirements  that  may,  in  future,  enable  EBO  to 
be  conducted  more  efficiently  through  time  and  space. 


WHAT  ARE  EFFECTS  BASED  OPERATIONS? 

During  the  Cold  War,  the  dominant  principle  of  Western  military  planning  was  the  ability 
to  mass  forces  at  key  points  whilst  preventing  or  deterring  an  adversary  from  doing  the 

o 

same.  Success  in  battle,  then,  was  understood  by  strategists  and  “operators”  alike  to 
depend  on  the  ability  to  overcome  the  adversary  in  a  lengthy  war  of  attrition.  However, 
the  nature  of  conflict  has  clearly  changed  since  1991.  Conflict  is  no  longer  limited  to 
attritional,  linear  battlefronts  and  mass  manouevre.  As  clearly  demonstrated  during 
recent  events  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq,  the  historic  focus  on  achieving  military  superiority 


63 


at  the  strategic,  operational  or  tactical  levels  should  be  considered  perfunctory  steps 
towards  the  achievement  of  strategic  military,  economic  and  diplomatic  aims.9 
Increasingly,  conflict  has  become  akin  to  a  complex  adaptive  system  that  operates  within 
the  complex  environments  of  such  as  terrorism,  peace  support  operations,  and  regime 
change,  as  shown  in  Figure  3-1.  Moreover,  the  complexity  of  warfare  has  come  to 
include  cyberspace,  the  nano-dimension,  space,  and  the  biological  and  chemical 
environments.  Operations  to  attend  to  such  factors  threats  will,  therefore,  require  an 
equally  adaptive  approach. 


-«&>  Conflict  Shift  and  Complexity 

s-y 


1945  to  1990 

1991  to  2001 

2002  to  ? 

•Linear  System 

•Limited  Dimensions 

•Sequential  operations 
•Reacting  to  Threats 

•Attritional  Forces 

•Focus  on  Attack  and  Defence 

•Single  service  focus 
•Civilian  vs  Military 
•Mass/Directed  weapons 

•Asymmetric  System 
•Increasing  Dimensions 
•Rapid  reaction  operations 
•Coping  with  Threats 
•Response  Forces 

•Focus  on  Outcomes/Exits 

•Joint/Coalition  Focus 

•OOTW  and  Civ-Mil  Ops 
•Small/Light  Weapons 

•Complex  Adaptive  System 

•Unlimited  Dimensions 

•Complex  operations 
•Mitigating  Threats 
•Agile  Forces 

•Focus  on  Effects 

•‘Collaborative’  Focus 

•Inter-Agency  Direction 
•Advanced  Technology  and  WME 

M 


National  Defense 
Defence  nationale 


Canada 


Figure  3-1 :  Conflict  Shift  and  Complexity 


First  of  all,  the  concept  of  Effects  Based  Operations  is  linked  to  the  effort  to  leverage  a 
nation’s  (or  a  coalition’s)  strategic  capabilities  at  the  political,  economic,  technological, 
and  information  networking  levels  in  order  to  achieve  politically  satisfactory  outcomes 
for  a  nation  or  coalition.  It  is,  at  the  same  time,  an  intrinsically  psychological  concept, 
linking  proposed  actions  to  achieve  physical  and  psychological  results  at  the  operational 
level.  Here,  psychological  results  may  include  the  ability  to  affect  an  adversary’s  will  to 
act,  or,  the  ability  to  affect  through  dissuasion  or  deterrence  an  ability  to  act  in  some  way. 

Focusing  merely  on  the  degradation  of  an  adversary’s  military  combat  power  does  not 
represent  a  holistic  approach  to  future  operations.  These  operations  will  likely  place 
increasing  emphasis  on  establishing  influence  over  the  mind  of  an  adversary  whilst 
keeping  casualties  and  collateral  damage  to  a  minimum.  Conceptually,  EBO  may  enable 
desired  aims  to  be  achieved  without  the  need  for  attritional  warfare,  although  success  is 
more  likely  to  be  achieved  through  a  combination  of  both  physical  and  psychological 
effects.  Of  course,  a  credible  war-fighting  capability  must  always  buttress  psychological 


64 


capabilities.  Canada’s  military  capability,  for  example,  is  one  component  of  a 
reductionist  pillar  of  the  three-dimensional  principles  of  foreign  affairs  that  include 
diplomacy,  defence  and  development.  This  is  known  as  the  3-D  defensive  policy,  in 
which  strategic  success  will  rely  on  being  able  to  identify  the  end-states,  or,  effects,  that 
will  lead  to  campaign  success  and  being  able  to  deploy  the  optimum  mix  of  capabilities 
with  which  to  achieve  them.  Clearly,  Canadian  values  may  dictate  that  operations  abroad 
include  complementary  diplomatic  measures  such  as  sanction,  financial  incentives,  and 
trade-offs,  just  as  easily  as  the  deployment  of  a  peacekeeping  force.  Alternatively,  of 
course,  such  actions  may  also  include  the  offer  of  developmental  aid  and  reconstruction 
assistance  at  a  level  equal  to  or  greater  than  that  of  the  defence  option. 

Secondly,  EBO  also  seeks  to  control  the  duration  and  gravity  of  a  crisis  or  conflict, 
allowing  nation  states  to  achieve  strategic  objectives  at  a  minimal  cost,  thereby  assisting 
decision  makers  to  achieve  desired  effects,  which  may  be  pursued  under  the  primary 
objectives  of  physical  and  psychological  effectiveness. 10  This  juxtaposition  of 
effectiveness  can  incorporate  quantitative  and  qualitative  measures  and  must  consider  the 
relative  relationships  between  cascading,  unintended,  or  unwanted  secondary  and  tertiary 
effects.  As  such,  EBO  is  very  much  rooted  in  theories  of  complexity  and  complex 
adaptive  systems,  as  well  as  theoretical  causality.  These  issues  will  be  addressed  below, 
and  more  fully  in  a  subsequent  Operational  Research  Division  publication. 

Thirdly,  EBO  may  be  considered  a  process  for  obtaining  a  desired  outcome  or  effect  from 
an  adversary,  friend  or  neutral  through  the  synergistic  and  cumulative  application  of 
military  and  non-military  capabilities  at  the  tactical,  operational  and  strategic  levels. 1 1 
Other  definitions  of  EBO  portray  them  as  operations  conceived,  planned  and  executed 
within  a  systems  framework  that  considers  the  full  range  of  direct,  indirect  and  additional 
cascading  effects  that  may  be  achieved  by  the  application  of  political,  military, 
diplomatic  or  psychological  instruments.  It  is  worth  underscoring  that  EBO  involves  a 
broad  range  of  activities,  of  which  military  action  is  only  a  subset.  For  example,  if  a 
nation  or  coalition  has,  as  one  of  its  strategic  objectives,  the  establishment  of  a 
democratic  regime  in  a  formerly  violent  totalitarian  region,  there  may  be  infinite  (or 
pennutated)  operational  level  actions  and  resources  needed  to  achieve  the  desired  effects. 
From  this  it  follows  that  EBO  may  be  defined  as  the  combined  direct  and  indirect 
administration  of  any  means  at  the  nation’s  disposal  applied  in  a  synergistic  manner  in 
order  to  elicit  a  desired  strategic  outcome.  Therefore,  it  is  imperative  that  planners  think 
rigourously  about  the  orchestration  of  effects  and  proposed  actions  and  resources  needed 
to  achieve  them,  i.e.,  what  is  needed  to  achieve  the  above  effect  -  diplomacy,  military 
action,  financial  incentives  or  some  combination  of  them? 

In  summary,  EBO  are  a  co-ordinated  set  of  actions  (or  inactions)  directed  at  shaping  the 
behaviour  of  foes,  friends  and  neutrals  during  times  of  peace,  crisis  and  war.  They  rely 
primarily  on  the  exploitation  of  cognitive  and  kinetic  weaknesses  rather  than  simply 
massing  traditional  power  against  traditional  power.  This  approach  to  the  achievement  of 
a  long-term  strategic  aim  requires  planners  to  develop  a  better  appreciation  of 
increasingly  complex  human  networks.  Planners  also  require  a  significantly  more 
sophisticated  understanding  of  human  values  and  mindsets  over  time  and  space  as  well  as 


65 


a  multidimensional  analysis  of  the  primary  and  secondary  “nodes,”  or  “targets”  to  be 
affected  during  the  course  of  EBO.  A  “node”  may  be  any  selected  person,  place,  thing, 
or  social  construct,  identified  by  a  planning  team  and  may  include,  for  example,  a 
national  or  party  leader,  a  military  base,  a  non-governmental  organization,  a  power  grid,  a 
bank,  a  religious  movement,  an  international  fund,  a  population  indicator. 

Finally,  the  EBO  concept  demands  from  decision  makers  a  recognition  that  sophisticated 
technological  tool-suites  will  enable  an  efficient  Effect-Based  Planning  (EBP)  process. 
The  complexity  associated  with  the  EBP  process  requires,  by  nature,  a  technological  tool- 
suite  capable  of  affording  the  decision  maker  the  opportunity  to  compile,  evaluate,  assess, 
and  analyze  relevant  strategic,  operational  and  tactical  data  in  real-time.  This  is  a  task  of 
incredibly  high  order  that,  conceptually,  integrates  specific,  time-sensitive,  knowledge 
about  an  area  of  operations  with  data  associated  with  proposed  courses  of  action 
susceptible  to  an  evolving  strategic  objective. 

From  the  discussion  above,  it  is  clear  that  EBO  is  a  concept  still  in  its  infancy.  It  has  not 
yet  advanced  to  a  mature  experimentation  phase,  nor  has  it  been  developed  adequately 
enough  to  consider  immediate  implementation.  Making  EBO  a  reality  will  require  the 
maturation  of  the  appropriate  theoretical  and  analytical  frameworks,  both  of  which 
consider  a  holistic  spectrum  of  conflict  that  includes  political,  military,  economic,  social, 
legal  and  ethical,  and  infrastructure  and  information  segments.  This  framework  (or 
frameworks)  and  associated  methodologies  will  enable  decision  makers  to  plan  for 
activities  and  operations  more  effectively  and  then  to  adapt  plans  as  situations  evolve. 
Future  operations  that  reflect  the  principles  of  EBO  will,  by  their  very  nature,  require 
political  and  military  leadership  to  both  anticipate  and  understand  the  consequences  of 
actions.  Decision  makers  will  require  a  framework  that  integrates  concepts  such  as  the 
explicit  linking  of  actions  to  resources  and  actions  to  effects.  Decision  makers  will  also 
require  a  framework  that  relates  actions  to  national  strategy,  the  continuing  assessment  of 
operational  outcomes  and  intended  and  unintended  consequences,  the  co-ordination  and 
optimization  of  interagency  efforts  and  the  effective  use  of  enabling  operational  concepts 
such  as  network-enabled  capabilities  and  Operational  Net  Assessment. 

It  should  be  noted  that  while  the  EBO  concept  requires  further  refinement,  there  are  a 
number  of  multinational  and  Canadian  initiatives  in  place  that  are  investigating  the  “sub¬ 
concepts”  involved  in  the  Effects  Based  Approach.  Canada  has  been  involved  in  the 
conceptual  development,  analysis,  technological  development,  experiment  design,  and 
participatory  phases  of  Limited  Objective  Experiment  II  (LOE  II)  and  Multinational 
Experiment  III  (MNE  III).  The  former  experiment  was  conducted  in  February  2002  and 
addressed  multinational  information  sharing  in  “real-time”  over  a  secure  Collaborative 
Information  Environment  (CIE)  and  the  development  of  a  multinational  ONA  database. 
The  latter,  which  took  place  in  February  2004,  explored  the  technological,  organizational 
and  process  requirements  for  multinational  Effects  Based  Planning  and  coalition 
development  of  a  robust  ONA  database.  At  the  time  of  the  writing  of  the  report  on 
which  this  chapter  is  based,  MNE  4  was  scheduled  for  the  summer  of  2005  and  was 
planned  to  be  an  experiment  on  the  conduct  of  an  Effects  Based  Operation.  Such 


66 


experimentation  is  highly  desirable  and  produces  a  great  deal  of  qualitative  and 
quantitative  data  for  analysis  on  the  preparatory  stages  of  EBO. 


OPERATIONAL  NET  ASSESSMENT 


A  critical  sub-concept,  or  tool,  in  the  EBP  process  is  the  Operational  Net  Assessment. 
ONA  is  a  continuously  updated  analysis  of  adversary,  allied,  or  neutral  capabilities  based 
on  a  limited  number  of  courses  of  action  (COA)  that  a  state  or  coalition  may  take. 
Underlying  ONA  is  both  a  process  and  a  database  that  includes  an  assessment  of  all 
national  or  coalition  assets  and  that  incorporates  the  analytical  expertise  of  the  strategic 
and  operational  context  that  shapes  it. 14  A  functional  ONA  reflects  a  constantly  refreshed 
national  (or  international)  analysis  of  political,  military,  economic,  social,  infrastructure 
and  informational  systems  relating  to  a  proposed  COA.  The  systems,  and  their 
interaction,  are  an  integral  component  to  understanding  how  to  plan  and  execute  EBO 
(see  Figure  3-2).  This  process  is  ideally  developed  through  collaborative  intelligence  and 
information  sharing  arrangements  among  academia,  government  and  treasury  intelligence 
services,  non-government  organizations  (NGOs),  international  organizations  (IOs), 
corporations,  and  defence  establishments  as  well  the  use  of  technology  that 
accommodates  geographical  dispersion. 


Social  and  Cultural 


Military 


Figure  3-2:  Inputs  Required  for  the  ONA  Process 

The  nature  of  the  strategic  environment  means  that  the  Effects  Based  Approach  must 
adopt  a  global  posture.  This  posture  necessitates  ready  access  to  an  ONA  that  contains 
information  gathered  from  national,  international  and  coalition  sources.  National 
information  may  be  derived  from  a  broad  range  of  classified  and  unclassified  sources  and 
requires  a  strong  inter-agency  collaborative  process  for  successful  application.  This 
requirement  is  sometimes  encumbered  by  traditional  bureaucratic  structures,  however. 
For  example,  in  Canada,  there  are  a  number  of  departments  and  agencies  that  develop 


67 


security  and  development  policy,  including,  but  not  limited  to,  the  Privy  Council  Office 
(PCO),  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  International  Trade  (DFAIT),  the  Solicitor 
General,  the  RCMP,  Health  Canada,  Transport  Canada,  and  the  Department  of  National 
Defence  (DND). 15  While  each  of  these  departments  may  share  a  unified  strategic  aim, 
there  may  be  varied  interpretations  of  how  best  to  achieve  that  aim. 

In  order  to  conduct  EBO  amongst  national  agencies,  there  is  a  requirement  for  strong 
inter-agency  cooperation  and  co-ordination.  Arguably,  at  present,  this  requirement  is  at 
best  superficially  implied,  or  at  worst,  simply  ignored.  The  reasons  for  this  situation  are 
far  too  diverse  for  this  essay  to  discuss;  suffice  it  to  say,  there  is  a  challenge  ahead  for  the 
Canadian  government  and  its  agencies  and  departments.  For  example,  should  a  severe 
humanitarian  crisis  develop  abroad,  one  to  which  the  Canadian  government  pledged 
assistance,  it  is  generally  understood  that  there  would  be  a  certain  level  of  cooperation 
and  co-ordination  among  a  number  of  associated  agencies  and  departments,  including  the 
DND  and  DFAIT.  It  is  also  understood  that  decision  making  would  indeed  take  place  in 
some  collaborative  fashion.  However,  currently  that  such  decision  making  and 
collaboration  is,  for  the  most  part,  ad  hoc  and  would  therefore  fail  to  provide  an  adequate 
assessment  of  the  cascading  effects  of  potential  actions  and  capabilities  when  decisions 
are  made.  Moreover,  although  decisions  would  be  made  collaboratively,  at  least  in  spirit, 
it  is  unlikely  that  such  decisions  would  be  made  based  on  the  most  holistic  set  of 
information  available;  nor  would  they  be  made  in  sufficient  time.  This  is  a  challenge  to 
overcome  and  one  exponentially  more  complicated  in  the  dynamics  of  a  coalition 
environment. 

The  Effects  Based  Planning  process  envisages  inter-agency  co-ordination  and  assistance 
in  developing  the  ONA,  creating  potential  “effects”  and  actions  linkages,  and  pursuing 
actions  based  on  capabilities.  The  United  States  has  explored  the  Standing  Joint  Forces 
Headquarters  (SJFHQ)  concept  and  it  is  now  in  its  prototype  phase.  The  SJFHQ  concept 
has,  at  its  core,  a  combat  commander  with  the  capability  to  “reach-back”  to  knowledge 
and  planning-specific  Boards,  Centres  and  Cells  and,  more  importantly,  to  a  Joint  Inter- 
Agency  Coordination  Group  (JIACG).  This  is  an  innovative  approach  to  decision 
making,  one  which  places  an  appropriate  emphasis  on  the  role  of  other  government 
departments  in  the  EBP  process.  However,  alternative  concepts  of  command  and  control 
(C2)  give  even  greater  emphasis  to  the  inter-agency  role  in  decision  making.  Research 
has  been  initiated  in  Canada  that  will  explore  the  National  Inter-Agency  C2  Group 
concept  and  its  position  relative  to  ONA  and  EBO. 

Once  a  unified  strategic  aim  has  been  developed  and  a  net  assessment  of  desired  end- 
states  and  the  means  to  achieve  them  has  been  agreed  upon,  a  representation  of  the  real 
world  is  generated  that  allows  the  “battlespace”  to  be  considered  as  a  complex  adaptive 
system  (CAS).  From  this  understanding,  the  planning  process  can  be  properly  configured 
to  ensure  that  the  right  information  gets  to  the  right  people  at  the  right  time.  EBO  seeks 
to  assure  decision  superiority  by  improving  one’s  (or  one’s  allies’)  information  posture, 
whilst  manipulating  another  actor’s  position  in  order  to  exploit  every  opportunity  to 
increase  the  speed  and  accuracy  of  operations. 16  Decision  making  will  involve  an 
assessment  of  the  multitude  of  possible  (and  probable)  outcomes  or  goals  which  “include 


68 


the  assurance  of  “beyond  first-order”  effects  on  the  agents,  institutions,  technologies,  and 
motivations  that  constitute  an  adversary’s  infrastructure,  as  well  as  on  the  global  state  of 
the  socio-physical  systems  that  comprise  the  adversary  and  international  system.”17 


In  summary,  ONA  promises  to  provide  an  understanding  of  the  nature,  structure,  and 
vulnerabilities  of  key  critical  nodes  or  targets  in  a  “system  of  systems.”  To  provide  this 
understanding,  ONA  must  be  continually  updated  to  support  an  ongoing  planning  process 
for  each  selected  contingency.  ONA’s  utility  extends  from  peacetime  interaction  with 
potential  adversaries  through  to  the  conduct  of  rapid  decisive  military  operations.  Given 
the  level  of  understanding  provided  by  the  ONA,  EBO  planners,  assisted  by  sophisticated 
decision  support  tools,  can  identify  appropriate  response  mechanisms,  the  body  and 
sequence  of  means  to  upset  the  adversary's  coherency,  and  then  coerce  him  to  take 
actions  that  are  favourable  to  national  and  coalition  interests.  The  objective  is  to  provide 
the  decision  makers  with  a  current  analysis  of  the  adversary's  capabilities  and 
vulnerabilities  (or  “nodes”),  as  well  as  an  array  of  effects-based  options  that  can  be 
applied  to  adversary  courses  of  action  as  they  are  identified. 


COMPLEX  SYSTEMS  AND  EBO 

The  most  direct  implications  of  EBO  in  the  future  are  likely  to  lie  in  the  areas  of 
command  and  control.  That  said,  the  Effects  Based  Approach  relies  on  a  firm 
understanding  of  complexity  theory,  causality,  networking  and  complex  adaptive  systems 
theory.  EBO  and  complexity  theory  both  deal  with  how  a  widely  distributed  collection  of 
diverse  autonomous  agents  acting  individually  can  nonetheless  behave  like  a  single,  even 

i  o 

directed,  entity.  Alternatively,  traditional  (Newtonian)  science  has  always  provided 
metaphors  and  models  for  isolated  military  concepts  and,  even  more  fundamentally,  it  has 
provided  the  general  paradigm  that  has  classified  Western  culture.  This  paradigm  shapes 
both  our  interpretation  of  the  problems  we  face  and  the  solutions  we  generate  to  those 
problems.  It  is  mechanistic,  measurable,  and  reliable. 19 

The  traditional  Western  way  of  warfare  has  been  as  heavily  infonned  by  Newtonian 
principles.  If  one  accepts  this  interpretation,  it  would  follow  that,  like  other  events, 
warfare  is  deterministically  predictable — given  knowledge  of  the  initial  conditions  and 
having  identified  the  universal  laws  of  combat,  one  should  be  able  to  resolve  specific 
political  and  military  issues  and  predict  the  results.  Indeed,  for  argument’s  sake,  all 
Newtonian  systems  can  eventually  be  distilled  to  one  concept:  linear  cause  and  effect.  In 
fact,  such  efforts  to  quantify  cause  and  effect  in  war  have  been  numerous,  with  some 
recent  methodologies  including  those  used  in  the  Correlates  of  War  Project.20  This 
approach  accepts  that  war  is  altogether  “knowable”  and  that  which  we  cannot  directly 
understand,  we  should  be  able  to  extrapolate  scientifically.  Unfortunately,  this  paradigm 
is  limited  when  applied  to  EBO  and  the  complex  nature  of  future  conflict. 

The  marriage  of  complexity  theory  to  international  security  studies  should  come  as  no 
surprise,  because  since  the  September  1 1th  2001terrorist  attacks,21  there  has  been 
increasing  focus  on  non-linear  theories  as  ways  to  help  us  understand,  and  mitigate, 
unpredictable  and  complex  adaptive  systems  such  as  terrorism.2-  Complexity  theory, 


69 


then,  can  be  viewed  as  an  innate  form  for  investigating  the  properties  and  behaviour  of 
the  dynamics  of  non-linear  systems,  such  as  warfare.23  This  stands  in  contrast  to 
traditional  methods  within  the  theoretical  domain  designed  to  analyze  the  relatively  non¬ 
linear  world,  such  as  statistics. 


Complexity  has  been  defined  as: 

The  set  of  detenninistic  theories  that  do  not  necessarily  lead  to  long-term 
prediction...  The  numerical  variables  are  still  uniquely  related  to  each  other 
locally  in  space  and  time.  But...  we  cannot  obtain  the  future  values  implied  by 
the  theory  just  as  a  result  of  compact,  well-defined  manipulation  of  the  present 
values.24 

Complexity  can  appear  even  in  apparently  simplistic  or  detenninistic  causal  situations, 
such  as  those  in  the  natural  world.25  The  mathematician  Henri  Poincare  showed  that  the 
motion  of  three  celestial  bodies,  although  governed  by  scientific  laws,  defied  exact 
solution:  while  eclipses  of  the  moon  could  be  predicted  thousands  of  years  in  advance, 

they  could  not  be  predicted  millions  of  years  in  advance — a  very  short  period  in 

26 

astronomical  terms." 

As  we  know,  linear  systems  portray  an  arrangement  of  nature  (with  all  of  its  warts  and 
foibles)  where  outputs  are  proportional  to  inputs,  where  the  whole  is  equal  to  the  sum  of 
its  parts,  and  where  cause  and  effect  are  directly  (or  indirectly,  through  inductive 
reasoning)  observable.  According  to  David  Alberts,  linear  systems  exist  in  a  scientific 
environment  where  prediction  is  facilitated  by  planning;  success  is  pursued  by  detailed 
monitoring;  and  a  “premium  is  placed  upon  reductionism,  rewarding  those  who  excel  in 
reductionist  processes,”  in  which  large  swaths  of  data  are  reduced  to  manageable 
morsels."  By  contrast,  non-linear  systems  consider  the  arrangement  of  nature,  with  all 
of  its  complications  (including  warfare),  as  an  environment  where  inputs  and  outputs  are 
not  proportional;  where  the  whole  is  not  quantitatively  equal  to  its  parts;  and,  where 
cause  and  effect  are  not  immediately  visible.28  It  is  the  world  of  EBO — where 
phenomena  are  not  visibly  predictable  but  are  self-organizing;  where  unpredictability 
defeats  conventional  methods;  and,  where  self-organization  defeats  traditional  control.29 
It  is  clear  that  social  interactions  within  political  environments  constitute  systems  and  that 
the  many  outcomes  within  those  systems  are  the  consequences  of  complex  interactions. 

In  EBO,  we  are  dealing  with  a  system  (or  system  of  systems)  where  1)  a  set  of  elements 
are  inter-connected  so  that  shifts  in  the  system  produce  changes  in  other  parts  of  the 
system;  and  2)  the  entire  system  exhibits  properties  and  behaviours  that  are  related  to  but 
different  from  the  sum  of  the  parts. 

The  result  of  this  situation  is  that  the  systems  within  EBO  display  non-linear  (and  causal) 
relationships  that  cannot  be  understood  by  adding  together  the  units  or  their  relation. 

30 

Indeed,  many  of  the  results  of  actions  are  unpredictable,  unintended  or  unwanted/ 

Actions  produce  effects,  but  these  effects  may  be  neither  the  intended  results  of  the 
action,  nor  what  was  wanted  to  achieve  the  overall  objective. 


70 


International  relations  are  full  of  inter-connections  and  complex  interactions.  Ripples 

3 1 

move  through  channels  established  by  interests  and  strategies.  Therefore,  when  these 

39 

interactions  are  elaborate,  or  multidimensional,  the  ramifications  will  be  as  well. 
Similarly,  when  planning  EBO,  one  must  consider,  and  mitigate,  the  wide  array  of 
potential,  possible,  and  probable  effects  and  cascading  effects  which  may  result  from  a 
single  course  of  action.  In  a  system,  the  chain  of  consequences  extend  over  time  and 
space  and  the  effects  of  actions  are  always  multiple.  Any  disturbance  of  a  “node”  within 
the  system,  or  the  disturbance  of  a  system  within  a  system  of  systems,  will  produce 
several  effects.  Consequently,  and  contrary  to  all  the  hopes  and  aspirations  of  some 
strategists,  one  cannot  always  find  or  develop  the  key  agent  which  will  produce  the 
desired  effect.  For  example,  one  cannot  expect  to  link  with  linear  methods  one  hundred 
years  of  scientific,  economic,  and  cultural  degrees  to  the  events  on  September  1 1th  That 
is,  a  link  from  Ernest  Rutherford  to  Albert  Einstein  to  Robert  Oppenheimer  to  Harry 
Truman  to  Joseph  Stalin  to  Winston  Churchill  to  Jawaharlal  Nehru  to  Mohammad  Ah 
Jinnah  to  Prince  Mohammed  Daoud  to  the  Mujahideen  to  the  Taliban  to  Osama  bin 
Laden,  although  arguably  causally  sufficient  is  not  causally  logical  in  a  non-linear 
system.  Because  of  the  prevalence  of  inter-connections,  we  cannot  understand  systems 
by  simply  summing-up  the  characteristics  of  the  parts.33  More  precisely,  actions  interact 
to  produce  effects  that  cannot  be  readily  comprehended  by  linear  models.34  While  we 
may  intuitively  expect  linear  relationships,  this  is  not  possible,  particularly  in  warfare. 
Moreover,  the  effect  of  one  series  of  characteristics  can  depend  heavily  on  what  other 
characteristics  are  within  the  environment.36  Even  if  one  were  to  hold  true  Michael 
Doyle’s  thesis  that  democracies  do  not  fight  each  other  in  a  world  where  other  regimes 

37 

exist,  it  would  not  hold  true  that  an  entirely  democratic  world  would  be  a  peaceful  one. 


EBO  are  not  linear;  nor  is  the  ONA  process  that  feeds  them.  EBO  are  conducted  in  an 
open,  collaboratively  distributed,  non-linear  system  that  is  sensitive  to  initial  conditions 
and  characterized  by  complex,  continuous  feedback.  Thus,  EBO  are  a  process  rather  than 
an  event.  The  environment  in  which  EBO  operate,  the  “system  of  systems,”  is  an  open 
system  -  continuously  exchanging  energy  and  information  with  other  systems  and  with 
the  strategic  environment  at  large.  EBO  are  in  a  continuous  state  of  flux — they  operate 
within  the  perpetual  cycle  of  crisis,  conflict  and  post-conflict  resolution.  Planners  and 
decision  makers  must,  therefore,  be  cognizant  of  interactions  and  linkages  between 
nodes,  or  targets,  within  and  between  systems,  as  illustrated  in  Figure  3-3. 


71 


Complexity  ancl  Cause  and  Effect 


The  EBO  planning  process  must  always  be 
cognizant  of  'systems  of  systems  analysis'  and 
complexity  theory: 

•The  degrees  of  separation: 

♦The  probability  of  interaction  between  effects: 

•The  probability  of  residual  (cascading)  effects 
and  the  order  in  which  they  may  occur. 


•Can  these  effects  be  pre-empted,  mitigated, 
anticipated? 


1+1 


National 

Defence 


Defense 

nationale 


Canada 


Figure  3-3:  Complexity  and  Cause  and  Effect. 

Complexity  theory  and  causality  theory,  then,  provides  a  fundamental  theoretical 
background  to  the  nature  of  conflict  generally  and  EBO  specifically.  The  challenge  is  to 
apply  this  understanding  to  the  operational  planning  levels. 


EBO  IN  A  VIRTUAL  ENVIRONMENT 

If  we  are  to  treat  war  as  a  non-linear  system,  two  premises  emerge:  1)  war,  as  we 
traditionally  understand  it,  is  uncertain;  and  2)  war,  as  we  traditionally  understand  it,  is 
uncontrollable,  given  our  linear  understanding  of  command  and  control. 

Uncertainty  is  a  natural  and  unavoidable  product  of  a  dynamic  endeavour  such  as  war, 
and  complex  systems  cannot  be  manipulated  to  suit  our  current  understanding  of  the  so- 
called  “battlespace.”  On  the  other  hand,  decision  makers  can  adapt  to  complex  systems 
and  produce  technology  enablers  to  help  mitigate  uncertainty.  Thus,  if  EBO  are 
uncertain  and  uncontrollable,  one  might  consider  technological  enablers  as  a  means  of 
achieving  at  least  relative  certainty  and  relative  control.  In  the  end,  it  is  not  a  question  of 
whether  we  will  ever  have  the  technology  to  gather  enough  information  to  understand  the 
complexities  involved  in  EBO,  but  once  we  have  the  capability,  how  can  we  best  use  it  to 
best  shape  events.38 


72 


The  quest  to  remove  uncertainty  from  strategic  and  operational  planning  has  always 
dominated  warfare.  Indeed,  recent  US  and  coalition  political/military  experiments  have 
been  specifically  designed  to  help  mitigate  uncertainty.  US-led  experiments  on 
“collaborative  information  environments”;  “dominant  effects”;  “network-enabled 
capabilities”;  and,  “rapid-decisive  operations”,  have  all  placed  an  emphasis  on 
technological  enablers  to  help  achieve  certainty.40  This  reliance  on  technology  to 
mitigate  uncertainty  reflects  the  reality  of  a  technologically  advanced  US  military  unsure 
of  its  future  role  in  global  affairs,41  not  to  mention  a  very  conscious  defence  decision  to 
continue  the  transformation  that  was  initiated  under  Secretary  of  Defence  Donald 
Rumsfeld.  ~  As  mentioned  above,  the  MNE  III  experiment  is  designed  to  test  the 
processes,  organizations  and  technologies  required  to  conduct  Effects  Based  Planning. 
Once  the  experiment  is  concluded  and  analysis  completed,  recommendations  will  be 
forwarded  to  DND  through  the  Operational  Research  Division. 

According  to  some  military  theorists,  “to  date,  most  warfare  has  taken  place  within  what 
Robert  J.  Bunker  terms  the  ‘human  space,’  meaning  the  traditional  four-dimensional 
battlespace  that  is  discernible  to  the  human  senses.”43  In  this  interpretation,  warfare  has 
been  conducted  with  human  beings  doing  their  best  to  hit  other  human  beings  with 
projectiles  who  are,  in  turn,  doing  their  best  to  hit  other  human  beings  with  projectiles. 
Advances  are  being  made,  however,  that  propose  placing  humans  on  the  periphery  of 
battle,  as  ever  more  capable  machines  take  the  place  of  humans  in  the  battlespace.44 
These  progressions  include,  most  notably,  computer-driven  information  gathering  and 
synthesis  systems,  and,  the  proliferation  of  autonomous  tactical  weapons  systems,  i.e., 
robotic  systems.  More  and  more  elements  of  warfare  are  evolving  beyond  the  realm  of 
the  human  senses,  and,  more  importantly,  crossing  outside  the  limits  of  human  reaction 
and  assessment  times.45  Logically,  then,  military  systems,  once  integrated  into  the 
conduct  of  war,  will  eventually  be  “too  fast,  too  small,  too  numerous,  and  will  create  an 
environment  too  complex  for  humans  to  direct.”46 

This  process  of  replacing  humans  on  the  battlefield  is  deliberate,  is  well  within  the 
mandate  of  the  two  most  recent  US  Quadrennial  Defense  Reviews,  and  is  being  explored 
by  most  Western  armed  forces,  despite  post-Cold  War  Western  defence  expense 
reductions.47  In  this  process,  knowledge  is  seen  as  the  key  to  the  successful  achievement 
of  an  objective;  speed  and  accuracy  are  seen  as  the  keys  to  exploiting  that  knowledge; 
and  computer-assisted  decision  making  tools  are  an  inevitable  evolution  of  this  process. 
Consequently,  many  envisage  a  steadily  altered  role  for  humans  in  decision  making  and 

.  ,  .  4«  ~ 

operations  as  this  century  progresses. 


A  fundamental  development  underlying  the  evolution  (or  devolution)  of  human  control  is 
that  of  automated  infonnation  and  networking  systems.  A  recent  US  Army  Training  and 
Doctrine  Command  paper  has  claimed  that: 

Advances  in  computer  architecture  and  machine  intelligence  will  have  reached  the 
point  where  intelligent  agents  can  analyze  the  environment  and  current  battle 
situation,  search  likely  target  areas,  detect  and  analyze  targets,  assist  in  attack 
decisions,  select  and  dispense  munitions,  and  report  results.49 


73 


Indeed,  the  difference  between  a  machine  that  can  do  all  of  these  things  and  actually 
make  key  decisions  may  only  be  a  matter  of  programming.  The  citation  above  is  a 
description  of  computers  that  can  function  autonomously  to  conduct  asymmetric  warfare 
at  the  tactical  level.  If  anything,  the  description  is  an  understatement.  This  author 
suggests  that  within  our  lifetimes,  computers  may  be  capable  of  planning,  tasking,  and 
assessing  events  at  the  operational  level.  During  MNE  III,  the  coalition  planners  for  the 
EBP  process  will  test  a  number  of  different  software  packages  during  each  of  the 
planning  steps.  Canada,  in  particular,  has  taken  the  lead  for  both  the  conceptual 
development  and  design  of  a  technological  tool  that  would  enable  planners  to 
synchronize  desired  operational  effects  across  time  and  space.  This  tool,  to  be  tested  in 
MNE  III  and  subsequently  analyzed  by  the  Operational  Research  Division,  is  expected  to 
adapt  proposed  effects  to  actions  to  available  capabilities  in  order  to  provide  planners 
with  a  visualization  of  what  the  “best”  course  of  action  would  be  based  on  probabilities 
of  success,  resource  constraints,  action  usage  and  required  predecessors,  as  illustrated  in 
Figure  3-4.  Subject  to  experimentation  and  analysis,  this  tool  may  be  worthy  of  further 
development  for  DND  and  OGD  crisis  management  and  EBO. 


There  have  been  several  recent  defence  science  investigations  into  the  marriage  of 
technology  to  complex  thinking  and  complex  adaptive  systems  such  as  EBO.  The  TTCP 
[The  Technical  Cooperation  Program]  JSA  AGIO  “Technologies  for  Effects  Based 
Operations,”  in  which  Canada  has  participated,  focussed  on  modelling  and  analysis 
concepts  and  tools  and  techniques  that  would  bring  both  analytical  rigour  and  assistance 
to  decision  making  in  the  complex  environment  of  EBO.50  Included  in  this  exploration 
were  physical  models  (such  as  the  Canadian  GEOPOL  model),  in  which  physical 
networks  are  characterized  by  nodes  and  links  with  sources  and  sinks,  plus  material 
stocks  and  flows;  virtual  network  models,  (including  the  Australian  Analytica  Model  and 
the  Danish  Hugin  model),  in  which  networks  of  relationships  can  be  listed  hierarchically 
and  assigned  relative  value,  or,  which  may  bring  an  ability  to  build  interactive  causal 
networks  for  strategic  indicators  and  warnings  that  aid  operational  planning.  The  US 
SIAM  (Situational  Influence  Assessments  Module)  software  application  purports  to 
streamline  complex  decision  making  by  facilitating  the  construction  and  analysis  of  an 
influence  net  model.  The  net  model  depicts  events  and  their  causal  relationships. 


74 


ID 

Task  Name 

1 

OBJ_1  Piovide  Secuie  Euviioiiineiitfoi  Economic  Reyeneuit 

2 

E001  -  Restore  Iraqi  Oil  Production 

3 

A001  -  Military-  Seize  and  Secure  Oil  Fields 

4 

A001  -  Military-  Seize  and  Secure  Oil  Fields 

5 

A001  -  Military-  Seize  and  Secure  Oil  Fields 

6 

A002  -  Military-  Repair  pipelines 

7 

A003  -  Military-  Cap  Wells 

8 

A004  -  Military  -  Rebuild  Infrastructure 

9 

A1 01  -  Diplomatic  -  Negotiate  ownership  of  northern  oilfielc 

10 

A201  -  Economic  -  Influence  global  markets 

11 

OBJ_2 

12 

E002  -  Preserve  Iraqi  Infrastructure 

13 

A001  -  Military-  Seize  and  Secure  Oil  Fields 

14 

A001  -  Military-  Seize  and  Secure  Oil  Fields 

15 

A001  -  Military-  Seize  and  Secure  Oil  Fields 

16 

A005-  Military- X 

17 

A102-  Diplomatic- Y 

1  January^ 


E 


February 


1  2/7  |  1  2/1  4|  12/2l|  12/28j  1/4  1/11  1/18]  1/25  |  2/1  |  2/8  |  2/1  5  |  2/22  |  2/29  [  3/7  1  3/14  3/21  |  3/28 


OBJ 1  Piovide  Secuie  Eiiviioiiineiitfor  Economic  Reijenei  otion 


E001  -  Restore  liaqi  Oil 

+  3/25 


E002  -  Preserve  Iraqi  Infrastructure 

+  223 


Figure  3-4:  Effect  Synchronization  Example.  Effects  can  be  synchronized  over  time  and 
space  based  on  resource  constraints,  predecessors,  action  doubling  and  usage. 

While  these  future  uses  of  technology  may  seem  farfetched,  we  should  recognize  that 
current  computer  technology  has  not  yet  begun  to  approach  its  theoretical  limits.  In  1998 
(a  long  time  ago  in  computer  terms),  scientists  at  Los  Alamos  National  Laboratory 
announced  that  they  had  been  able  to  consistently  manipulate  subatomic  particles,  thus 
opening  the  way  for  computation  systems  an  order  of  magnitude  smaller  and  faster  than 
anything  in  existence. M  In  1999,  researchers  at  UCLA  began  work  on  a  molecular 
computer  with  a  processing  power  of  100  personal  computers.  In  October  2001,  the 
American  company  ASI  revealed  the  development  of  its  KARNAC  suite,  a  software 
package  that  uses  human  “profiling”  and  data  mining  techniques  to  sift  through 
seemingly  unrelated  pieces  of  information  in  order  to  pre-empt  terrorist  attacks  before 
they  happen.  More  recently,  Professor  Wilpen  Gorr  and  researchers  at  Carnegie 
Mellon’s  Heinz  School  have  created  a  computer  programme  that  forecasts  “criminal” 
activity  before  it  occurs.  Gorr’s  programme  is  based  on  a  sophisticated  trend  analysis  of 
criminal  activity  combined  with  an  ability  to  predict  with  some  degree  of  accuracy  future 
criminal  activity.  The  implications  of  such  advances  are  almost  unimaginable: 
inexpensive,  ubiquitous  supercomputing  in  minute  machines  so  advanced  that  they  can 
gather,  assess,  and  analyze  thousands  of  strands  of  complex  information.  This  is  not  to 
suggest  that  there  will  ever  be  a  conscious  decision  to  remove  humans  from  battlefield 
decision  making;  rather,  in  the  future,  soldiers  might  retain  less  control,  whilst  gradually 


75 


leaning  towards  advanced  systems  when  logic  dictates  that  human  control  become  less 
pronounced.  54  The  implications  of  this  technology  for  complex  processes  such  as 
Effects  Based  Planning  are  equally  fantastic,  and  raise  the  question  of  how  one  can 
effectively  and  efficiently  plan  for  tasks  in  order  to  achieve  a  stated  strategic  objective? 

As  technology  advances,  one  might  expect  the  clarity  of  EBO  computer  models  to 
improve  exponentially.  Of  course,  linear  algorithms  may  never  be  able  to  replicate  the 
non-linear  and  often  unquantifiable  logic  of  war.  Indeed,  the  history  of  human  conflict  is 
littered  with  examples  of  how  armed  forces  achieved  results  that  no  algorithm  would 
have  predicted.  55  EBO,  however,  might  be  executed  completely  outside  of  the  human 
sphere  of  activity.  For  example,  the  concept  of  “net-war”  assumes  that  conflict  will 
eventually  be  waged  virtually  within  and  amongst  computer  systems  attacking  the  full 
spectrum  of  opposing  military  and  civilian  infonnation  systems.  By  its  very  nature,  then, 
the  speed  and  accuracy  of  EBO  may  be  limited  only  to  the  speed  of  the  electronic  circuit 
boards  in  which  it  develops.  EBO  is  complex  and  adaptive,  with  operational  moves  often 
too  pervasive  for  human  intervention.  In  the  end,  both  offence  and  defence  might  be 
completely  automated,  simply  because  humans  will  be  far  too  slow  and  linear  to 
participate.  As  a  caveat,  one  might  also  assume  that  the  panacea  of  technology  may  not 
appear  as  sufficient  as  one  might  expect.  Indeed,  there  are  several  mathematical, 
engineering,  technological,  and  tcmporal/spatial,  not  to  mention  ethical,  issues  that 
require  attention  before  such  an  advance  be  considered  an  appropriate  enabler  of  EBO. 
Nonetheless,  one  suspects  that  the  future  of  EBO  requires  further  investigation  of  the 
potential  of  technology. 

CONCLUSION 

This  essay  has  been  deliberately  suggestive  because  future  conflict  is  uncertain  and 
complex  and  Canada  must  understand  it.  The  essay  has  introduced  the  concept  of  EBO 
and  argued  that  its  planning  and  execution  rely  on  an  understanding  of  the  complex 
nature  of  conflict  and  on  theories  of  complex  adaptive  systems  and  causality.  An 
acceptance  of  EBO  demands  a  shift  in  mind-set,  as  well  as  the  application  of 
sophisticated  technologies  to  the  overall  planning,  decision  making,  execution,  and 
assessment  phases  of  an  operation.  The  effective  management  and  manipulation  of  large 
quantities  of  evolving  data  is  essential  in  order  to  achieve  and  maintain  shared  situational 
awareness  both  within  and  outside  of  an  area  of  operations  (or  system  of  systems)  and  to 
gain  an  understanding  of  what  effects  may,  or  may  not  be,  achieved  with  the  available 
resources.  If  EBO  are  to  function  efficiently  and  with  the  appropriate  level  of  accuracy 
and  speed  required  in  the  future  security  environment,  then  there  is  a  need  for  alternative 
methods  to  assist  leaders  and  planners  in  recognizing  where,  and  why,  uncertainty 
exists.  56  Traditional  linear  methods  of  warfare  are  no  longer  suitable;  neither  are  the 
traditional  means  of  operational  planning,  decision  making  and  command  and  control. 

This  study  is  the  first  in  a  series  of  monographs  on  the  Effects  Based  Approach.  It  has 
introduced  EBO  as  a  concept  that  relies  heavily  on  the  injection  of  specific  inter-agency, 
academic,  corporate,  diplomatic,  economic  and  coalition  intelligence  knowledge  for  the 
formulation  of  an  Operational  Net  Assessment,  as  well  as  a  recognition  of  the 


76 


technological  means  needed  to  assist  the  decision  maker  in  ascertaining  the  complexity  of 
desired  tactical  end-states,  or,  “effects,”  required  for  the  attaimnent  of  a  strategic 
objective.  It  has  suggested  that  Canada  pursue  the  exploration  of  this  concept. 

The  advantages  that  the  Effects  Based  Approach  may  offer  rely  heavily  on  a  shift  in  the 
psychological  mind-set  of  the  decision  maker,  as  well  as  a  suitable  application  of 
technology  to  the  overall  planning,  decision  making,  and  analysis  phases  of  an  operation, 
be  it  humanitarian,  developmental,  defence  or  a  combination  thereof.  If  EBO  are  to 
function  efficiently  and  with  the  appropriate  level  of  accuracy  and  speed,  there  is  a 
requirement  for  governments  and  armed  forces  to  adopt  alternative  thought  processes  to 
assist  operational  planners  in  recognizing  where  challenges  and  uncertainty  may  exist, 
and,  in  Canada,  this  may  require  a  series  of  shifts  that  include: 

a.  greater  inter-agency  cooperation  and  co-ordination  of  planning  and 
operations; 

b.  greater  inclusion  of  academia,  IOs  and  NGOs,  and  private  industry  in 
planning  for  crises,  mitigating  threats,  planning  for  “effects,”  and 
developing  a  robust  ONA; 

c.  further  exploration,  both  nationally  and  with  international  partners,  of  the 
complex  nature  of  warfare  generally  and  EBO  specifically; 

d.  further  exploration  of  the  requirements  needed  to  operationalize  EBO; 
and 

e.  a  cross-government  appreciation  of  the  advantages  of  adopting  an  Effects 
Based  Approach  as  a  major  operating  concept  of  the  future. 

Taking  the  above  shifts  into  account,  the  following  recommendations  should  be 
considered: 

a.  continued  Canadian  involvement  in  the  development  of  the  EBO  concept 
within  a  multinational  environment,  i.e.,  specifically  in  terms  of 
conceptual  refinement,  what  can  Canada  provide  the  international 
community,  or,  what  can  the  international  community  provide  Canada? 

b.  continued  Canadian  involvement  in  the  development  of  analytical  tools 
and  techniques  that  assist  in  the  refinement,  collation  and  visualization  of 
complex  systems; 

c.  an  investigation  into  a  suitable  organizational  framework  for  a  Canadian 
headquarters  structure  and  Effects  Based  Inter-Agency  C2  structure; 

d.  an  exploration  into  the  relative  merits  of  Canada  adopting  the  Effects 
Based  Approach.  Is  it  feasible?  Does  it  merit  substantial  organizational, 
functional,  operational  re-evaluation  of  the  CF?  Does  it  merit  financial 
allocation? 

e.  an  assessment  of  the  Effects  Based  Approach  and  its  inclusion  into  a 
major  Canadian  defence  paper,  or,  strategic  concept. 


77 


1  This  chapter  originally  appeared  as  a  Department  of  National  Defence,  Operational  Research  Division, 
Directorate  of  Operational  Research  (Joint)  Research  Note  RN  2004/01  published  in  January  2004. 

2  “The  Economist  Global  Agenda,”  Economist  (2  July  2003),  1.  Available  at  www.economist.com. 
Accessed  2  July  2003. 

3  Ibid. 

4  Edward  Luttwak,  “Digging  out  from  disaster,”  The  Globe  and  Mail  (21  August  2003),  p.  A17. 

5  Madeline  K.  Albright,  “Bridges,  Bombs,  or  Bluster?”  Foreign  Affairs  82,  no.  5  (Sep-Oct  2003),  2-20. 

6  The  “traditional”  method  of  warfare  and  its  pursuit  in  Iraq  has  been  analyzed  further  in  several  newspaper 
editorials.  See  for  example  “Comment  and  Analysis,”  Financial  Times  (30  June  2003),  13;  R.W.  Apple,  “A 
New  Way  of  Warfare  Leaves  Behind  an  Abundance  of  Loose  Ends,”  New  York  Times  (20  April  2003),  pp. 
Bl,  B14;  BBC  News,  “US  Plans  for  Iraq  ‘Flawed,’”  (26  June  2003).  Available  at  www.bbc.co.uk. 
Accessed  26  June  2003;  Jim  Hoagland,  “The  War  Isn’t  Over,”  Washington  Post  (22  May  2003),  p.  A35; 
and  Thomas  E.  Ricks,  “U.S.  Alters  Tactics  in  Baghdad  Occupation,”  Washington  Post  (25  May  2003),  pp. 
Al,  A18. 

7  Roger  Lewin,  Complexity:  Life  at  the  Edge  of  Chaos  (New  York,  Macmillan,  1992). 

8  Desmond  Saunders-Newton  and  Aaron  B.  Frank,  “Effects-Based  Operations:  Building  the  Analytical 
Tools,”  Defense  Horizons  no.  19,  Center  for  Technology  and  National  Security  Policy,  National  Defense 
University  (October  2002). 

9  The  threat  of  asymmetric  retaliation  and  guerrilla  warfare  (slowly)  persuaded  Coalition  forces  to  re-assess 
strategic  options  in  Iraq  in  the  spring  of  2003.  See,  Edmund  L.  Andrews  and  Patrick  E.  Tyler,  “An  Iraqis’ 
Disaffection  Grows,  U.S.  Offers  Them  a  Greater  Political  Role,”  New  York  Times  (7  June  2003),  p.  A8. 

10  Saunders-Newton  and  Frank,  “Effects-Based  Operations,”  1. 

11  This  definition  is  derived  from  a  recent  multinational  experiment  definition.  See  for  example,  US  J9 
Experimentation,  US  Joint  Forces  Command  (USJFCOM),  working  definition,  2002.  See  also  draft  of 
Effects  Based  Planning  concept  for  Multinational  Experiment  3,  a  joint  concept  between  the  UK  Joint 
Doctrine  and  Concepts  Centre  (JDCC),  the  Canadian  Forces  Experimentation  Centre  (CFEC),  the  German 
Bundeswehr,  France,  NATO  ACT,  Australian  Defence  Science  and  Technology  Organisation  (DSTO), 
(August  2003). 

12  Paid  K.  Davis,  Effects-Based  Operations:  A  Grand  Challenge  for  the  Analytical  Community  (Santa 
Monica,  CA:  RAND,  2001),  RAND  MR-1477-USJFCOM/AF,  200L 

13  R.  David  Smith,  “The  Inapplicability  of  Principle:  What  Chaos  Means  for  Social  Science,”  Behavioral 
Science  40,  (1995),  22;  Steven  Guastello,  Chaos,  Catastrophe,  and  Human  Affairs:  Application  of 
Nonlinear  Dynamics  to  Work,  Organizations,  and  Social  Evolution  (Mahwah,  NJ:  Lawrence  Erlbaum 
Associates,  1995). 

14  Keith  P.  Curtis,  Multinational  Information  Sharing  and  Collaborative  Planning  Limited  Objective 
Experiments,  MITRE  Corporation,  2001,  p.  3. 

15  See  Conference  of  Defence  Association  Institute,  A  Nation  at  Risk  (Ottawa,  ON:  2002). 

16  Decision  superiority  is  the  application  of  knowledge  by  leaders  to  make  the  highest  quality  decisions 
directing  assigned  resources  such  that  they  maintain  operational  flexibility  and  agility.  With  its  roots  in  the 
OODA  loop,  this  concept  includes  psychological  determinants  such  as  will,  capability  and  intent. 

17  Saunders-Newton  and  Frank,  “Effects-Based  Operations, ”.3. 

18  Paul  Davis  and  Brian  Michael  Jenkins,  “The  Influence  Component  of  Counterterrorism:  A  Systems 
Approach,”  RAND  Review  (Spring  2003).  Available  at  www.rand.org.  Accessed  7  May  2003. 

19  See  for  example,  arguments  presented  in  Murray  Gell-Mann,  The  Quark  and  the  Jaguar  (London: 
Abacus,  1994),  84-5.  Note  also  that  Gell-Mann  also  considers  the  rarity  of  revolutionary  scientific 
paradigm  shifts  (as  defined  and  extrapolated  by  Thomas  Kuhn  in  The  Structure  of  Scientific  Revolutions.) 

20  J.  David  Singer  and  Paul  F.  Diehl,  eds.,  Measuring  the  Correlates  of  War  (Ann  Arbor,  MI:  University  of 
Michigan  Press,  1990). 

21  United  States,  Department  of  Defense,  Quadrennial  Defense  Review’  Report  (30  September  2001),  14. 

22  Ironically,  it  is  rather  late  to  arrive  when  compared  to  its  use  in  fields  such  as  economics,  management, 
ecology,  biology  and  physics.  See  for  example,  Dana  Mackenzie,  “The  Science  of  Surprise:  Can 
complexity  theory  help  us  understand  the  real  consequences  of  a  convoluted  event  like  September  11?” 
Discover  (February  2002).  Available  at:www. discover.com/feb  02/featsurprise.htm.  Accessed  8  July  2003. 

23  Douglas  Van  Belle,  “Unexpected  Innovation:  Lessons  from  Simulating  Complex  Anarchical 
Environments  over  the  Internet,”  International  Studies  Notes  22,  no.  2  (Spring  1997),  18. 


78 


24  Alvin  Saperstein,  “Chaos:  A  Model  for  the  Outbreak  of  War,”  Nature  309  (24  May  1984),  303-5. 

25  Robert  Jervis,  “Complex  Systems:  The  Role  of  Interactions,”  in  David  Alberts,  ed.,  Complexity,  Global 
Politics  and  National  Security >  (Washington,  DC:  CCRP/Institute  for  National  Strategic  Studies,  1997),  46. 

26  Ibid. 

~7  David  Alberts,  Complexity,  Global  Politics  and  National  Security’  (Washington,  DC:  CCRP/Institute  for 
National  Strategic  Studies,  1997),  xiii. 

28  M.  Mitchell  Waldrop,  Complexity:  The  Emerging  Science  at  the  Edge  of  Order  and  Chaos  (New  York: 
Simon  and  Schuster,  1992). 

29  This  argument  has  evolved,  in  part,  from  a  University  of  Maryland  project  on  complex  adaptive  systems. 
See,  Kiersten  Blair  Johnson,  “The  Development  of  Progressive  and  Sustainable  Human  Complex  Adaptive 
Systems:  Institutions,  Organizations  and  Communities,”  1999.  Available  at 
www.wam.umd.edu/~nafikiri/webcomplex.htm.  Accessed  17  June  2003. 

30  Robert  Pool,  “Chaos  Theory:  How  Big  an  Advance?”  Science  245  (9  July  1989). 

31  Note  a  study  on  modelling  civil  violence  in  Joshua  M.  Epstein,  John  D.  Steinbrunner,  Miles  T.  Parker, 
“Modeling  Civil  Violence:  An  Agent-Based  Computational  Approach,”  Center  on  Social  and  Economic 
Dynamics,  Working  Paper,  no.  20  (January  2001). 

32  See  also,  Garrett  Hardin,  “The  Cybernetics  of  Competition,”  Perspectives  in  Biology  and  Medicine  7 
(Autumn  1963),  80. 

Allan  Beycheren,  “Nonlinear  Science  and  the  Unfolding  of  a  New  Intellectual  Vision,”  in  Richard 
Bjornson  and  Marilyn  Waldman,  eds.,  Papers  in  Comparative  Studies  Vol.  6.  (Columbus,  OH:  Center  for 
Comparative  Studies  in  the  Humanities,  Ohio  State  University  Press,  1989). 

’4  Kenneth  Waltz,  Theory  of  International  Politics  (Reading,  MA:  Addison-Wessely,  1979);  and  Charles 
Perrow,  Normal  Accidents  (New  York:  Basic  Books,  1984. 

35  Roger  Beaumont,  War,  Chaos,  and  History  (Westport,  CT:  Praeger,  1994). 

36  These  may  be  linkages  but  not  necessarily  logically  causal  ones. 

37  Michael  Doyle,  “Michael  Doyle  on  the  Democratic  Peace,”  International  Security  19  (1995),  180-4.  See 
also  Robert  Jervis,  “Complex  Systems,”  52. 

38  Jeffrey  Cooper,  “Diplomacy  in  the  Information  Age:  Implications  for  Content  and  Conduct,”  iMP 
Magazine  (July  2001).  Available  at  www.cisp.org/imp/iuly  2001/07  02cooper.htm.  Accessed  17  June 
2003. 

39  Recent  exercises  have  included  USJFCOM-sponsored  multinational  experiments  such  as  Limited 
Objective  Experiment  2  and  the  forthcoming  Multinational  Experiment  3. 

40  William  M.  Arkin,  “A  New  Mindset  for  Warfare,”  Washington  Post  (22  September  2001),  3.  Available 
at  www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/.  Accessed  17  June  2003. 

41  David  C.  Gompert  and  Irving  Lachow,  “Transforming  US  Forces:  Lessons  from  the  wider  revolution,” 
Issue  Paper,  RAND/National  Defense  Research  Institute  (2002).  Available  at 
www.randf.org/publications/IP/IP193/.  Accessed  22  October  2002. 

42  United  States,  Department  of  Defense,  Quadrennial  Defense  Review  Report,  30  September  2001. 

43  Thomas  K.  Adams,  “Future  Warfare  and  the  Decline  of  Human  Decisionmaking,”  Parameters  31,  no.  4 
(Winter  2001-02),  57-71.  See  also  Robert  J.  Bunker,  Five-Dimensional  (Cyber)  Warfighting  (Carlisle,  PA: 
US  Army  War  College,  Strategic  Studies  Institute,  10  March  1998),  7-8. 

44  There  are  numerous  sources  on  this  topic.  Some  of  the  more  applicable  to  this  article  include,  Dan 
Hunter  and  F.  Gregory  Lastowka,  “To  Kill  an  Avatar,”  Legal  Affairs  (May/June  2003).  Available  at 
www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-20Q3/feature  hunter  julaug03.html.  Accessed  3  July  2003;  and 
Matthew  Brzezinski,  “Autopilot:  Can  the  Next  War  be  Fought  with  no  Soldiers  at  All?”  New  York  Times 
Magazine  (20  April  2003),  38-40,  80. 

45  Thomas  K.  Adams,  “Future  Warfare  and  the  Decline  of  Human  Decisionmaking,”  58. 

46  Ibid.  Examples  include  the  emergence  of  directed  energy  weapons  (DEWs)  with  capacities  for 
engagement  at  the  speed  of  light,  developments  in  nano-,  bio-,  and  quantum-technology,  “digital  army” 
initiatives  such  as  the  Land  Warrior  system,  semi-  and  fully  autonomous  robotic  systems,  the  first 
operational  light-speed  weapon,  the  US  Air  Force’s  Yal-la  Attack  Laser,  microwave  systems,  and  tiny 
MEMS  (Micro-Electro-Mechanical  Systems). 

47  Kip  N.  Nygren,  “Emerging  Technologies  and  Exponential  Change,”  Parameters  32,  no.  2  (Summer 
2002),  86-99. 


79 


48  This  is  a  major  philosophical  issue  unable  to  be  explored  further  in  this  article.  See  Michael  Ignatieff  s 
excellent  study  on  this  topic,  Virtual  War  (London:  Vintage,  2000);  John  Leech,  Asymmetries  of  Conflict 
(London:  Frank  Cass,  2002);  Batya  Friedman  and  Lynette  Millett,  ‘“It’s  the  computer’s  fault’:  Reasoning 
about  computers  as  moral  agents,”  Department  of  Mathematics  and  Computer  Science,  Colby  College, 
1995.  Available  at  www.acm.org/sigchi/chi95/Electronic/documnts/shortppr/bf2  bdy.htm.  Accessed  17 
June  2003. 

49  US  Army  Training  and  Doctrine  Command,  “Concept  of  Employment  for  Unmanned  Systems  (Draft),” 
24  August  1999,  4. 

30  DRAFT  Final  Report  of  TTCP  JSA  AGIO  “Technologies  for  Effects  Based  Operations,”  Unclassified, 
December  2003. 

51  “Breakthrough  Made  in  Subatomic  Manipulation,”  Scripps-Howard  Newspapers,  8  November  1998. 
Available  at  www.nandotimes.com.  Accessed  17  June  2003. 

32  Duncan  Graham-Rowe,  “Intelligence  Analysis  Software  Could  Predict  Attacks,”  New  Scientist.com  (2 
October  2001).  Available  at  www.newscientist.com/news/print. i sp.  Accessed  17  June  2003.  See  also  the 
ASI  Website  at  www.asinc.com  for  information  on  their  PreAct®  Libraries. 

53  Wilpen  Gorr,  “Cloudy,  with  a  chance  of  theft,”  Wired  (September  2003),  79-80. 

34  One  should  also  note  the  development  of  “computerized  knowledge  assessment”  (CKA),  or  brain 
fingerprinting,  which  analyzes  brainwaves  to  predict  terrorist  attack.  See  Steve  Kirsh,  “Identifying 
terrorists  before  they  strike  by  using  computerized  knowledge  assessment  (CKA),”  www.skirsh.com  (7 
October  2001).  Accessed  17  June  2003. 

55  Charles  J.  Dunlap,  Jr.,  “Technology  :  Recomplicating  Moral  Life  for  the  Nation’s  Defenders,” 
Parameters  29,  no.  3  (Autumn  1999),  24-53. 

36  Roger  Lewin,  Complexity:  Life  at  the  Edge  of  Chaos  (New  York:  Macmillan,  1992). 


80 


PART  III  -  CANADIAN  PERSPECTIVES  FROM  THE  EBO  WORKSHOP 


81 


Chapter  4 

Summary  of  Conclusions  From  the  Effects  Based  Operations  Workshop 

Howard  Coombs  and  Allan  English 


General 

This  section  reflects  a  summary  of  conclusions  from  a  Canadian  Forces  Air  Warfare 
Centre  (CFAWC)/Defence  Research  and  Development  Canada  (DRDC)  Workshop  on 
Effects  Based  Operations  (EBO)  that  took  place  27-28  November  2006  in  the  NAV 
Canada  Training  and  Conference  Centre  at  Cornwall,  Ontario.  The  workshop  proceedings 
will  be  available  in  a  separate  DRDC  report. 

The  aim  of  the  workshop  was  to  identify  issues  related  to  EBO  and  to  begin  to  establish 
the  agenda  for  better  understanding  EBO  in  a  Canadian  context.  The  workshop  consisted 
of  a  series  of  syndicate  seminars  and  plenary  sessions,  based  on  selected  readings, 
contemporary  literature  on  EBO  and  personal  experiences  with  EBO.  Questions,  created 
by  the  workshop  organizers,  were  circulated  in  advance  and  were  designed  to  guide 
discussion;  therefore,  not  ah  questions  were  necessarily  answered.  This  conclusion 
summarizes  participants’  perspectives  so  that  we  can  have  a  clearer  picture  of  what  EBO 
means  from  a  Canadian  perspective. 

Conclusions 

Ah  participants  acknowledged  that  the  idea  of  achieving  certain  effects  through  military, 
diplomatic,  and  other  actions  is  a  very  old  concept  that  has  been  evolving  for  a  long  time. 
There  were  a  number  of  different  ways  of  conceptualizing  the  tenn  “effect,”  but  the  idea 
that  an  effect  is  a  change,  whether  physical,  moral  or  cognitive,  that  has  been  caused  by 
an  action  or  inaction”  seemed  to  be  acceptable  to  most  workshop  participants.  It  was 
noted  by  some,  that  the  word  “effect”  infers  that  there  is  no  finality  to  the  result  of  a 
particular  action  and  that  there  is  always  “more  to  come.”  This  idea  has  implications  for 
the  concept  of  “endstate”  in  operational  art. 

Despite  its  ancient  roots,  in  its  current  context,  the  term  “Effects  Based 
Operations”  was  derived  from  the  writings  of  20th  century  air  power  theorists,  and 
the  term  EBO  was  first  used  by  the  US  Air  Force  in  the  late  1990s.  Because  of 
this  recent  background  and  its  technological  focus,  EBO  is  seen  by  some  as  a 
particularly  air  force  approach  to  operations.  Given  the  perceived  air  force  origins 
of  EBO,  some  at  the  workshop  preferred  to  use  the  term  “Effects-Based  Approach 
to  Operations”  (EBAO),  because,  they  argued,  EBO  had  become  associated  with  a 
prescriptive,  technologically-based,  largely  air  force  way  of  conducting 
operations,  whereas  EBAO  conveyed  the  idea  of  a  broader,  more  philosophical 
approach  to  operations. 


82 


Some  workshop  participants  indicated  that  the  term  EBO  had  evolved  since  the 
mid-1990s,  as  the  early  21st  century  military-strategic  situation  has  caused  some 
to  emphasize  the  sociological  as  opposed  to  the  technological  aspects  of  EBO.  For 
example,  conflict  in  the  post-Cold  War  era  has  shown  that  tactical  victories  can  be 
achieved,  but  that  they  do  not  necessarily  result  in  overall  strategic  success. 

Therefore,  for  some,  a  more  human- focussed  version  of  EBO  is  the  best  way  to 
link  tactical  actions  to  strategic  goals.  Others  acknowledged  that  EBO  was  a 
method  that  could  help  to  understand  the  complex  situations  that  are  found  in 
today’s  operational  environments,  but  that  current  planning  processes  based  on 
the  Operational  Art  were  flexible  enough  to  incorporate  EBO  concepts  without 
changing  the  processes  radically.  All  workshop  participants  agreed  that  EBO  was 
still  an  immature  concept  and  had  not  enough  explanatory  power  to  be  regard  as  a 
theory. 

Some  at  the  workshop  argued  that  Canada  does  not  have  the  resources  to  fully  practice 
EBO,  and,  therefore  could  only  employ  EBO  as  part  of  a  larger  coalition  or  with  the 
United  States.  Nevertheless,  most  participants  felt  that  Canada  needed  to  both  fully 
understand  EBO  as  a  concept  and  know  how  EBO  might  apply  to  Canadian  operations  if 
it  was  to  be  an  effective  alliance  or  coalition  partner. 

Conceptual  Foundations.  During  the  workshop  a  number  of  concepts  were  put  forward 
as  being  fundamental  to  the  practice  of  EBO.  Despite  the  immaturity  of  EBO  as  a  concept 
and  the  differing  views  on  exactly  what  constituted  EBO,  there  was  some  consensus 
among  workshop  participants  that  EBO  should  be  a  top  down,  integrated  approach  that 
can  be  employed  to  make  changes  in  the  security  environment  to  achieve  one  or  more 
desired  end  states  related  to  attaining  of  a  strategic  objectives.  It  was  suggested  that  if 
EBO  sought  to  produce  change,  whether  physical,  moral  or  cognitive,  then  changes 
should  be  observable  and  measurable,  either  by  objective  or  subjective  means.  To  be 
meaningful,  the  change  being  measured  should  also  be  considered  in  terms  of  outcomes 
as  opposed  to  inputs  or  outputs.  In  this  regard,  an  effects-based  approach  encourages  the 
consideration  of  the  use  of  non-kinetic  means  to  produce  change,  but  it  does  not  exclude 
kinetic  means. 

Another  important  concept  that  emerged  during  the  workshop  discussions  was  the 
importance,  when  using  the  EBO  process  in  a  Canadian  context,  of  adopting  a  “Whole  of 
Government”  approach,  in  which  there  is  greater  interaction  between  the  CF  and  other 
government  agencies  (e.g.,  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  International  Trade). 
All  present  acknowledged  that  EBO  could  be  used  to  situate  the  use  of  the  military 
instrument  of  power  in  a  broader  “Whole  of  Government”  or  DIME  (Diplomatic, 
Informational,  Military  and  Economic)  context.  In  this  “Whole  of  Government” 
approach,  responsibility  and  authority  would  be  delegated  to  the  agency  or  government 
department,  or  perhaps  even  a  non-governmental  organization  (NGO),  to  ensure  that  the 
right  actor  with  the  right  expertise  and  capabilities  was  employed  to  deliver  the  desired 
effect.  However,  for  an  EBO  “Whole  of  Government”  approach  to  be  feasible,  clear 
definitions  and  tenninology  would  be  required.  This  could  be  problematic  at  the  moment 
given  the  diversity  of  ways  of  describing  EBO. 


83 


Furthermore,  implementing  an  EBO  “Whole  of  Government”  approach  could  be 
problematic  if  EBO  is  perceived  to  be  a  military-based  concept  rooted  in  military 
tenninology.  Some  suggested  that  an  innovative,  multi-disciplinary  process  is  needed  to 
bridge  the  gap  between  various  government  organizations.  This  new  approach  would 
require  a  new  vocabulary,  based  on  language  that  could  be  understood  by  all  involved,  as 
opposed  to  the  highly  technical  and  culturally-specific  DND  lexicon  that,  when  used, 
often  inhibits  cooperation  across  government  departments. 

Defining  EBO.  As  we  have  seen,  there  are  many  approaches  to  and  definitions  of  EBO. 
Some  participants  found  Edward  A.  Smith’s  definition  concise  and  relevant:  “Effects- 
based  operations  are  co-ordinated  sets  of  actions  directed  at  shaping  the  behaviour  of 
friends,  neutrals,  and  foes  in  peace,  crisis,  and  war.”1  EBO  in  this  context  included,  for 
them,  the  requirement  to  co-ordinate  efforts  among  all  the  instruments  of  national  power, 
as  well  as  a  requirement  to  emphasize  psychological  or  cognitive,  versus  physical,  effects 
across  the  spectrum  of  conflict. 

Other  participants  noted  that  a  US  study  of  EBO  emphasized  the  following  points  that 
were  consistent  with  Smith’s  definition: 

a)  the  importance  of  linking  all  actions  (political,  diplomatic,  economic, 
and  military)  to  operational  and  strategic  outcomes; 

b)  the  continuous  assessment  of  the  effect  and  adaptation,  as  needed,  of 
plans  and  actions  to  the  reality  of  conflict; 

c)  thinking  about  the  implications  of  actions  and  operations  in  terms  of 
their  second-,  third-,  and  nth-order  effects;  and 

d)  thinking  about  the  implications  and  consequences  of  effects  over  time.- 

Applying  EBO  Today.  There  was  a  general  consensus  among  the  workshop  participants 
that,  in  today’s  complex  security  environment,  EBO  should  be  applied  in  a 
comprehensive  and  holistic,  “Whole  of  Government,”  way.  In  the  context  of  using  EBO 
in  a  “Whole  of  Government”  approach,  some  participants  suggested  examining  the 
British  “Comprehensive  Approach,”  which  refers  to  a  means  of  coordinating  government 
efforts  to  obtain  particular  outcomes  during  complex  emergencies.  In  the 
“Comprehensive  Approach”  it  is  understood  that  the  military  may  not  be  the  lead  agency 
in  many  cases  and  may  have  to  conduct  enabling  or  supporting  operations  for  other 
government  departments.3  The  British  “Comprehensive  Approach”  requires  military 
planners  to  examine  and  consider  lines  of  operations  other  than  military  ones  when 
planning  international  or  domestic  operations.  Some  felt  that  this  type  of  approach  to 
operations  offered  a  means  of  inculcating  a  culture  of  information  sharing  and 
collaboration  among  various  actors  and  optimized  parallel  and  integrated  planning  and 
execution  with  other  government  departments  to  attain  government  objectives.  A  major 
caveat  to  the  use  of  EBO  in  this  way  is  that  it  depends  on  clearly  articulated  strategic 
intent  or  government  aims,  and,  historically,  Western  governments  have  been  reluctant  to 
clearly  articulate  their  strategic  intent  or  aims. 


84 


Linkages  and  relationships  among  EBO  and  Operational  Art,  NCW,  NEOps, 
Information  Operations,  and  adversary  intent.  There  were  a  variety  of  opinions 
expressed  during  the  workshop  concerning  linkages  between  EBO  and  other  ways  of 
thinking  about  military  operations,  such  as  Operational  Art,  Network  Centric  Warfare, 
Network  Enabled  Operations,  and  Information  Operations,  as  well  as  more  general 
concepts  in  the  national  security  lexicon,  such  as  Strategic  Art  and  adversary  intent.  It 
was  suggested  that  Canada  needs  to  have  a  mechanism  for  strategic  level  co-ordination, 
akin  to  the  US  National  Security  Council,  that  could  be  used  to  implement  Strategic  Art 
by  integrating  the  activities  of  many  different  actors  in  the  “Whole  of  Government” 
approach  as  well  as  determining  which  processes  and  concepts,  e.g.,  EBO,  Operational 
Art,  NCW,  NEOps,  Information  Operations,  and  adversary  intent,  should  be  used  in 
particular  circumstances.  Based  on  the  notion  that  EBO  is  fundamentally  an  intellectual 
process,  it  was  proposed  that,  in  this  context,  EBO  could  elevate  Operational  Art  to  the 
level  of  “Strategic  Art.” 

A  difficulty  in  practicing  both  Operational  Art  and  Strategic  Art  today,  according  to  some 
at  the  workshop,  is  that  that  too  much  of  the  intelligence  product  now  used  is  based  on 
kinetic  factors  and  the  physical  capabilities  of  the  opponent,  while  not  enough  effort  is 
devoted  to  understanding  the  adversary’s  culture  and  other  non-physical  factors.  Some 
believed  that  an  effects-based  approach  could  be  used  to  try  to  better  understand  and 
predict  adversary  behaviour  based  on  culture  and  other  non-physical  factors.  However,  to 
use  this  effects-based  approach  successfully,  a  better  understanding  of  the  concept  of 
“adversary  intent”  is  required. 

Some  participants  suggested  that  “adversary  intent”  could  best  be  understood  in  the 
context  of  Complex  Adaptive  Systems,  using  Basil  Liddell  Hart’s  analogy  of  the  “Man  in 
the  Dark”  where  conflict  was  described  as  a  fight  between  two  men  in  a  dark  room  and 
each  combatant  fights  using  very  limited  infonnation  about  his  opponent.  However,  this 
simple  analogy  assumes  the  adversary’s  only  intent  is  to  beat  his  opponent,  whereas  this 
may  not  be  the  case.  The  adversary  may  engage  in  combat  as  a  way  of  influencing  his 
opponent’s  future  actions.  Furthermore,  the  analogy  does  not  take  into  account  the  fact 
that  adversaries,  and  others  we  wish  to  influence,  are  complex  adaptive  systems,  and  that 
both  the  initiator  and  the  target  of  EBO  change  during  and  as  a  result  of  the  interaction.  In 
these  circumstances,  the  intent  of  one  or  both  parties  could  change  during  the  interaction, 
and,  therefore  the  effects  required  to  achieve  subsequent  change  could  vary  as  well. 

This  simple  analogy  also  does  not  account  for  the  fact  that  there  are  spectators  to  this 
combat,  for  example  an  international  audience  to  some  conflicts  created  by  global  media. 
This  complicates  operations  for  an  armed  force  because  it  needs  to  consider  how  its 
actions  might  be  interpreted  by  various  parts  of  the  audience,  as  well  as  those  present  in 
the  area  of  operations,  in  order  to  reduce  potentially  negative  and  unintended 
consequences  of  its  actions. 

EBO  and  CF  force  employment.  There  was  general  consensus  among  the  workshop 
participants  that  EBO,  if  employed  by  the  CF,  would  affect  its  force  employment.  It  was 
noted  that  many  of  the  CF’s  current  effects-based  capabilities,  such  as  the  capacity  to 


85 


conduct  information  operations  (10)  through  psychological  operations,  military 
deception,  and  computer  operations  has  been  relegated  largely  to  the  Reserve  component 
of  the  CF.  This  situation  was  attributed  to  a  culturally-based  preference  in  the  CF  for 
kinetic  approaches  to  operations,  which  has  resulted,  some  claim,  in  10  not  being 
included  in  the  planning  process,  because  10  and  similar  capabilities  are  seen  as 
peripheral  roles  for  the  CF.  The  result  is  that  these  capabilities  are  not  being  developed  in 
a  co-ordinated  fashion. 

Using  an  effects-based  approach  to  force  employment,  many  participants  argued,  would 
have  significant  advantages.  An  EBAO  could  conceivably  underpin  a  new  “Whole  of 
Government”  approach  to  Canada’s  actions  domestically  and  abroad  by  ensuring  better 
organizational  structures,  better  use  of  resources,  and  better  co-operation  among 
government  agencies  and  levels  of  governments,  while  at  the  same  time  avoiding 
unnecessary  duplication  of  effort.  Furthermore,  EBO  has  the  potential  to  give  those 
involved  in  the  “Whole  of  Government”  approach  a  clearer  understanding  of 
responsibilities,  clearer  lines  of  communications  among  all  agencies  involved,  and  the 
potential  to  be  a  catalyst  for  the  creation  of  effective  networks  and  linkages  among  those 
involved. 

An  impediment  to  an  effective  “Whole  of  Government”  approach  in  Canada  is  that  the 
CF,  as  the  only  organization  in  the  Canadian  government  with  a  formal  yet  flexible 
planning  process  and  a  mission-focused  organizational  culture,  has  often  led  multi¬ 
department  planning  teams  even  when  the  CF  was  not  the  lead  agency.  This  situation  has 
sometimes  been  described  as  “leading  from  behind.”  Some  participants  suggested  that  in 
these  circumstances,  the  CF  may  need  to  adapt  to  other  organizational  cultures  and  accept 
that  other  organizations’  inability  to  formulate  and  implement  plans  as  skilfully  as  the  CF 
does  not  mean  that  the  CF  must  assume  responsibility  for  them.  It  was  suggested  that  in 
these  situations,  the  CF  should  encourage  OGDs  to  assume  the  commensurate  level  of 
responsibility  in  their  areas  of  expertise  and  lines  of  operation. 

From  a  CF  point  of  view,  some  participants  argued  that  EBO  could  prove  to  be  a  better 
tool  for  ensuring  that  desired  military  effects  are  clearly  articulated  before  forces  are 
deployed.  EBO  could  also  help  to  ensure  that  effects  are  focussed  on  national  priorities  as 
opposed  the  needs  of  a  single  environment  (i.e.,  army,  navy  or  air  force)  or  group. 

EBO  and  CF  force  development.  As  with  force  employment,  there  was  general 
consensus  among  the  workshop  participants  that  EBO,  if  employed  by  the  CF,  would 
affect  its  force  development.  Force  development  was  taken  to  include  such  issues  as 
concepts,  doctrine,  force  structure,  and  personnel  development  strategies.  It  was  also 
noted  that  force  development  is  a  long-term  process,  whereas  force  generation  occurs  in 
response  to  short  term  needs.  One  way  of  looking  at  the  difference  between  force 
development  and  force  generation  is  that  force  development  is  about  the  structure  of  the 
force,  while  force  generation  is  about  the  creation  of  forces  to  meet  a  specific  need. 

It  was  noted  that  with  the  3-D  +C  (Defence,  Diplomacy  and  Development,  plus 
Commerce)  approach,  CF  force  development  issues  and  activities  are  evolving,  but  that 


86 


this  process  is  far  from  complete.  For  example,  the  CF  has  not  yet  addressed  the  issue  of 
interoperability  with  NGOs,  and  EBO  could  be  a  tool  to  assist  with  addressing  this  and 
other  deficiencies. 

Among  the  force  development  options,  it  was  suggested  by  some  that  the  CF  needs 
greater  intelligence  and  analytical  capabilities  if  EBO  is  to  be  used  successfully. 

A  problem  that  has  affected  CF  force  development  in  the  post-Cold  War  era  is  that 
doctrine  and  concepts,  including  those  related  to  EBO,  have  not  kept  up  with  the  pace  of 
change  in  the  CF;  therefore,  much  of  the  change  has  been  ad  hoc. 

EBO  and  CF  force  generation.  Force  generation,  as  noted  above,  was  understood  to 
involve  the  creation  of  forces  to  meet  a  specific  need  over  a  relatively  short  period  of 
time.  Force  generation  includes  such  issues  as  recruiting,  selection,  training  and 
education.  Solid  force  development  principles  and  activities  should  serve  as  the  base  for 
force  generation;  however,  as  we  have  seen,  force  development  in  the  CF  has  been 
hampered  by  deficiencies  in  doctrine  and  concepts.  Therefore,  many  recent  force 
generation  activities  have  been  ad  hoc,  with  predictable  adverse  outcomes  to  the  long 
tenn  health  of  the  CF  as  an  organization. 

One  immediate  effect  of  EBO  on  force  generation,  if  it  is  accepted  by  the  CF  as  a 
philosophy,  is  that  the  CF  will  need  to  be  able  to  obtain  the  right  people  with  the  right 
skill  sets  to  use  an  effects-based  approach.  EBO  will  require  people  with  critical  thinking 
skills,  who  are  able  to  understand  various  cultures,  and  who  are  able  to  conduct  analyses 
to  foresee  and  avoid  potential  problems.  If  the  CF  is  not  able  to  meet  these  personnel 
requirements  with  people  in  unifonn,  it  must  devise  ways  to  obtain  the  required  expertise 
from  outside  the  CF. 

A  vital  part  of  force  generation  is  a  combination  of  military  training  and  professional 
education.  It  was  noted  that  not  only  will  CF  training  and  education  institutions  have  to 
prepare  CF  members,  and  perhaps  others,  for  work  in  an  EBO  environment,  but  also  that 
the  CF  must  collaborate  with  other  partners,  inside  and  outside  of  government,  in 
developing  appropriate  training  and  educational  experiences  that  adequately  prepare 
personnel  to  work  in  an  effects-based  “Whole  of  Government”  approach  to  Canada’s 
security  issues. 

Summary.  While  workshop  participants  acknowledged  that  EBO  is  an  evolving  concept 
that  is  interpreted  in  different  ways  by  different  people,  if  Canada  is  to  be  an  effective 
alliance  or  coalition  partner,  members  of  the  CF  need  to  both  fully  understand  EBO  as  a 
concept  and  know  how  EBO  might  apply  in  a  Canadian  context. 

There  was  some  consensus  among  workshop  participants  that  EBO  should  be  seen  as  a 
philosophy,  rather  than  a  process,  and  that  philosophy  implied  a  top  down,  integrated 
approach  that  could  be  used  by  a  government  to  achieve  a  nation’s  strategic  objectives. 
The  idea  that  effects-based  operations  are  “co-ordinated  sets  of  actions  directed  at 
shaping  the  behaviour  of  friends,  neutrals,  and  foes  in  peace,  crisis,  and  war,”  based  on 


87 


Smith’s  definition,  seemed  to  many  workshop  participants  to  be  a  good  working 
definition  of  EBO.  However,  many  at  the  workshop  felt  that  the  term  “Effects-Based 
Approach  to  Operations”  (EBAO)  was  a  better  term  to  use  than  EBO,  as  EBO  had 
become  associated  with  a  technologically-based,  largely  air  force  way  of  conducting 
operations. 

If  EBO  was  to  be  used  as  a  means  of  achieving  national  strategic  objectives,  it  was  felt 
that  EBO  needed  to  be  applied  in  a  comprehensive  and  holistic,  “Whole  of  Government,” 
way.  Furthermore,  the  changes  that  were  to  be  produced  needed  to  be  based  on  outcomes, 
as  opposed  to  inputs  or  outputs,  and  the  changes  had  to  be  observable  and  measurable.  A 
number  of  obstacles  were  identified  to  implementing  an  effects-based  “Whole  of 
Government”  approach  in  Canada,  including  different  goals  and  aims  as  well  as  cultural 
differences  among  government  departments;  the  appearance  that  EBO  was  a  military 
methodology  where  the  military  was  expected  to  take  the  lead;  and  a  failure  by 
successive  Canadian  governments  to  clearly  articulate  their  strategic  goals  or  intent. 
Another  impediment  to  introducing  an  effects-based  “Whole  of  Government”  approach  in 
Canada  is  the  lack  of  a  clear  and  widely  accepted  definition  of  EBO  and  the  relative 
immaturity  of  the  effects-based  approach  at  the  moment. 

If  EBO  is  to  be  successfully  applied  as  “Whole  of  Government”  approach  in  Canada,  it 
was  suggested  that  Canada  needs  to  have  a  mechanism  for  detennining  how  strategic 
objectives  could  be  attained,  determining  which  processes  could  be  used  to  optimize  the 
achievement  of  these  objectives  and  then  co-ordinating  among  various  actors  in  the 
application  of  the  selected  processes. 

The  effects-based  approach  could  have  a  significant  positive  impact  on  force 
employment,  force  development  and  force  generation,  workshop  participants  concluded. 
If  an  effects-based  approach  used  in  a  “Whole  of  Government”  approach,  however, 

OGDs  might  need  to  be  brought  into  the  CF  force  development  process  in  order  to 
incorporate  their  expertise  at  an  early  stage  in  the  CF  change  process.  Force  development 
plans  will  need  to  address  how  to  maintain  the  CF’s  kinetic  capability  while  improving  its 
non-kinetic  capability.  In  tenns  of  force  generation,  critical  thinking  skills,  an 
appreciation  of  intelligence  products  and  the  importance  of  cultural  factors  will  need  to 
be  important  parts  of  CF  training  and  education  if  the  effects-based  approach  is  to  be 
used  by  it.  Using  an  effects-based  approach,  force  employment  could  have  significant 
advantages  if  it  were  part  of  a  “Whole  of  Government”  approach  linking  the  actions  of 
various  agencies  to  Canadian  strategic  objectives. 

At  the  moment,  the  effects-based  approach  to  operations  has  a  great  deal  of  potential  to 
make  a  useful  contribution  as  a  guiding  philosophy  for  the  achievement  of  Canadian 
strategic  objectives.  However,  to  be  a  useful  tool  in  this  process,  much  more  refinement 
of  the  theory  underlying  EBO  and  related  concepts  is  required.  The  utility  of  the  effects- 
based  approach  to  the  operational  and  tactical  realms  of  operations  will  also  be 
problematic  until  the  theory  of  the  effects-based  approach  is  developed  enough  so  that  its 
practical  applications  can  be  derived. 


88 


1  Edward  A.  Smith,  Effects  Based  Operations:  Applying  Network  Centric  Warfare  in  Peace,  Crisis  and 
War,  (Washington,  DC:  U.S.  Department  of  Defense,  2003),  108. 

2  Colonel  J.F.  Cottingham,  “Effects-Based  Operations:  An  Evolving  Revolution,”  unpublished  paper 
written  as  part  of  the  MA  in  War  Studies  program,  Royal  Military  College  of  Canada,  July  2004,  33-4. 

3  The  Comprehensive  Approach ,  Joint  Doctrine  Note  4/05,  (Shrivenham:  UK  Joint  Doctrine  and  Concepts 
Centre,  2006),  pp.  1-1  to  1-2. 


89 


PART  IV  -  ASSESSING  EFFECTS-BASED  APPROACHES 


90 


Chapter  5 


The  History  and  Theory  of  Naval  Effects-Based  Operations 

Commander  Kenneth  P.  Hansen1 

Naval  writers  have  largely  shunned  the  discussion  of  Effects-Based  Operations  (EBO), 
with  at  least  one  authority  rejecting  the  concept  outright.2  While  airpower  advocates  and 
air-land  battle  theorists  have  had  rich  discussions  about  such  things  as  whether  the  origins 
of  the  EBO  concept  date  from  the  inter-war  period  or  from  the  post-Vietnam  war  era,  the 
best  naval  writers  have  been  able  to  muster  is  to  question  the  impact  of  Net  Enabled 
Operation  (NEO)  and  Network-Centric  Warfare  (NCW)  on  the  application  of  operational 
planning  processes.3 

Where  is  the  naval  discussion  of  EBO  in  relation  to  the  historical  principles  of  sea 
power?  What  is  the  relationship  between  networked  naval  information  systems  and  naval 
warfare  theory?  The  importance  of  history  and  theory  to  Canadian  military  professionals 
for  gaining  an  understanding  of  NEO  as  a  useful  tool  was  emphasized  at  a  conference 
held  in  late  November  2006.  Interestingly,  the  discussion  paper  tabled  at  the  conference 
stated:  “. . .  each  service  in  a  nation’s  armed  forces  have  their  own  unique  paradigm  of 
how  military  operations  should  be  conducted  based  on  the  physical  environment  in  which 
they  operate,  their  historical  experience,  and  their  culture.”  The  paper  recognized  that  the 
notion  of  a  one-size-fits-all  approach  to  command  and  control  may  not  be  advisable 
despite  the  desirability  of  increased  jointness,  and  that  there  is  no  consensus  between  the 
services  on  the  meaning  of  applicable  tenninology  nor  is  there  a  standard  model  for  a 
networked  command  and  control  system.4 

In  effect,  the  Canadian  discussions  about  EBO  and  the  relevance  of  NEO  to  joint  warfare 
have,  once  again,  highlighted  the  fundamental  differences  between  sea  power  and  land 
power.  5  However,  EBO  advocates  are  advancing  the  notion  of  its  joint  applicability 
without  any  reference  to  naval  historical  context  and  unsupported  by  an  appreciation  of 
the  underlying  theories  of  naval  warfare.  Before  any  commitment  is  made  to  the 
development  of  an  EBO-based  joint  doctrine  that  would  compel  a  common  approach  to 
conceptualizing  missions,  revising  planning  processes,  and  changing  the  traditional 
conduct  of  operations,  at  least  a  cursory  knowledge  of  the  roots  of  EBO  in  naval  history 
and  the  theoretical  purposes  of  NEO  is  essential.  Once  so  informed,  the  long  history  of 
deriving  strategic  effects  from  naval  operations  lends  new  credibility  to  the  applicability 
of  deriving  effects  through  broadly-based  operations,  but  the  purely  attritional  nature  of 
tactical  naval  warfare  serves  as  a  warning  against  replacing  existing  theory  and  methods 
with  an  effects-oriented  approach  to  planning  and  conducting  naval  operations. 

When,  in  1911,  Sir  Julian  Corbett  set  about  to  frame  naval  warfare  theory  in  the  joint 
context,  he  did  so  against  the  backdrop  of  major  turmoil  in  British  naval  policy.  With  the 
“Dreadnought  Revolution”  as  a  backdrop  and  the  First  World  War  looming,  Corbett’s 
writings  found  very  little  support  at  the  Admiralty,  whose  leaders  were  focused  on  the 
notion  of  a  single  major  fleet  engagement  deciding  the  outcome  of  the  war.  In  a 


91 


significant  departure  from  the  seminal  works  of  Admiral  Alfred  Mahan,  whose  writings 
had  captivated  the  imagination  of  navies  worldwide,  Corbett  argued  that  war  could  not, 
except  in  the  most  rare  of  circumstances,  be  decided  solely  by  naval  action  and  that  its 
normal  effect  was  always  slow  to  be  felt.  Corbett  knew  that  the  diverse  effects  of  naval 
power  had  their  origins  in  antiquity.  Because  people  live  upon  the  land,  naval  power’s 
purposes  should  always  be  aimed  at  either  enabling  or  enhancing  (or  both)  the  strategic 
potential  of  land  power,  he  said.6 

Corbett’s  writings  did  not  benefit  from  a  unifying  concept  of  war,  such  as  Carl  von 
Clausewitz’s,  who  made  no  statement  of  any  kind  on  naval  warfare.  Despite  this 
limitation,  most  naval  historians  and  theorists  have  borrowed  extensively  from  Corbett’s 
work  as  they  refined  their  understanding  of  the  relevance  of  sea  power  in  joint  operations, 
although  some  continue  to  question  the  applicability  of  Clauswitzian  theory  to  all  levels 
of  war.7  Corbett’s  grasp  of  history  and  theory  allowed  him  to  devise  a  broad  view  of  the 
utility  of  sea  power  and  how  it  may  be  exercised  in  the  joint  context.  Although  his 
theories  rankled  many  flag-rank  officers  in  his  day,  they  were  consistent  with  the 
fundamental  principles  of  naval  thought  and  seamanship  that  are  the  basis  of  naval 
doctrine.8 

The  very  long  developmental  history  of  naval  doctrine  can  be  traced  in  the  professional 
literature  as  far  back  as  1270, 9  but  Corbett  knew  that  naval  forces  have  practised  the 
fundamental  concepts  and  functions  of  maritime  operations  since  warships  were 
primarily  oar-powered  and  their  main  weapon  was  the  ram.  Although  the  advance  of 
technology  meant  that  the  sophistication  of  the  equipments  in  warships  increased 
phenomenally,  the  basic  capabilities  that  dictate  whether  or  not  a  warship  can  be  assigned 
to  various  missions  and  tasks  can  still  be  described  with  the  same  terms  as  they  were 
centuries  ago,  as  shown  in  Table  5-1. 


92 


Roles 

Concepts 

Functions 

Capabilities 

Missions 

Tasks 

Military 

Force 

Counterforce 

Sea  Control 

Sea  Denial 

Deterrence 

Lines-of- 

Communication 

Concentration 

Dispersion 

Interdiction 

Centre-of- 

Gravity 

Manoeuvre 

Poise 

Logistical* 

Power 

Projection 

Strike/Move/Impose 

Capture/Secure/Invade/ 

Evacuate 

Sink/Disable/Land/ 

Embark 

Fleet 

Engagement 

Attack/Defend 

Destroy/Protect 

Engage/Patrol/Screen 

Fleet-in-Being 

Attack/Defend 

Contain/Protect 

Distract/Patrol/Engage 

Trade  Warfare 

Attack/Defend 

Destroy/Protect 

Sink/Escort/Patrol 

Exclusion 

Prohibit 

Exclude 

Stop 

Support 

Sustainment 

Replenish 

Provide 

Sealift 

Movement 

Transport 

Embark//Disembark 

Command** 

Coordinate** 

Control** 

Constabulary 

Domain- 

Awareness 

Sovereignty 

Stewardship 

Safety  of  Life 
at  Sea 

Administer/Respond 

Facilitate/Monitor 

Surveille/Search/Rescue 

National 

Authority 

Assert 

Enforce/Facilitate 

Surveille/Patrol/Stop 

Oceans 

Management 

Enable/Assert 

F  acilitate/Enforce 

Surveille/Patrol/Stop 

Aid  to  the 

Civil  Power 

Augment 

Facilitate 

Assist 

Diplomatic 

Rule  of  Law 
Human  Rights 
Pride 

Reputation 

Credibility 

Disaster  Relief 

Movement/Respond 

Facilitate/Direct 

Assist/Provide 

Deterrence 

Presence/Coercion 

Prevent/Dissuade 

Demonstrate/Show 

Evacuation 

Movement/Accommodate 

Remove 

Rescue/Protect 

Interception 

Inspect 

Enforce 

Monitor/Stop 

Representation 

Host/Visit 

Facilitate 

Demonstrate/Show 

Cooperation 

Communicate*** 

Various 

Demonstrate/Show 

Logistical*  -  Includes:  endurance  (mechanical  and  human);  range;  reach  (logistical  in 
conjunction  with  combat-related  functions);  capacity;  and  rates  of  supply,  movement,  and 
consumption. 

Command**  -  (as  well  as  Coordinate  and  Control)  are  capabilities  relevant  to  all  roles  in 
all  functions. 

Communicate***  -  in  the  sense  of  relating  intent  in  a  comprehensible  fashion. 

Table  5-1-  Maritime  Operational  Descriptive  Tenninology 

Whether  warships  were  propelled  by  oars,  sails,  or  screws,  Corbett  knew  that  there  was  a 
dynamic  tension  between  the  need  for  naval  forces  to  concentrate  to  enhance  their 
offensive  and  defensive  powers,  and  the  need  to  disperse  over  a  broad  area  of  ocean  in 
order  to  gather  the  infonnation  needed  for  the  commander  to  confidently  carry  out  the 
assigned  mission  or  task.  The  concept  of  “Sea  Control”  demanded  that  the  assigned  area 
be  under  the  surveillance  of  a  capable  naval  force,  which  had  the  inevitable  effect  of 
forcing  the  fleet  to  spread  out.  Nevertheless,  within  the  assigned  area,  intensive 
concentration  was  safe  and  effective  for  the  fleet  locally,  but,  in  this  situation,  enemy 
naval  forces  could  operate  with  impunity  just  outside  of  the  assigned  area  away  from  any 
concentration  of  forces.  Therefore,  the  area  was  not,  strictly  speaking,  “under  control.” 
Excessive  dispersion,  on  the  other  hand,  allowed  commanders  to  surveille  their  assigned 


93 


areas  effectively,  but  presented  possibilities  for  defeat  in  detail  of  their  forces,  sometimes 
with  an  attendant  loss  of  the  all-important  numerical  advantage  and  the  inability  to 
achieve  tasks  due  to  disaggregating.10  The  ability  to  concentrate  in  a  timely  fashion  in 
order  to  engage  effectively  was  always  the  greatest  challenge  for  naval  operational-level 
and  tactical-level  commanders. 

Once  opposing  naval  forces  came  into  contact,  the  effects  of  gun-based  firepower 
resulted  in  attrition  that  had  a  very  predictable  outcome  based  on  the  numbers  of  the  two 
sides.  In  the  symmetrical  engagements  that  were  predominant  in  Corbett’s  time, 
technological  advantages  almost  never  outweighed  numerical  advantage  because  force- 
on-force  engagements  resulted  in  attrition  to  both  sides,  and  the  side  with  a  numerical 
advantage  tended  to  slowly  “erode”  the  combat  power  of  its  opponent,  despite  any 
technological  advantage  that  the  opponent  might  have.  As  the  action  wore  on,  the 
advantage  tended  to  grow  for  the  numerically  superior  side  and  the  outcomes  of  extended 
engagements  were  typically  disastrous  for  the  inferior  force.  While  the  slow  progress  of 
erosive  firepower  gave  opportunities  for  inferior  forces  to  disengage  from  a  potential 
calamity,  the  only  way  for  an  inferior  force  to  defeat  a  superior  force  was  to  locate  the 
opposition  first,  manoeuvre  aggressively  so  as  to  concentrate  what  forces  the  inferior 
force  could  against  a  part  of  the  superior  force’s  fleet,  and  then  to  quickly  exploit  this 
temporary  vulnerability  in  the  superior  force  by  striking  first  at  the  point  of  contact. 1 1 
This  happened  only  rarely  in  history. 

Just  as  Corbett  was  writing,  a  major  change  began  to  take  place  in  the  way  naval 
firepower  was  delivered  in  combat.  Rather  than  erosive  firepower  from  guns,  a  “pulsed” 
form  of  firepower  from  such  weapons  as  torpedoes,  aerial  bombs  and,  eventually, 
missiles,  began  to  change  the  way  that  major  fleet  engagements  and  other  minor  tactical 
actions  were  conducted.  Enormous  amounts  of  destructive  power  could  be  delivered  in  a 
very  brief  span  of  time,  which  had  the  potential  to  destroy  even  major  warships  outright 
or  to  render  them  ineffective  for  further  combat.  As  time  progressed,  the  threat  from 
torpedo  boats  and  submarines,  aircraft  (including  suicide  attacks),  and  unmanned  vehicles 
launched  and  controlled  from  shore  or  the  air,  challenged  the  two  ancient  standard 
methodologies  of  naval  organization  for  combat.  While  concentration  for  attack  and 
massing  for  defence  could  still  be  effective,  the  consequences  of  an  enemy  firing 
effectively  first  could  be  so  instantaneously  devastating  that  no  opportunity  to  disengage 
and  save  the  majority  of  the  fleet  from  destruction  existed.  As  the  destructive  potential  of 
the  attacker  increased,  the  importance  of  scouting  for  information  compelled  further 
dispersion  for  both  the  attacker  and  defender,  but  weakened  both  the  potential  of  their 
striking  power  and  their  counterforce  defensive  power. 

What  finally  prompted  a  radical  change  to  the  traditional  tension  between  the  need  to 
disperse  (to  gather  infonnation)  and  concentrate  (for  layered  defence)  in  naval  warfare 
was  the  Information  Technology  Revolution.  This  combination  of  infonnation  gathering, 
processing  and  display,  and  dissemination  capabilities  made  it  possible  to  simultaneously 
extend  the  information  gathering  network  for  the  sake  of  area  control,  and  allowed 
dispersed  units  to  engage  in  an  offensive  fashion  without  the  need  to  first  concentrate  to 
be  effective.  In  this  context,  the  question  of  massing  for  defence  becomes  a  very 


94 


complicated  series  of  calculations  that  weigh  the  relative  strength  of  the  attacker  versus 
the  defender.  To  put  it  simply,  when  massing  is  expected  to  be  effective  for  defence,  the 
fleet  should  be  concentrated,  which  implies  a  loss  of  effectiveness  for  scouting.  If  the 
aggregate  defensive  capabilities  of  the  fleet  are  inferior  to  the  attacking  capabilities  of  the 
enemy,  the  fleet  should  be  dispersed  to  prevent  annihilation,  which  will  surely  occur  if 
the  enemy  can  penetrate  the  defender’s  anti-scouting  and  counterforce  measures.  ~  Thus, 
for  the  first  time  in  naval  history,  a  truly  revolutionary  development  changed  the  ways  in 
which  naval  warfare  theory  is  applied  to  the  principal  function  of  fleet  engagement  and 
how  subsidiary  forms  of  tactical  actions  are  conducted  in  practice. 

With  so  much  emphasis  on  the  conduct  of  high-intensity  combat,  naval  professional  are 
now,  just  as  they  were  in  Corbett’s  day,  in  danger  of  losing  the  broader  view  of  naval 
effects  due  to  the  overwhelming  importance  the  attritional  nature  of  naval  combat. 
Although  often  overshadowed  by  the  blindingly  swift  and  horrifyingly  destructive 
combat  potential  of  fleet  units,  all  of  the  other  traditional  functions  of  sea  power  within 
the  naval  military  role,  as  well  as  the  naval  constabulary  and  diplomatic  roles,  remain  as 
valid  in  the  present  age  as  they  were  in  the  ages  of  oars,  sails,  and  the  “big  gun” 
battleships.  Governments  with  naval  capabilities  are  (or  should  be)  aware  that  cognitive, 
cultural,  infonnational,  and  physical  effects  can  be  derived  from  all  levels  of  maritime 
activities,  and  that  these  missions  and  tasks  are  not,  nor  have  they  ever  been,  limited  to 
naval  warfare,  as  shown  in  Table  5-2.  The  centuries-long  association  of  naval  forces  with 
trade  warfare  is  the  most  obvious  example  of  this  truism,  although  maritime  history  is 
replete  with  a  myriad  of  others.  In  complete  accord  with  the  attritional  nature  of  naval 
combat,  most  tactical  actions  will  have  more  immediate  physical  effects,  but  the  more 
violent  and  decisive  they  are  the  more  likely  it  is  that  they  will  also  have  effect  in  the 
other  three  domains.  It  is  also  completely  consistent  with  naval  theory  that  naval  tactical 
operations  are  shaped  against  physical  objectives,  either  directly  or  indirectly  attacking 
enemy  maritime  capabilities.  The  employment  of  asymmetrical  means  to  accomplish 
these  sorts  of  objectives  has  been  commonplace  since  just  before  the  beginning  of  the 
Twentieth  century,  the  adherents  of  the  Jeune  Ecole  being  among  the  most  famous  to 

1 3 

seek  strategic  effect  through  this  approach. 


Level* 

Aim 

Methods 

Concepts 

Tasks 

Effect  Domains*** 

Strategic 

Objective 

(Political) 

0  ffensive/Defensi  ve 
(DDD&C  - 
Diplomacy, 
Development, 

Defence,  & 

Commerce) 

Maritime-Containment 

Land-Engagement 

Determine  End  States/Major 
Operations** 

Cultural,  Cognitive, 
Informational,  Physical 

Operational 

Objective 

(Conceptual) 

Offensive/Defensive 

(Joint/Service/Other) 

(M)  From  Table  One 
(L)  From  Land 

Doctrine 

Determine  Major 

Operations*  */Synchronize 
Capabilities 

Informational, 

Cognitive, 

Cultural,  Physical 

95 


Tactical 

Objective 

0  ffensive/Defensi  ve 

Symmetric/Asymmetric 

Sequence  Activities  (Arising  from 

Physical,  Informational, 

(Physical) 

(Direct/Indirect/ 

Parallel) 

Tasks  in  Table  One) 

Cognitive,  Cultural 

♦Level  is  determined  by  the  nature  of  the  objective,  not  the  size  or  capability  of  the  forces 
involved. 

♦♦Determine  Major  Operations  -  historically,  examples  exist  of  major  operations  being 
determined  at  each  level. 

♦♦♦Effect  domainss  are  list  in  their  approximate  order  of  importance  at  each  level. 

Table  5-2  -  Relationship  of  Levels  of  Maritime  Activity  to  Effects 

The  extreme  breadth  of  the  naval  roles  and  their  long  history  of  application  mean  that  sea 
power  has  always  been  linked  to  leveraging  national  strategic  capabilities.  Indeed,  for 
maritime  nations  sea  power  has  been  the  single  most  important  lever,  which  has 
traditionally  been  used  as  part  of  a  strategy  of  containment  wherein  like-minded  nations 
formed  alliances  and  used  their  collective  dominance  of  the  world’s  oceans  to  preserve 
their  strategic  advantage.  Although  EBO  advocates  claim  that  “focussing  only  on  the 
degradation  of  an  adversary’s  military  combat  power  does  not  represent  a  holistic 
approach  to  future  combat  operations,”14  sea  power  has  always  been  founded  on  the  swift 
and  decisive  application  of  tactical  combat  power  against  enemy  fleet  forces  at  the 
earliest  possible  juncture.  Any  scheme  of  action  that  imposes  some  other  methodology  is 
likely  to  result  in  delays  and  increased  cost  in  the  application  of  the  other  functions  of  sea 
power,  which,  it  has  been  shown,  are  already  traditionally  slow  to  take  effect. 

In  the  current  context,  plans  to  implement  an  effects-based  approach  to  planning  are 
inconsistent  with  the  underpinning  naval  requirement  for  swift  and  decisive  tactical 
engagement. 15  While  naval  operations  in  all  three  roles  at  all  three  levels  of  warfare  have 
a  long  history  of  effects,  both  intended  and  unintended,  and  sea  power  is  recognized  as  a 
robust  network  of  associated  capabilities,  it  is  an  anathema  to  naval  logic  to  pause  at  any 
level  of  activity  while  attempting  to  ascertain  whether  or  not  an  anticipated  effect  has 
been  achieved.  Corbett  had  it  right  when  he  said:  “Unaided,  naval  pressure  can  only 
work  by  a  process  of  exhaustion.”16  Sea  power  must  be  unrelenting  in  order  for  it  to  be 
effective,  and  it  is  most  effective  when  the  natural  volumetric  capacity  and  strategic 
speed  of  maritime  force  is  used  to  deliver  massive  combat  power  with  overwhelming 
effectiveness.  This  operational  form  of  naval  power  projection  is  unique  from  the  land 
conception  of  manoeuvre  warfare  and  has  been  described  as  “power  warfare.”  17 

Recent  analysis  of  the  EBO  approach  to  the  planning  and  conduct  of  combat  operations 
has  produced  further  uncomplimentary  assessments  of  the  EBO  approach.  The  main 
criticism  has  been  that  promises  of  achieving  decisive  “effects”  earlier  by  less  costly 
means  resulted  in  confusion  and  loss  of  operational  tempo  when  the  desired  effects  could 
not  be  measured  or  were  simply  not  achieved  as  anticipated.  Secondary  criticisms 
charged  that,  based  on  the  promises  of  air  power  advocates  using  EBO  concepts  to 
buttress  their  claims,  politicians  authorized  damaging  reductions  in  army  and  navy  force 
structures  and  readiness  levels.  These  observations  conform  to  the  warnings  of  the  only 
naval  theorist  to  venture  into  the  debate  and  should  serve  as  a  caution  to  naval 


96 


professionals  that  placing  effects  ahead  of  objectives  in  the  planning  process,  or,  worse, 
replacing  completely  the  achievement  of  objectives  with  effects  is  foreign  to  the  way  that 
sea  power  has  been,  and  continues  to  be,  applied  across  the  spectrum  of  conflict.  While  it 
is  perfectly  acceptable  and  usual  to  discuss  the  effects  of  naval  operations  at  all  levels  of 
planning,  true  jointness  cannot  be  achieved  by  compelling  naval  experts  to  depart  from  a 
style  of  warfare  that  is  both  centuries  old  in  its  formulation  and  is  in  the  midst  of  the 
single  greatest  transformation  in  its  long  history. 

The  signpost  of  only  the  second-ever  revolution  in  naval  affairs  will  be  whether  or  not  the 
dawning  “age  of  robotics”  will  affect  the  traditional  requirement  of  warships  to 
concentrate  for  defensive  effectiveness.  Will  the  anti-scouting  and  counterforce 
capabilities  of  traditionally-disposed  fleet  forces  be  strong  enough  to  defeat  a  “swarming” 
attack  by  unmanned  vehicles  that  are  both  unflinchingly  “courageous”  and  absolutely 
expendable?  Or,  will  networked  forces  develop  the  ability  to  engage  collectively  while 
still  dispersed?  Certainly,  a  suicidal  willingness  to  press  an  attack  to  point-blank  range  is 
not  new  in  naval  warfare.  New  assessments  claim  that  swarming  will  be  a  tactic 
employed  in  the  near  future. 19  However,  modern  warships  are  no  longer  built  with  the 
same  degree  of  annour  and  inherent  durability  that  was  once  a  common  physical  feature 
of  them.  Likewise,  the  speed,  range,  and  lethality  of  modern  defensive  and  offensive 
weapons  are  much  greater  than  ever  before.  When  these  features  are  combined,  it  will 
likely  serve  as  yet  another  example  of  how  the  tactical  conduct  of  naval  warfare  will 
achieve  strategic  effects  by  forcing  completely  new  methodologies  for  the  practical 
application  of  the  ancient  and  still  valid  functions  of  sea  power. 


1  The  views  presented  in  this  paper  are  attributable  solely  to  the  author  and  are  not  to  be  construed  in  any 
way  as  declarations  of  policy  by  the  government  of  Canada,  the  Department  of  National  Defence  or  the 
Canadian  Forces,  or  any  member  of  the  Canadian  Forces  other  than  the  author.  The  author  wishes  to 
acknowledge  the  timely  assistance  provided  by  Prof.  Milan  N.  Vego,  US  Naval  War  College,  Newport, 

R.I.,  in  locating  the  references  by  Amos  Flarel  and  Fariborz  Flaghshenass. 

2  Milan  N.  Vego,  “Effect-Based  Operations:  A  Critique,”  Joint  Forces  Quarterly  4 1 ,  no.  2  (2006),  51-7. 

3  Eric  J.  Dahl,  “Network  Centric  Warfare  and  the  Death  of  Operational  Art  "Defence  Studies  2,  no.  1 
(Spring  2002),  1-24. 

4  Joe  Sharpe  and  Allan  English,  “Network  Enable  Operations:  The  Experience  Of  Senior  Canadian 
Commander,”  Defence  R  &  D  Canada  (Toronto),  Contract  Report  Number  7908-04,  31  March  2006,  iii  - 
iv,  2-3,21-4. 

5  Wayne  P.  Hughes,  Jr.,  Fleet  Tactics  and  Coastal  Combat  (  Annapolis,  MD:  Naval  Institute  Press,  2000), 
172-4. 

6  Julian  S.  Corbett,  Some  Principles  of  Maritime  Strategy’  (London,  UK:  Conway  Maritime,  1972),  13-14. 

7  Mark  Cancian,  “Centers  of  Gravity  Are  a  Myth,”  US  Naval  Institute  Proceedings  124,  no.  9  (Sep  1998), 
30-4. 

8  John  B.  Hattendorf,  Naval  History  and  Maritime  Strategy’:  Collected  Essays  (Malabar,  FL:  Kreiger, 

2000),  241. 

9  JamesTritten,  Lessons  and  Conclusions  from  the  History’  of  Navy  and  Military’  Doctrinal  Development 
(Norfolk,  VA:  US  Navy  Naval  Doctrine  Command,  1997),  2. 

10  Canadian  Forces  College,  Naval  Doctrine  Manual  (MCP  1)  (Toronto,  ON:  Maritime  Component 
Programme,  2006),  Chapter  4,  pp.  21-3.  See  also:  Hughes,  Fleet  Tactics  and  Coastal  Combat,  73-4. 

11  Hughes,  Fleet  Tactics  and  Coastal  Combat,  40. 

12  Hughes,  Fleet  Tactics  and  Coastal  Combat,  286-90. 

13  Arne  Roksund,  “The  Jeune  Ecole:  The  Strategy  of  the  Weak,”  in  Rolf  Hobson  and  Tom  Kristiansen,  eds., 
Navies  in  Northern  Waters,  1 721-2000  (London:  Frank  Cass,  2004),  117-50.  See  also:  Erik  J.  Dahl,  “Net- 


97 


centric  before  its  Time:  The  Jeune  Ecole  and  Its  Lessons  for  Today,”  Naval  War  College  Review  58,  no.  4 
(Autumn  2005),  109-36. 

14  Robert  Vermaas,  “Future  Perfect:  Effects  Based  Operations,  Complexity  and  the  Human  Environment,” 
Directorate  of  Operational  Research  (Joint)  Research  Note  2004/01  (Ottawa,  ON:  National  Defence,  2004), 
4-5. 

15  Wayne  P.  Hughes,  Jr.,  “The  Strategy-Tactics  Relationship,”  in  Colin  S.  Gray  and  Roger  W.  Barnett,  eds., 
Seapower  and  Strategy’  (Annapolis,  MD:  Naval  Institute  Press,  1989),  47-76. 

16  Corbett,  Some  Principles  of  Maritime  Strategy,  13-14. 

17  Wayne  P.  Hughes,  Jr,  “Naval  Maneuver  Warfare,”  Naval  War  College  Review  50,  no.  3  (Summer  1997), 
25-49. 

18  Amos  Harel,  “IDF  the  Unready,”  Ha  ’aretz  (15  December  2006).  Available  at 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/801402.html.  Accessed  22  December  2006;  and  “New  Report  on 
Lebanon  war  criticizes  IDF’s  Chiefs  conduct,”  Ha  ’aretz  (12  December  2006).  Available  at 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/799738.html.  Accessed  22  December  2006. 

19  Fariborz  Haghshenass,  “Iran’s  Doctrine  of  Asymmetric  Naval  Warfare,”  The  Washington  Institute  for 
Near  East  Policy,  Policy  Watch  website,  report  no.  1179,  21  December  2006.  Available  at 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2548.  Accessed  30  December  2006. 


98 


Chapter  6 


Don’t  Drink  the  Kool-Aid  -  Effects  Based  Operations 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Colin  Magee 

.  .when  we  speak  of  destroying  the  enemy’s  forces. .  .nothing  obliges  us  to  limit 
this  idea  to  physical  forces:  the  moral  element  must  also  be  considered.” 

Clausewitz 

Recent  events  have  seen  a  resurgence  in  the  desire  to  embrace  Effects  Based  Operations 
(EBO)  as  the  solution  to  the  perceived  shortfalls  in  the  current  operational  design  and 
planning  construct.  1  Yet  despite  the  drive  to  replace  contemporary  elements  of 
operational  design  and  the  Canadian  Forces  Operational  Planning  Process  (CFOPP)  with 
EBO,  there  remains  a  level  of  confusion  surrounding  it  -  specifically  what  EBO  actually 
is.  This  confusion  is  compounded  by  the  fact  that  a  large  number  of  Canadian  officers  are 
using  tenns  like  EBO  without  a  clear  understanding  of  either  what  the  terms  actually 
mean  or  a  common  agreement,  doctrinally  approved  or  otherwise,  on  how  the  concepts 
the  terms  represent  should  be  employed.  The  result  is  a  perception  amongst  a  growing 
number  that  EBO  is  a  commonly  understood  and  accepted  construct,  which  has,  or  is 
replacing  the  current  operational  design  methodology.  In  short,  they  have  drunk  the  Kool- 
Aid  without  fully  understanding  the  implications.  This  perception  has  led  some  to  suggest 
that  the  current  construct  for  operational  design  and  planning  is  no  longer  valid.  The 
danger  is  that  the  perception  is  a  based  on  some  false  assumptions,  for  example,  that  the 
contemporary  elements  of  operational  design  are  kinetic  and  linear  in  nature.  The  reality, 
however,  is  that  many  proponents  of  EBO  lack  a  firm  understanding  of  current  doctrinal 
concepts  and  that  their  speech  and  writing  are  filled  with  an  unintelligible  “effects-speak” 
which  adds  to  the  confusion  and  misunderstanding  of  both  the  contemporary  elements  of 
operational  design  as  well  as  EBO. 

The  lack  of  a  clear  understanding  and  consensus  on  what  EBO  is,  and  what  it  is  not, 
within  a  Canadian  context  was  highlighted  at  the  EBO  conference  in  November  2006, 
whose  conclusions  are  summarized  in  Part  3  above.  Even  amongst  a  group 
knowledgeable  in  the  area  of  EBO,  there  was  little  agreement  on  either  the  utility  of  EBO 
or  on  what  it  actually  means.  Obviously,  choosing  an  inherently  imprecise  tenn  presents 
a  range  of  dangers  for  a  profession  that  requires  precision  and  clarity  in  language  to  avoid 
misunderstandings,  which  might  lead  to  confusion  in  battles  and  operations.2  While 
there  is  a  great  deal  of  literature  on  the  subject  of  EBO,  most  seem  to  be  “thought  pieces” 
with  little  in  the  way  of  actually  how  to  apply  or  operationalize  EBO.  The  foundational 
piece  used  by  the  participants  of  the  conference  was  Colonel  J.F.  Cottingham’s  “Effects- 
Based  Operations,  An  Evolving  Revolution”  (see  Part  2  above);  therefore,  for  ease  of 
reference,  his  work  will  be  used  in  this  paper  as  the  foundational  piece  in  relation  to 
EBO. 


99 


EBO  originated  as  an  airpower  theory  that  suggested  an  enemy  could  be  defeated  by 
affecting  systems  rather  than  simply  servicing  targets.  Cottingham  notes  that  the  early 
proponents  of  airpower  suggested  that  attacking  and  destroying  specific  targets  “would 
result  in  a  collapse  of  the  enemy’s  economy  and  strategic  war  making  ability.”3 
The  early  proponents  used  the  term  “destroy,”  a  term  generally  associated  with  attritionist 
or  old-think  warfare,  and  not  “applying  effects”  when  describing  their  early  version  of 
EBO.  Additionally,  their  focus  was,  and  many  today  would  argue  continues  to  be,  at  the 
strategic  level  of  war.  The  maturing  of  the  theory  saw  a  shift  to  the  destruction  of  key 
nodes,  which  if  successfully  destroyed  would  have  the  maximum  effect  on  the  overall 
conduct  of  the  war.  This  basic  philosophy  of  key  nodes  is  seen  throughout  the  evolution 
of  EBO,  including  that  of  Warden.  However,  Cottingham  suggests  that  the  central  thesis 
of  EBO  is  best  captured  by  this  statement  from  Force  Transfonnation,  Office  of  the  US 
Secretary  of  Defense: 

In  the  ...effects  based  contest,  the  objective  is  to  break  the  will  or  otherwise 
shape  the  behaviour  of  the  enemy  so  that  he  no  longer  retains  the  will  to 
light,  or  to  so  disorient  him  that  he  can  no  longer  fight  or  react  coherently. 
Although  physical  destruction  remains  a  factor  in  EBO,  it  is  the  creation  of 
such  a  psychological  or  cognitive  effect  that  is  the  primary  focus  of  the 
effects-based  approach.4 

It  is  from  this  perspective  that  EBO  is  often  proposed  as  an  alternative  to  attrition-based 
or  kinetic  warfare,  seen  by  EBO  proponents  as  the  logical  outcome  of  the  contemporary 
operational  design  construct.  But  as  General  Fastabend  points  out,  this  has  never  been 
the  true  basis  of  operational  design  doctrine.  Citing  the  fundamentals  of  campaign  plans 
found  in  US  Joint  Doctrine  Publication  5-00,  Fastabend  reminds  us  that: 

...campaigns  are  not  isolated  from  other  government  efforts  to  achieve 
national  strategic  objectives.  Military  power  is  used  in  conjunction  with 
other  instruments  of  national  power  —  diplomatic,  economic,  and 
infonnational  —  to  achieve  strategic  objectives.  Depending  on  the  nature  of 
the  operation,  a  military  campaign  may  be  the  main  effort,  or  it  may  be  used 
to  support  diplomatic  or  economic  efforts.  A  campaign  must  be  co-ordinated 
with  nonmilitary  efforts  to  ensure  that  all  actions  work  in  harmony  to 
achieve  the  ends  of  policy.5 


To  realize  this  aim,  the  campaign  plan  seeks  to  achieve  unity  of  effort  with  air,  land,  sea, 
space,  and  special  operations  forces,  in  conjunction  with  interagency,  multinational, 
nongovernmental,  or  United  Nations  forces,  as  required.  On  a  similar  note,  current 
Canadian  Forces  doctrine  states,  “a  campaign  is  the  integration  and  sequencing  of 
operations  and  engagements  to  achieve  a  desired  strategic  effect.”6  In  discussing 
campaign  planning,  the  Canadian  Forces  College  (CFC)  Combined  and  Joint  Staff 
Officer’s  Handbook  (CJSOH)  describes  campaign  design  as  “the  Joint  Force 
Commander’s  vision... of  how  actions  and  effects  will  be  sequenced.”7  According  to 
doctrine,  there  are  several  operational  concepts  that  are  fundamental  to  the  design  and 
conduct  of  campaigns.  Of  particular  interest  for  this  paper,  they  are  the  end  state  and  the 


100 


decisive  point.  As  will  be  shown  below,  these  classical  elements  of  operational  design, 
ideas  currently  enshrined  in  doctrine,  have  always  generated  effects. 

Current  instruction  at  the  CFC  emphasizes,  “endstate  planning.”  That  is,  commanders 
and  their  staffs  must  identify  the  desired  strategic  endstate  and  from  that  endstate,  plan 
how  the  military  element  of  power  can  be  applied  to  deliver  desired  effects  needed  to 
help  set  the  conditions  necessary  for  achieving  the  endstate.  The  endstate  is  defined  as 
“the  political  and/or  military  situation  to  be  obtained  at  the  end  of  an  operation,  which 
indicates  that  the  objective  has  been  achieved.”8  B-GJ-005-500/FP-000  ( Canadian 
Forces  Operations )  adds  that  the  “end  state  includes  the  require  conditions  that,  when 
achieved,  attain  the  strategic  goal”9 

B-GJ-005-500/FP-000  further  defines  a  decisive  point  as  “a  battlespace  condition  that 
must  be  achieved  in  order  to  threaten  or  attack  the  adversary’s  center  of  gravity.”10  The 
manual  adds,  “A  sound  determination  of  decisive  points  indicates  the  conditions  that 
must  be  set”11 

Therefore,  as  shown  by  these  examples,  extant  Canadian  Forces  doctrine  tells  us  that 
commanders  and  planners  should  be  thinking  in  terms  of  those  conditions  that  are  desired 
in  order  to  achieve  the  strategic  goal.  Furthermore,  CF  doctrine  also  says  that  “the 

|9 

essence  of  operational  design  for  a  campaign  is  in  its  ability  to  mass  joint  effects.” 

Thus,  doctrinally,  conditions  are  realized  by  applying  effects  in  the  battlespace.  The 
identification  of  those  battlespace  effects  needed  to  achieve  the  desired  conditions  is 
listed  as  a  task  under  stage  two  of  the  Canadian  Forces  Operations  Planning  Process  - 
orientation.  As  the  process  progresses  from  operational  design  to  operational  planning, 
in  discussing  targeting,  doctrine  states  that  the  prioritized  target  list  includes  “the  desired 
effects.”14 

In  short,  in  order  to  achieve  the  desired  endstate  a  number  of  conditions  must  be  meet 
(decisive  points).  In  order  to  achieve  the  desired  conditions,  effects  must  be  applied,  and 
effects  are  generated  from  capabilities  available  to  the  joint  force  commander.  Figure  1, 
illustrates  this  process  in  the  current  operational  design  and  planning  construct. 


Land 


Air 


SOF 


Non-military 


Maritime 


Figure  6-1  -  A  Depiction  of  Aspects  of  the  Canadian  Forces  Operations  Planning  Process 


In  examining  Antulio  Echevarria’s  ideas,  Cottingham  concludes  that  unlike  “traditional 
anny  views,”  Echehevarria’s  argument  focuses  on  the  objective  and  effects  and  in  so 
doing  “shifts  the  emphasis  of  analysis  from  destruction  to  creation  of  a  condition  or  an 
effect.”15  It  would  seem,  from  this  statement,  that  EBO  is  partly  based  on  the  assumption 
that  until  the  arrival  of  EBO,  military  leaders  have  been  unconcerned  by  “effects.”  As 
indicated  by  the  discussion  of  the  current  operational  design  and  planning  construct 
above,  however,  this  assumption  is  incorrect,  because  the  idea  of  effects  has  been  clearly 
articulated  within  current  CF  doctrine  and  being  taught  at  CFC.  The  reality,  as  expressed 
by  Deptula,  is  that  “the  idea  of  targeting  systems  to  achieve  strategic  results  is  not  a  new 
one.”16  In  fact,  his  “emphasis  on  the  end-state  or  the  objective  and  the  search  for  ways  to 
create  desired  effects”17  in  order  to  achieve  the  endstate  is  a  consistent  theme  within 
current  Canadian  Forces  doctrine. 

However,  Cottingham  notes  that  EBO  has  evolved  from  its  origins,  and  the  “second 
version  of  EBO,”  is,  one  could  argue,  in  essence  a  return  to  doctrinal  basics  in  which  all 
elements  of  national  power  need  to  be  integrated  in  order  to  achieve  success.  The  other 
perspective  that  could  be  taken  from  Cottingham’ s  analysis  is  that  while  EBO  version  1 
provides  an  element  of  success  in  conventional  force-on-force  operations,  the  first  Gulf 
War  and  early  stages  of  Operation  Iraqi  Freedom  clearly  being  excellent  examples,  it  is 
not  effective  in  asymmetric  warfare.  The  apparent  failure  of  EBO  version  1  was  clearly 
demonstrated  in  both  the  Korean  and  Vietnam  Wars,  a  fact  that,  as  Cottingham  points 
out,  EBO  enthusiasts  generally  choose  to  ignore. 

The  main  weakness  with  EBO  is  that  it  is  largely  based  on  a  reductionist  approach  to 
understanding  enemy  systems.  That  is,  EBO  seems  to  work  reasonably  well  with 
systems  that  have  low  interactive  complexity,  but  they  will  fall  flat  against  systems  with 
high  interactive  complexity,  such  as  social,  military,  governmental,  political,  and 
economic  systems.  As  Fastabend  argues,  “there  are  differences  between  structurally 
complex  systems — such  as  integrated  air  defense  systems  and  power  grids — and 
interactively  complex  systems — such  as  economic  and  leadership  systems.”  Given  that 
the  entire  Air  Force  planning  model  is  focused  on  targeting,  and  for  the  most  part  on 
physical  systems,  EBO  is  eminently  sensible  for  the  Air  Force.  However,  conflict, 
especially  at  the  operational  level,  occurs  in  more  than  the  physical  domain.  In  the 
physical  domain,  the  world  of  cause  and  effect,  EBO  might  work,  within  the  limitations 
discussed  above.  In  the  information  domain,  the  realm  of  decision-making,  not  only  by 
military  commanders  but  also  by  populations  and  whole  societies,  the  causal  effects  of 
action  are  far  less  clear.  Those  causal  linkages  disappear  completely  in  the  moral 
domain,  the  realm  of  belief,  conviction,  and  motivation. 19  It  is,  therefore,  dangerous  to 


102 


20 

pretend  that  databases  and  science  drive  the  moral  domain.  '  Operational  planners  can 
understand  the  physical  domain  using  the  reductionism  of  systems  analysis;  however, 
they  can  only  understand  the  second  and  third  type  of  domains  holistically. 

In  an  apparent  attempt  to  keep  the  concept  alive,  some  participants  at  the  DRDC 
workshop  suggested  that  EBO  is  entering  into,  or  is  actually  in,  its  third  stage  of 
evolution,  or  “third  version.”  This  third  version  is  one  that  posits  not  only  the  integration 
of  all  elements  of  national  power,  but  also  a  renewed  focus  on  the  morale  as  well  as  the 
physical  plain.  There  is  a  great  deal  of  literature  that  equates  EBO  to  operations  using  all 
elements  of  national  power,  what  are  often  referred  to  as  joint,  interagency,  multinational 
and  public  (JIMP)  operations.  But  the  JIMP  approach  is  also  embedded  in  existing 
doctrine;  this  is  clearest  in  US  Joint  doctrine,  which  states  that: 

All  JFCs  [Joint  Force  Commanders]  are  responsible  for  unified  actions  that 
are  planned  and  conducted  in  accordance  with  the  guidance  and  direction 
received  from  senior  authorities  (i.e.  NCA  [National  Command  Authority], 
alliance  or  coalition  leadership,  and  superior  commander).  JFCs  should 
ensure  that  their  joint  operations  are  integrated  and  synchronized  in  time, 
space,  and  purpose  with  the  actions  of  other  military  forces  (multinational 
operations)  and  nonmilitary  organizations  (government  agencies  such  as  the 
Agency  for  International  Development;  nongovernmental  organizations 
(NGOs)  and  the  UN). 

The  limitations  of  a  solely  military  solution  to  complex  problems  are  also  highlighted  by 
the  CJSOH,  when  describing  peace  support  operations.  In  this  type  of  operation,  the 
military  campaign  “is  not  conducted  with  the  aim  of  achieving  the  end  state,  but  of 
setting  the  conditions  within  which  diplomatic,  humanitarian  and  developmental  agencies 

.  a  1 

can  successfully  achieve  this  objective.”'  This  is  a  clear  acknowledgement  of  the  need 
for  a  “whole  of  government”  or  JIMP-like  approach.  There  is  a  consensus  that  the  joint 
force  must  be  better  at  integrating  all  instruments  of  national  power  and  broaden  its 
perspective  beyond  just  military  force,  resources  and  actions.  EBO  does  set  a  higher 
premium  on  integrating  the  other  instruments  of  national  power  and  calls  for  a  better 
understanding  of  the  operational  environment.  But  perhaps  EBO  brings  with  it,  not  a 
newer  and  more  effective  design  and  planning  construct,  but  rather  a  less  intimidating 
lexicon.  Military  planners,  particularly  Army  planners  consistently  underestimate  how 
the  fundamentals  of  military  planning  can  be  intimidating  to  those  not  in  the  military,  and 
as  Fastabend  jokes  “and  sometimes  to  other  services.”  Many  can  be  intimidated  by  tenns 
like  “mission”  “objective”  “end  state”  “assumptions”  as  used  in  the  military  planning 
context  because  of  a  perceived  focus  on  lethal  means;  therefore,  a  lexicon  that  moves 
away  from  the  perceived  focus  on  lethal  means  is  desirable.  What  is  also  clear  is  that  the 
language  of  effects,  either  from  EBO  or  from  extant  doctrine  is  more  suited  to  working 
with  interagency,  other  government  agencies,  and  non-governmental  organizations.22 

Yet  despite  EBO’s  shortcomings,  its  proponents  continue  to  push  it  as  “the  way  ahead” 
and  in  doing  so  fail  to  acknowledge  that  many  of  the  fundamental  aspects  of  EBO  are 
already  incorporated  within  contemporary  operational  design.  While  this  difference  of 
professional  opinion  can  lead  to  a  series  of  thought  provoking  debates,  it  has  resulted  in 


103 


diverting  intellectual  efforts  from  clearly  refining  existing  concepts  while  identifying 
those  opposed  to  EBO  as  dinosaurs  or  anti-transformationalist. 

In  summary,  we  do  not  need  another  label,  that  on  the  surface  suggests  a  newer,  better 
method  of  solving  complex  operational  problems  that  in  reality  only  serves  to  confuse  an 
already  complex  environment.  Words  have  consequences;  words  have  outcomes;  words 
have  “effects,”  and  the  military  should  think  carefully  about  what  those  effects  are.  The 
joint  force  is  dealing  with  operational  art  -  the  linkage  of  tactical  means  to  strategic  ends. 

23 

As  US  Army  General  Wallace  is  quoted  as  saying:  “It’s  kinda  sort  of  important!”' 

There  is  no  reason  to  reinvent  the  wheel,  as  the  current  doctrine  and  concepts  explicitly 
and  implicitly  point  the  commander  and  planner  to  thinking  effects.  Joint  doctrine 
effectively  describes  current  constructs  for  planning  and  operations;  therefore,  this 
doctrine  should  not  be  wholly  supplanted  by  EBO  concepts  and  methodologies.  But 
there  is  some  room  for  improvement  in  current  doctrine.  This  could  be  accomplished  by 
integrating  a  few  of  the  elements  of  EBO  into  current  processes,  or  by  clarifying  some  of 
the  extant  doctrine  to  ensure  a  better  integration  of  other  instruments  of  national  power 
with  military  power;  a  better,  systemic  understanding  of  the  operational  environment;  and 
a  better  assessment  of  the  effects  of  our  actions  against  the  achievement  of  objectives  and 
the  end  state.  But  these  actions  should  occur  using  the  current  constructs  for  design  and 
planning;  thereby  reducing  confusion  and  provide  the  joint  force  with  improved 
capability.  Put  down  the  cup  of  Kool-Aid  and  read  and  then  apply  existing  doctrine. 


1  Current  operational  design  and  planning  consist  of  a  number  of  elements.  For  the  purposes  of  this  paper 
the  term  contemporary  elements  of  operational  design  will  be  the  overarching  term  used  to  include  centre 
of  gravity,  decisive  points,  and  lines  of  operation. 

2  Taken  from  a  briefing  package  presented  by  Major-General  David  Fastabend,  Commander  US  Army 
Training  and  Doctrine  Command  (TRADOC)  Futures  on  3 1  Jan  2006.  In  possession  of  the  author. 

3  Colonel  J.F.  Cottingham,  “Effects-Based  Operations:  An  Evolving  Revolution,”  unpublished  paper 
written  as  part  of  the  MA  in  War  Studies  program.  Royal  Military  College  of  Canada,  July  2004,  8. 

4  Original  quote  from  United  States,  Military  Transformation:  A  Strategic  Approach  (Washington,  DC: 
Director,  Force  Transformation,  Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  Fall  2003),  36. 

5  Fastabend  presentation. 

6  DND,  Canadian  Forces  Operations,  B-GJ-005-300/FP-000  (2004),  p.  3-1. 

7  Canadian  Forces  College  (CFC)  Combined  and  Joint  Staff  Officer’s  Handbook  (CJSOH),  p.  11-1-3/16. 

8  Canadian  Forces  Operations,  B-GJ-005-300/FP-000,  p.  3-1. 

9  Ibid.,  p.  2-2. 

10  Ibid.,  p.  3-1. 

11  Ibid.,  p.  2-3. 

12  Ibid.,  p.  2-8. 

13  Ibid.,  p.  4A-1. 

14  Ibid.,  p.  5-9. 

15  Cottingham,  33. 

16  Cottingham,  20. 

17  Cottingham,  21. 

18  Fastabend  presentation. 

19  Fastabend  presentation. 

20  The  dissatisfaction  with  EBO  has  resulted  in  a  growing  interest  in  Systemic  Operational  Design, 
developed  by  Israeli  Dr  Brigadier  (Reserve)  Shimon  Naveh,  which  moves  from  a  science-based  predictive 
approach  to  a  philosophical-based  approach  for  analysis. 

21  CFC,  CJSOH,  p.  II- 1-6/1 6. 


104 


22  Fastabend  presentation. 

23  Fastabend  presentation. 


105 


Chapter  7 


Putting  Lipstick  on  a  Pig:  The  Effects  Based  Approach  and  Strategic 
Art 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Craig  Dalton 

The  practitioners  of  EBA  [Effects  Based  Approach]  profess  many  assertions  and 
defend  their  methods  at  the  level  of  doctrine.  However,  the  deep  theory  of  the 
effects-based  approach  rests  on  several  philosophical  mistakes  -  metaphysical, 
epistemological,  and  logical  mistakes... We  should  expect  mostly  mistakes  as  a 
result  of  a  practice  resting  on  a  mistaken  theory,  for  only  by  accident  and  not  by 
design  could  anything  good  come  out  of  it. 1 

Dr  Tim  Challans 


In  a  1995  article  entitled  “Strategic  Art:  The  New  Discipline  For  21st  Century  Leaders,” 
Major-General  Richard  A.  Chilcoat  issued  an  appeal  for  strategists  to  “match  success  in 
the  development  of  operational  art  and  joint  doctrine  with  an  equally  comprehensive 
approach  to  strategic  art  as  a  distinct  discipline...”2  Considering  the  complex  challenges 
confronting  practitioners  of  strategic  art  in  the  contemporary  operating  environment,  as 
evidenced  by  the  ongoing  conflicts  in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan,  Chilcoat’ s  appeal  may  be 
more  pressing  than  ever.  While  this  paper  does  not  in  any  way  attempt  to  fully  answer 
his  appeal,  it  does  intend  to  contribute  in  a  small  way  to  the  development  of  strategic  art 
by  considering  the  following  question:  Could  application  of  the  Effects  Based  Approach 
enhance  the  practice  of  strategic  art  in  a  Canadian  context? 

In  order  to  consider  whether  or  not  application  of  the  Effects  Based  Approach  could 
enhance  the  practice  of  strategic  art,  one  must  address  two  seemingly  simple,  yet  in 
reality  somewhat  difficult,  questions.  First,  what  is  strategic  art?  Second,  what  is  the 
Effects  Based  Approach?  The  intent  is  for  this  simple,  yet  logical  approach  to  shed  light 
on  both  concepts  and  to  lead  to  some  relevant  conclusions  regarding  the  potential 
application  of  the  Effects  Based  Approach  to  the  practice  of  strategic  art. 

To  define  and  develop  an  understanding  of  strategic  art  as  a  discipline,  one  must  take  a 
step  back  and  first  consider  the  meaning  of  the  term  “strategy.”  When  doing  so  one 
should  bear  in  mind  the  words  of  Arthur  F.  Lykke,  Jr  who  observed  that  strategy  has  “no 
universal  definition,  nor  even  the  approximation  of  a  consensus.”3  Lykke  further 
contended  that  a  plethora  of  definitions  and  loose  application  of  the  term  “strategy” 
detracts  from  sound  consideration  of  this  important  and  complex  subject.4  Mindful  of 
Lykke ’s  observation  and  hopeful  to  avoid  detracting  from  sound  consideration,  it 
therefore  seems  prudent  to  begin  by  defining  the  following  tenns:  “national  strategy,” 
“military  strategy”  and  the  associated  concept  of  “strategic  art.” 


106 


Fortunately,  Canadian  Forces  doctrine  is  quite  helpful  in  this  regard.  B-GJ-005-300/FP- 
000  -  Canadian  Forces  Operations  considers  military  strategy  and  the  application  of  the 
military  instrument  of  power  within  the  context  of  national  security  strategy,  noting  that 
“a  nation  employs  all  of  its  resources  -  political,  economic,  scientific,  technological, 
psychological  and  military  -  to  achieve  the  objectives  of  national  policy.”  Canadian 
doctrine  further  defines  military  strategy  as  “that  component  of  national  or  multinational 
strategy  that  presents  the  manner  in  which  military  power  should  be  developed  and 
applied  to  achieve  national  objectives  or  those  of  a  group  of  likeminded  nations.”5  From 
these  passages,  one  can  see  that  the  Canadian  Forces  perspective  on  national  strategy  (the 
application  of  all  instruments  of  national  power  in  pursuit  of  national  objectives)  and 
military  strategy  (the  co-ordinated  application  of  the  military  instrument  of  power  in 
support  of  national  security  interests)  is  consistent  with  the  commonly  accepted  western 
strategic  paradigm  of  co-ordinated  ends,  ways  and  means.  Of  note,  from  the  perspective 
of  strategic  art,  is  the  emphasis  that  Canadian  Forces  doctrine  places  on  the  requirement 
to  co-ordinate  the  various  instruments  of  national  power  and  to  consider  the  multinational 
perspective. 

Canadian  doctrine  is  less  helpful  in  defining  or  addressing  the  concept  of  strategic  art. 
Presently,  Canadian  doctrine  does  not  acknowledge  strategic  art  as  a  practice  nor  does  it 
discuss  strategic  art  from  a  theory  or  process  perspective,  suggesting  that  perhaps 
Chilcoat’s  appeal  has  gone  largely  unanswered  in  this  country.  Therefore,  in  the  absence 
of  a  Canadian  definition,  this  paper  employs  Chilcoat’s  definition  of  strategic  art,  which 
is  consistent  with  the  Canadian  Forces’  definition  of  strategy.  He  defined  it  as  follows: 
“Strategic  art  entails  the  orchestration  of  all  the  instruments  of  national  power  to  yield 
specific,  well-defined  end  states.  Strategic  Art  is,  broadly  defined,  is  therefore:  The 
skilful  formulation,  co-ordination,  and  application  of  ends  (objectives),  ways  (courses  of 
action),  and  means  (supporting  resources)  to  promote  and  defend  the  national  interests.”6 
Armed  with  suitable  definitions  for  the  terms  “strategy”  and  “strategic  art,”  it  is  time  to 
consider  the  environment  in  which  they  are  practiced. 

In  a  2002  article  entitled  “Operational  Art  for  the  Objective  Force,”  Colonel  James  K. 
Greer  identified  the  challenges  posed  by  the  contemporary  operating  environment, 
highlighting  its  increasingly  complex  and  adaptive  nature  and  suggesting  that  the 
evolving  security  environment  demanded  a  new  approach  to  operational  and  strategic 
art.7  Citing  examples  of  what  he  tenned  “full  spectrum  operations,”  Greer  argued  that 
the  traditional  approach  to  the  application  of  the  military  instrument  of  power  was  of  little 
benefit  to  commanders  and  planners  in  their  efforts  to  design  campaigns  and  major 
operations  beyond  conventional  force-on-force  scenarios.  In  short,  traditional  approaches 
failed  to  address  two  key  characteristics  of  the  contemporary  operating  environment:  the 
demands  associated  with  functioning  in  a  complex  adaptive  systems  environment,  and  the 
requirement  to  integrate,  to  a  new  degree,  all  the  instruments  of  national  power  in 
considering  problems  in  a  broader  context.  While  Greer  focused  specifically  on  the 
operational  level  of  warfare,  his  insights,  shared  by  numerous  military  theorists  and 
practitioners  of  strategic  and  operational  art,  applied  equally  to  the  strategic  level  of  war 
and  to  the  practice  of  strategic  art.  Greer  not  only  identified  the  challenge  posed  by  the 
contemporary  operating  environment,  he  also  identified  a  number  of  emerging  concepts 


107 


that  offered  potential  benefit  to  practitioners  of  operational  and  strategic  art.  One  of  the 
concepts  identified  by  Greer,  the  Effects  Based  Approach,  has  since  been  the  subject  of 
considerable  research,  experimentation  and  development.  Recently,  versions  of  the 
Effects  Based  Approach  have  been  incorporated,  to  varying  degrees,  into  both  US  and 
UK  joint  doctrine,  which  prompted  this  inquiry  into  the  potential  application  of  the 
Effects  Based  Approach  to  the  practice  of  strategic  art  in  a  Canadian  context. 

In  examining  the  Effects  Based  Approach,  one  must  be  aware  that  there  is  no  single, 
commonly  accepted  definition  of  the  term.  Rather,  there  are  many  varied  versions  of  the 
Effects  Based  Approach  and  at  least  12  different  definitions.8  Moreover,  while  the 
different  definitions  and  versions  of  the  Effects  Based  Approach  share  some  common 
themes,  debate  abounds  as  to  the  theoretical  and  logical  soundness  of  the  concept  in 
general,  as  well  as  the  many  varied  processes  associated  with  particular  versions.  J.P. 
Hunderwadel,  a  proponent  of  the  Effects  Based  Approach,  noted:  “there  are  as  many 
opinions  about  what  EBO  actually  is  as  there  are  people  who  have  written  on  the 
subject. . .  .We  talk  effects,  we  teach  effects,  we  claim  to  “do”  effects,  but  we’ve  come  to 
no  definitive  conclusions  concerning  what  effects  and  effects-based  means.  ”9  The  intent 
in  exposing  this  fact  here  is  not  to  critique  the  Effects  Based  Approach,  as  satisfying  that 
temptation  may  be.  Instead,  the  intent  is  merely  to  set  the  stage  for  further  discussion 
below  and  to  serve  as  a  caution  for  subsequent  consideration  of  its  potential  utility  as  an 
enabler  of  strategic  art. 

From  its  beginnings  in  the  US  Air  Force  as  a  targeting  methodology  to  its  development 
(in  concert  with  the  concept  of  Network  Centric  Warfare)  as  a  theory  of  war  to  its  present 
existence  as  an  enabler  of  operational  and  strategic  art  (in  US  joint  doctrine)  and  a 
philosophy  (in  some  UK  joint  doctrine),  the  Effects  Based  Approach  has  generated 
considerable  debate  amongst  theorists  and  practitioners  of  operational  and  strategic  art. 
Proponents  suggest  that  the  Effects  Based  Approach  “is  a  mind-set  . .  .that  should  be 
inherent  in  all  military  operations”  and  contend  that  adopting  this  “mind-set”  will  “ensure 
that  military  strategy,  if  successfully  completed,  will  achieve  or  contribute  to  the  political 
goals  set  before  it.”10  Proponents  of  EBO  also  argue,  as  military  theorists  and 
practitioners  who  opposed  attritional  warfare  such  as  Sun  Tzu,  B.  H.  Liddell-Hart,  T.E. 
Lawrence  and  more  recently,  advocates  of  the  manoeuvre  warfare  school  such  as  Robert 
I  .eon  hard  and  Bill  Lind  argued  in  their  own  contexts,  that  “conceptually,  EBO  may 
enable  desired  aims  to  be  achieved  without  the  need  for  attritional  warfare...”11 
Furthermore,  US  Joint  Doctrine  on  Effects  Based  Planning  prescribes  particular 
processes  based  on  the  premise  that  the  Effects  Based  Approach  holds  the  key  to 
addressing  the  challenges  posed  by  complex  adaptive  systems.  “  At  the  less 
deterministic  end  of  the  spectrum  is  the  British  effects-based  philosophy  which  suggests 
that  “the  military  instrument  needs  to  act  in  harmony  with  the  diplomatic  and  economic 
instruments  of  national  power  in  taking  a  long-tenn  view  to  address  both  the  underlying 
causes  and  the  overt  symptoms  of  a  crisis”  and  that  the  effects-based  approach 
“....considers  the  whole  environment,  recognising  that  it  is  complex,  unpredictable  and 
adaptive. . .”  On  the  surface,  this  broad  range  of  claims  suggests  that  the  Effects  Based 
Approach  holds  much  promise;  however,  there  are  many  who  dispute  these  claims  and 
question  the  uniqueness  and/or  validity  of  the  Effects  Based  Approach. 


108 


Critics  of  the  Effects  Based  Approach  range  from  those  such  as  Ralph  Peters  (who 
suggests  that  “EBO  isn’t  a  strategy.  It’s  a  sales  pitch...”)14  to  those  such  as  Tim  Challans 
(who  argues  that  the  Effects  Based  Approach  fails  to  accommodate  moral  concerns)  to 
those  such  as  J.P.  Hunerwadel  (who,  while  ultimately  a  supporter  of  the  Effects  Based 
Approach,  takes  a  much  more  reasoned  and  balanced  view  of  what  it  is  and  is  not, 
thereby  countering  those  who  “worship  at  the  altar  of  Effects.”) 

Peters  captures  a  number  of  common  criticisms  of  the  Effects  Based  Approach,  including 
the  contention  that  the  Effects  Based  Approach  is  really  nothing  new.  Rather,  the  Effects 
Based  Approach  is  merely  the  latest  example  of  a  “recurring  American  delusion  -  the 
notion  that,  if  only,  we  can  discover  it,  there  must  be  a  formula  for  winning  wars  on  the 
cheap.”15  Peters  also  suggests,  as  have  many  other  critics  of  the  Effects  Based  Approach, 
that  warfare  has  always  been  about  achieving  effects,  thus  countering  the  rather  simplistic 
and  difficult-to-accept  argument  that,  somehow,  objective-based  and  effects-based 
operations  are  mutually  exclusive.  Finally,  Peters  addresses  the  plethora  of  opinions  and 
definitions  of  the  Effects  Based  Approach  and  suggests  that  if  a  concept  cannot  be  clearly 
and  simply  defined  or  explained  then  it  will  not  work. 

In  a  2006  presentation  to  a  joint  services  conference,  Challans  addressed  the  moral 
implications  of  adopting  the  Effects  Based  Approach.  In  the  process,  Challans  presented 
an  insightful  and  sound  critique  of  the  Effects  Based  Approach  from  a  scientific  and 
theoretical  perspective  and  contended  that  the  Effects  Based  Approach  “rests  on  several 
philosophical  mistakes  -  metaphysical,  epistemological,  and  logical.”16  More 
specifically,  Challans  revealed  how  proponents  of  the  Effects  Based  Approach 
mistakenly  contend  “that  something  as  complex  as  human  activity  can  be  rendered  and 
reduced  and  mutilated  to  fit  the  procrustean  bed  of  behaviourism,  choking  the  mental 
realm  into  lifelessness  with  their  chains  of  cause  and  effect.”  Challans  suggests  that  the 
pseudo-science-informed  hubris  of  strategy-makers  led  to  the  conclusion  that  instituting 
democracy  in  Iraq  was  simply  a  matter  of  causality:  the  action  of  regime  change  would 
result  in  the  effect  of  a  democratic,  less  threatening  Iraq.  Further,  Challans  challenged 
the  logic  of  the  Effects  Based  Approach  and  its  teleological  underpinnings,  observing  that 
“imposing  telos  into  a  so-called  scientific  process  is  to  misunderstand  the  whole 
enterprise  of  modern  science.”17  Challans’  thought-provoking  work  should  give  caution 

to  any  organization  considering  the  adoption  of  an  Effects  Based  Approach,  an  approach 

1 8 

he  quite  accurately  describes  as  “pseudo-scientific  and  pseudo-philosophical.” 

So,  in  light  of  the  dozen  or  more  definitions  of  the  Effects  Based  Approach  in 
existence  and  the  very  polarized  debate  regarding  its  theoretical  soundness  and  utility, 
how  does  one  move  forward  in  an  attempt  to  first  determine  exactly  what  the  Effects 
Based  Approach  is,  and  second,  whether  or  not  it  is  applicable  to  the  practice  of  strategic 
art?  The  short  answer  is:  cautiously.  The  long  answer  involves  a  degree  of  selective 
consideration  (sorting  through  the  noise  associated  with  the  many  different  versions  and 
definitions),  a  more  detailed  analysis  of  some  of  the  different  versions  of  the  Effects 
Based  Approach,  and  an  awareness  of  the  potential  pitfalls  associated  with  adopting 
unsound  emerging  theories  and  practices.  While  detailed  discussion  of  individual 


109 


definitions  and  approaches  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper,  the  UK  effects-based 
approach  is  discussed  briefly  below  in  order  to  consider  its  utility  as  an  enabler  of 
strategic  art. 

The  UK  Effects  Based  Approach  actually  comprises  three  interrelated  concepts:  the 
comprehensive  approach,  the  effects-based  approach,  and  the  effects-based  philosophy. 
The  emergence  of  these  three  concepts  is  a  result  of  British  analysis  and  reaction  to  the 
emerging  realities  of  the  21st  Century  security  environment  and  represents 
acknowledgement  of  many  of  the  challenges  identified  by  Greer  above.  In  particular,  the 
UK  Effects  Based  Approach  reflects  an  effort  to  come  to  grips  with  two  prominent 
characteristics  of  the  contemporary  operating  environment:  the  complex  adaptive  nature 
of  today’s  security  challenges  and  the  demand  for  a  co-ordinated,  broad,  whole-of- 
govemment  approach  to  strategy  formulation. 19  Accordingly,  the  effectiveness  of  the 
UK  approach  and  its  potential  applicability  to  the  practice  of  strategic  art  can  be 
examined  against  these  two  characteristics. 

UK  Joint  Discussion  Note  4/05  “The  Comprehensive  Approach,”  was  a  direct  response  to 
the  evolving  international  security  environment  of  the  post-Cold  War  era  and  reflected 
the  benefit  of  experience  gained  in  the  Balkans,  Afghanistan  and  Iraq.  In  short,  “The 
Comprehensive  Approach”  acknowledged  the  complex  security  challenges  the  UK  faced 
and  more  importantly,  recognized  the  need  for  a  comprehensive  and  collaborative 
approach  to  applying  the  “3  (diplomatic,  military  and  economic)  national  instruments  of 
power”  to  achieve  the  goals  of  national  policy."  Joint  Doctrine  Note  7/06  “Incorporating 
and  Extending  the  UK  Military  Effects-Based  Approach”  built  on  “The  Comprehensive 
Approach”  and  established  it  as  a  cornerstone  of  the  UK  effects-based  philosophy.  Joint 
Doctrine  Note  7/06  defined  the  UK  effects-based  approach  and  effects-based  philosophy 
as  follows: 

Effects-Based  Approach.  The  way  of  thinking  and  specific  processes  that, 

together,  enable  both  the  integration  and  effectiveness  of  the  military  contribution 

within  a  CA  [Comprehensive  Approach]  (collaborative,  i.e.,  integrated  whole-of- 

2 1 

government  context)  and  the  realization  of  strategic  outcomes. 

Effects-Based  Philosophy.  The  UK  effects-based  philosophy  recognises  that  the 
military  instrument  needs  to  act  in  hannony  with  the  diplomatic  and  economic 
instruments  of  national  power  in  taking  a  long-tenn  view  to  address  both  the 
underlying  causes  and  the  overt  symptoms  of  a  crisis.22 

These  largely  underwhelming  definitions  suggest  that  there  is  nothing  revolutionary 
about  the  UK  Effects  Based  Approach.  Indeed,  there  is  not.  However,  the  degree  to 
which  Joint  Doctrine  Note  7/06  incorporates  the  principle  of  the  comprehensive  and 
collaborative  approach  throughout,  suggests  that  the  underlying  intent  is  to  inculcate  the 
“whole-of-governmenf  ’  approach  as  a  response  to  the  demand  to  think  more  broadly 
about  contemporary  security  challenges,  both  in  terms  of  framing  and  understanding  a 
problem  and  in  formulating  strategy.  In  this  regard,  the  UK  effects-based  approach  is 

23 

noteworthy  and  potentially  of  great  benefit  to  practitioners  of  strategic  art." 


110 


Unfortunately,  the  sections  of  Joint  Doctrine  Note  7/06  that  deal  with  “The  UK  Approach 
to  Warfare”  as  well  as  “Planning”  and  “Execution”  merely  represent  a  repackaging  of  the 
existing  approaches  to  the  conduct  of  these  activities.  Further,  despite  efforts  of  the 
author(s)  to  assign  mystical  powers  to  the  term  “effects”  and  attempts  to  convince  the 
reader  that  the  “new”  construct  based  on  “thematic  lines  of  operation”  and  “decisive 
conditions”  is  somehow  different  and  superior  to  the  traditional  “logical  lines  of 
operation”  and  “decisive  points”  construct,  it  offers  no  substantial  improvement  over 
traditional  approaches.  Further,  it  lends  credence  to  those  opponents  of  the  Effects  Based 
Approach  who  suggest  that  the  concept  contains  no  new  thought.  In  summary,  the  UK 
Effects  Based  Approach  should  be  lauded  for  its  forthright  efforts  to  institutionalize  the 
“comprehensive  approach”  in  response  to  the  demands  of  the  contemporary  operating 
environment.  However,  it  falls  short  in  addressing  the  challenges  posed  by  the  complex 
adaptive  systems  environment  that  confronts  modern-day  practitioners  of  strategic  art, 
therefore  suggesting  that  the  Effects  Based  Approach  is  of  limited  utility. 

The  intent  of  this  paper  was  to  contribute,  in  a  very  modest  way,  to  the  development  of 
strategic  art.  More  specifically,  this  paper  has  considered  whether  or  not  the  Effects 
Based  Approach  could  enhance  the  practice  of  strategic  art  in  light  of  the  challenges 
posed  by  the  contemporary  operating  environment  and,  in  particular,  the  demands 
associated  with  functioning  in  a  complex  adaptive  systems  environment  and  the 
requirement  to  integrate,  to  a  new  degree,  all  the  instruments  of  national  power. 

In  response  to  the  first  challenge,  posed  by  the  complex  adaptive  nature  of  the 
contemporary  security  environment,  the  Effects  Based  Approach  comes  up  short  and 
offers  no  improvement  over  existing  methods.  Indeed,  despite  the  claims  of  Effects 
Based  Approach  advocates  who  suggest  that  their  approach  views  warfare  as  “a  clash  of 
complex  adaptive  systems,”  the  responses  to  this  first  challenge  are  surprisingly  linear, 
mechanistic  and  teleological  in  nature.  To  suggest  that  talking  “effects”  (taking  action  to 
achieve  an  effect  vice  taking  action  for  action’s  sake)  is  somehow  the  key  to  addressing 
the  challenges  of  strategy  formulation  in  a  complex  adaptive  environment  is  simply  silly. 
There  are  other  approaches  to  confronting  complex  adaptive  systems,  such  as  the  Israeli 
Defence  Forces’  Systemic  Operational  Design,  that  might  offer  greater  potential  and  are 
certainly  less  “pseudo-scientific”  than  the  Effects  Based  Approach. 

As  demonstrated  by  the  brief  discussion  of  the  UK  approach  above,  the  Effects  Based 
Approach  has  achieved  far  greater  success  and  offers  far  greater  potential  for  addressing 
the  second  challenge  associated  with  the  contemporary  operating  environment,  that  of 
advancing  the  whole-of-government  or  “3D”  approach.  The  UK’s  “Comprehensive 
Approach”  and  “Effects  Based  Philosophy”  are  quite  forceful  in  this  regard  and  serve  as 
good  examples  for  practitioners  of  strategic  art.  Nevertheless,  one  should  recognize  that 
instituting  a  comprehensive  approach  to  broaden  problem  framing  and  strategy 
formulation  as  well  as  improving  interagency  cooperation  is  not  exclusive  to  the  Effects 
Based  Approach.  Rather,  it  could  and  should  be  pursued  independent  of  a  particular 
approach  to  warfare. 


Ill 


In  the  end,  the  Effects  Based  Approach  (in  whichever  form  or  definition)  does  not 
enhance  the  practice  of  strategic  art.  It  is,  in  my  opinion,  no  better  or  worse  than  existing 
approaches,  which  should  come  as  no  surprise,  for  it  is  largely  a  repackaging  of  these 
same  approaches.  Indeed,  one  could  consider  the  development  of  the  Effects  Based 
Approach  as  an  exercise  in  “putting  lipstick  on  a  pig.”  The  Canadian  Forces  should, 
notwithstanding  the  need  for  interoperability,  therefore  avoid  being  seduced  by  concepts 
like  the  Effects  Based  Approach,  and  should  instead  invest  efforts  into  the  development 
of  a  viable  alternative  to  enable  the  practice  of  strategic  art. 


1  Dr.  Tim  Challans,  “Emerging  Doctrine  and  the  Ethics  of  Warfare,”  presentation  to  the  Joint  Services 
Conference  on  Professional  Ethics  on  Emerging  Doctrine  and  the  Ethics  of  Warfare,  2006.  Available  at 
http://www.usafa.af.mil/iscope/JSCOPEO6/ChallansO6.html.  Accessed  6  Sep  2007. 

2  Major-General  Richard  A.  Chilcoat,  “Strategic  Art:  The  New  Discipline  for  21st  Century  Leaders”  in 
Joseph  R.  Cerami  and  James  F.  Holcomb,  Jr,  eds.,  The  US  Army  War  College  Guide  to  Strategy,  (Carlisle 
Barracks,  PA:  US  Army  War  College,  2001),  203.  Available  at 

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.armv.mil/pubs/displav.cfm7PubIDA362.  Accessed  6  Sep  2007. 

3 

Arthur  F.  Lykke,  Jr,  “Toward  an  Understanding  of  Military  Strategy”  in  Cerami  and  Holcomb,  eds.,  The 
US  Army  War  College  Guide  to  Strategy’,  179. 

4  Ibid.,  179. 

5  DND,  Canadian  Forces  Operations,  B-GJ-005-300/FP-000  (2004),  p.  1-4. 

6  Chilcoat,  “Strategic  Art,”  for  21st  Century  Leaders”  in  Cerami  and  Holcomb,  eds.,  The  US  Army  War 
College  Guide  to  Strategy’,  205. 

7  James  K.  Greer,  “Operational  Art  for  the  Objective  Force,”  Military  Review  82,  no.  5  (September/October 
2002),  26-7. 

8  J.P.  Hunderwadel,  “The  Effects  Based  Approach  to  Operations:  Questions  and  Answers,”  Air  &  Space 
Power  Journal  20,  no.  1  (Spring  2006),  54. 

9  Ibid.,  54. 

10  Steven  D.  Carey  and  Robyn  S.  Read,  “Five  Propositions  Regarding  Effects-Based  Operations,”  Air  & 
Space  Power  Journal  20,  no.  1  (Spring  2006),  63-74. 

1 1  Robert  Vermaas,  Future  Perfect:  Effects  Based  Operations  Complexity  and  the  Human  Environment, 
Department  of  National  Defence  Canada,  Operational  Research  Division,  DOR  (Joint)  Research  Note  RN 
2004/01,  January  2004,  4. 

12  Edward  A.  Smith,  Effects  Based  Operations:  Applying  Network  Centric  Warfare  in  Peace,  Crisis,  and 
War  (Washington,  DC:  DoD  Command  and  Control  Research  Program,  2002),  231 

13  Incorporating  and  Extending  the  UK  Military’  Effects-Based  Approach'.  Joint  Doctrine  Note  7/06, 
(Swindon,  UK:  Ministry  of  Defence,  2006),  p.  1-2. 

14  Ralph  Peters,  “Bloodless  Theories,  Bloody  Wars:  Easy-Win  Concepts  Crumble  in  Combat,”  Armed 
Forces  Journal  143,  no.  9  (April  2006),  34-6.  Available  at  http://www.armedforcesioumal.com.  Accessed 
17  December  2006. 

15  Ibid. 

16  Challans,  “Emerging  Doctrine  and  the  Ethics  of  Warfare,”  np. 

17  Ibid. 

18  Ibid. 

19  The  Comprehensive  Approach,  Joint  Doctrine  Note  4/0,  (Swindon,  UK:  Ministry  of  Defence)  2006,  pp. 
1-1  to  1-4. 

20  Ibid.,  p.  1-1. 

21  Incorporating  and  Extending  the  UK  Military  Effects-Based  Approach,  p.  1-3. 

22  Ibid.,  p.  1-2. 


112 


23  This  whole-of-government  theme  reflects  similar  views  in  Canada  (the  3D  approach)  and  in  the  US, 
where  recent  experiences  in  Iraq  have  underscored  the  requirement  for  coordinated  whole  of  government 
strategy  and  led  to  calls  for  a  “Goldwater-Nichols  for  the  interagency.” 

24  Robert  S.  Dudney,  “It’s  the  Effect,  Stupid,”  Air  Force  Magazine  Online  89,  no.  11  (Nov  2006).  Available 
at  http://www.afa.Org/magazine/nov2006/l  106edit.asp.  Accessed  21  December  2006. 


113 


PART  V  -  APPLYING  EFFECTS-BASED  APPROACHES 


114 


Chapter  8 


The  Canadian  Land  Force  and  Effects  Based  Operations 

Robert  H.  Vokac 


Introduction 

During  2005  and  2006  I  observed  battle  staff  training  throughout  the  Canadian  Land 
Force  (hereafter  called  the  Canadian  Army).  The  battle  staff  training  I  observed  was 
conducted  by  all  three  formed  brigade  staffs  and  a  handful  of  battalion/battle  group/task 
force  headquarters  and  was  conducted  in  a  simulation-supported  environment. 
Additionally,  I  supported  numerous  exercises  for  students  attending  the  Army  Operations 
Course  conducted  by  the  Land  Force  Command  and  Staff  College  in  Kingston,  Ontario. 
Lastly,  I  assisted  in  the  design,  development,  and  execution  of  the  capstone  land 
environmental  exercise  for  students  attending  the  Command  and  Staff  Course,  now  the 
Joint  Command  and  Staff  Programme,  conducted  by  the  Canadian  Forces  College  in 
Toronto,  Ontario. 

This  paper’s  aim  is  to  describe,  not  to  evaluate  or  assess,  the  use  of  Effects  Based 
Operations  (EBO)  within  the  Canadian  Anny  by  both  formed  staffs  in  the  field  and 
students  during  professional  military  education  (PME)  exercises.  There  is  no  attempt 
made  to  describe  EBO  as  planned  or  executed  during  actual  operations.  Before  describing 
selected  aspects  of  EBO  as  observed  in  the  training  environment,  some  historical  and 
doctrinal  background  is  necessary. 

Background 

Effects  Based  Operations,  or  EBO,  has  gradually  found  its  way  into  the  lexicon  of 
Canadian  Army  officers.  As  is  often  the  case  with  new  terms,  it  was  and  is  used  without  a 
common  understanding  amongst  those  employing  the  term.  There  are,  as  we  have  seen 
from  previous  essays  in  this  volume,  numerous  definitions  of  EBO.  Within  the  Canadian 
Forces  (CF)  there  are  some  working  definitions,  or  at  least  descriptions,  of  EBO.  For 
example,  the  Canadian  Forces  Strategic  Operating  Concept  (dated  2 1  May  2004) 
describes  EBO  as: 

. .  .an  effort  to  leverage  the  soft  and  hard  power  assets  of  a  nation  or  coalition, 
including  its  political,  economic,  technological,  and  social  resources,  in  order  to 
achieve  a  set  of  desired  outcomes.  It  seeks  to  establish  influence  over  the  mind  of 
an  adversary  to  affect  his  will  to  act  while,  at  the  same  time,  keeping  collateral 
damage  to  a  minimum. 1 


115 


One  can  argue  that  the  working  definition  above  reflects  status  quo  or  is  that  it  is  truly 
revolutionary.  Regardless  of  one’s  opinion,  it  does  provide  an  authoritative  foundation  on 
which  to  further  explore  the  concept. 

Not  surprisingly,  EBO,  as  a  defined  concept  and  philosophy,  migrated  north  from  the 
United  States  military.  While  the  general  concept  and  philosophy  migrated  north  with 
sufficient  robustness  to  ensure  a  place  in  Canadian  lexicon,  it  did  not  appear  with  an 
agreed  upon  application  or  employment  methodology.  Furthermore,  the  United  Kingdom 
and  Australia,  two  prominent  Canadian  allies,  developed  their  own  versions  of  EBO, 
pieces  of  which  found  their  way  to  Canada.  Current  Canadian  Army  thinking,  as 
described  by  Director  General  Land  Combat  Development  Draft  Doctrinal  Note  001/06, 
“An  Effects  Based  Approach  to  Operations,”  recognizes  that  the  contemporary  operating 
environment  has  undergone  significant  change  and,  as  such,  “[t]o  succeed  in  this 
environment  commanders  must  recognize  that  the  military  is  but  one  instrument  of  power 
available.  A  more  comprehensive  approach  that  co-ordinates  the  resources  provided  by  a 
range  of  individuals,  groups  and  agencies  will  be  required  [emphasis  added].”  2  An 
effects  based  approach,  a  maturation  of  the  original  military-centric  EBO  philosophy, 
implicitly  recognizes,  therefore,  that  effects  are  best  achieved  using  the  full  resources 
available  to  a  commander  and  to  a  government,  the  military  instrument  of  power  alone 
being  insufficient  to  achieve  the  effects  necessary  to  reach  the  desired  end-state. 
Consequently,  an  effects  based  approach,  to  be  useful  and  relevant  to  the  Canadian  Anny, 
should  complement  existing  doctrine. 

Integration  with  Existing  Doctrine 

The  Canadian  Army  is  doctrinally  based.  As  a  guiding  principle  “[t]he  Canadian  Army 
has  adopted  Manoeuvre  Warfare  as  its  doctrinal  approach  to  warfighting.”3  The  objective 
of  manoeuvre  warfare  is  “[t]o  defeat  the  enemy  by  shattering  his  moral  and  physical 
cohesion,  his  ability  to  fight  as  an  effective  co-ordinated  whole,  rather  than  destroying 
him  physically  through  incremental  attrition.”4  Manoeuvre  warfare  requires  a  command 
philosophy  that  decentralizes  decisions  and  fosters  initiative.  That  command  philosophy 
is  called  “mission  command,”  which  requires  commanders  to  “tell  subordinates  what 
effect  they  are  to  achieve  and  the  reason  why  it  needs  achieving  [emphasis  added].”5 
Therefore,  an  effects  based  approach  appears  to  complement  the  doctrinal  fundamentals 
articulated  above. 

Furthermore,  a  2004  Canadian  Army  force  employment  document  embraces  EBO: 

EBO  is  the  natural  extension  of  our  departure  from  the  attritional  approach  of 
attacking  physical  targets.  It  is  a  strategy  that  does  not  necessarily  depend  upon 
physical  force  for  attaining  a  desired  outcome  or  effect  on  an  enemy. .  .This  will  be 
accomplished  by  achieving  a  full  range  of  effects,  both  non-lethal  and  lethal...  In 
sum,  the  focused  use  of  national  assets,  independently  or  as  part  of  a  coalition,  will 
produce  cascading,  systemic  effects  as  the  tactical,  operational  and  strategic 
levels.6 


116 


Accordingly,  EBO,  or  an  effects  based  approach,  appears  to  fit  within  the  concepts  of  an 
anny  defined  by  manoeuvre  warfare  and  mission  command.  While,  at  the  time  of  the 
writing  of  this  essay,  EBO,  or  an  effects  based  approach,  had  yet  to  make  its  appearance 
in  approved  Canadian  Army  doctrine,  it  has  reached  a  receptive  training  audience.  The 
EBO-related  training  observations  noted  below  provide  an  anecdotal  look  at  the  current 
state  of  EBO  within  the  Canadian  Anny. 

Training  Observations 

Formation  and  unit  commanders,  and  those  who  role-play  formation  and  unit 
commanders,  adhere  to  the  principles  of  manoeuvre  warfare  and  mission  command. 
Moreover,  commanders  who  so  choose,  supplement  the  assigned  mission  and 
commander’s  intent  by  describing  desired  effects.  Given  the  increasing  complexity  of 
planning  as  one  moves  from  sub-unit,  to  unit,  to  formation  level,  an  effects  based 
planning  approach,  within  a  training  environment,  appears  to  work  better  at  higher  levels, 
because  it  is  at  the  higher  levels  that  the  resources  necessary  to  implement  an  effects 
based  approach  exist.  It  is  at  formation  or  higher  where  the  need  to  integrate  and 
synchronize  efforts  with  other  elements  of  national  power  is  brought  to  the  fore. 

However,  while  the  overall  utility  of  an  effects  based  approach  is  quite  clear  at  the 
formation  level,  there  are  times  when  the  approach  seems  “forced”  at  lower  levels. 

Senior  commanders  often  choose  to  emphasize  an  effects  based  approach  during  training 
exercises.  This,  of  course,  tends  to  focus  the  senior  staff  and  subordinate  commanders  on 
this  approach  and  is  typically  accompanied  by  operational-level  language  such  as  end- 
state  and  objectives.  The  top-down  emphasis  on  an  effects  based  approach,  if  not 
properly  tempered  by  experienced  subordinate  commanders  and  staffs  has,  at  times,  led 
to  confusion  and  planning  inefficiencies.  Suddenly,  the  casual  observer  sees  all  command 
levels  swirling  about  attempting  to  define  their  own  effects  while  concurrently  losing  the 
important  linkage  that  connects  subordinate  activities  (tasks)  to  the  achievement  of  higher 
effects. 

Another  observation  related  to  using  the  effects  based  approach  during  training  exercises 
is  that  almost  all  exercises  do  an  excellent  job  replicating  the  physical  domain,  but  are 
much  less  successful  replicating  the  moral  or  cognitive  domain.  Physical  activities  are 
typically  manifested  in  exercises  by  direct  effects,  in  that  the  effects  are  usually 
immediate  and  easily  recognizable.  While  physical  activities  in  the  operational  world 
may  generate  indirect  effects  (those  removed  in  time  or  purpose  from  the  initial  activity), 
the  typical  exercise  rewards  physical  activities  (kinetic  attack,  for  example)  while 
virtually  ignoring  those  activities  directed  at  the  moral  and  cognitive  levels.  Therefore, 
while  an  effects  based  approach  is  often  planned,  its  execution  is  virtually  impossible  to 
simulate.  And  yet,  even  effects-based  planning  is  hard  to  replicate  given  the  inherent 
difficulties  in  developing  relevant  measures  of  effectiveness.  One  senior  commander,  for 
example,  mentioned  that  he  thinks  of  effects  in  tenns  of  weeks,  months,  years,  and  even 
generations.  If  one  accepts  his  view,  how  is  this  reality  effectively  translated  into  the 
exercise  environment? 


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Well,  for  all  practical  purposes,  it  isn’t.  Commanders  and  their  staffs  are  comfortable 
visualizing  the  effects  produced  by  physical  activities,  and  to  a  large  degree  this  comfort 
zone  is  a  product  of  their  own  experience  and  the  experience  of  their  mentors.  For 
example,  experienced  commanders  and  Directing  Staff  have,  over  time,  developed  the 
“critical  eye”  necessary  to  evaluate  and  assess  a  plan  or  order  to  determine  its  probability 
of  success.  This  “critical  eye”  wavers  ever  so  slightly  when  evaluating  or  assessing  a  plan 
emphasizing  a  sophisticated  effects  based  approach.  Why?  Clearly,  it  is  easier  for 
commanders,  Directing  Staff,  and  exercise  controllers  to  assess  and  evaluate  a  potential 
force-on-force  engagement  than  to  assess  and  evaluate  the  effects  of,  for  example, 
psychological  operations  directed  against  an  enemy  commander. 

One  way  of  overcoming  the  shortcomings  of  using  the  effects  based  approach  during 
training  exercises  is  to  incorporate  outside  participants,  specifically  non-military 
participants,  in  them,  because  an  effects  based  approach  to  operations  is  “predicated  on  a 
sound  understanding  of  the  battlespace  and  the  actors  within  it.”7  Therefore,  sophisticated 
training  scenarios,  with  a  wide  range  of  actors,  allow  for  a  more  comprehensive  (i.e., 
effects  based)  planning  approach  by  commanders  and  their  staffs.  The  best  exercises 
recognize  the  requirement  to  take  into  account  other  instruments  of  national  power,  the 
stated  and  unstated  agendas  of  other  government  departments  (OGDs),  non-governmental 
organizations  (NGOs),  and  international  organizations  (IOs),  and  the  requirement  to 
achieve  a  “whole  of  government  approach.”  To  be  clear,  the  need  to  work  with  others 
(OGDs  in  particular),  the  need  to  integrate  and  synchronize  military  actions  with  the 
efforts  of  other  actors,  and  the  recognition  that  the  achievement  of  required  effects 
requires  more  than  a  purely  military  solution,  begins  with  the  participation  of  a  wide 
variety  of  actors  in  complex,  demanding,  and  innovative  scenarios. 

A  final  observation  related  to  using  the  effects  based  approach  during  training  exercises 
is  that  commanders  typically  emphasize  the  necessity  to  minimize  so-called  collateral 
damage.  This  is  prudent  guidance  as  commanders  and  their  staffs  recognize  that  collateral 
damage,  no  matter  how  it  is  caused,  creates  a  negative  effect,  one  that  can  significantly 
hinder  the  execution  of  an  effects-based  operation.  However,  within  the  training 
environment,  this  guidance  is  often  emphasized  to  the  point  that  force  is  not  applied  even 
when  pennissible,  hence  increasing  the  risk  to  the  friendly  forces.  Using  force  is  a 
delicate  balancing  act  that  requires  difficult  decisions,  and  it  may  be  that  the  difficulties 
surrounding  these  decisions  could  be  more  accurately  portrayed  in  exercises. 

Conclusion 

The  Canadian  Army’s  evolving  draft  doctrine  on  an  effects  based  approach  to  operations 
reflects  the  reality  of  the  contemporary  operating  environment,  which  resists  simple 
solutions  to  difficult  problems  resident  within  a  complex  environment.  Gone  are  the  days 
when  the  proper  application  of  the  military  instrument  of  power  was  sufficient  to  achieve 
the  desired  end  state. 

An  effects  based  approach  to  operations  requires  that  commanders  and  their  staffs  exhibit 
a  sound  understanding  of  the  battlespace.  Knowledge  requirements  are  greater  than  ever 


118 


as  it  is  virtually  impossible  to  plan  or  execute  an  effects  based  approach  to  operations 
without  understanding  the  existing  linkages  and  relationships  resident  amongst  all  the 
actors  in  the  battlespace.  Knowledge  of  the  complete  battlespace  environment  allows  a 
commander  and  staff,  knowing  the  desired  end  state,  to  properly  identify  objectives, 
identify  the  effects  required  to  achieve  the  objectives,  and  select  those  activities  required 
to  create  the  effects. 

An  effects  based  approach  to  operations  is  consistent  with  existing  doctrine  and  does  not 
appear,  at  this  point,  to  be  a  revolutionary  approach  to  the  planning  and  conduct  of 
operations.  And  it  is  in  the  training  environment,  through  the  design  of  demanding  and 
complex  scenarios,  that  our  current  and  future  commanders  and  staffs  will  leam  to 
maximize  all  resources  available  to  them. 


1  United  States,  Military’  Transformation:  A  Strategic  Approach  (Washington,  DC:  Director,  Force 
Transformation,  Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  Fall  2003),  36. 

2  DND,  Director  General  Land  Combat  Development  Draft  Doctrinal  Note  001/06,  “An  Effects  Based 
Approach  to  Operations,”  3. 

3  Canada,  Department  of  National  Defence,  Land  Force  Command ,  B-GL-300-003/FP-000  (dated  21  July 
1996),  27. 

4  Ibid.,  28. 

5  Ibid.,  30. 

6  DND,  Purpose  Defined:  The  Force  Employment  Concept  for  the  Army  -  One  Army  One  Team  One  Vision , 
(np,  31  March  2004),  38-9. 

7  Canada,  Land  Force,  Draft  Doctrinal  Note  001/06,  “An  Effects  Based  Approach  to  Operations,”  8. 


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Chapter  9 


Effects  Based  Professional  Military  Education 

Colonel  Randall  Wakelam 

Introduction 

As  the  title  of  this  essay  might  suggest,  the  following  paragraphs  examine  where  the 
study  of  effects  based  operations  would  seem  best  situated  within  the  continuum  of 
professional  military  education  (PME).  The  other  possible  interpretation  of  the  title 
would  have  us  look  for  the  most  effective  options  for  professional  military  education. 
Indeed  the  paper  attempts  both  tasks,  first  situating  the  current  construct  of  the  effects 
based  approach  to  operations  (EBAO),  described  elsewhere  in  this  volume,  with  like 
elements  of  military  studies,  and  then  examining  how  such  studies  are  best  conducted.  In 
so  doing  it  considers  a  number  of  approaches  to  PME  which  have  been  proposed  or  used 
by  the  Canadian  military  over  the  past  70  years  and  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  some  of 
the  previous  education  strategies  may  well  serve  the  purpose  of  helping  the  profession 
understand  and  build  upon  the  effects-based  philosophy. 

EBAO:  Education  -  and  a  bit  of  training 

If  we  start  by  accepting,  as  postulated  elsewhere  in  this  volume,  that  the  maturity  and 
precision  of  the  EBAO  concept  is  such  that  it  falls  more  into  the  category  of  a  philosophy 
of  war  than  that  of  a  technique  to  be  learned,  mastered  and  employed,  then  it  is 
reasonable  to  say  that  EBAO  should  be  studied  using  education  and  not  training 
practices.  Education,  it  has  been  widely  accepted,  allows  the  student  to  develop 
intellectual  skills  -  critical  thinking,  creativity  and  the  like  -  which  in  turn  allow  the 
individual  to  come  up  with  reasoned  solutions  to  unanticipated  problems.  Training  on  the 
other  hands  permits  an  individual  to  respond  in  a  predictable  way  to  predicted 
conditions. 1  Given  the  still-evolving  nature  of  EBAO,  an  education-based  approach,  one 
which  pennits  and  encourages  debate  about  the  essence  and  validity  of  various  new  and 
old  notions,  is  definitely  the  more  suitable  method  of  studying  EBAO  for  the  time  being. 

This  is  not  to  say,  however,  that,  should  the  philosophy  become  concept  and  the  concept 
lead  to  doctrine  and  procedure,  it  would  not  eventually  be  appropriate  to  include  EBAO 
practices  in  a  range  of  PME  courses  and  programmes  which  concentrate  on  practical 
issues.  It  has  been  shown,  however,  that  EBAO  is  likely  to  be  practised  not  so  much  at 
the  tactical  level  as  at  the  higher  levels  of  military  and  security  operations.  It  would 
therefore  appear  that  should  EBAO  become  a  practice  it  should  be  taught  primarily  at  the 
operational  and  high  tactical  levels;  that  is,  in  staff  and  war  college  programs,  or  to  use 
Canadian  Forces  terminology,  in  Development  Periods  3  and  4.  This  is  not  to  say  that 
EBAO  doctrine  should  not  be  introduced,  at  least  in  passing,  to  officers  and  senior  NCMs 
attending  tactical-level  courses,  but  this  would  be  done  more  so  to  allow  them  to  know 
that  the  concept  exists  than  to  allow  them  to  become  practitioners  of  EBAO. 


120 


EBAO  -  Two  versions  of  learning 


Learning  about  the  first  version  of  EBAO  -  that  which  Colonel  Jim  Cottingham  portrays 
at  the  operational  level  of  war2  -  would  take  place  in  what  is  tenned  in  Canada  as 
Development  Period  3  which  encompasses  professional  education  for  Majors/Lieutenant- 
Commanders  and  Lieutenant-Colonels/Commanders  and  which  focuses  on  the  use  of 
military  forces  at  this  level  of  war.  These  linkages  seem  to  make  good  sense  for  it  is  at 
the  staff  college  that  officers  are  given  the  time  to  find  their  way  through  philosophies  of 
war  and  also  to  develop  their  understanding  of  the  operational  level  of  war  and 
campaigning.  Lectures  and  seminars  on  philosophers  of  war  already  examine  such 
theoreticians  as  Sun  Tzu  and  Clausewitz  as  well  as  the  early  and  contemporary  air  power 
thinkers.  In  particular,  the  current  Command  and  Staff  program  taught  at  the  Canadian 
Forces  College  gives  students  ample  opportunity  to  test  the  relevance  of  operational-level 
concepts  through  the  Master  of  Defence  Studies  thesis. 

At  the  same  time  that  they  learn  to  test  theories  and  concepts,  students  taking  this 
program  are  also  taught  how  to  use  the  Canadian  Forces  Operations  Planning  Process, 
which  is  the  primary  planning  tool  used  by  the  CF  to  design  campaigns  and  major 
operations.  The  process  already  includes  such  EBAO-related  elements  as  Information 
Operations  and  C4ISR  and  it  is  not  hard  to  envisage  teaching  the  contribution  of  EBAO 
to  the  campaigning  process  as  described  in  Lieutenant-Colonel  Colin  Magee’s  chapter  in 
this  volume.  At  the  same  time,  however,  students  on  this  course  are  introduced  to  the 
notion  that  military  solutions  are  not  always  kinetic  and  not  always  appropriate  by 
themselves  to  the  resolution  of  security  concerns.  The  Command  and  Staff  program 
therefore  contains  curriculum,  which  deal  with  the  contributions  of  other  government 
departments  and  NGOs  and  major  tabletop  exercises  include  peace  support  and  domestic 
operations  scenarios  that  do  not  involve  force-on-force  solutions. 

An  even  greater  opportunity  to  test  the  concept  of  EBAO  and  to  explore  the  possibilities 
of  linkages  between  version  one  and  version  two  presents  itself  in  the  fonn  of  the 
Advanced  Military  Studies  Program  which  is  designed  for  more  senior  officers  (generally 
Colonels/Captains  (Navy)  or  officers  destined  for  those  ranks)  who  are  likely  to  find 
themselves  either  commanding  at  higher  tactical  or  operational  levels  or  acting  as  senior 
planners  in  operational-  and  strategic-level  headquarters.4  This  program  of  studies 
affords  additional  opportunities  to  practice  campaigning  concepts  and  techniques,  this 
time  from  the  perspective  of  a  commander,  while  perhaps  more  importantly  providing 
opportunities  for  more  rigorous  analysis  and  evaluation  of  warfare  philosophies,  concepts 
and  doctrines.  It  is  during  this  program  that  many  students  begin  to  display  a  mastery  of 
the  profession  of  arms  that  one  would  expect  of  its  senior  practitioners.  Here  too  students 
consider  effects-based  solutions  to  problems  and  work  with  civilian  analysts  during 
tabletop  exercises. 

Programs  of  study  focused  on  the  second  version  of  EBAO  fall  clearly  in  the  category  of 
the  war  and  defence  colleges  -  these  being  learning  institutions  that  look  beyond  the 
application  of  kinetic  solutions  in  resolving  security  problems.  (This  is  not  to  say  that  the 
previous  programs  are  only  about  “warfighting,”  but  their  emphasis  has  been  and 


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currently  remains  the  study  of  the  use  of  military  forces.)  Senior  colleges,  at  least  in  the 
Commonwealth,  also  tend  to  focus  on  “all  of  government”  examinations  of  national  and 
international  concerns.  Student  bodies  are  frequently  a  mix  of  domestic  and  foreign 
military  officers  (usually  senior  colonels/captains  (navy)  and  flag  officers  who  are  likely 
to  find  themselves  working  in  national  and/or  strategic  headquarters),  public  service 
executives  and  occasionally  senior  private  sector  executives. 

Currently  Canada’s  senior  program  is  the  six-month  National  Security  Studies  Program, 
while  there  is  also  the  two-week  Canadian  Security  Studies  Program  that  provides  a  rapid 
tour  d’ horizon  of  national  security  issues.  This  shorter  program,  formerly  known  as  the 
National  Security  Studies  Seminar,  tends  to  attract  a  wide  range  of  participants  while  the 
longer  course  has  experienced  difficulty  since  its  inception  in  1998  in  attracting  officers 
from  other  countries  as  well  as  Canadian  public  service  and  senior  private  sector 
executives.  This  latter  problem  may  have  been  unique  to  the  past  decade  and  may  now 
be  changing  given  the  Canadian  government’s  renewed  interest  in  national  and 
international  security.  If  so,  future  program  focus  and  student  enrolment  may  fall  more  in 
line  with  past  practice. 

All  of  Government  Professional  Education  in  the  20th  Century 

Prior  to  the  Second  World  War  Canada  sent  selected  senior  officers  to  Britain  for  both 
staff  and  war  college  education.  At  the  senior  level,  Britain  operated  the  Imperial 
Defence  College  (IDC),  now  called  the  Royal  College  of  Defence  Studies,  which  looked 
at  defence  issues,  but  from  a  broader  perspective  than  just  the  use  of  military  courses  of 
action.  The  experience  of  one  Canadian  officer,  General  Maurice  Pope,  in  the  late  1930s 
is  indicative  of  the  value  of  this  sort  of  programme.  He  found  himself  “in  the  company  of 
senior  sailors,  soldiers,  airmen  and  civil  servants,  enjoying  the  rare  privilege  of  studying 
the  strategy,  as  well  as  the  wider  aspects  of  defence  of  the  British  Commonwealth  and 
Empire.”  While  he  went  on  to  say  that  studies  focused  on  “hypothetical  wars,”  he  also 
noted  that:  “In  these  studies  I  was  much  struck  by  the  attention  paid  to  the  economic  side 
of  warfare. .  .Wars,  in  our  day,  had  considerably  overrun  the  comparatively  narrow 
province  of  the  professional  sailor,  soldier,  or  airman.”5  Particular  studies  during  the 
program  included  the  fonnulation  of  a  framework  for  imperial  defence  including  the 
parsing  of  defence  and  security  responsibilities  for  Britain’s  global  alliances  as  well  as 
the  associated  resource  issues.  In  another  case,  students  were  to  turn  their  criticism  of 
the  contemporary  British  foreign  policy  into  viable  alternatives.  Students  were  sent  away 
in  syndicates  and  given  two  weeks  to  prepare  their  alternative  policies.  Pope’s  group 
sought  to  expand  the  Treaty  of  Locarno  in  order  to  stop  Hitler  by  a  “superior  show  of 
force.”6  Thwarting  the  Nazi  regime  through  a  show  of  force  rather  than  a  kinetic 
campaign  can  easily  be  qualified  as  effects-based  solution  which  implicated  the  most 
senior  levels  of  government.  In  this  case  in  particular  the  IDC  was  clearly  focusing  its 
learning  on  what  Cottingham  calls  version  two  effects. 

With  the  coming  of  peace  in  1945,  Canada  established  its  own  war  college.  Opened  in 
1949,  the  National  Defence  College  at  Kingston  had  originally  been  intended  to  be  a  joint 
warfare  program  that  would  seek  to  maintain  the  hard  won  knowledge  about  joint  service 


122 


operations.  When  the  college  did  open  its  doors  it  had  morphed  into  a  Canadian  version 
of  the  IDC.  Until  it  closed  in  1995,  the  college’s  curriculum  looked  at  a  wide  range  of 
international  strategic  and  security  issues:  culture,  economy,  politics,  and  security  and 
defence.  Students  spent  much  time  visiting  all  the  major  regions  of  the  globe  and 
reflecting  on  what  they  had  seen.  The  student  body  comprised  not  only  a  mixture  of 
Canadian  military  officers  and  their  NATO  and  Commonwealth  counterparts,  but  also  a 
significant  number  of  senior  public  servants.  This  was  very  much  an  all  of  government 
program  looking  at  the  complexity  of  state,  regional  and  global  interconnections. 

All  of  government  education  was  also  a  prominent  component  of  a  seminal  study  into 
officer  professional  development  commissioned  in  the  late  1960s  by  General  Jean  Victor 
Allard,  first  Chief  of  Defence  Staff  of  the  newly-unified  Canadian  Forces.  Allard  tasked 
Major-General  Roger  Rowley  to  examine  the  nature  of  the  unified  officer  corps  and  to 
define  the  professional  education  needs  and  mechanisms  that  would  ensure  that  officers 
were  adequately  educated  for  the  challenges  of  the  day.  As  part  of  his  education 
continuum,  Rowley  proposed  the  establishment  of  a  National  Security  College  (NSC)  as 
a  replacement  for  the  National  Defence  College  (NDC).  While  NDC  had  a  number  of 
shortcomings  related  to  student  selection  and  assessment,  Rowley  did  underscore  its 
strength:  “the  [NDC’s]  chief  virtue  is  its  interdepartmental  approach  to  national  security 
issues.”7  And  he  continued: 

The  National  Security  Course  would  build  on  this  strength. 

The  National  security  college  [sic]  should  not  be  designed  solely  to  meet  the 
needs  of  military  officers.  It  should  serve  all  departments  of  government  and 
other  civil  sectors  that  contribute  significantly  to  national  security.  It  should  have 
within  it  a  research  group  that  would  analyse  national  security  problems,  and 

should,  in  the  process,  assist  in  maintaining  a  suitable  orientation  in  the  teaching 

8 

programme  of  the  National  security  college. 

Rowley’s  study  team  further  emphasized  that  the  NSC  would  contribute  to  the 
development  of  a  military-executive  ability  within  the  senior  leadership  of  the  profession: 

Military-executive  ability  implies  a  knowledge  of  the  nation  in  which  the  force  is 
raised  paid  for  and  equipped;  and  of  the  international  environment  in  which  force 
must  be  applied  or  its  application  threatened.  It  involves  a  knowledge  of  the 
context  in  which  the  officer  will  apply  his  executive  ability  and  military  expertise 
and  give  his  advice  to  government.  It  includes  economic,  political,  sociological, 
ideological,  scientific  and  technological,  as  well  as  military  factors.9 

In  other  words,  the  NSC  was  intended  as  a  capstone  in  formal  PME  that  would  give  a 
senior  leader  the  knowledge  and  mindset  to  operate  effectively  in  developing  all  of 
government  effects-based  solutions  to  complex  security  challenges. 

Ultimately  Rowley’s  NSC  was  not  established,  but  much  of  his  thinking  was  applied  to 
the  NDC.  The  deputy  commandant  of  the  college  was  an  ambassadorial-level 
appointment  from  the  Department  of  External  Affairs  and  a  Centre  for  National  Security 


123 


Studies  was  established  to  conduct  government-level  research  into  security  issues.10 
Therefore,  Rowley’s  intent,  that  the  program  be  “interdepartmental  in  terms  of  staff  [and 
students],  but  DND  administered,”  was  largely  met.11 

Effects  Based  PME  for  the  21st  Century 

Since  2001  and  the  realization  that  national  security  is  more  than  just  a  defence  matter, 
the  public  service  in  Canada  has  been  more  focused  on  looking  for  ah  of  government 
strategies  both  domestically  and  internationally.  The  currently  favoured  3D+T  (Defence, 
Diplomacy,  Development  and  Trade)  is  an  example  of  this  approach.  This  approach  was 
applied  in  2006  in  Afghanistan,  but  as  the  recently  returned  Canadian  commander  of 
region  south  has  said,  this  approach  needs  to  be  taught  and  understood  in  senior 
professional  programs.  He  has  perhaps  said  this  because  the  ah  of  government 
approach  taught  in  Western  war  colleges  in  the  20th  century  has  not  been  as  effectively 
taught  in  Canada  for  the  past  decade.  But,  just  as  the  requirement  is  being  identified  “in 
the  field”  by  people  such  as  Fraser,  so  too,  in  recent  months,  the  interest  in  the  National 
Security  Studies  Program  by  senior  bureaucrats  and  by  the  federal  public  service  as  a 
whole  is  seemingly  on  the  rise.  At  the  time  of  the  writing  of  this  essay,  public  service 
enrolment  for  the  2007  National  Security  Studies  Program  was  up  from  one  student  to 
four  and  Canada’s  Department  of  National  Defence  had  mandated  that  ah  of  its 
executives  at  the  EX-2  level  and  above  would  attend  the  two-week  Canadian  Security 
Studies  Program  as  well  as  the  one-week  Executive  Leadership  Program,  normally 
attended  only  by  newly  promoted  Brigadier  Generals  and  Commodores. 13  At  the  same 
time  as  there  has  been  a  move  towards  civilian  attendance  on  military  programs  senior 
officers  have  been  participating,  admittedly  in  small  numbers,  in  graduate-level 
education.  Arguably,  the  most  avant-garde  example  of  the  latter  was  the  selection  in 
2003  of  Major-General  Mike  Ward,  currently  Chief  of  Force  Development,  to  attend  the 
Yale  World  Fellowship. 14  Ah  of  this  suggests  that  the  mechanisms  for  learning  about  ah 
of  government  solutions  for  security  problems  may  soon  return  to  the  relatively  effective 
delivery  systems  of  the  past  -  a  sort  of  effects-based  education  for  version  two  effects- 
based  approaches  to  security. 

Conclusion 

In  the  preceding  discussion  we  have  seen  that  the  mechanisms  for  the  study  of  effects 
based  approaches  to  operations  already  exist  within  the  domain  of  professional  military 
education.  Ample  opportunity  exists,  as  it  has  for  many  years,  to  look  at  the  implications 
of  classical  and  emerging  philosophies  of  security  and  defence  stratagems  both  as  they 
apply  at  the  warfighting  and  ah  of  government  levels.  Where  theory  becomes  practice, 
the  military  education  and  training  continuum  has  the  necessary  processes  in  place  to 
design  and  conduct  the  appropriate  learning  activities.  If  we  accept  for  a  moment  the 
premise  that  there  is  nothing  fundamentally  new  about  effects-based  approaches  to 
operations,  then  we  need  also  to  recognize  that  the  current  professional  education  system, 
while  relatively  young  by  comparison  to  the  profession  of  arms,  has  the  flexibility  and 
the  inclusiveness  to  deal  with  this  as  well  other  concepts  which  emerge  from  time  to  time. 
While  there  are  those  who  would  quip  that  military  education,  like  the  much-reviled 


124 


military  intelligence,  represents  an  oxymoron,  there  is  much  to  be  said  for  an  education 
system  that,  at  its  best,  prepares  members  of  the  profession  to  seek  all  possible  solutions 
for  the  challenges  of  the  new  defence  and  security  environment. 


1  This  construct  has  been  attributed  to  BGen  (retired)  Don  Macnamara,  a  long  time  member  of  the  facidties 
of  the  Canadian  Forces  College  and  the  now-closed  National  Defence  College.  Macnamara  indicates  that 
the  concept  was  one  that  predates  him  and  believes  that  it  may  have  its  origins  with  the  US  Marine  Corps. 
Email  Macnamara  to  Wakelam  dated  27  August  2007.  See  also  Canada,  Depaertment  of  National  Defence, 
“Final  Report  of  the  Officer  Development  Review  Board”  (Ottawa:  DND,  15  September  1995),  xiv,  xvi. 

2  Colonel  J.F.  Cottingham,  “Effects-Based  Operations:  An  Evolving  Revolution,”  unpublished  paper 
written  as  part  of  the  MA  in  War  Studies  program,  Royal  Military  College  of  Canada,  July  2004,  40. 

’  The  syllabus  for  the  Joint  Command  and  Staff  Programme  (formerly  the  Command  and  Staff  Course)  of 
the  Canadian  Forces  College  can  be  found  at  http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/DP3/CSC  Syllabus/cfc300- 
34  e.pdf.  Accessed  7  Sep  2007.  Also  available  from  this  site  are  the  syllabi  of  the  other  programmes 
described  in  this  chapter. 

4  These  senior  positions  would  range  from  Chief  of  Staff  through  the  principal  planning  appointments  -  J3, 
J5  and  J7. 

5  Maurice  Pope,  Soldiers  and  Politicians,  The  Memoirs  ofLt.-Gen.  Maurice  A.  Pope  (Toronto:  University 
of  Toronto  Press,  1962),  98. 

6  Pope,  Soldiers  and  Politicians,  101-2. 

7  Canada,  Department  of  National  Defence,  Report  of  the  Officer  Development  Board,  Vol.  l(Ottawa: 

DND,  1969),  85. 

8  Ibid.,  99. 

9  Ibid.,  40. 

10  See  Randall  Wakelam,  “Officer  Professional  Education  in  the  Canadian  Forces  and  the  Rowley  Report, 
1969,”  Historical  Studies  in  Education/Revue  d’historie  de  l’ education  16,  2  (2004),  287-314. 

1 1  Report  of  the  Officer  Development  Board,  Vol.  2,  259. 

12  BGen  David  Fraser,  Presentation  to  the  Advanced  Military  Studies  Program  at  the  Canadian  Forces 
College,  6  December  2006. 

13  Email  from  Senior  Staff  Officer  Professional  Development,  HQ  Canadian  Defence  Academy  to 
Wakelam,  dated  28  August  2007.  The  ELP  is  a  short  workshop  to  prepare  executives  for  appointments  in 
strategic-level  positions  dealing  with  security  and  defence. 

14  Yale  World  Fellows  Program,  2003  Yale  World  Fellows.  Available  at 
http://www.yale.edu/worldfellows/fellows/alum  2003.html.  Accessed  15  December  2006. 


125 


Chapter  10 


A  Bridge  Too  Far?:  The  Theory  and  Practice  of  the  Effects-Based 
Concept  and  the  Multinational  Inter-agency  Role1 


Robert  Grossman- Vermaas 


Conflict  is  no  longer  limited  to  linear  battlefronts  and  mass  manoeuvre.  As  clearly 
demonstrated  during  recent  events  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq,  the  historic  focus  on 
achieving  military  superiority  at  the  operational  or  tactical  levels  would  be  better  seen  as 
perfunctory  steps  towards  the  achievement  of  strategic  military,  economic,  diplomatic 
and  developmental  aims.  Increasingly,  conflict  has  become  more  akin  to  a  complex  and 
adaptive  system  that  operates  within  and  between  the  progressively  more  challenging 
environments  of  war,  terrorism,  peace  support  operations,  and  regime  change.  Conflict 
has  shifted  from  being  primarily  a  mechanically  linear  system  in  which  military  powers 
smash  away  at  each  other  until  one  is  far  too  bloodied  to  continue,  to  fluid,  increasingly 
adaptive  and  often  unpredictable,  situations  in  which  specialized,  usually  multinational, 
armed  forces  function  alongside  civilians  in  order  to  achieve,  one  would  hope,  shared  and 
desired  tactical  and  systemic  effects  that  would  lead  to  a  shared  strategic  aim.  Operations 
to  attend  to  such  threats  will,  therefore,  require  an  equally  adaptive  approach. 


In  multinational  effects-based  planning,  success  relies  on  being  able  to  identify  the 
desired  and  achievable  strategic  end-states  that  might  inform  campaign  planning  and  the 
deployment  of  the  optimum  mix  of  civilian  and  military  capabilities  with  which  to 
achieve  a  range  of  long  and  short-term  effects.  Therefore,  future  multinational  operations 
will  include  complementary  diplomatic  measures  such  as  sanctions,  financial  incentives, 
and  trade-offs,  just  as  much  as  the  deployment  of  an  infantry  brigade,  a  wing  of  aircraft 
or  a  squadron  of  ships.  Alternatively,  effects-based  actions  may  include  the  military 
option  at  a  level  equal  to  or  greater  than  the  use  of  developmental  aid  and  reconstruction 
assistance.  The  challenge  for  the  effects-based  concept  lies  with  the  integration,  or 
bridging,  of  such  efforts  externally  between  coalition  partners  and  internally  by  large, 
institutionally  independent,  military  and  civilian  levels  of  government.  But  is  this 
“bridging”  feasible?  In  several  states  today  a  military  “defensive”  capability  is  but  one 
component  of  a  multi-dimensional  principle  of  statecraft  that  includes  diplomacy, 
defence  and  development.  In  Canada,  this  is  known  as  the  inter-agency  3D  policy.4  But 
can  such  principles  translate  into  action?  This  paper  explores  the  Effects-based  concept 
within  the  context  of  the  Multinational  Experimentation  (MNE)  series,  and  specifically 
analyzes  the  inter-agency  “role”  under  the  Coalition  Inter-agency  Coordination  Group 
(CIACG)  as  it  contributed  towards  an  experimental  Effects-based  Planning  (EBP)  cycle. 

WHAT  IS  THE  EFFECTS-BASED  CONCEPT? 


126 


In  order  to  properly  understand  the  Effects-based  concept,  it  is  important  to  begin  with 
taxonomy.  There  are  several  characterizations  the  Effects-based  concept  and  of  its 
“operationalized”  form,  Effects-based  Operations  (EBO).  One  definition  states  that  EBO 
be  considered  as  processes  for  obtaining  a  desired  outcome  or  effect  from  an  adversary, 
friendly  or  neutral  through  the  synergistic  and  cumulative  application  of  military  and 
non-military  capabilities  at  the  tactical,  operational  and  strategic  levels.5  Other 
definitions  consider  EBO  as  operations  conceived,  planned  and  executed  within  a 
systems  framework  that  considers  the  full  range  of  direct,  indirect  and  additional 
cascading  effects  that  may  be  achieved  by  the  application  of  political,  military, 
diplomatic  or  psychological  instruments.6  There  are,  to  date,  no  less  that  two-dozen 
definitions  of  EBO.  In  order  to  encapsulate  and  refine  some  of  the  key  concepts  in  these 
definitions,  the  following  definition  of  EBO  is  proposed: 

Operations  designed  to  influence  the  long-  or  short-term  state  of  a  system 
through  the  achievement  of  desired  physical  or  psychological  effects. 
Operational  objectives  are  sought  to  achieve  directed  policy  aims  using  the 
integrated  application  of  all  applicable  instruments  of  hard  or  soft  power. 
Desired  effects,  and  the  actions  required  to  achieve  them,  are  concurrently 
and  reactively  planned,  executed,  assessed  (and  potentially  adapted) 
within  a  complex  and  adaptive  system.1 


This  definition  notwithstanding,  the  effects-based  concept  is  still  immature,  and  while 
Effects-based  planning  has  demonstrated  some  potential,  it  has  not  yet  progressed  to  a 

o 

mature  experimentation  or  prototype  phase.  Prototyping  the  EBP  concept  will  require 
the  maturation  of  the  appropriate  theoretical  and  analytical  frameworks,  both  of  which 
consider  conflict  as  a  holistic  spectrum  of  political,  military,  economic,  social,  legal  and 
ethical  and  infrastructure  and  information  segments.  This  framework  (or  frameworks) 
and  associated  methodologies  will  enable  decision  makers  to  plan  for  operations  more 
effectively  and  then  to  adapt  plans  as  situations  evolve.  That  said,  future  operations  that 
reflect  the  principles  of  the  effects-based  approach  will,  by  their  very  nature,  require 
political  and  military  leadership  to  both  anticipate  and  understand  the  consequences  of 
actions.  Ultimately,  decision  makers  will  require  a  framework  that  integrates  processes 
that  link:  strategic  aims  to  operational  effects;  effects  to  networks  and  nodal  relationships; 
actions  to  resources  and  organizational  mandates  and  accountabilities;  resources  to  the 
appropriate  actions  required  to  achieve  the  desired  effect(s);  and  resources  to  supporting 
processes  and  capabilities. 


In  order  to  achieve  a  long-term  strategic  aim,  effects-based  operational  planners  must 
develop  a  better  appreciation  of  increasingly  complex  human  networks  and  the 
dependency  linkages  that  connect  communities  of  interest,  as  shown  in  Figure  10-1. 
They  also  require  a  significantly  more  sophisticated  understanding  of  culture  and  human 
values  time  and  space  as  well  as  a  multidimensional  analysis  of  primary,  secondary  and 
follow-on  actionable  “nodes,”  “targets,”  networks,  or  dependency  relationships  between 
nodes,  that  are  to  be  influenced  during  the  course  of  operations.9 


127 


National  Intel 
Agencies 


Academia 


I 


Services 


I 


"S4 


Multi-National 


Corporations 


Commerce  / 
Treasury 


Social  and  Cultural 


Figure  10-1 10 :  Theoretically,  an  operational  net  assessment  (ONA)  for  EBO  requires 
inputs  from  a  wide  range  of  political,  economic,  social,  intelligence,  technological, 
infrastructure  specialists  in  order  to  make  an  assessment  of  strengths  and  vulnerabilities 
within  a  ‘system  of  systems’.  The  weaknesses  and  vulnerabilities  within  the  system  are 
then  exploited  to  induce  effects. 


It  is  worth  underscoring  that  EBO  are  outcome-focused  and  involve  a  broad  range  of 
activities,  of  which  military  action  is  only  a  subset.  For  example,  if  a  state  or  coalition 
has  as  one  of  its  strategic  aims  the  establishment  of  a  democratic  regime  within  a  failed 
state,  there  may  be  an  infinite  or  permutated  number  of  possible  actions  and  resources 
available  to  produce  the  necessary  desired  effects,  including  diplomatic,  developmental, 
international  organization  (10),  inter-governmental  organization  (IGO),  and  non¬ 
governmental  organizations  (NGO)  ways  and  means.11  Unfortunately,  as  will  be  seen 
below,  conventional  military  planning  staffs  have  made  little  more  than  superficial 
gestures  to  incorporate  the  so-called  “other”  instruments  of  power  into  multinational 
planning  and  command  and  control  processes.  Moreover,  few  attempts  have  been  made 
to  integrate  these  levels  of  influence  into  a  prototypical  effects-based  operational 
headquarters.  It  is  imperative  that  planners  think  rigorously  about  how  best  to 
synchronize  and  orchestrate  effects  and  the  proposed  actions  and  resources  needed  to 
achieve  the  desired  effects.  This  process  involves  a  strong,  and  ultimately  transparent, 
civilian  and  military  information  sharing  and  knowledge  management  process  that  reacts 
to  the  potential  propagation  of  effects.  However,  if  indeed  EBO  are  to  include  the 
combined  direct  and  indirect  use  of  any  means  at  the  nation’s  disposal  applied  in  a 
synergistic  manner  in  order  to  elicit  a  desired  strategic  outcome  based  on  the  achievement 


128 


of  cumulative  effects,  then  there  is  a  long  way  to  go  before  operationalization  of  the 
concept  is  complete. 


EBO,  MNE  3  AND  THE  INTER-AGENCY  ROLE 

Background.  The  evolving  international  security  environment  and  subsequent  changing 
role  of  armed  forces  is  an  essential  backdrop  to  our  discussion.  Understanding  this 
environment  is  key  to  the  effective  civil-military  implementation  of  effects-based 
planning  and  execution.  This  understanding  also  reflects  the  desire  to  move  away  from 
the  traditional  realist  view  of  war  as  a  tool  of  state  to  the  desire  to  view  conflict’s  entirety 
-  pre-crisis,  crisis,  and  post-crisis  -  inclusive  of  a  civil-military  domain.  There  are 
historical  precedents  of  the  shift  in  civil-military  relationships.  For  example,  during  and 
immediately  following  the  first  Gulf  War,  there  was  a  marked  shift  in  civil-military 
relationships.  This  shift  was  most  evident  during  operations  under  the  UN  flag  in 
Cambodia  and  the  fonner  Yugoslavia  and  the  NATO  war  in  Kosovo.  Peacekeeping 
operations  emerged  from  the  new  security  environment  of  the  post-Cold  War  era 
reflecting  these  new  demands  and  new  challenges.  Between  1989  and  1999  there  were 
well  over  40  instances  of  UN-sponsored  intervention  around  the  globe.  "  Significantly, 
during  this  period,  not  only  did  multinational  missions  multiply,  they  were  complex, 
innovative  and  multi-levelled. 


The  Centre  for  Defence  Studies  at  King’s  College  London  recently  identified  five 
communities  whose  participation  is  critical  to  the  successful  resolution  of  future 
international  crises.  These  are,  in  no  particular  order:  donor  governments,  anned  forces, 
multilateral  agencies,  non-governmental  organizations,  and  private  industry.  As  the 
operational  net  assessment  (ONA)  concept  has  demonstrated,  this  list  might  benefit  from 
the  addition  of  academia  and  national  and  international  intelligence  agencies,  as  these 
communities  have  become  significant  players  in  the  pursuit  of  regional  and  global 
stability  through  trend  analysis  and  indicator  measurement.  However,  this  union  of 
several  seemingly  disparate  players  has  had  a  long  and  turbulent  history.  As  Mike 
Duffield  argues,  in  adapting  to  the  new  security  environment  of  the  post-Cold  War  era, 
each  of  these  communities  was  in  turn  driven  to  revisit  fresh  issues  such  as  how  and  in 
what  manner  they  would  be  involved  in  multinational  military  operations.  This 
acclimatization  to  new  geopolitical  realities  underwent  several  iterations,  impacting 
organization,  process,  and,  above  all,  policy.  In  the  1990s,  the  integration  of 
development  and  security,  along  with  the  privatization  of  these  responsibilities  gradually 
produced  more  effective  ways  and  means  to  achieve  a  common  objective.  Parties  that 
were  autonomous  throughout  the  Cold  War  era  now  found  new  forms  of  “synergy, 
overlap  and  mutual  interest.”14  However,  the  question  remains  as  to  whether  this 
integration  can  translate  effectively  to  a  transformational  Effects-based  Planning  concept 
and  doctrine. 


EBP  Experimentation.  The  following  sections  will  explore  the  integration  of  military 
and  non-military  organizations  (NMOs)  in  the  conduct  of  effects-based  planning  and 


129 


operations,  and  they  will  introduce  Multinational  Experiment  3  as  a  case  study  on 
coalition  Effects-based  Planning.  The  analysis  is  critical,  but  it  is  not  intended  to 
denigrate  the  efficacy  of  multinational  experimentation  as  it  relates  to  the  effects-based 
approach;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  designed  to  explore  gaps  in  our  collective  understanding 
of  what  components  are  required  for  the  practical  application  of  the  conceptual  issues 
related  to  the  effects-based  approach,  and  to  explore  avenues  for  further  exploration. 


Multinational  representation  and  association  with  US  Joint  Forces  Command 
(USJFCOM)  has  expanded  since  the  Command’s  inception.  From  the  outset,  the  joint 
experimentation  plan  at  USJFCOM  was  intended  to  provide  the  transformation 
framework  for  inter-service  (and  multinational)  conceptual,  experimentation  and 
doctrinal  development,  interoperability  and  integration.  The  USJFCOM  Joint 
Experimentation  Directorate  (J9)  thus  sought  (and  still  seeks)  to  envisage,  develop, 
explore,  test  and  then  validate  21st  century  warfighting  concepts  such  as  rapid  decisive 
operations,  operational  net  assessment  and  the  effects-based  concepts  of  EBP  and  EBO. 
These  concepts  are  seen  as  transfonnational,  driving  both  thought  and  technology,  with 
prior  civil-military  demarcations  less  visible.  Furthennore,  the  experimentation  process 
sought  (and  still  seeks)  to  provide  a  way  to  ensure  that  the  US,  and  its  allies,  could 
operate  effectively  and  interoperably  in  the  complex  security  environment  of  the  future. 
To  this  end,  J9  has  initiated  several  experiments  since  2001.  At  the  time  of  the  writing  of 
this  essay,  there  were  four  scheduled  transformational  multinational  experiment  series 
events  that  include  the  Multinational  Interoperability  Council  (MIC)  nations.  The  first, 
FOE  1  (November  2001),  investigated  coalition  military  planning.  The  second,  FOE  2 
(February  2002),  explored  the  development  of  the  ONA.  MNE  3  will  be  discussed  below 
and  MNE  4  was  scheduled  to  occur  in  2006. 


Multinational  Experiment  3.  A  US-directed  and  US-sponsored  exploratory  experiment, 
Multinational  Experiment  3  attempted  to  examine  the  processes,  organization(s)  and 
technologies  required  for  an  ad  hoc  coalition  to  plan  an  effects-based  operation  within  a 
representative  complex  system.  The  third  in  a  series  of  four  experiments  related  to 
coalition  planning,  infonnation  sharing  and  the  effects-based  approach,  MNE  3  was  a 
“virtual”  (i.e.,  internationally  dispersed  yet  technologically  networked)  experiment  on  a 
series  of  sub-concepts  under  the  general  mantle  of  Effects-based  Planning.  These  “sub¬ 
concepts”  included,  amongst  many  others,  the  Coalition  Inter-agency  Coordination 
Group  in  the  EBP  process,  a  construct  designed,  in  part,  to  explore  the  necessary  co¬ 
ordination  and  integration  of  the  defence  and  development  communities. 


The  US  experiment  design  team  intentionally  opted  to  explore  the  EBP  concept  within 
the  construct  of  a  Coalition  Task  Force  Headquarters  (CTFHQ),  which  mirrored  the  US 
Standing  Joint  Forces  Headquarters  (SJFHQ)  organizational  structure.  There  were 
several  persuasive,  and  some  not  so  persuasive,  reasons  for  the  inclusion  of  the  SJFHQ 
component  into  the  experiment  design.  The  most  important  for  this  discussion,  however, 
was  that  it  afforded  the  six  MIC  participants  (Australia,  Canada,  France,  Germany, 
United  Kingdom,  United  States),  as  well  as  the  nascent  NATO  Response  Force  the 


130 


opportunity  to  observe  and  evaluate  the  efficacy  of  the  US  SJFHQ  (and  CTFHQ) 
command  and  control  (C2)  prototype  within  an  experimental  EBP  framework.  It  also 
offered  USJFCOM  proponents  the  opportunity  to  observe  the  multinational  reception  of 
the  SJFHQ  core  element  within  a  controlled  and  documented  experiment. 


The  experiment  operated  within  a  Collaborative  Information  Environment  (CIE).  The 
CIE  involves:  the  establishment  of  a  multinational  information  sharing  domain;  hardware 
and  software  tools  enabling  information  exchange  across  a  classified  network;  and  an,  as 
yet,  relatively  immature  knowledge  management  process  that  would  allow  for  the  posting 
and  exchanging  of  relevant  operational  information.  MNE  3  was  successful  in  providing 
the  CIE  medium  by  which  national  planners  could  share  infonnation  whilst  refining  the 
EBP  process  and  drawing  on  information  within  an  ONA  database  in  order  to  plan 
operations. 


The  SJFHQ  construct,  or  core  element,  is  now  entering  the  prototype  phase  in  the  US. 
The  model  consists  of  a  small  team  of  operational  planners  (about  60  people)  and 
information  command  and  control  specialists  attached  to  and  complementing  a  Regional 
Combatant  Command  (RCC)  headquarters. 15  These  specialists  form  the  core  for  the 
Joint  Task  Force  (JTF)  command  structure.16  The  construct  envisages  four  specialist 
teams  (Knowledge  Management,  Plans,  Operations,  Infonnation  Superiority)  working 
collaboratively  towards  the  development  of  an  operational  EBP  for  the  commander. 
Although  guided  and  commanded  by  the  JTF  Commander  (or  in  the  case  of  MNE  3  a 
Coalition  Task  Force  Commander),  the  four  specialist  teams  are  detached  from  the 
traditional  hierarchical  C2  relationship  in  order  to  provide  the  Commander  with,  what  is 
hoped  to  be,  fully  comprehensive  operational  plans.  In  early  2005,  the  SJFHQ  construct 
was  to  be  fielded,  augmenting  several  RCCs  by  developing  pre-crises  knowledge  bases 
and  providing  guidance. 


2 

The  SJFHQ  is  expected  to  provide  each  US  geographic  commander  with  an  informed  C" 
capability  and  enhanced  appreciation  of  the  operational  environment,  therefore 
facilitating  a  more  efficient  ONA  and  EBP  process  capable  of  delivering  “a  rapid, 
decisive  operation.”17  Theoretically,  the  expertise  provided  by  the  SJFHQ  affords  the 
commander  better  pre-crisis  planning,  more  timely  situational  awareness,  and,  one  would 
hope,  a  more  holistic  understanding  of  the  operational  “system  of  systems”  that  would 
thereby  enable  decision  superiority.  Using  the  CIE  (or  some  comparable  portal),  the 
SJFHQ  is  expected  to  develop  and  maintain  knowledge  of  the  crisis  environment  through 
the  establishment  of  habitual  working  relationships  with  inter-agency  colleagues.  In 
practical,  or  at  least  in  experimental,  terms  the  hopes  for  a  coalition-friendly  SJFHQ 
construct  are  equally  high.  The  experiment  design  for  MNE  3  envisaged  each  national 
participant  being  involved  (or  in  some  cases  embedded)  in  the  SJFHQ  experiment 
equivalent,  which  was  a  Coalition  Task  Force  Headquarters. 


131 


Perhaps  the  most  ambitious  assertion  by  proponents  of  the  construct  is  that  it  will, 
inherently,  maintain  “established  habitual  relationships  through  the  combatant 
commanders  to  the  inter-agency  community.”  Presumably,  the  reasons  for  this 
maintenance  of  relationships  are  several,  the  most  important  of  which  is  the  recognition 
that  it  is  necessary  to  aid  the  headquarters  in  making  appropriate  decisions  based  on  a 
more  holistic  understanding  of  the  crisis  or  pre-crisis  environment  as  an  adaptive  system, 
and,  more  significantly  in  the  longer  term,  on  a  more  strategic  understanding  of  the 
potential  cascading  effects  that  may  occur  at  the  operational  level. 


Non-Military  Organizations,  the  CIACG  and  MNE  3.  At  the  outset,  the  injection  of  a 
functional  inter-agency  planning  group  into  the  experiment  design  for  MNE  3  was 
considered  fundamental  conceptual  priority. 19  This  group  would  help  to  integrate,  co¬ 
ordinate,  and  facilitate  military  and  non-military  components  in  the  development  of 
effects-based  plans.  It  was  also  essential  for  validation  of  the  effects-based  concept  at  its 
most  holistic  level. 


The  Coalition  Inter-agency  Coordination  Group  “sub-concept”  was  incorporated  into  the 
design  and  play  of  MNE  3  and,  as  it  turned  out,  CIACG  was  one  of  the  more  stimulating 
aspects  to  be  played.  The  CIACG  construct  had  its  genesis  in  USJFCOM  discussion 
papers  and  concept  evaluations  related  to  the  SJFHQ,  although  each  national  participant 
presented  issues  related  to  its  own  historical  understanding  of  the  multinational  inter¬ 
agency  approach  to  pre-crisis  and  crisis  decision  making.  But  for  USJFCOM,  the 
construct  originated  as  a  quasi-integrated,  although  unfortunately  not  integral,  advisory 
facility  for  the  commander  and  planners  in  the  course  of  campaign  planning.  Known  as 
the  Joint  Inter-agency  Coordination  Group  (JIACG),  the  concept  aimed  to  “establish 
operational  connections  between  civilian  and  military  departments  and  agencies  that  will 
improve  planning  and  co-ordination  within  the  government.”  At  the  national,  or  JIACG, 
level  the  group  was  envisaged  as  a  “multi-functional,  advisory  element  that  represents  the 
civilian  departments  and  agencies  and  facilitates  information  sharing  across  the  inter- 
agency  community.”-  In  sum,  it  was  expected  to  serve  as  a  liaison  between  civilian  and 
military  actors  and  to  support  the  SJFHQ  planners  by  advising  on  civilian  agency 
operations  and  plans.  It  was  also  to  provide  a  so-called  “third-party”  perspective  on 
civilian  agency  approaches,  capabilities  and  limitations  that  would  inform  the 
development  of  an  effects-based  approach  and  enable  the  co-ordination  of  national 
instruments  of  power.  Presumably,  when  a  JTF  is  formed  and  deployed,  a  JIACG  would 
extend  this  support  to  the  commander’s  staff  through  the  JFHQ  political-military 
planning  staff.  This  would  then  become  the  mechanism  to  optimize  planning  and  ensure 
the  best  use  of  capabilities  to  achieve  the  desired  effects  that  would  include  the  range  of 
diplomatic,  informational,  military  and  economic  (DIME)  inter-agency  activities,  which 
was  the  conceptual  basis  for  the  CIACG. 


Throughout  2002  and  2003,  the  issue  of  disjointed  operational  planning  amongst  agencies 
was  addressed  through  the  US  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  initiative,  which  was  designed  to 
establish  a  JIACG  directorate  for  crisis  intervention  within  the  Regional  Combatant 


132 


Command  headquarters.  Still,  and  in  hindsight,  prior  to  implementation,  the  JIACG 
concept  would  have  benefited  from  further  refinement,  certainly  at  the  national  level, 
and,  ideally,  at  the  multinational  level.  Granted,  this  concept  is  breaking  new  ground, 
and,  at  the  date  of  writing,  no  model  exists  to  help  with  the  development  of  this  concept. 
Moreover,  no  coherent  operational  planning  structure  exists  that  is  multi-agency  in  nature 
or  that  extends  planning  and  co-ordination  into  the  multilateral  spheres  that  are  involved 
in  complex  crisis  response  and  action.  The  attempt  to  address  this  challenge  within  MNE 
3  through  the  inclusion  of  the  JIACG  concept  was,  therefore,  certainly  sensible  and 
timely. 


The  JIACG  concept  was  also  expanded  to  include  civilian  agency  representatives  of  the 
participating  coalition  countries.  In  accordance  with  the  Concept  of  Operations 
(CONOPS),  the  emergent  CIACG  was  to  focus  on  coordinating  and  harmonizing 
operational  planning  between  the  coalition  military  planners  and  the  relevant  civilian 
agencies  or  departments  of  their  respective  governments.-  Thus,  in  both  theory  and 
practice,  any  difficulties  envisaged  for  the  establishment  of  a  national  inter-agency  model 
were  now  magnified. 

Afghanistan  in  2003-2005  provided  the  experimental  scenario  for  MNE  3.  The  scenario 
included,  in  its  pre-experiment  stages,  a  United  Nations  request  for  Coalition  Task  Force 
(CTF)  intervention  in  order  to  stabilize  a  volatile  situation  in  southern  Afghanistan. 
Experiment  injects  posited  that  MNE  3  players  should  establish  a  CTFHQ  that  was 
prepared  to  conduct  a  pre-crisis  EBP  procedure  in  co-ordination  with  a  CIACG.  The 
CTF  was  to  proceed  though  specific,  although  conceptual,  EBP  steps,  culminating  in  an 
Effects  Tasking  Order  (ETO).  The  ETO  would  flow  from  and  reflect  the  previous  steps 
in  the  EBP  process  and  would  outline  the  effects-based  ways  and  means  to  enable  the 
EBO. 


Theoretically,  the  EBP  process  steps  replicate  the  operational  “steps”  required  to  perform 
EBP  within  a  “real  world”  coalition  environment,  as  shown  in  Figure  10-2.  The  process 
begins  with  the  CTF  gaining  an  understanding  of  the  strategic  context,  aims  and 
direction.  This  understanding  emerges  from  the  operational-level  Focused  ONA,  which 
incorporates  national  and  multinational  information  and  intelligence  related  to  the 
environment  (in  the  case  of  MNE  3  it  was  Afghanistan).  Collation,  in  turn,  enriches  the 
analysis  and  contributes  to  derivation  of  a  multinational  appreciation  of  threats  and 
opportunities.  During  MNE  3,  this  was  replicated  in  slow  time,  i.e.,  the  experiment  steps 
were  designated  into  specific  time  slots.  The  CTFHQ  would  then  proceed  through  a 
series  of  EBP  steps  towards  producing  an  ETO.  In  MNE  3,  these  steps  were  replicated, 
with  limited  success.-"  What  is  particularly  significant  for  our  purposes  was  the  “role”  of 
the  CIACG.  The  MNE  3  multinational  EBP  CONOPS  clearly  underscored  the  relative 

23 

importance  of  the  CIACG  in  the  EBP  process  and  particularly  in  the  penultimate  steps. - 
However,  the  experiment  also  highlighted  the  conceptual  frailties  of  the  concept  itself. 


133 


National 

ONA 


EBP  Process  (MNE  3) 


Strategic  Aim 


Strategic 

Objectives 


Strategic  Objectives  for  Other 
Instruments  of  Government 


OGDs 

NGOs 

Agencies 


0>OWW^NDERS  INTEHf 


Assessment 

Matrix 

/  |  * 

Effects 

Commander  . 

■  i 

Assessment 

Guidance 

Figure  10-2:  The  EBP  process  steps  for  MNE  3.  The  CTF  participants  were  to  proceed 
through  the  operational  steps  (right  side)  in  order  to  consider  the  appropriate  effects, 
nodes,  actions  and  resources  that  would  sufficiently  enable  the  coalition  strategic  aim. 
This  process  was  to  include  several  points  where  assistance,  guidance,  or  advice  could  be 
offered  by  the  CIACG,  although  this  was  not  successfully  achieved. 


MNE  3  and  the  CIACG:  More  Questions  than  Answers.  MNE  3  confirmed  that  the 
CIACG  is  an  evolving  and  potentially  useful  concept  in  need  of  further  refinement.  If 
anything,  the  CIACG  piece  in  MNE  3  highlighted  the  requirement  to  integrate,  co¬ 
ordinate  and  facilitate  the  activities  and  capabilities  of  multinational  military,  OGD  and 
other  non-military,  non-national  governmental  organizations  as  well  as  humanitarian, 
developmental  and  relief  agencies,  with  that  of  the  CTF.  It  also  highlighted  the  necessity 
to  incorporate  military  and  non-military  perspectives,  sensitivities  and  support 
requirements  and,  insofar  as  possible,  to  reconcile  competing  demands.  Indeed,  the 
CONOPS  for  MNE  3  suggested  aspirations  for  a  more  holistic  crisis  planning  process 
than  had  previously  been  the  case  in  multinational  operations  with  a  military  strategic 


134 


bias,  and  these  expectations  were  given  a  greater  weighting  by  the  choice  of  the  Afghan 
stability  operation  scenario. 


Still,  portions  of  the  CIACG  CONOPS  for  MNE  3  reflected  inconsistencies  attributable 
to  its  genesis  in  national  concept  development  and  this  affected  the  experimental  EBP 
process.  At  first  glance,  the  CIACG  appeared  to  emulate  the  role  of  the  US  Joint  Inter¬ 
agency  Coordination  Group  for  the  Regional  Combatant  Commander.  For  a  national 
commitment,  and  in  particular,  a  US  national  commitment,  this  approach  may  have  been 
satisfactory.  However,  MNE  3  was  specifically  designed  as  a  discovery  experiment 
relating  to  a  coalition  planning  process.  During  play,  it  became  clear  that  the  role  of 
CIACG  was  more  complicated  and  its  links  to  the  CTFHQ  more  intricate  than  the  US- 
derived  complement,  the  JIACG. 


Conceptually,  EBP  prescribes  a  level  of  adaptability  that  mitigates  some  of  the 
complexities  of  conflict.  These  complexities  necessitate  a  dynamic  EBP  process, 
requiring  a  cognitive  shift  from  linear,  or  sequential,  plans  and  operations,  to  adaptive 
and  distributed  plans  and  operations  to  keep  pace  with  (if  not  anticipate)  both  contextual 
changes  and  the  tempo  of  operations.  The  CIACG  is  not,  as  yet,  a  mature  “enabling” 
concept,  and,  therefore,  there  was  a  natural  tendency  for  the  CIACG  (and  its  several 
multinational  components)  to  react  strongly  to  immediate  military  circumstances  in  order 
to  better  define  its  own  relationship  with  the  CTF  (i.e.,  as  planner,  guide,  liaison,  or  some 
other  relationship).  At  this  stage  of  conceptual  development,  a  more  rigourous  review 
and  analysis  of  CIACG  integration  into  CTFHQ  activities  may  be  required.  On  one  level, 
the  CIACG  provided  liaison  between  OGDs,  IOs,  IGOs  and  the  CTFHQ;  on  another  level 
the  CIACG  offered  specific  guidance  to  the  CTF  Commander  during  phases  of  the  EBP 
process;  and  at  yet  another  level,  the  CIACG  provided  planning  and  assistance  though 
Subject  Matter  Experts  (SMEs).  This  latter  “role”  was  perhaps  the  most  contentious  one 
during  the  experiment:  the  specific  issue  being,  at  what  stage  does  a  multinational  inter¬ 
agency  group  limit  its  “co-ordination”  activities  to  that  of  advice  rather  than  assistance? 
Perhaps  non-military  organization  and  inter-agency  roles  need  refinement  for  each  CTF 
contingency.  However,  core  functions  should  be  identified  in  common  doctrine  with  the 
assumption  that  additional  functions  could  be  added  as  required. 


Other  questions  to  emerge  from  the  experiment  were:  should  some  or  all  multinational 
military  commands  and  NMOs  be  fully  integrated  into  the  CTFHQ  to  provide  EBP 
advice  and/or  contingency  options?  If  it  is  the  former,  what  criteria  should  be  used  in 
selecting  representation?  Should  multinational  NMOs  always  be  present  during  CTF 
planning  phases  in  order  to  provide  “another”  perspective,  external  advice  and  expert 
guidance  on  the  probabilities  of  cascading  effects  and,  therefore,  on  the  success  of  the 
mission? 


During  MNE  3,  it  became  obvious  that  a  CIACG  was  required  to  operate  at  a  much 
higher  level  than  anticipated  -  both  strategically  and  temporally.  This  was  not 


135 


appreciated  in  either  the  EBP  or  the  SJFHQ  CONOPS.  Similar  to  interactions  associated 
with  Allison’s  organizational  process  model,  the  CIACG  perceived  itself  as  a  conduit,  or, 
often  times,  as  a  translator  or  champion  of  higher  strategic  objectives.24  This  being  the 
case,  the  CIACG  felt  particularly  responsible  for  developing  perspectives  on  how  best  to 
achieve  the  desired  strategic  end-states  for  the  coalition.  Discussion  and  debate  often 
ensued  regarding  the  direction  and  longevity  of  the  stability  operation,  e.g.,  was  it  to  end 
after  a  sixty-day  combat  operation  or  was  it  to  include  developmental  activities, 
humanitarian  efforts,  and  the  so-called  “soft”  objectives  that  may  take  years  to  achieve? 
Prior  to  and  during  stability  operations,  such  issues  are  routinely  considered  by  NMOs; 
however,  during  EBP  and  EBO,  any  uncertainty  as  to  civil-military  options  and  end- 
states  may  actually  be  counterproductive.  For  example,  the  decision  to  avoid  the  pursuit 
of  immediate  combat  tactical  effects  because  they  might  damage  physical  infrastructure, 
may  actually  preclude  their  use  as  “enabling  effects”  requisite  for  the  more  long-term 
“soft”  operational  and  strategic  aims,  such  as  stability. 


Finally,  a  concept  that  integrates  multinational  military  organization  and  NMOs  in  a 
construct  such  as  the  CIACG  presumably  reflects  the  values  of  the  nation,  or  nations,  that 
develop  it.  National,  cultural,  sociological,  organizational,  and  even  psychological, 
issues  will  be  reflected  in  the  composition,  roles  and  even  proposed  actions  of  the 
CIACG.  This  is  a  delicate  balancing  act,  particularly  at  the  multinational  level.  If  the 
CIACG  is  to  be  a  truly  coalition  construct,  and,  therefore  a  reflection  of  many  national 
and  international  inter-agency  relationships  combined  together,  then  there  is  a  need  for  a 
rigorous  examination  of  these  relationships  prior  to  further  experimentation. 


THE  EFFECTS-BASED  CONCEPT,  NMOS  AND  MNE  3  -  CONCEPTUAL 
OBSERVATIONS 

The  EBP  process,  both  as  theoretically  conceived  and  as  developed  for  MNE  3,  requires 
the  establishment  of  a  coalition  military  and  NMO  group  for  planning  effects-based 
operations,  but  future  concept  development  and  refinement  is  required.  The  CIACG 
played  a  considerable  role  in  MNE  3.  Indeed,  the  experiment  design  and  process  steps 
were  augmented  throughout  the  two-week  experiment  to  reflect  the  increasing  import  of 
the  CIACG  sub-concept.  The  impact  of  the  CIACG  on  EBP  was  most  apparent  during 
the  following  process  steps,  as  illustrated  in  Figure  10-2  above: 

•  Commander ’s  Initial  Guidance  -  the  aim  of  the  CIACG  was  to  provide  specific 
advice  to  the  CTF  Commander  in  order  to  frame  the  Commander’s  guidance  in 
acceptable  tenns  for  multinational  NMO  and  inter-agency  sensitivities  and  co¬ 
ordination.  This  is  an  important  insight  (albeit  somewhat  contrived,  given  the 
artificiality  of  the  experiment).  One  conclusion  drawn  from  the  experiment 
CIACG  After  Action  Report  is  that  integration  of  the  CIACG  in  all  planning 
developments  should  be  initiated  prior  to  the  outset  of  the  EBP  process.  There 
should  be  a  clear  role  established  for  the  CIACG  and  a  clear  relationship  to  the 


136 


Commander  outlined  in  full.  How  this  is  to  be  achieved  requires  further 
investigation. 

•  Effects  Assessment,  Actions  Assessment  and  Priority  Effects  List  (PEL)  -  the 
CIACG  played  an  active  role  in  the  Assessment  phases.  During  these  phases 
CTFHQ  Planners  consider  what  effects  would  prove  most  valuable  and  what 
actions  would  be  required  to  enable  these  desired  effects.  The  CIACG  played  an 
integral  part  in  establishing  the  causal  links  and  weighing  the  relative  priority  of 
one  effect  and/or  action  over  another.  This  sort  of  injection  is  essential  to  3D 
policy  projection  and  the  integration  of  DIME  instruments  by  posing  these 
questions:  Why  kill  when  you  can  create?  Alternatively,  why  aid  when  you  can 
degrade,  damage  or  depose?  These  questions  are  critical  to  the  conduct  of  EBP 
and  EBO  in  a  complex  environment  and  yet  they  are  not  easily  resolved  without 
some  associated  risk. 

•  Wargaming/Course  of  Action/Synchronization  -  Ideally,  these  steps  would  require 
active  co-ordination  and  reach-back  through  the  CIACG,  which  was  not 
successfully  achieved  during  MNE  3.  In  order  to  maximize  the  synchronization 
of  effects,  however,  CIACG  SME  input  is  critical.  Effect  “blowback,”  or  at  least 
the  consideration  of  probable  cascading  effects  and  unwanted  or  unintended 
effects  can  only  be  detennined  with  CIACG  involvement  in  the  planning  process. 


If  the  effects-based  concept  is  to  prove  practicable,  the  CTF  (and  the  coalition)  must 
appreciate  fully  the  status  and  authority  of  each  associate  member  of  the  inter-agency 
group  assigned  to  it.  In  practice,  it  may  be  that  governments  choose  to  issue  their 
members  with  credentials  formally  outlining  their  authority  bounds  -  within  the  CTF  and 
between  members  of  the  CTF.  Similarly,  suitable  arrangements  are  required  to  ensure 
that  accountability  for  CIACG  actions  are  commensurate  with  its  allocated  role.  Military 
and  NMO  injects  into  a  CTFHQ  are  essential;  equally,  they  too  must  be  held  accountable 
for  their  input  to  planning  decisions. 


The  MNE  3  CIACG  was  designed  in  part  to  stimulate  thought  and  to  act  as  a  catalyst  for 
effects-based  dialogue  and  knowledge  management.  It  was  envisaged  that  the  CIACG 
should,  and  would  eventually,  assume  the  same  sort  of  role  with  respect  to  non-official 
entities,  e.g.,  NGOs  and  the  media,  which,  for  example,  are  a  major  source  of  information 
and  a  major  source  of  influence  in  theatre.  This  role  is,  however,  a  sticking  point, 
because  in  a  volatile  military  theatre,  perceptions  of  overt  NMO  influence  on  specifically 
military  operations  may  seriously  cripple  command  and  control  relationships.  On  the 
other  hand,  perceptions  of  military  influence  on  IOs  and  NGOs  operating  in  theatre  for 
long-term  developmental  planning  must  also  be  avoided.  During  MNE  3,  this 
relationship  was  strained  several  times,  and  this  issue  that  remains  to  be  addressed. 


In  a  complex  conflict  environment,  multinational  military  and  NMO  roles  are  likely  to 
remain  situationally  dependent,  and  the  ad  hoc  nature  of  the  CIACG  offers  both 
advantages  and  disadvantages.  Clearly,  coalition  civil-military  and  inter-agency  co- 


137 


ordination  mechanisms  for  regions  frequently  in  crisis  will  be  further  developed  and 
better  maintained  than  arising  areas  of  interest  that  are  not  frequently  in  crisis;  therefore, 
NMO  roles  will  need  to  be  clarified  for  each  operation.  However,  emergent,  minimum 
core  functions  could  be  entrenched  in  common  doctrine  with  the  assumption  that 
additional  functions  could  be  added  as  required.  In  this  regard,  several  national  MNE  3 
CIACG  After  Action  Reports  tabled  options  regarding  the  role  of  the  CIACG. 


In  MNE  3,  the  CIACG  role  was  designed  to  meet  experimental  demands  for  EBP  that  do 
not  envisage  NMO  control  and/or  direction  over  a  stability  operation.  Indeed,  the  US 
concept  developers  for  the  MNE  3  CIACG  construct  have  stated  that  the  primary  role  of 
a  CIACG  is  to  provide  civilian  advice  and  subject  matter  expertise  to  the  CTF 
Commander  and  effects-based  planners  regarding  civilian  agency  operational-level 
activities  during  the  planning  stages  of  an  operation.  Naturally,  this  advisory  role  could 
evolve  over  time,  as  requirements  and  circumstances  demand.  This  begs  the  question:  at 
what  point  in  the  effects-based  planning  and  execution  process  is  the  decision  made  to 
forego  routine  multinational  civil-military  liaison  in  favour  of  a  CIACG  complement? 


Several  issues  regarding  roles  remain  unanswered  and  require  exploration  within  the 
context  of  the  effect-based  concept: 

•  What  should  the  operating  relationships  between  the  inter-agency  or  NMO 
group(s)  and  their  respective  national  governments  be?  Is  there  such  a  thing  as 
one  CIACG  that  operates  within,  or  amongst,  the  CTFHQ?  Should  it  maintain 
the  higher  (or  strategic)  level  of  interest?  If  so,  how  should  this  translate  to  the 
operational  level?  How  best  are  communities  of  interest  represented, 
established  and  sustained? 

•  Assuming  that  there  is  an  agreed  upon  end,  ways  and  means  strategy  for  EBO 
between  the  civil-military  actors,  what  ethical  issues  need  consideration? 
Clearly,  should  an  NMO  lead  group  be  tasked  as  liaison  between  CTF  and 
NGOs,  IGOs,  and  IOs  in  the  area  of  concentration,  there  is  the  potential  for  an 
ethical  dilemma.  At  what  point  does  the  NMO  lead  risk  precipitating  a  conflict 
of  interest  when  it  acts  as  a  conduit  between  humanitarian  and  relief 
organizations  and  the  anned  forces  tasked  by  the  Commander  to  pursue  tactical 
effects?  Does  the  NMO  lead  recommend  and  then  co-ordinate  relief  and 
humanitarian  activities  under  the  helm  of  the  CTF?  Presumably  not. 

•  What,  then,  should  the  composition  of  a  CTF  inter-agency,  or  NMO,  group  look 
like?  During  MNE  3,  several  debates  on  the  composition  of  the  CIACG  were 
initiated.  Clearly,  civilian  SMEs  should  be  involved  in  EBP,  and  for  MNE  3 
they  were  chosen  from  a  wide  range  of  OGDs,  foreign  offices  and  departments 
of  state.  However,  inclusion  of  members  for  the  purposes  of  “human 
intelligence”  from  IGOs  and  NGOs  may  also  be  necessary  in  practice.  As 
mentioned  above,  this  raises  both  practical  and  ethical  challenges.  Where  and 
how  does  one  receive,  evaluate,  and  use  expert  advice  in  an  area  of  concern? 


138 


How  can  immediate  tactical,  and  possibly  physical,  effects  be  reconciled  with 
long-term  strategic,  and  possibly  psychological,  end-states? 


Finally,  if  NMOs  are  expected  to  make  a  strong  contribution  to  the  development  of  the 
effects-based  approach,  then  a  strong  identifiable  civilian  champion  is  needed  for 
whatever  form  the  inter-agency  group  takes.  This  leader  would  presumably  come  from 
the  lead  nation,  although  there  is  a  strong  argument  to  be  made  that  this  leader  should 
come  from  another  coalition  nation  to  provide  greater  legitimacy. 


The  discussion  above  implies  some  balance  to  effects-based  decision  making: 

•  The  relative  value  of  the  NMO  group  is  greatly  increased  if  members  can 
readily  reach-back  to  national  networks.  This  is  not  easily  accomplished, 
however,  as  current  security  and  information  sharing  practices  may  preclude 
secure  national  communications  systems  from  operating  in  both  the  NMO  and 
CTF  area. 

•  During  operations,  it  may  be  appropriate  to  transfer  CTF  subordinate  leads 
from  military  to  civilian  command.  Conceptually,  an  effects-based  operation 
will  eventually  require  the  transition  of  authority  to  a  civilian  lead.  Effects,  if 
properly  chosen,  will  require  a  civilian  administration  to  ensure  any  action 
taken  is  directed  properly  and  considers  all  humanitarian,  social,  economic, 
political,  cascading  effects. 

•  Should  EBP  be  restricted  to  focussing  on  a  military  objective,  it  is 
recommended  that  a  military  liaison  officer  be  posted  as  a  pennanent  member 
of  the  generic  NMO  co-ordination  group,  or  the  CIACG. 

The  following  points  challenge  the  extant  SJFHQ  (or  CTFHQ)  model  and  open  for 
discussion  the  proposed  civil-military  EBO  C  structure  illustrated  below  in  Figure  10-3: 

•  Analysis  of  MNE  3  suggests  that  concept  development  and  experimentation 
efforts  recognize  and  accept  the  primacy  of  coalitions  as  the  most  probable 
paradigm  within  which  nations  may  participate.  These  efforts  should 
therefore  be  willing  to  explore  alternative  C  processes  and  organizations, 
some  of  which  include  the  injection  of  a  truly  multinational  NMO  into  the 
EBP  planning  structure.  Should  it  be  the  case  that  a  CTF  is  required,  a 
complementary  co-ordinated  multinational  NMO,  or  Inter-agency  Command 
Group,  should  be  available  to  provide  strategic  and  operational  advice  (and 
not  guidance)  to  the  CTF  Commander.  To  adapt  to  each  contingency,  the 
composition  of  this  Command  Group  should  be  ad  hoc,  however,  members 
could  be  national  representatives  at  the  ambassadorial  level  chosen  by  their 
respective  states.  This  approach  has  recently  been  explored  by  US  Pacific 

25 

Command. 


139 


•  The  CTF  Commander  could  be  augmented  by  a  civilian  equivalent,  capable  of 
both  serving  to  achieve  the  strategic  objective  through  an  effects-based  plan 
and  providing  the  military  commander  with  rational  and  objective  advice  and 
planning  guidance.  This  civilian  would  not  provide  military  operational 
advice;  rather  he  or  she  would  provide  guidance  on  the  area  of  operations; 
operations  and  coalition  unity  of  effort;  diplomatic  and  inter-agency  feedback 
to  contingent  nations;  and  NMO  liaison  services. 

•  An  NMO  Liaison  would  act  between  the  Deputy  Commander  and  the  four 
collaborative  subject  matter  areas  in  order  to  provide  feedback  to  the  Inter¬ 
agency  Command  Group,  as  well  as  to  maintain  the  fluidity  of  options 
available  to  the  SJFHQ. 

•  Each  of  the  four  SJFFIQ  areas  would  also  have  one  NMO  liaison  to  provide 
input  to  help  ensure  that  strategic  objectives  are  being  met  when  effects-based 
planning  has  been  initiated 


L 


Logistics 


Figure  10-3:  This  figure  shows  a  proposed  CTFHQ  conceptual  organization  based  on  the 
more  holistic  inclusion  of  multinational  Military  and  NMO  and  inter-agency  components. 
Each  of  the  four  pillars:  Operations,  Plans,  Information  Superiority  and  Knowledge 
Management  are  augmented  by  a  NMO  liaison;  there  is  an  added  NMO  component 


140 


attached  to  the  Information  Superiority  cell;  there  is  a  distinctly  separate  NMO 
component  for  advice  to  the  CTFHQ;  and,  most  importantly,  there  is  a  civilian  equivalent 
to  the  CTF  Commander  embedded  within  the  Command  chain,  which  may  act  as  guide, 
liaison  to  civilian  agency  counter  parts,  or  advisor. 

Most  importantly,  in  addition  the  points  raised  above,  there  would  be  a  non-military 
advice  chain  provided  to  the  Information  Superiority  cell  of  the  SJFHQ.  There  are 
several  reasons  for  providing  this  non-military  advice  chain.  First,  NMO  input  is  not 
only  critical  when  infonnation  on  an  area  of  interest  or  operation  is  collected,  collated 
and  assessed,  but  it  is  also  essential  for  the  maintenance  of  a  fluid,  and  adaptive, 
information  assessment.  Second,  prior  to  the  initiation  of  operational  planning,  this 
NMO  cell  would  be  required  to  assist  in  the  exploitation  of  information  from  the 
assessment  through  to  the  development  of  an  operational  (military)  campaign  plan. 

Third,  this  cell  would  provide  advice  and  guidance  on  proposed  follow-on  effects  and  the 
avoidance  of  unwanted  and  unintended  social,  developmental,  legal,  economic,  and 
governance  effects. 


The  construct  in  Figure  10-3  is  presented  for  review  and  comment.  It  is  not  intended  to 
supplant  any  effort  to  promote  the  current  SJFHQ  prototype;  however,  it  is  intended  to 
provide  a  more  holistic  representation  of  what  positions  might  be  necessary  for  an  ad  hoc 
coalition  task  force  headquarters  should  it  be  necessary  to  develop  and  plan  for  a  multi¬ 
disciplinary  effects-based  operation. 


CONCLUSIONS  AND  CHALLENGES 

The  above  discussion  on  the  theoretical  requirements  for  inter-agency  participation  in 
effects-based  operations,  as  well  as  experimental  observations  on  coalition  Effects-based 
Planning,  have  provided  some  support  to  the  notion  that  future  effects-based  processes 
and  structures  will  utilize  both  military  and  non-military  organizational  components. 
Indeed,  strategic  and  operational  errors  may  result  from  the  failure  to  integrate,  or  at  the 
very  least  co-ordinate,  military,  non-military  and  inter-agency  roles,  perspectives  and 
obligations. 


Evidence  thus  far  has  indicated  that  in  the  days  and  months  following  the  Coalition 
military  invasion  of  Iraq,  actions  were  not  driven  by  an  inter-agency  Effects-based  Plan 
that  might  have  included  a  civil-military  outcome-based  mission  analysis;  Effects  and 
Action  assessment;  and  effects-based  course  of  action  requirements.  There  was  also 
scant  attention  paid  to  potential  cascading  short  and  long-term  effects,  or  what  has  been 
tenned  “blowback,”  that  might  result  from  crushing  military  force. “  One  suspects  that 
there  was  little  integrated  civil-military  thought  of  the  Iraqi  theatre  as  a  complex  adaptive 
system  of  systems  with  interacting  nodal  behaviour.  As  experienced  at  the  experimental 
level,  there  also  existed  little  practical  evidence  of  the  inclusion  of  non-military 
organizations  in  the  operational  decision  making  processes  and  organizations  that 
cultivated  the  war  in  Iraq."  Indeed,  months  before  the  invasion,  Office  of  the  Secretary 
of  Defense  and  Pentagon  planning  staffs  repeatedly  dismissed  inter-agency  efforts  to 


141 


prepare  plans  for  the  combat  and  post-conflict  phases  in  Iraq.  Advice  from  the  US 
Agency  for  International  Development  (USAID)  and  several  other  NGOs  was  rebuffed 
along  with  advice  from  more  traditional  government  bodies  such  as  the  Central 
Intelligence  Agency  and  the  National  War  College.  The  inter-agency  Iraq  Working 
Group,  hastily  formed  to  explore  post-war  reconstruction  and  social  efforts,  was 
successively  resisted  by  Secretary  of  Defense  Donald  Rumsfeld  and  his  deputy,  Paul 
Wolfowitz,  because,  the  Group  was  told,  “the  President  has  already  spent  an  hour  on  the 
humanitarian  issues.”28  As  Dayton  Maxwell,  Special  Advisor  to  the  Administrator  of 
USAID  and  former  advisor  to  the  Coalition  Provisional  Authority,  has  recently  claimed, 
in  the  context  of  the  Global  War  on  Terror,  non-military  organizations  have  been  largely 

9Q 

absent  from  the  planning  and  execution  of  events. 


At  the  beginning  of  military  operations  in  Iraq,  there  were  over  80  non-military 
organizations  operating  alongside  thousands  of  military  personnel  from  several  nations. 
Five  independent  groups  formed  the  Joint  NGO  Emergency  Preparedness  Initiative 
(JNEPI)  to  serve  as  a  “command  post”  for  NGOs.30  JNEPI  activities  were  focused  and 
adaptable  to  include  planning,  pre-positioning  of  equipment  and  supplies  to  co-ordination 
and  infonnation  sharing.  A  significant  source  of  funding  for  JNEPI  was  USAID; 
however,  one  of  the  five  JNEPI  groups,  the  International  Medical  Corps,  warned  its 

3 1 

members  and  other  NGOs  to  avoid  the  appearance  of  being  “with  the  occupiers.” 


Combat  operations  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq,  while  tactically  successful,  appear  to  have 
been  temporally  short-sighted.  In  some  way  they  have  suffered  what  some  civil- 
military  professionals  have  tenned  “the  tyranny  of  the  immediate,”  in  which  short-term 
tactical  gains  are  sought  over  the  more  difficult  long-term  end-states.  During  the 
Global  War  on  Terror  and  the  subsequent  war  in  Iraq,  the  symbiosis  between  military- 
and  NMO-outcome  planning  diminished.  Why  this  occurred  has  yet  to  be  sufficiently 
analyzed  and  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  study;  suffice  it  to  say  that  civil-military 
planning  by  Regional  Combatant  Commands  may,  in  fact,  be  anathema  to  very 
conceptual  pillars  of  the  effects-based  concept  and  its  inter-agency  “role.”  Furthermore, 
this  form  of  military  governance  by  Regional  Combatant  Commands  does  not  translate 
easily  to  coalition  partners.34 


These  operational  challenges  mirror  those  identified  during  MNE  3,  and  raise  the 
question,  at  what  point  do  NMOs  and  military  organizations  agree  that  cooperation  and 
collaboration  might  be  more  effective  at  producing  a  shared,  desired  operational  effect 
than  segregation  of  effort  and  disagreement?  Or,  at  what  point  do  NMOs  and  military 
organizations  agree  that  collaboration  is,  instead,  not  applicable  at  all  and  that  unity  of 
effort  would  be  tantamount  to  an  ethical  dilemma,  especially  for  the  NMOs?  This  is  an 
important  ethical  issue  that  cannot  be  resolved  here.  There  is,  however,  a  compelling 
need  for  effects-based  planners,  both  civilian  and  military,  to  consider  these  questions. 
Alternatively,  there  are  arguments  for  recommending  that  Regional  Combatant 
Commands  include  liaison  with  the  NMO  community  and  vice  versa.  This  idea  parallels 
some  of  the  recommendations  made  above  in  Figure  10-3,  as  well  as  examples  explored 


142 


within  the  Pacific  Command  Multinational  Planning  Augmentation  Team  on-line 
“exercises.”  This  Team  focuses  on  short-term  planning  for  operations  other  than  war  and 
includes  in  test-case  multinational  crisis  planning  efforts  with  NGOs  and  ad  hoc  civil- 

35 

military  networks. 


Presumably,  the  end-state  of  an  effects-based  plan  is  one  that  is  holistic  in  all  respects, 
one  that  promotes  the  integration  and  realization  of  the  3D  principle.  That  being  the  case, 
effects-based  operational  planners  must  resolve  the  failures  in  communication  and  co¬ 
ordination  that  might  jeopardize  the  achievement  of  shared  strategic  outcomes;  however, 
there  is,  as  yet,  few  effective  means  (or  the  desire)  to  communicate  through  the  EBP 
process.  The  addition  of  liaison  personnel,  specific  to  the  tasks  (or  end  states),  could 
enable  a  faster  and  more  effective  transition  to  a  stable  post-conflict  environment.  The 
opportunity  for  co-ordination  through  liaisons  should  not,  however,  infer  control. 


The  “interventionist  years”  of  the  immediate  post-Cold  War  era  were  notable  for  the 
widespread  inclusion  of  developmental,  social  and  humanitarian  affairs  into  defence 
policy,  not  to  mention  the  widespread  inclusion  of  security  issues  in  the  planning  stages 
of  regional  development  and  reconstruction  efforts.  This  phenomenon  may  provide  us 
with  some  guidance  as  we  refine  the  effects-based  concept.  It  is  now  generally  accepted 
that  international  organizations  and  national  or  international  other  government 
departments  should  not  only  be  made  aware  of  conflict  and  its  effects,  but  that  they 
should  be  party  to  the  pursuit  of  objectives  designed  to  promote  regional  and  global 
security. 


Based  on  results  from  MNE  3  and  consideration  of  the  past,  present  and  future  security 
environments,  this  paper  contends  that  national  and  international  NMOs  and  inter-agency 
partners  should  be  directly  involved  in  the  operational  planning  and  execution  stages  of  a 
coalition  effects-based  effort.  IOs  and  NGOs  need  to  be  aware  of  the  potential  effects  of 
military  intervention,  and,  if  possible,  align  their  capabilities  and  efforts  towards  stability, 
development  and  resolution.  Ironically,  the  ultimate  outcome  of  intervention,  then, 
would  be  to  avert  future  violence  and  post-conflict  instability.36  These  sentiments  are 
well  expressed  in  the  policy  statements  of  several  leading  IOs,  UN  agencies,  non-partisan 
think-tanks,  NGOs  and  financial  institutions/  Indeed,  NMOs  have  expanded  their 
mandates  to  include  working  directly  with  national  and  international  anned  forces. 
Following  recent  events  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq,  there  have  been  strong  calls  within  the 
US  legislature  for  the  establishment  of  a  Civilian  Reconstruction  Service  to  work  closely 
with  military  elements  towards  an  effects-based  operational  objective.  Ideally,  this  work 
would  occur  within  an  Integrated  Strategic  Planning  environment  that  takes  into 
consideration  conflict  and  post-conflict  planning  sources;  however,  this  form  of  planning 

38 

cell  requires  more  study  and  experimentation  prior  to  implementation. 


Conflict  is  complex  in  nature  and  armed  forces  must  adapt  to  the  environments  with 
which  they  are  faced.  Security  and  stability  operations  today  require  concepts,  processes 


143 


and  tools  that  have  never  before  been  considered.  The  diverse  means  used  by  some  to 
perpetuate  conflict  (for  example,  child  soldiers,  eco-terrorism,  computers,  weapons  of 
mass  effect,  and  terror  against  civilians)  implies  that  in  order  to  address  these  means,  one 
must  be  prepared  to  explore  all  necessary  ways  to  stop  the  propagation  of  conflict, 
including  the  integration  of  civilian  and  military  roles,  functions  and  processes.  Threats 
can  emanate  from  anywhere  and  the  armed  forces  tasked  to  address  them  collect 
intelligence  from  civilians;  deliver  humanitarian  aid;  protect  NGOs;  and  eliminate  the 
threats’  funding  sources.  At  the  same  time,  armed  forces  can  be  killing  and  protecting, 
destroying  and  rebuilding.  Information  and  intelligence  to  aid  armed  forces  in  these  tasks 
comes  from  a  variety  of  indicators,  including  population,  religion,  economic  spending, 
and  resource  allocation.  Obscure  indicators  such  as  the  cost  of  weapons,  the  price  of 
brides  and  the  nature  of  tribal  blessings  can  also  foreshadow  conflict.  The  sources  of 
knowledge  about  these  indicators,  or,  nodes,  are  most  assuredly  not  the  armed  forces,  but 
rather  non-military  organizations  and  inter-agency  partners.  Finally,  generic  civil- 
military  training  by  itself  is  not  enough  to  give  armed  forces  the  necessary  awareness  of 
cultural,  social,  and  economic  issues  and  how  to  optimize  the  capabilities  of  NMOs  and 
OGDs  in  understanding  these  issues.  MNE  3  highlighted  the  fact  that  these  areas  require 
legitimate  “bridging”  between  civilian  and  military  values  and  perspectives  before 
implementation  of  the  effects-based  concept  is  possible. 


1  This  essay  was  originally  published  in  David  Carment  and  Martin  Rudner,  eds.,  Peacekeeping 
Intelligence:  New  Players,  Extended  Boundaries  (London:  Routledge,  2006),  188-209. 

2  The  threat  of  asymmetric  retaliation  and  guerrilla  warfare  (slowly)  persuaded  Coalition  forces  to  re-assess 
strategic  options  in  Iraq  in  the  spring  of  2003.  See  for  example  E.  L.  Andrews  and  P.  E.  Tyler,  “As  Iraqis’ 
Disaffection  Grows,  U.S.  Offers  Them  a  Greater  Political  Role,”  New  York  Times  (7  June  2003),  p.  A8. 

’  R.  Grossman-Vermaas,  Action  Group  10  Operational  Briefing  (Dalhgren,  VA:  The  Technical 
Cooperation  Program  (TTCP)  Joint  Systems  Analysis  Group,  Joint  Warfare  Analysis  Center,  29  April 
2004). 

4  The  3D  approach  is  endorsed  by  the  Department  of  National  Defence,  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs 
and  International  Trade,  and  the  Canadian  International  Development  Agency,  i.e.,  the  defence,  diplomacy 
and  development  sectors  of  the  Canadian  government  bureaucracy.  See  the  CIDA  website  at  www.canada- 
afghanistan. gc ,ca/ menu-en. asp .  Accessed  15  July  2004. 

4  US  J9  Experimentation,  US  Joint  Forces  Command  (USJFCOM),  working  definition,  2002.  See  also 
draft  of  “Effects-based  Planning  concept  for  Multinational  Experiment  3,”  (August  2003)  which  is  a  joint 
concept  agreed  to  by  the  UK  Joint  Doctrine  and  Concepts  Centre  (JDCC),  the  Canadian  Forces 
Experimentation  Centre  (CFEC),  the  German  Bundeswehr,  France,  NATO  ACT,  the  Australian  Defence 
Science  and  Technology  Organisation  (DSTO),  and  US  Joint  Forces  Command. 

6  P.K.  Davis,  Effects-Based  Operations:  A  Grand  Challenge  for  the  Analytical  Community ,  RAND  MR- 
1 477-US JF COM/AF,  2001  (Santa  Monica,  CA:  RAND,  2001). 

7  Robert  Vermaas,  “Future  Perfect:  Effects  Based  Operations,  Complexity  and  the  Human  Environment,” 
DOR  (Joint)  Research  Note  RN  2004/01,  Operational  Research  Division,  Department  of  National  Defence, 
January  2004,  which  appears  as  Chapter  3  in  this  volume. 

8  It  should  be  noted  that  while  the  EBO  concept  requires  further  refinement,  there  are  a  number  of 
multinational  and  Canadian  initiatives  in  place  that  are  investigating  the  “sub-concepts”  involved  in  the 
effects-based  approach.  Canada  has  been  involved  in  the  conceptual  development,  analysis,  technological 
development,  experiment  design,  and  participatory  phases  of  Limited  Objective  Experiment  II  (LOE  II)  and 


144 


Multinational  Experiment  III  (MNE  III).  The  former  experiment  was  conducted  in  February  2002  and 
addressed  multinational  information  sharing  in  “real-time”  over  a  secure  Collaborative  Information 
Environment  (CIE)  and  the  development  of  a  multinational  ONA  database.  The  latter,  which  took  place  in 
February  2003,  explored  the  technological,  organizational  and  process  requirements  for  multinational 
Effects-based  Planning  (EBP)  and  coalition  development  of  a  robust  ONA  database.  MNE  4  was 
scheduled  for  the  spring  of  2006  and  was  planned  as  an  experiment  on  the  conduct  of  an  effects-based 
operation  in  a  stability  operation  environment. 

9  S.  Guastello,  Chaos,  Catastrophe,  and  Human  Affairs:  Application  of  Nonlinear  Dynamics  to  Work, 
Organizations,  and  Social  Evolution  (Mahwah,  NJ:  Lawrence  Erlbaum  Associates,  1995);  and  R.  D.  Smith, 
“The  Inapplicability  of  Principle:  What  Chaos  Means  for  Social  Science,”  Behavioral  Science  40  (1995), 
22. 


10  Figure  from  USJFCOM,  Rock  Drill  Draft,  Concept  of  Operations  for  Multinational  Experiment  3,  3  Nov 
2003. 


An  example  of  an  IO  is  the  United  Nations;  an  example  of  an  IGO  is  the  Association  of  South  East  Asian 
Nations  (ASEAN);  an  example  of  an  NGO  is  Amnesty  International.  The  distinctions  between  an  IO  and 
an  IGO  are  sometimes  blurred. 

12  W.  Durch,  UN  Peacekeeping,  American  Policy,  and  the  Uncivil  Wars  of  the  1990s  (London:  Macmillan, 
1997);  and  L.  Freedman,  Military’  Intervention  in  European  Conflicts  (Oxford:  Blackwell,  1994). 

13  K.  von  Hippel,  Democracy  by  Force:  US  Military  Intervention  of  the  post-Cold  War  World  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge  University  Press,  1999);  and  M.  Duffield,  Global  Governance  and  the  New  Wars  (London:  Zed 
Books,  2001). 

14  Duffield,  Global  Governance  and  the  New  Wars,  52. 

15  The  RCC  construct  is  unique  to  US  C2  structure.  In  future,  this  anomaly  may  create  difficulties  for 
multinational  partners  who  wish  to  integrate  into  the  SJFHQ  construct. 

16  United  States  Joint  Forces  Command  (USJFCOM),  Standing  Joint  Forces  Headquarters  (2003). 
Available  at  www.jfcom.mil/about/fact  sjfhq.htm.  Accessed  24  Mar  2004. 

17  Ibid. 

18  Ibid. 

19  USJFCOM,  MNE  3  Experiment  Directive,  Version  2.6  (2003). 

20  Ibid. 

21  USJFCOM,  “Improving  Cooperation  Among  US  and  Coalition  Military  and  Civilian  Operational 
Planners  in  Crisis  Intervention,”  in  Draft  Combined  Inter-agency  Coordination  Group  (CIACG)  Concept  of 
Operation  for  MNE  3,  Revision  1.1,  dated  4  Sep  2003. 

22  The  analysis  for  MNE  3  was  released  in  two  forms:  a  Canadian  national  contingent  report  and  a  full 
USJFCOM  report.  Both  are  unclassified. 

23  USJFCOM,  MNE  3  Experiment  Directive. 

24  G.  T.  Allison,  Essence  of  Decision:  Explaining  the  Cuban  Missile  Crisis  (New  York:  Little,  Brown  and 
Co.,  1971),  4-5,  10-11. 

25  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization  (NATO),  Coalition  Warfare:  Coordination  and  Planning  Options, 
Draft  NATO  White  Paper  (2003). 

26  C.  Johnson,  Blowback  (New  York:  Henry  Holt  and  Co.,  2000). 

27  J.  Fallows,  “Blind  into  Baghdad,”  The  Atlantic  Monthly  293,  no.  1  (Jan-Feb  2004),  52-74. 

28  Fallows,  “Blind  into  Baghdad,”  69. 

29  D.  Maxwell,  Keynote  Address  to  the  NATO  ACT/USJFCOM  CD&E  annual  conference,  3  November 


2004. 

30  NATO,  Coalition  Warfare:  Coordination  and  Planning  Options. 

31  International  Medical  Corps  (IMC),  “Press  Release,”  dated  12  Mar  2003.  Available  at  www.imc- 
la.com.  Accessed  24  Mar  2004. 

32  L.  Diamond,  “What  Went  Wrong  in  Iraq?”  Foreign  Affairs  9,  no.  10  (2004),  34-56;  and  “The  Right  Plan 
for  Iraq,”  The  Economist  (25  September  2004),  13. 

33  D.  Maxwell,  Keynote  Address  to  the  NATO  ACT/USJFCOM  CD&E  annual  conference. 

34  As  of  mid-2004,  there  were  some  indications  from  within  the  US  DoD  recognizing  the  need  for  further 
changes  to  its  “way  of  war.”  See  K.  Costa,  “Pentagon  Kicks  off  Effort  to  Re-examine  the  Basic  Principles 


145 


of  War,”  Inside  the  Pentagon  (1  July  2004),  1;  and  T.  Ricks,  “US  Army  Changed  by  Iraq,  but  for  Better  or 
Worse?”  Washington  Post  (6  July  2004),  p.  A10. 

35  Multinational  Planning  Augmentation  Team  (MPAT)  (2004).  Available  at  www2.apan-info.net/mpat. 
Accessed  7  November  2004. 

36  R.  Read,  Address  to  the  NATO  ACT/USJFCOM  CD&E  annual  conference,  3  November  2004. 

37  These,  for  example,  include  the  Organization  for  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe,  the  European 
Union,  the  World  Bank,  the  United  Nations  Development  Program,  the  United  Nations  High  Commission 
for  Refugees,  and  the  Carnegie  Commission. 

38  D.  Maxwell,  Keynote  Address  to  the  NATO  ACT/USJFCOM  CD&E  annual  conference. 


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PART  VI  -  CONCLUDING  MATERIAL 


147 


Chapter  11 


Concluding  Remarks  from  the  Editors 

Allan  English  and  Howard  Coombs 

As  noted  at  the  beginning  of  this  volume,  there  are  currently  three  major  theoretical 
approaches  that  dominate  analyses  and  descriptions  of  military  operations:  Operational 
Art,  Network  Centric  Warfare  (or  Network  Enabled  Operations  in  the  Canadian  context), 
and  Effects  Based  Operations.  While  the  concept  of  EBO  is  having  a  significant  influence 
on  the  other  concepts,  as  well  as  how  operations  are  conceptualized  today,  there  are  many 
variants  of  EBO  and  each  alternative  has  been  shaped  by  national  and  organizational 
cultures.  Because  of  the  importance  of  the  concept  of  EBO  today,  this  volume  has 
presented  some  aspects  of  Canadian  approaches  to  EBO  so  that  we  might  get  a  clearer 
picture  of  what  this  concept  means  in  a  Canadian  context. 

Descriptions  and  accounts  of  approaches  to  EBO  are  emerging  through  discussions  and 
papers  within  Defence  Research  and  Development  Canada  (DRDC)  and  jointly  with 
other  players  in  the  Department  of  National  Defence  (DND);  however,  there  are  many 
ways  of  describing  EBO  in  the  literature  and  in  practice.  In  order  to  fully  understand  the 
nature  of  EBO  today  and  how  it  might  evolve  in  the  future,  it  is  vital  to  understand  the 
theoretical  and  historical  origins  of  this  subject,  as  well  as  how  EBO  is  conceptualized 
and  practised  by  the  CF.  Since  there  has  been  no  comprehensive  examination  of  these 
concepts  in  a  Canadian  context,  the  Command  Effectiveness  and  Behaviour  Section  at 
DRDC  Toronto  co-sponsored,  with  the  Canadian  Forces  Aerospace  Warfare  Centre 
(CFAWC),  a  two-day  workshop,  held  in  November  2006,  to  identify  issues  related  to 
EBO  and  to  begin  to  establish  an  agenda  for  better  understanding  EBO.  The  proceedings 
of  the  workshop  documented  the  origins,  context,  and  various  aspects  of  EBO  taken  from 
Canadian  experience  with  EBO.  This  summary  of  the  proceedings  and  other  Canadian 
writings  on  EBO  attempts  to  capture  the  diversity  of  current  Canadian  views  on  EBO  as  a 
first  step  towards  achieving  a  more  comprehensive  and  integrated  Canadian  approach  to 
EBO.  Because  of  the  immaturity  of  the  concept  of  EBO  and  its  continually  evolving 
nature,  no  attempt  was  made  here  to  reconcile  differences  among  viewpoints.  Rather  the 
differences  are  presented  so  that  readers  can  get  a  better  idea  of  how  effects-based 
tenninology  is  currently  being  used  by  Canadians. 

This  final  chapter,  based  on  the  works  that  appear  in  this  volume,  summarizes  the 
following  viewpoints  related  to  aspects  of  EBO:  origins,  concepts  and  context;  Canadian 
perspectives  from  the  EBO  workshop;  assessing  effects-based  approaches;  and  applying 
effects-based  approaches. 

Origins,  Concepts  and  Context 

A  key  resource  for  the  workshop  was  the  essay,  reproduced  above,  by  Colonel  Jim 
Cottingham,  Commandant  of  the  CFAWC,  which  described  in  detail  the  evolution  of 
EBO. 1  He  concluded  that  there  are  two  versions  of  EBO,  one  that  seeks  success  in  armed 


148 


conflict  and  one  that  seeks  success  in  a  much  broader  application.  The  earliest  notions  of 
EBO  are  quite  old,  but  in  a  modem  context  date  to  First  World  War  aerial  bombing.  The 
central  idea  in  this  first  version  of  EBO  is  that  there  is  a  better,  cheaper,  and  in  the  long 
run  a  more  humane  way,  of  winning  than  to  wage  the  long  drawn  out  land  and  sea 
campaigns  that  characterized  much  of  20th  century  warfare.  Up  until  the  1990s,  however, 
the  means  to  implement  this  idea  in  practice  did  not  exist,  and  it  was  really  not  until  the 
Persian  Gulf  War  (or  first  Gulf  War)  1990-91  that  the  potential  of  this  version  of  EBO 
was  realized  when  it  was  mated  with  new  technology  in  the  form  of  stealth  and  precision 
weaponry.  Based  on  the  promising  results  of  aerial  bombardment  during  the  first  Gulf 
War,  US  Air  Force  General  David  Deptula  declared  that  this  new  approach  to  fighting 
represented  a  fundamental  change  in  the  nature  of  war  and  coined  the  term  “Effects 
Based  Operations”  to  describe  it. 

This  optimism  was  dampened  by  the  character  of  the  post-Cold  War  security 
environment  at  the  beginning  of  the  21st  century  when  conventional  military  operations 
were  not  seen  to  be  as  effective  as  hoped  in  bringing  long  term  peace  and  stability  to 
troubled  regions  of  the  world.  In  this  context,  EBO,  as  it  was  originally  conceived,  was 
perceived  to  be  a  less  revolutionary  concept  than  its  advocates  claimed.  This  perceived 
failure  of  the  first  version  of  EBO  to  resolve  complex  security  problems  gave  rise  to  the 
second  main  version  of  EBO,  which  is  intended  to  broaden  the  application  of  EBO  into 
areas  other  than  armed  conflict  between  nations.  Cottingham  argues  that  this  second 
version  of  EBO  is  evolutionary  and  has  been  built  on  the  original  thinking  that  shaped  the 
development  of  airpower  theory,  plus  other  ideas,  to  create  a  new  way  of  thinking  about 
how  to  manage  the  attainment  of  national  objectives  in  peace  and  in  war.  He 
characterizes  this  second  version  of  EBO  as  going  beyond  just  using  military  force  to 
achieve  national  objectives  by  employing  a  holistic  approach  to  achieve  them.  However, 
he  concludes  that,  like  the  first  version  of  EBO  prior  to  the  1990s,  this  second  version  of 
EBO  must  wait  for  the  development  of  new  concepts  and  technologies  to  be  effective. 

Other  aspects  of  EBO  were  examined  in  another  workshop  resource,  the  essay  by  Robert 
Grossman- Vermaas,  a  Canadian  defence  scientist,  which  explored  concepts  related  to  the 
developing  theory  of  the  effects-based  approach  and  examined  how  EBO  could  be 
applied  to  strategic  and  operational  planning  processes  and  to  the  implementation  of 
plans  devised  by  these  processes.  He  also  discussed  possible  applications  of  the  effects- 
based  approach  and  explored  the  implications  of  its  use  the  in  the  human  and  virtual 
environments  of  the  future. 

Grossman- Vermaas  notes  that  conflict  today  has  many  diverse  elements,  such  as 
terrorism,  peace  support  operations,  and  regime  change  involving  the  complex 
environments  of  cyberspace,  the  nano-dimension,  space,  and  the  biological  and  chemical 
environments.  Given  these  varied  elements,  he  argues  that  conflict  has  begun  to  resemble 
a  complex  adaptive  system,  and  that  conducting  operations  in  such  conditions  will 
require  an  equally  adaptive  approach. 

In  this  context,  Grossman- Vermaas  visualizes  EBO  in  three  different  ways.  First  of  all,  he 
asserts  that  EBO  is  linked  to  the  effort  to  leverage  a  nation’s  (or  a  coalition’s)  strategic 


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capabilities  at  the  political,  economic,  technological,  and  information  networking  levels 
in  order  to  achieve  politically  satisfactory  outcomes  for  a  nation  or  coalition.  It  is,  at  the 
same  time,  an  intrinsically  psychological  concept,  linking  proposed  actions  to  achieve 
physical  and  psychological  results  at  the  operational  level.  Secondly,  he  argues,  EBO 
seeks  to  control  the  duration  and  gravity  of  a  crisis  or  conflict,  allowing  nation-states  to 
achieve  strategic  objectives  at  a  minimal  cost.  Thirdly,  EBO  may  be  seen  as  a  process  for 
obtaining  a  desired  outcome  or  effect  from  an  adversary,  friend  or  neutral  through  the 
synergistic  and  cumulative  application  of  military  and  non-military  capabilities  at  the 
tactical,  operational  and  strategic  levels.  Consequently,  Grossman- Vermaas  emphasizes 
that  EBO  involves  a  broad  range  of  activities,  of  which  military  action  is  only  a  subset. 

In  his  analysis,  Grossman- Vermaas  contends  that  users  of  the  effects-based  approach  will 
require  a  firm  understanding  of  complexity  theory,  causality,  networking  and  complex 
adaptive  systems  theory.  They  will,  he  maintains,  also  need  to  move  away  from  the 
linear  cause-and-effect  Newtonian  paradigm  that  underlies  most  current  military  planning 
processes  and  embrace  a  new  paradigm  based  on  non-linear  systems,  where  inputs  and 
outputs  are  not  proportional,  where  the  whole  is  not  quantitatively  equal  to  its  parts,  and 
where  cause  and  effect  are  not  immediately  visible.  In  addition  to  a  shift  in  mind-set, 
Grossman- Vermaas  tells  us  that  an  effects-based  approach  will  also  demand  the 
application  of  sophisticated  technologies  to  the  overall  planning,  decision  making, 
execution,  and  assessment  phases  of  an  operation  due  to  the  complexity  of  the  approach 
and  the  volume  of  specific  information  from  inter-agency,  academic,  corporate, 
diplomatic,  economic  and  coalition  intelligence  sources. 

In  summary,  Grossman- Vermaas  says  that  EBO  are  a  co-ordinated  set  of  actions  (or 
inactions)  directed  at  shaping  the  behaviour  of  foes,  friends  and  neutrals  during  times  of 
peace,  crisis  and  war.  These  actions  rely  primarily  on  the  exploitation  of  cognitive  and 
kinetic  weaknesses  rather  than  the  traditional  practice  of  simply  massing  power  against 
power.  This  approach  to  the  achievement  of  a  long-term  strategic  aim  requires  planners  to 
develop  a  better  appreciation  of  increasingly  complex  human  networks.  It  also  requires  a 
significantly  more  sophisticated  understanding  of  human  values  and  mindsets  over  time 
and  space  as  well  as  a  multidimensional  analysis  of  the  primary  and  secondary  “nodes,” 
or  “targets”  to  be  affected  during  the  course  of  an  effects-based  operation. 

Grossman- Vermaas  acknowledges  that  EBO  is  a  concept  still  in  its  infancy,  and  that 
making  EBO  a  reality  will  require  the  maturation  of  the  appropriate  theoretical  and 
analytical  frameworks  to  consider  a  holistic  spectrum  of  conflict  that  includes  political, 
military,  economic,  social,  legal  and  ethical,  and  infrastructure  and  information  segments. 

Canadian  Perspectives  from  the  EBO  Workshop 

All  participants  in  the  DRDC-CFAWC  workshop  acknowledged  that  the  idea  of 
achieving  certain  effects  through  military,  diplomatic,  and  other  actions  is  a  very  old 
concept  that  has  been  evolving  for  a  long  time.  They  conceptualized  the  term  “effect”  in  a 
number  of  different  ways,  but  the  idea  that  an  effect  is  “a  change,  whether  physical, 
moral  or  cognitive,  that  has  been  caused  by  an  action  or  inaction”  seemed  to  be 


150 


acceptable  to  most  participants.  It  was  noted  by  some,  that  the  word  “effect”  infers  that 
there  is  no  finality  to  the  result  of  a  particular  action  and  that  there  is  always  “more  to 
come.”  This  idea  has  implications  for  the  concept  of  “endstate”  in  operational  art  and 
campaign  planning. 

Despite  its  ancient  roots,  in  its  current  context,  the  term  “Effects  Based 
Operations”  was  derived  from  the  writings  of  20th  century  air  power  theorists,  and 
the  term  EBO  was  popularized  by  the  US  Air  Force  in  the  late  1990s.  Because  of 
this  recent  background  and  its  technological  focus,  EBO  is  seen  by  some  as  a 
particularly  air  force  approach  to  operations.  Given  the  perceived  air  force  origins 
of  EBO,  some  at  the  workshop  preferred  to  use  the  term  “Effects  Based  Approach 
to  Operations”  (EBAO),  because,  they  argued,  EBO  had  become  associated  with  a 
prescriptive,  technologically-based,  largely  air  force  way  of  conducting 
operations,  whereas  EBAO  conveyed  the  idea  of  a  broader,  more  philosophical 
approach  to  operations. 

Some  workshop  participants  indicated  that  the  term  EBO  had  evolved  since  the 
mid-1990s,  as  the  early  21st  century  military-strategic  situation  has  caused  some 
to  emphasize  the  sociological  as  opposed  to  the  technological  aspects  of  EBO.  For 
example,  conflict  in  the  post-Cold  War  era  has  shown  that  tactical  victories  can  be 
achieved,  but  that  they  do  not  necessarily  result  in  overall  strategic  success. 

Therefore,  for  some,  a  more  human- focussed  version  of  EBO  is  the  best  way  to 
link  tactical  actions  to  strategic  goals.  Others  acknowledged  that  EBO  is  a  method 
that  could  help  to  understand  the  complex  situations  that  are  found  in  today’s 
operational  environments,  but  that  current  planning  processes  based  on  the 
operational  art  were  flexible  enough  to  incorporate  EBO  concepts  without 
changing  the  processes  radically.  All  workshop  participants  agreed  that  EBO  was 
still  an  immature  concept  that  did  not  have  enough  explanatory  power  to  be 
regard  as  a  theory. 

Some  at  the  workshop  argued  that  Canada  does  not  have  the  resources  to  fully  practice 
EBO,  and,  therefore  could  only  employ  EBO  as  part  of  a  larger  coalition  or  with  the 
United  States.  Nevertheless,  most  participants  felt  that  Canada  needed  both  to  fully 
understand  EBO  as  a  concept  and  to  know  how  EBO  might  apply  to  Canadian  operations 
if  Canada  was  to  be  an  effective  alliance  or  coalition  partner. 

Conceptual  Foundations.  During  the  workshop  a  number  of  concepts  were  put  forward 
as  being  fundamental  to  the  practice  of  EBO.  Despite  the  immaturity  of  EBO  as  a  concept 
and  the  differing  views  on  exactly  what  constituted  EBO,  there  was  some  consensus 
among  workshop  participants  that  EBO  should  be  a  top  down,  integrated  approach  that 
could  be  employed  to  make  changes  in  the  security  environment  to  achieve  one  or  more 
desired  end  states  aimed  at  attaining  strategic  objectives.  It  was  suggested  that  if  EBO 
sought  to  produce  change,  whether  physical,  moral  or  cognitive,  then  changes  should  be 
observable  and  measurable,  either  by  objective  or  subjective  measures.  To  be  meaningful 
in  an  EBO  context,  the  change  being  measured  should  also  be  considered  in  terms  of 
outcomes  as  opposed  to  inputs  or  outputs.  In  this  regard,  an  effects-based  approach 


151 


encourages  the  consideration  of  the  use  of  non-kinetic  means  to  produce  change,  but  it 
does  not  exclude  kinetic  means. 

Another  important  concept  that  emerged  during  the  workshop  discussions  was  the 
importance,  when  using  EBO  processes  in  a  Canadian  context,  of  adopting  a  “whole  of 
government”  approach,  in  which  there  is  greater  interaction  between  the  CF  and  other 
government  agencies  (e.g.,  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  International  Trade). 
All  present  acknowledged  that  EBO  could  be  used  to  situate  the  use  of  the  military 
instrument  of  power  in  a  broader  “whole  of  government,”  sometimes  referred  to  as  3D 
(Defence,  Diplomacy,  Development  or  DIME  (Diplomatic,  Informational,  Military  and 
Economic),  context.  In  this  “whole  of  government”  approach,  appropriate  responsibility 
and  authority  would  be  delegated  to  the  agency  or  government  department,  or  perhaps 
even  a  non-governmental  organization  (NGO),  with  the  right  competencies  and 
capabilities  to  ensure  that  the  right  actor  was  employed  to  deliver  the  desired  effect. 
However,  for  a  “whole  of  government”  EBO  approach  to  be  feasible,  clear  definitions 
and  terminology  would  be  required.  This  could  be  problematic  at  the  moment  given  the 
diversity  of  ways  of  describing  EBO. 

Implementing  an  EBO  “whole  of  government”  approach  could  also  be  problematic  if 
EBO  is  perceived  to  be  a  military  concept  rooted  in  military  terminology.  Some 
suggested  that  for  a  “whole  of  government”  approach  to  be  successful,  an  innovative, 
multi-disciplinary  process  is  needed  to  bridge  the  gap  between  various  government 
organizations.  This  new  approach  would  require  a  new  vocabulary,  based  on  language 
that  could  be  understood  by  all  involved,  as  opposed  to  the  highly  technical  and 
culturally-specific  military  lexicon  that,  when  used,  often  inhibits  cooperation  across 
government  departments. 

Furthermore,  if  EBO  is  to  be  successfully  applied  as  “whole  of  government”  approach  in 
Canada,  it  was  suggested  that  this  country  needs  a  mechanism  for  determining  how 
strategic  objectives  could  be  attained,  then  determining  which  processes  could  be  used  to 
achieve  these  objectives,  and  finally  determining  how  to  co-ordinate  the  application  of 
the  selected  processes  among  various  actors. 

The  effects-based  approach  could  have  a  significant  positive  impact  on  force 
development,  force  generation  and  force  employment  in  the  CF,  workshop  participants 
believed.  If  an  effects-based  approach  used  in  a  “whole  of  government”  approach, 
however,  other  government  departments  might  need  to  be  brought  into  the  CF  force 
development  process  in  order  to  incorporate  their  expertise  at  an  early  stage  in  the  CF 
change  process.  In  an  EBO  environment,  force  development  plans  would  need  to  address 
how  to  maintain  the  CF’s  kinetic  capability  while  improving  its  non-kinetic  capability.  In 
terms  of  force  generation,  critical  thinking  skills,  an  appreciation  of  intelligence  products 
and  the  importance  of  cultural  factors  would  need  to  be  important  parts  of  CF  training 
and  education  if  the  effects-based  approach  is  to  be  used  by  it.  Using  an  effects-based 
approach,  CF  force  employment  could  have  significant  advantages  if  it  were  part  of  a 
“whole  of  government”  approach  linking  the  actions  of  various  agencies  to  Canadian 
strategic  objectives. 


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At  the  moment,  the  effects-based  approach  to  operations  has  a  great  deal  of  potential  to 
make  a  useful  contribution  as  a  guiding  philosophy  for  the  achievement  of  Canadian 
strategic  objectives,  many  workshop  participants  concluded.  However,  to  be  a  useful  tool 
in  this  process,  much  more  refinement  of  the  theory  underlying  EBO  and  related  concepts 
is  required.  The  utility  of  the  effects-based  approach  to  the  operational  and  tactical  realms 
of  operations  will  also  be  problematic  until  the  theory  of  the  effects-based  approach  is 
developed  enough  so  that  its  practical  applications  can  be  derived. 

Assessing  Effects-Based  Approaches 

In  his  assessment  of  EBO  from  a  naval  perspective,  Commander  Ken  Hansen,  the 
Defence  Fellow  at  the  Centre  for  Foreign  Policy  Studies,  Dalhousie  University,  tells  us 
that  there  is  a  long  history  of  deriving  strategic  effects  from  naval  operations,  but  that  the 
purely  attritional  nature  of  tactical  naval  warfare  and  the  naval  requirement  for  swift  and 
decisive  tactical  engagement  serve  as  a  warning  against  replacing  existing  theory  and 
methods  with  an  effects-oriented  approach  to  planning  and  conducting  naval  operations. 
He  notes  that  despite  the  fundamental  differences  between  sea  power  and  other  types  of 
military  power,  advocates  of  EBO  are  advancing  the  notion  of  its  applicability  to  all 
forces  without  any  reference  to  naval  historical  context  and  without  an  appreciation  of  the 
underlying  theories  of  naval  warfare. 

Hansen  warns  that  placing  effects  ahead  of  objectives  in  the  planning  process,  or  worse, 
replacing  completely  the  achievement  of  objectives  with  effects,  is  foreign  to  the  way  that 
sea  power  has  been,  and  continues  to  be,  applied  across  the  spectrum  of  conflict.  He 
concludes  that,  while  it  is  perfectly  acceptable  and  usual  to  discuss  the  effects  of  naval 
operations  at  all  levels  of  planning,  success  in  joint  and  integrated  operations  cannot  be 
achieved  by  compelling  naval  experts  to  depart  from  a  style  of  warfare  that  is  both 
centuries  old  in  its  formulation  and  is  in  the  midst  of  the  single  greatest  transformation  in 
its  long  history. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Colin  Magee,  an  Army  officer  and  head  of  the  military  plans  and 
operations  department  at  the  Canadian  Forces  College,  takes  a  different  view  from 
Hansen.  Magee  argues  that  current  doctrine  and  the  contemporary  operational  design 
process,  including  the  Canadian  Forces  Operational  Planning  Process  (CFOPP), 
explicitly  and  implicitly  oblige  commanders  and  planners  to  think  in  terms  of  effects.  He 
concedes  that  current  doctrine  and  planning  processes  can  be  improved,  but  that  these 
improvements  should  be  accomplished  by  a  better  integration  into  the  planning  process  of 
other  instruments  of  national  power;  a  better,  more  systemic  understanding  of  the 
operational  environment;  and,  a  better  assessment  of  the  effects  of  actions  on  the 
achievement  of  objectives  and  the  desired  end  state. 

The  main  weakness  of  EBO  in  its  current  form,  according  to  Magee,  is  that  it  is  largely 
based  on  a  reductionist  approach  to  understanding  enemy  systems,  which  works 
reasonably  well  with  systems  that  have  low  interactive  complexity,  but  will  not  work  well 
with  systems  with  high  interactive  complexity,  such  as  social,  military,  governmental, 


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political,  and  economic  systems.  Magee  claims  that  many  proponents  of  EBO  lack  a  firm 
understanding  of  current  doctrinal  concepts  and  that  their  speech  and  writing  are  filled 
with  an  unintelligible  “effects-speak”  which  adds  to  the  confusion  and  misunderstanding 
of  both  contemporary  elements  of  operational  design  as  well  as  EBO.  He  contends  that 
we  do  not  need  another  label,  which  on  the  surface  suggests  a  newer,  better  method  of 
planning  complex  operations,  but  in  reality  only  serves  to  confuse  an  already  complicated 
environment.  In  the  end,  Magee  concludes  that  EBO  has  little  to  add  but  confusion  to  an 
already  proven  operational  design  and  planning  process. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Craig  Dalton,  an  Army  officer  and  a  member  of  the  CF’s  Strategic 
Joint  Staff,  considers  whether  the  effects-based  approach  could  enhance  the  practice  of 
strategic  art.  Like  Magee,  he  notes  that  some  critics  of  EBAO  believe  that  it  is 
fundamentally  flawed  as  a  methodology  in  this  regard  because  it  attempts  to  make  simple 
cause  and  effect  links  in  an  environment  that  is  too  complex  for  these  simple  links  to 
have  much  explanatory  value.  Nevertheless,  Dalton  observes  that  many  varied  versions 
of  the  effects-based  approach  exist.  He  selects  the  UK  Effects  Based  Approach  for 
evaluation  because  of  its  potential  to  be  of  great  benefit  to  practitioners  of  strategic  art. 
According  to  Dalton,  the  UK  Effects  Based  Approach  actually  comprises  three 
interrelated  concepts:  the  comprehensive  approach,  the  effects-based  approach,  and  the 
effects-based  philosophy.  Taken  together,  he  tells  us  that  they  form  a  UK  effects-based 
framework  whose  underlying  intent  is  to  infuse  a  “whole-of-governmenf  ’  approach  into 
British  security  and  defence  efforts.  This  framework  is  also  designed  to  get  decision 
makers  and  their  advisors  to  think  more  broadly  about  contemporary  security  challenges, 
both  in  tenns  of  framing  and  understanding  problems  and  in  formulating  strategy. 

Despite  its  merits,  especially  in  institutionalizing  the  “comprehensive  approach”  to  deal 
with  problems  in  the  contemporary  operating  environment,  Dalton  concludes  that  the  UK 
Effects  Based  Approach  falls  short  in  addressing  the  challenges  posed  by  the  complex 
adaptive  systems  in  the  contemporary  operating  environment  that  confront  modern-day 
practitioners  of  strategic  art.  Therefore,  because  it  is  no  better  or  worse  than  existing 
approaches,  he  suggests  that  the  effects-based  approach  currently  has  limited  utility  for 
the  practice  of  strategic  art. 

Applying  Effects-Based  Approaches 

Few  observers  have  described,  in  written  form,  how  the  Canadian  Army  has  been 
applying  the  EBAO  concept.  Therefore,  despite  their  limitations,  these  comments  by  Bob 
Vokac,  a  retired  US  Army  Lieutenant-Colonel  who  has  observed  battle  staff  training 
throughout  the  Canadian  Land  Forces  during  2005  and  2006,  provide  us  with  valuable 
insights  into  how  Canada’s  Army  uses  EBAO  while  preparing  for  operations. 

Vokac  notes  that  the  Anny’s  force  employment  concept,  published  in  2004,  embraces  the 
effects-based  approach: 

EBO  is  the  natural  extension  of  our  departure  from  the  attritional  approach  of 
attacking  physical  targets.  It  is  a  strategy  that  does  not  necessarily  depend  upon 
physical  force  for  attaining  a  desired  outcome  or  effect  on  an  enemy.  .  .This  will 


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be  accomplished  by  achieving  a  full  range  of  effects,  both  non-lethal  and  lethal.  .  . 
In  sum,  the  focused  use  of  national  assets,  independently  or  as  part  of  a  coalition, 
will  produce  cascading,  systemic  effects  as  the  tactical,  operational  and  strategic 
levels.3 

He  also  notes  that  parts  of  British  and  Australian  EBO  doctrine  have  been  incorporated 
into  the  Canadian  Army  approach  to  EBAO.  This  new  hybrid  Canadian  Army  EBAO 
philosophy  represents  an  evolution  from  the  original  military-centric  EBO  philosophy 
and  implicitly  recognizes  that  effects  are  best  achieved  using  all  the  resources  available  to 
a  commander  and  to  a  government,  because  the  military  instrument  of  power  alone  is 
insufficient  to  achieve  the  effects  necessary  to  reach  the  desired  end-state,  according  to 
Vokac. 

He  observed  that,  based  on  the  Canadian  Army  EBAO  philosophy,  senior  commanders 
often  chose  to  emphasize  an  effects-based  approach  during  training  exercises.  This 
approach  had  its  drawbacks,  however,  as  the  infusion  of  the  operational-level  terms  (like 
end-state)  into  tactical-level  exercises,  if  not  properly  tempered  by  experienced 
subordinate  commanders  and  staffs,  has,  at  times,  led  to  confusion  and  planning 
inefficiencies.  Vokac  observed  that  in  these  situations  ah  command  levels  struggled  to 
attempt  to  define  their  own  effects,  but  often  lost  the  important  linkage  that  should  have 
connected  subordinate  activities  (or  tasks)  to  the  achievement  of  higher  level  effects. 
Furthermore,  he  noted  that  while  almost  ah  exercises  do  an  excellent  job  of  replicating 
the  physical  domain,  they  are  much  less  successful  at  replicating  the  moral  or  cognitive 
domain.  Therefore,  while  an  effects-based  approach  is  often  planned,  its  execution  is 
virtually  impossible  to  simulate. 

In  fact,  Vokac  reported,  even  effects-based  planning  is  hard  to  replicate  given  the 
inherent  difficulties  in  developing  relevant  measures  of  effectiveness.  In  addition, 
because  commanders  and  their  staffs,  as  well  as  those  who  design  and  assess  exercises, 
are  more  comfortable  visualizing  the  effects  produced  by  physical  activities,  they  tend  to 
focus  on  force-on-force  engagements  rather  than  on  psychological  operations  directed 
against  an  enemy  commander. 

Vokac  concludes  that  an  effects-based  approach  to  operations  is  consistent  with  existing 
doctrine  and  does  not  appear,  at  this  point,  to  be  a  revolutionary  approach  to  the  way  the 
Canadian  Army  plans  and  conducts  its  operations.  However,  to  use  EBAO  successfully, 
commanders  and  their  staffs  must  have  a  sound  understanding  of  the  battlespace, 
including  the  linkages  and  relationships  among  ah  the  actors  in  their  area  of 
responsibility.  It  is  only  with  this  knowledge  that  commanders  and  their  staffs,  knowing 
the  desired  end  state  promulgated  by  higher  headquarters,  can  properly  identify 
objectives,  then  identify  the  effects  required  to  achieve  the  objectives,  and  finally  select 
those  activities  required  to  create  the  effects.  Vokac  believes  that  the  necessary 
knowledge  and  skills  to  use  EBAO  well  can  be  imparted  within  the  training  environment, 
through  the  design  of  demanding  and  complex  scenarios. 


155 


Another  way  to  ensure  that  CF  personnel  understand  effects-based  approaches  would  be 
by  studying  them  within  the  continuum  of  Professional  Military  Education  (PME), 
according  to  Colonel  Randall  Wakelam,  the  Director  of  Curriculum  at  the  Canadian 
Forces  College.  He  argues  that,  given  the  relative  immaturity  of  the  EBAO  concept  and 
the  lack  of  precision  in  descriptions  of  it,  EBAO  is  more  a  philosophy  of  war  than  a 
technique  to  be  learned,  mastered  and  employed.  If  one  accepts  this  argument,  then 
students  can  best  be  prepared  to  use  EBAO  by  developing  their  intellectual  skills,  critical 
thinking  abilities,  creativity,  and  the  like,  through  education,  not  training. 

In  Canada,  Wakelam  argues,  the  best  time  to  introduce  the  study  of  EBAO  as  a 
philosophy  of  war  is  in  Development  Period  (DP)  3  which  encompasses  professional 
education  for  Majors/Lieutenant-Commanders  and  Lieutenant-Colonels/Commanders 
and  which  focuses  on  the  use  of  military  forces  at  the  operational  level  of  war.  More 
advanced  study  of  EBAO  should  then  occur  at  the  DP  4  (Colonels/Captains  (Navy)  or 
officers  destined  for  those  ranks)  level.  Wakelam  notes  that,  in  the  past,  both  Britain’s 
Imperial  Defence  College  (now  called  the  Royal  College  of  Defence  Studies)  and 
Canada’s  National  Defence  College  at  Kingston  (which  operated  from  1949  to  1995) 
examined  national  security  issues  from  a  broader  perspective  than  just  the  use  of  military 
courses  of  action.  Their  curricula  included  a  “whole  of  government”  approach  to  defence 
and  security  issues  in  a  global  context.  Wakelam  concludes  that,  based  on  the  historical 
record,  there  is  nothing  fundamentally  new  about  effects-based  approaches  to  operations; 
however,  in  order  to  use  EBAO  effectively  military  professionals  need  relevant  advanced 
PME  to  develop  their  intellectual  capabilities  to  the  level  required.  The  types  of 
capabilities  necessary  for  the  successful  application  of  EBAO  are  evident  from  ongoing 
operations  that  use  an  effects-based  approach. 

In  his  second  essay  in  this  volume,  Robert  Grossman-Vermaas  argues  that,  to  be 
successful,  multinational  effects-based  operations  must  be  based  on  desired  and 
achievable  strategic  end-states  that  should  then  guide  campaign  planning.  Once  the  plans 
are  made,  the  optimum  mix  of  civilian  and  military  capabilities  must  be  deployed  to 
achieve  a  range  of  long  and  short-term  effects  aimed  at  achieving  the  strategic  end-states. 
The  challenge  in  this  process,  according  to  Grossman-Vermaas,  lies  with  the  integration, 
or  bridging,  of  such  planning  efforts  externally  among  coalition  partners  and  internally 
among  large,  institutionally  independent,  military  and  civilian  levels  of  government. 

Like  most  other  commentators,  Grossman-Vermaas  acknowledges  that  the  effects-based 
concept  is  still  immature;  therefore,  while  effect-based  planning  has  demonstrated  some 
potential,  it  has  not  yet  progressed  to  a  mature  experimentation  or  prototype  phase. 
Nevertheless,  Grossman-Vermaas  contends  that  future  operations  that  employ  the 
principles  of  the  effects-based  approach  will,  by  their  very  nature,  require  political  and 
military  leadership  to  both  anticipate  and  understand  the  consequences  of  actions.  He  also 
emphasizes  the  fact  that  effects-based  approaches  are  outcome-focused  and  involve  a 
broad  range  of  activities,  of  which  military  action  is  only  a  subset. 

Consequently,  Grossman-Vermaas  believes  that  to  be  successful  in  employing  the 
effects-based  approach,  planners  must  develop  a  better  appreciation  of  increasingly 


156 


complex  human  networks  and  the  dependency  linkages  that  connect  communities  of 
interest.  He  goes  on  to  say  that,  to  achieve  their  desired  results,  planners  must  have  a 
sophisticated  understanding  of  culture  and  human  values,  the  relationship  between  time 
and  space,  and  the  ability  to  conduct  a  multidimensional  analysis  of  primary,  secondary 
and  follow-on  actionable  “nodes,”  “targets,”  networks,  or  dependency  relationships 
between  nodes,  that  are  to  be  influenced  during  the  course  of  operations. 


The  end-state  of  an  effects-based  plan,  Grossman- Vermaas  argues,  should  be  holistic  in 
all  respects  and  one  that  promotes  the  integration  and  realization  of  the  3D  principle. 
Based  on  results  from  recent  multinational  and  inter-agency  exercises  and  consideration 
of  the  past,  present  and  future  security  environments,  Grossman- Vermaas  maintains  that 
national  and  international  non-military  organizations  and  inter-agency  partners  should  be 
directly  involved  in  the  operational  planning  and  execution  stages  of  coalition  effects- 
based  efforts.  He  concludes  that  to  make  this  involvement  viable,  a  “bridging”  between 
civilian  and  military  values  and  perspectives  must  occur.  This  “bridging”  is  not  simply  a 
case  of  generic  civil-military  training,  however,  and  can  only  be  accomplished  by 
activities  that  achieve  a  deep  understanding  of  the  cultural,  social,  and  other  differences 
among  the  various  groups  involved. 


Conclusion.  At  the  moment  there  is  no  comprehensive  and  widely  accepted  approach  to 
effects-based  operations  in  the  CF.  However,  there  are  some  common  points  of 
agreement  among  various  Canadian  commentators.  Most  of  those  consulted  in  the  EBO 
workshop  process  agree  that,  given  the  state  of  theory  and  practice  related  to  EBO,  it 
should  be  seen  as  a  philosophy  rather  than  a  process.  This  philosophy,  as  it  evolves, 
should,  they  believe,  involve  a  top  down,  integrated  (or  whole  of  government)  approach 
that  could  be  used  by  a  government  to  achieve  a  nation’s  strategic  objectives.  They  also 
felt  that  the  term  “Effects  Based  Approach  to  Operations”  (EBAO)  was  preferable  to 
EBO,  as  EBO  has  become  associated  with  a  technologically-based,  largely  air  force  way 
of  conducting  operations.  A  tentative  definition,  that  effects-based  operations  are  “co¬ 
ordinated  sets  of  actions  directed  at  shaping  the  behaviour  of  friends,  neutrals,  and  foes  in 
peace,  crisis,  and  war,”  found  widespread  acceptance  among  those  consulted.  However, 
there  was  little  consensus  among  them  whether  EBO,  or  even  EBAO,  had  much  utility  in 
practice  today,  based  on  its  current  immature  state  of  conceptual  development. 

1  J.F.  Cottingham,  “Effects-Based  Operations:  An  Evolving  Revolution,”  unpublished  paper  written  as  part 
of  the  MA  in  War  Studies  program.  Royal  Military  College  of  Canada,  July  2004. 

2  Robert  Vermaas,  “Future  Perfect:  Effects  Based  Operations,  Complexity  and  the  Human  Environment,” 
DOR(Joint)  Research  Note  RN  2004/01,  Operational  Research  Division,  Department  of  National  Defence, 
January  2004. 

3  Canada,  Department  of  National  Defence,  Purpose  Defined:  The  Force  Employment  Concept  for  the 
Army  -  One  Army  One  Team  One  Vision,  (np,  31  March  2004),  38-9. 


157 


Part  VII  -  Annexes 


158 


Annex  A  -  Annotated  Bibliography 


Effects-Based  Operations:  An  Annotated  Bibliography 

J.R.  McKay 

Introduction 

The  origins  of  this  annotated  bibliography  came  from  my  preparations  for  the 
workshop  in  which  I  examined  the  available  literature.  It  is  far  from  exhaustive  in  that 
the  volume  of  books,  monographs,  and  articles  on  the  topic  of  Effects-Based  Operations 
(EBO)  increases  with  every  month.  As  a  concept,  EBO  represents  a  synthesis  of  a 
number  of  different  ideas  and  is  continually  evolving.  This  presents  a  challenge  for  the 
authors  of  annotated  bibliographies  in  that  it  can  be  difficult  to  find  a  satisfactory  point  of 
departure  for  the  examination  of  the  literature. 

The  sources  used  in  this  bibliography  are  exclusively  from  the  English-speaking 
world.  In  the  main,  they  come  from  American  military  journals,  staff  college  papers, 
contracted  works,  and  US  Department  of  Defense  publications.  However,  there  are  also 
contributions  from  the  Canadian  Forces  and  Canadian  Department  of  National  Defence, 
Great  Britain,  Australia,  the  Netherlands  and  Singapore. 

There  are  a  number  of  themes  within  the  literature  associated  with  EBO.  These 
include  its  lineage,  explanations  of  the  concept,  “Strategy-to-Task,”  Complex  Adaptive 
Systems,  “Control”  Warfare,  the  Instruments  of  National  Power,1  Intelligence,  Criticism 
plus  a  series  of  miscellaneous  topics.  This  bibliography  has  been  organized  along 
thematic  lines;  within  each  theme,  the  works  are  presented  chronologically.  Some 
licence  has  been  taken  with  the  classification  of  the  works  as  many  overlap  or  bridge 
more  than  one  theme. 

Lineage 

T.W.  Beagle,  Effects-Based  Targeting:  Another  Empty  Promise?  (Maxwell  AFB:  Air  University,  2000). 

This  paper  was  a  School  of  Advanced  Airpower  Studies  thesis  by  a  serving  US 
Air  Force  officer,  produced  in  2000,  that  sought  to  examine  targeting  processes  in  light  of 
an  effects-based  methodology.  It  is  intended  to  act  as  an  academic  submission.  The 
author  compared  Operations  POINT  BLANK  (strategic  bombing  of  Germany), 
LINEBACKER  II  (1972  bombing  campaign  against  North  Vietnam),  DESERT  STORM 
(the  1991  restoration  of  Kuwait)  and  ALLIED  FORCE  (the  1999  campaign  against 
Serbia)  and  drew  some  interesting  conclusions.  First,  the  author  noted  that  the  air 
campaigns  were  far  more  successful  at  the  tactical  level  than  the  strategic  or  operational 
levels.  Second,  the  author  noted  that  the  successful  application  of  EBO  was  limited  by 
planning  and  bomb  damage  assessment  (BDA).  Finally,  the  author  noted  that 
psychological  effects  were  the  key  to  EBO,  but  the  least  understood.  This  early 


159 


contribution  is  interesting  in  that  it  represents  a  sceptical  point  of  view  from  within  the 
ranks  of  the  US  Air  Force. 

Major  K.  Noedskov,  “Systematizing  Effect  Based  Air  Operations,”  Air  &  Space  Power  Journal  - 
Chronicles  Online  Journal  (24  May  200),  pp.  1-11.  Available  at 

http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/noedskov.html.  Accessed  19  December  2006, 

This  article,  originally  written  in  2000  by  a  Royal  Danish  Air  Force  student  at  the 
US  Air  Force  Air  War  College,  focuses  on  air  operations  and  attempts  to  reconcile  EBO 
applications  in  air  warfare  with  the  levels  of  war  and  associated  missions  and  tasks.  The 
author  was  careful  to  associate  EBO  with  the  strategic  and  operational  levels.  The  article 
summarizes  both  NATO  and  US  Air  Force  doctrine  with  regard  to  targeting  and 
campaign  design  before  addressing  some  of  the  literature  related  to  systems  analysis  of 
the  enemy.  It  is  worth  reading  if  one  is  unfamiliar  with  air  warfare. 

Phillip  S.  Meilinger,  “The  Origins  of  Effects  Based-Operations,”  JFQ:  Joint  Forces  Quarterly,  35  (Autumn 
2004),  116-112. 

The  author,  a  renowned  scholar  of  airpower,  has  produced  a  short  yet  informative 
article  that  reminds  the  reader,  through  a  discussion  of  the  theories  of  strategic  bombing 
in  vogue  during  the  Second  World  War  and  the  application  thereof,  that  Effects-Based 
Operations  are  not  necessarily  new.  On  the  one  hand,  the  US  Army  Air  Corps’  Air  Corps 
Tactical  School  (ACTS)  had  trained  a  generation  of  American  airmen  to  conceive  of  the 
enemy’s  economy  as  a  vast  system  with  a  series  of  nodes  that  could  be  struck.  On  the 
other  hand,  critics  of  such  approaches  to  strategic  bombing  referred  to  such  nodes  as 
“panacea  targets.”  This  article  showed  that  John  Warden’s  conception  of  the  “enemy  as 
a  system”  was  a  renaissance  of  earlier  thinking  than  a  new  idea.  It  provides  a  succinct  yet 
informative  summary  of  the  origins  of  EBO  that  reminds  the  readers  that  the  concept  is 
evolutionary  as  opposed  to  revolutionary. 

Charles  Tustin  Kamps,  “Effects  Based  Operations,”  Doctrine  NOTAM,  Air  &  Space 
Power  Journal,  18,  no.  2  (Summer  2004),  18. 

Charles  Tustin  Kamps  is  a  professor  at  the  US  Air  Force’s  Air  War  College  and  a  fonner 
officer  in  the  US  Army  and  US  Navy.  This  article  provides  a  brief  summary  of  the 
evolution  of  Effects-Based  Operations  and  its  long  heritage  in  air  power  theory  from 
Giulio  Douhet  to  ACTS  to  Warden  to  Deptula.  He  notes  that  the  major  enabler  of  the 
Effects-Based  Operations  concept  has  always  been  intelligence,  but  that  its  imperfect 
nature  limited  the  effectiveness  of  the  concept.  This  appears  to  be  an  implicit  call  for  the 
US  Air  Force  to  increase  the  emphasis  on  intelligence  issues  and  provides  evidence  of  the 
existence  of  a  debate  internal  to  that  service. 

Major  Z.  Jobbagy,  Literature  Survey  on  Effects-Based  Operations,  (The  Etague:  TNO  Physics  and 
Electronics  Laboratory,  2003). 

As  the  title  suggests,  this  is  a  literature  survey  on  EBO.  The  author,  a  serving 
Dutch  officer,  has  created  a  lengthy  summary  of  EBO-related  material,  including 
European  and  some  obscure  American  sources,  to  fill  the  first  of  a  number  of 


160 


requirements  for  a  PhD  on  the  topic.  It  is,  however,  not  an  annotated  bibliography,  as  the 
author  does  not  attempt  to  make  any  judgments  on  the  quality  of,  or  bias  inherent  in,  the 
sources.  It  is  worth  reading  as  a  primer,  but  it  is  three  years  old  and  the  EBO  concept 
continues  to  evolve.  The  author’s  conclusions  still  have  some  merit  in  that  more  research 
into  the  cognitive  and  psychological  domains  and  a  common  lexicon  are  required  for 
progress  to  be  made  in  understanding  EBO  better. 

EBO  Explained 

Major  Thomas  Tighe,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Raymond  Hill  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Greg  McIntyre,  “A 
Decision  for  Strategic  Effects:  A  Conceptual  Approach  to  Effects-Based  Targeting,”  Air  &  Space  Power 
Journal  -  Chronicles  Online  Journal  (11  Oct  2000),  1-21.  Available  at 
http://www. airpower.au. af.miEairchronicles/cc/hill.html.  Accessed  19  December  2006. 

This  paper,  written  by  three  US  Air  Force  officers  in  2000,  applied  John  Boyd’s  Orient-Observe-Decide 
Act  (OODA)  Loop  model  to  the  analysis  of  an  enemy  with  a  view  to  identifying  opportunities  for  strategic 
attack.  The  paper  goes  into  vivid  detail  of  the  various  conceptions  of  the  OODA  loop  but  concludes  the  best 
form  of  strategic  attack  is  to  defeat  the  enemy’s  decision  process.  The  paper  appears  to  be  an  academic 
submission  of  an  Air  War  College  paper  as  opposed  to  a  conscious  advocacy  on  the  part  of  the  authors.  It 
shows  the  influence  of  Boyd’s  theories  on  EBO. 

Maris  “Buster”  McCrabb,  “Explaining  ‘Effects’:  A  Theory  for  an  Effects-based 
Approach  to  Planning,  Executing  and  Assessing  Operations,”  Version  2.0,  dated  7 
August  2001,  3.  Available  at  http://www.dtic.mil/iointvision/ideas  concepts/ebo.doc. 
Accessed  24  Jul  2007. 

This  paper,  written  by  a  former  US  Air  Force  officer  turned  academic,  represents 
an  attempt  to  address  the  issue  of  the  EBO  lexicon  combined  with  an  analysis  of  US  Air 
Force  and  joint  doctrine  on  EBO  extant  in  2001.  The  paper  is  intended  to  work  towards 
the  development  of  a  more  coherent  theory  of  EBO  to  inform  doctrinal  work  and  research 
and  development.  The  discussion  of  the  lexicon  is  very  useful  as  the  author  also  takes  the 
time  to  explain  the  weaknesses  within  the  body  of  doctrine  and  alternatives  to  EBO.  It 
must  be  read  by  anyone  interested  in  the  topic. 

Colonel  Edward  Mann,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Gary  Endersby  and  Tob  Searle,  “Dominant 
Effects:  Effects-Based  Joint  Operations,”  Aerospace  Power  Journal  15,  no.  3  (Fall  2001), 
92-100  (online  version).  Available: 

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/api/apiO  1/falO  1/vorfalO  1  .html. 

Accessed  24  Jul  2007. 

This  article,  written  by  a  pair  of  former  US  Air  Force  officers  and  a  research 
fellow  at  the  Airpower  Research  Institute,  provides  an  excellent  lexicon  of  effects  and 
their  classification.  The  article  is  an  excerpt  of  the  results  of  a  1999  Title  X  Global 
Engagement  War  game  run  by  Air  University’s  College  of  Airpower  Doctrine,  Research 
and  Education  (CADRE).  The  authors  describe  the  nature  and  type  of  effects,  such  as 
direct  (first  order  physical,  collateral,  psychological  and  functional),  and  indirect  (second 
or  third  order  collateral,  psychological,  functional,  cascading,  cumulative  and  systemic) 
effects  (the  physical,  functional,  systemic,  and/or  psychological  outcomes  or 


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consequences  that  result  from  specific  action).  Their  work  sets  the  standard  for 
identifying  and  dealing  with  effects-related  language.  It  should  serve  as  the  basis  for  any 
doctrine  work. 

Major  Reginald  J.  Williams  and  Rocky  Kendall,  Operationalizing  Effects-Based  Operations:  An  EBO 
Methodology ;  Based  on  Joint  Doctrine  (Langley  AFB:  Air  Combat  Command,  2004). 

This  paper’s  origins  are  unknown,  but  it  contains  a  short,  yet  good,  summary  of 
the  lineage,  nature  and  existing  lexicon  of  EBO  written  by  a  US  Air  Force  officer  and  a 
civilian  employee  at  Air  Combat  Command  Headquarters.  It  is  intended  to  offer  a 
methodology  for  EBO  planning;  however,  this  methodology  is  based  on  the  contents  of 
JP  3-30  Joint  Air  Estimate  Process.  The  source  makes  the  paper  a  rather  US  Air  Force- 
oriented  publication,  and  it  should  not  come  as  a  surprise  that  Deptula  and  other  US  Air 
Force  sources  have  influenced  it  heavily. 

Colonel  J.F.  Cottingham,  “Effects-Based  Operations:  An  Evolving  Revolution,”  unpublished  paper  written 
as  part  of  the  MA  in  War  Studies  program.  Royal  Military  College  of  Canada,  July  2004,  which  is  also  a 
chapter  in  this  volume. 

Colonel  Cottingham  is  the  Commandant  of  the  Canadian  Forces  Aerospace 
Warfare  Centre  and  his  paper  provides  an  excellent  summary  of  the  literature  and  lineage 
of  the  ideas  surrounding  EBO.  The  paper,  like  Meilinger’s  work,  summarizes  the  US  Air 
Force’s  development  of  a  number  of  ideas  that  converged  in  the  early  1990s  to  generate 
the  concept  of  EBO.  In  addition,  Cottingham’s  paper  sought  to  explain  the  causes  and 
nature  of  subsequent  evolution,  which  the  author  explains  with  the  concept  of  “spiral” 
development  or  the  evolution  of  different  versions  of  EBO.  argues  that  there  have  been 
two  “spirals”  or  versions  of  EBO  to  date:  the  first  was  the  development  of  the  strategic 
military  concepts  that  led  to  John  Warden’s  and  David  Deptula’s  concepts  and  the 
second,  dealing  primarily  with  the  national  instruments  of  power,  was  borne  of  coercion 
theories,  the  rise  of  complex  adaptive  systems,  and  the  1990s  experience  of  dealing  with 
complex  emergencies  through  an  inter-agency  process.  This  paper,  which  appears  in  this 
volume,  ought  to  be  read  by  all  military  professionals  and  academics  of  military  affairs. 

J.P.  Hunerwadel,  “The  Effects-Based  Approach  to  Operations:  Questions  and  Answers,” 
Air  &  Space  Power  Journal  20,  no.  1  (Spring  2006),  53-62. 

The  author,  a  former  US  Air  Force  officer  who  drafted  the  early  US  Air  Force 
doctrine  that  introduced  EBO,  is  recognized  as  an  expert  in  the  field.  In  this  work, 
Hunerwadel  appears  to  be  writing  to  those  unfamiliar  with  or  hostile  to  the  concept  of 
EBO.  He  makes  an  effort  to  demonstrate  that  EBO  is  a  synthesis  of  earlier  concepts  and 
that  it  seeks  to  bring  the  military  instrument  of  power  into  the  broader  context  of  the 
American  government’s  National  Security  Strategy.  He  argues  that  EBO  ought  to  focus 
on  the  desired  end-state  and  objectives,  which  he  described  as  “Clausewitz  101.” 
Hunerwadel’s  article  represents  an  attempt  to  debate  with  the  critics  of  EBO  as  opposed 
to  merely  replying  to  their  criticisms. 

Douglas  E.  Lee  and  Major  Timothy  Albrecht,  “Transforming  Battle  Damage  Assessment  into  Effects- 
Based  Assessment,”  Air  &  Space  Power  Journal  2,  no.  1  (Spring  2006),  51-2. 


162 


No  information  on  the  authors  could  be  found  other  than  they  are  US  Air  Force 
officers,  but  it  is  likely  that  they  work  in  the  realm  of  US  Air  Force  doctrine.  Their  short 
article  recommends  a  methodological  change  to  the  assessment  phase  of  the  targeting 
process  to  bring  into  compliance  with  the  tenets  and  requirements  of  EBO.  It  is  of 
greater  interest  to  those  who  wish  to  examine  how  EBO  ought  to  occur  as  opposed  to 
those  that  wish  to  debate  whether  or  not  EBO  ought  to  be  adopted  as  a  doctrinal 
principle. 

Douglas  E.  Lee  and  Major  Timothy  Albrecht,  “Strategy  for  Effects-Based  Doctrine,”  Air  &  Space  Power 
Journal  2,  no.  2  (Summer  2006),  118-19. 

This  is  another  short  article  from  Lee  and  Albrecht  that  offers  a  “way  ahead”  for 
dealing  with  the  confusion  generated  by  the  lack  of  common  joint  lexicon  for  dealing 
with  EBO.  Its  simplicity  and  argument  make  it  a  useful  piece  to  read,  even  if  it  is  very 
brief. 

Strategy  to  Task 

Dennis  J.  Gleeson,  Colonel  Gwen  Linde,  US  Air  Force,  Commander  Kathleen  McGrath,  US  Navy, 

Adrienne  J.  Murphy,  Williamson  Murray,  Tom  O’Leary  and  Joel  Resnick,  New  Perspectives  on  Effects- 
Based  Operations:  Annotated  Briefing,  (Alexandria,  VA:  Institute  for  Defense  Analyses,  2001). 

Staff  at  the  Institute  for  Defense  Analyses  prepared  this  paper  on  behalf  of  US 
Joint  Forces  Command  (JFCOM).  It  is  the  summary  of  a  briefing  and  informs 
subsequent  JFCOM  work  on  the  topic.  Their  intent  was  to  brand  EBO  as  a  joint,  as 
opposed  to  US  Air  Force,  concept.  The  authors  provide  a  summary  of  EBO,  offering  that 
the  key  to  EBO  was  the  adoption  of  “Effects  Based  Thinking,”  which  combined  the  use 
of  the  military  instrument  of  power  in  a  larger  context  to  serve  strategic  ends  and  the 
consideration  of  effects.2  It  is  worth  reading  to  look  at  the  origins  of  the  JFCOM  EBO 
efforts. 

Major  William  E.  Young,  Discovering  the  Effects-End  state  Linkage:  Using  Soft  Systems  Methodology’  to 
Perform  EBO  Mission  Analysis,  paper  submitted  to  the  10th  International  Command  and  Control  Research 
and  Technology  Symposium  -  the  Future  of  C2. 

Major  Young  was  a  US  Air  Force  student  at  the  US  Air  Force  Air  War  College 
when  this  paper  was  produced.  It  was  a  submission  to  a  symposium  intended  to  suggest  a 
methodology  to  inform  the  process  of  mission  analysis  in  EBO.  His  key  point,  apart 
from  the  discussion  of  “soft  systems  methodology,”  was  that  there  has  not  been  a  lot  of 
research  into  how  mission  analysis  deals  with  linking  endstates  and  effects.  He  criticizes 

3 

the  Political  /  Military  /  Economic  /  Social  /  Infrastructure  /  Informational  (PMESII) 
construct  created  by  JFCOM  is  somewhat  reductionist  in  nature  and  which  does  not 
describe  an  adversary  as  a  complex  adaptive  system  adequately.  The  first  half  of  the 
paper  is  worth  reading  for  the  discussion  of  the  endstates  and  effects  at  all  levels  of  war, 
but  the  second  would  be  of  less  interest  to  students  of  EBO. 

Donald  Lowe  and  Simon  Ng,  Effects-based  Operations:  Language,  Meaning  and  the  Effects-based 
Approach  (Canberra,  Australia:  Defence  Science  and  Technology  Organization,  2004). 


163 


The  authors  are  a  pair  of  Australian  defence  scientists  and  their  paper  was  a 
submission  to  the  2004  Command  and  Control  Research  and  Technology  Symposium. 
The  paper  was  an  attempt  to  provide  a  logical  framework  for  EBO  through  a  coherent 
lexicon,  but  due  to  the  nature  of  the  paper,  it  merely  offers  the  first  furtive  steps  to  do  so. 
While  their  arguments  are  coherent  and  clear,  readers  familiar  with  the  subject  may  find 
their  conclusions  to  be  obvious. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Joshua  Ho,  “The  Dimensions  of  Effects-Based  Operations,”  Defence  Studies  5,  no.  2 
(Summer  2005),  169-87. 

The  author,  a  serving  Singaporean  Navy  officer,  worked  on  this  topic  while  he 
was  a  senior  fellow  at  the  Institute  of  Defence  and  Strategic  Studies  at  Nanyang 
Technical  University,  Singapore.  His  article  was  an  exploration  of  the  concept  of  EBO 
and  an  attempt  to  associate  EBO  with  the  levels  of  war.  He  started  with  the  premise  that 
EBO  offered  an  alternative  to  the  traditional  strategies  of  annihilation  or  exhaustion  by 
noting  that  destruction  of  the  enemy  is  but  a  means  to  an  end.4  From  there,  he  stated  that 
EBO  was  a  planning  methodology  at  the  tactical  level,  a  means  to  leverage  other 
instruments  of  power  at  the  operational  level  and  a  framework  for  strategic  resource 
allocation.  This  classification  is  thought  provoking  and  makes  this  essay  and  its 
predecessor5  very  useful. 

Steven  D.  Carey  and  Robyn  S.  Read,  “Five  Propositions  Regarding  Effects-Based 
Operations,”  Air  &  Space  Power  Journal  20,  no.  1  (Spring  2006),  63-74. 

The  authors  of  this  article,  one  a  serving  and  the  other  a  retired  US  Air  Force  Colonel, 
offer  the  idea  that  Effects-Based  Operation  represents  a  mindset  that  links  all  activities  to 
the  overall  goal.  Their  Proposition  1  was  that  all  military  operations  should  be  effects- 
based,  regardless  of  their  place  within  the  levels  of  war.  Proposition  2  suggested  that 
Effects  Based  Operations  provides  a  comprehensive  framework  for  coalition  operations, 
and  that  EBO  is  a  means  for  coalitions  to  fight  easily  and  in  more  sophisticated  way  than 
by  using  attrition  or  annihilation  strategies.  Others,  however,  had  rejected  this 
proposition.6  Proposition  3  suggested  that  intelligence  preparation  is  the  critical 
foundation  of  Effects-Based  Planning.  This  means  that  military  organizations  must  be 
capable  of  adaptation  to  match  the  environment  and  should  look  for  second  and  third 
order  effects  in  the  context  of  their  environment.  Their  fourth  Proposition  held  that  EBO 
should  include  specific  mechanisms  to  identify,  measure,  and  assess  the  consequences  of 
each  action  taken.  Their  final  proposition  was  that  military  forces  should  be  specifically 
organized  and  trained  to  conduct  EBO.  Their  work  represents  an  attempt  to  develop  an 
operational  concept  to  inform  future  doctrine.  This  article  has  inspired  some  criticism  as 
critics  note  that  J.P.  Hunerwadel  (see  above)  had  already  covered  much  of  the  conceptual 
ground  found  in  this  article.  Furthermore,  some  critics  claim  that  their  approach  suffers 
from  “ad  hoc-cracy”  and  imprecise  definitions.  One  critic  recommended  that  the  concept 
be  pennitted  to  evolve  further  before  rejecting  or  codifying  an  immature  concept,  as  was 
attempted  in  this  article.7  Hunerwadel’s  article  should  be  read  in  conjunction  with  this 
essay. 


164 


“Commander’s  Handbook  for  an  Effects  Based  Approach  to  Joint  Operations,”  (Norfolk,  VA:  US  Joint 
Force  Command,  2006). 

This  is  a  “must  read”  book.  It  contains  the  most  recent  iteration  of  American  joint 
doctrine  on  EBO.  It  represents  an  attempt  to  provide  a  common  baseline  for  effects- 
based  joint  military  operations  within  a  whole-of-government  approach,  as  opposed  to  the 
US  Air  Force  version  of  EBO.  It  offers  guidance  on  the  role  of  effects  within  the 
planning  and  execution  of  joint  military  operations,  and  it  states  that  the  effects-based 
approach  has  a  very  limited  application  at  the  tactical  level. 

Complex  Adaptive  Systems 

Colonel  John  A.  Warden  III,  “The  Enemy  as  a  System,”  Airpower  Journal  9,  no.  1  (Spring  1995),  40-55. 

John  Warden  is  remembered  most  for  his  influence  over  the  early  version  of  the 
1991  Gulf  War  air  campaign  and  his  1988  work,  The  Air  Campaign ,8  In  this  work,  “The 
Enemy  as  a  System,”  Warden  encourages  his  readers  to  apply  the  deductive  approach  to 
warfare,  where  general  rules  are  applied  to  arrive  at  specific  conclusions.  He  follows  this 
exhortation  with  the  use  of  scientific  analogies,  e.g.  the  body  or  an  atom,  to  describe  an 
enemy.  Warden  owes  a  debt  to  Deptula  in  that  he  also  uses  terms  like  “control  warfare” 
and  “parallel  attack”  found  in  Deptula’s  work.9  Warden’s  article  merits  reading  as  it 
provides  a  clear  and  parsimonious  concept  to  deal  with  the  analysis  of  an  adversary. 

Paul  K.  Davis,  Effects-Based  Operations:  A  Grand  Challenge  for  the  Analytical  Community  (Santa 
Monica,  CA:  RAND,  2001). 

Paul  K.  Davis  is  a  RAND  researcher  working  on  matters  associated  with 
operational  research.  In  this  publication,  written  before  the  proliferation  of  effects-based 
articles  after  the  2003  Iraq  war,  he  provides  a  brief  description  of  EBO  and  notes  that  the 
analytical  community  had  to  invest  more  effort  in  figuring  out  how  to  deal  with  it.  This 
was  a  call  to  action  to  that  community  so  that  new  concepts  would  not  render  it  useless  to 
practitioners.  He  notes  that  the  “systems  framework,”  by  which  he  meant  complex 
adaptive  systems,  makes  it  difficult  for  practitioners  to  avoid  failures  and/or  unintended 
consequences.  Despite  its  intended  audience,  the  initial  discussion  of  EBO  is  clear  and 
free  from  jargon,  which  makes  it  an  extremely  lucid  and  coherent  introduction  to  the 
concept. 

William  A.  Owens,  “The  Once  and  Future  Revolution  in  Military  Affairs,”  Joint  Force  Quarterly  31 
(Summer  2002),  55-61. 

William  Owens  is  a  former  US  Navy  Admiral  who  had  worked  on  force 
modernization  in  the  1990s.  This  article  is  primarily  about  the  revolution  in  military 
affairs,  but  it  offers  a  succinct  description  of  the  concept  of  complex  adaptive  systems, 
noting  that  conflict  is  a  dynamic  process.  Owens  states  that  there  was:  “...a  new 
conceptual  framework  that  some  called  the  system  of  systems.  This  concept  depicts  war  as 
a  deadly  contest  in  which  the  side  that  best  understands  the  battle  space  and  can  best 
transfer  that  knowledge  among  its  own  elements  to  apply  force  faster,  more  precisely, 
and  over  greater  distances  wins.  The  key  was  seeing  power  in  functional  interactions  and 


165 


synergy.”  This  article  represents  an  evolution  of  Warden’s  idea  of  the  enemy  as  a 
“system”  and  merits  reading  for  this  reason. 

Major  Leonard  Rickerman,  Effects-Based  Operations:  A  New  Way  of  Thinking  and  Fighting,  (Fort 
Leavenworth,  KS:  US  Army  Command  and  General  Staff  College,  2002). 

The  author  of  this  paper  was  a  US  Army  student  at  the  School  of  Advanced 
Military  Studies  and  the  intended  audience  of  the  paper  was  an  internal  one.  In  the  paper, 
Major  Rickerman  examined  EBO  as  the  emerging  joint  warfare  paradigm  and  sought  to 
counter  service-specific  criticisms  of  the  concept  as  he  concluded  it  was  the  best  tool  at 
hand  to  organize  for  joint  warfare.  While  an  EBO  enthusiast,  he  was  careful  to  note  that 
more  work  on  the  concept  was  required.  This  work  does  not  significantly  add  to  the  body 
of  literature. 

Edward  A.  Smith,  Effects  Based  Operations:  Applying  Network  Centric  Warfare  in 
Peace,  Crisis,  and  War,  (Washington,  DC:  Department  of  Defense,  2003). 

The  author  was  a  retired  US  Navy  Captain  and  the  senior  analyst  for  Network 
Centric  Warfare  and  Effects  Based  Operations  at  Boeing  Corporation.  This  weighty 
volume  is  intended  to  discuss  EBO  (defined  as  “co-ordinated  sets  of  actions  directed  at 
shaping  the  behavior  of  friends,  foes,  and  neutrals  in  peace,  crisis,  and  war”)  and  its 
application  through  Network  Centric  Warfare.  The  book  is  the  third  in  the  Department 
of  Defense  Information  Age  series  and  is  written  in  the  vein  of  the  1990s  Revolution  in 
Military  Affairs  literature.  Despite  the  aforementioned  broad  definition,  EBO  was  later 
described  in  this  work  as  “operations  in  the  cognitive  domain”  and  the  book  is  oriented 
towards  the  latter  concept.  Smith  discusses  complexity  in  detail  and  explores  how  to 
generate  the  desired  effect  from  an  action,  determining  what  other  effects  actions  will 
have  and  how  to  attribute  causality  to  an  action.  He  provides  a  conceptual  link  between 
complexity  theory  and  the  lexicon  surrounding  effects.  The  book  did  not  get  good 
reviews  and  its  length  (600+  pages)  may  deter  some  from  reading  it.10  However,  these 
factors  should  not  detract  from  its  contribution  to  the  body  of  literature,  and  it  is  worth 
the  effort  to  read  it. 

Robert  Vermaas,  “Future  Perfect:  Effects  Based  Operations,  Complexity  and  the  Human  Environment,” 
Directorate  of  Operational  Research  (Joint)  Research  Note  2004/01  (Ottawa,  ON:  National  Defence,  2004); 
and 

Robert  Grossman- Vermaas,  “Discourse  of  Action:  Command,  Control,  Conflict  and  the  Effects  Based 
Approach”  (Ottawa:  Department  of  National  Defence,  2004). 

Robert  Grossman- Vermaas  is  a  defence  scientist  with  the  Department  of  National 
Defence.  This  first  title  was  a  monograph  and  was  the  first  of  in  a  series  on  the  EBO 
concept.  It  is  intended  to  inform  readers  of  the  potential  benefits  of  the  concept,  such  as 
the  leveraging  of  all  of  the  instruments  of  national  power,  a  greater  economy  of  effort  and 
a  means  to  influence  allies,  adversaries  or  neutrals.  He  notes  that  the  inclusion  of 
complex  adaptive  systems  concepts  will  have  the  greatest  impact  on  command  and 
control  issues,  and,  as  a  result,  Canada  ought  to  pursue  a  means  of  Operational  Net 
Assessment,  the  American  tenn  for  interagency  information  fusion. 


166 


The  second  work  builds  upon  the  contents  of  the  first,  and  it  expanded  the 
discussion  of  Effects-Based  Planning  with  regard  to  command  and  control.  This  work 
was  one  of  the  few  sources  to  deal  with  the  issue  of  coalitions  and  information  sharing. 
Both  of  these  works  are  worth  reading  as  a  primer  for  issues  pertaining  to  complex 
adaptive  systems  and  for  the  broad  perspective  taken  to  EBO. 

Edward  A.  Smith,  Complexity,  Networking  and  Effects-Based  Operations:  Approaching  the  “how  to”  of 
EBO  (Arlington,  VA:  Boeing  Company,  2005). 

Edward  Smith,  at  the  time  of  publication,  was  the  Executive  Strategist,  Effects- 
Based  Operations  for  Boeing  Corporation.  This  paper  is  aimed  at  addressing  a  perceived 
gap  in  terms  of  cognitive  and  psychological  effects  within  complex  adaptive  systems. 
However,  being  somewhat  short,  does  not  do  so  specifically,  but  offers  a  logical 
framework  to  deal  with  the  issue.  This  framework,  based  on  living  systems  theory, 
provides  the  context  for  understanding  the  concept  of  complex  adaptive  systems  as  open 
entities  and  is  worth  the  effort  to  read  it  on  that  subject  alone. 

Edward  A.  Smith,  Complexity,  Networking,  &  Effects-Based  Approaches  to  Operations ,  (Washington,  DC: 
Department  of  Defense,  2006). 

This  book  expands  upon  the  aforementioned  paper.  In  this  book,  the  author 
recommends  the  application  of  EBO  as  the  best  means  of  dealing  with  the  complexity  of 
the  contemporary  operating  environment.  His  2003  definition  of  EBO  in  his  Effects 
Based  Operations:  Applying  Network  Centric  Warfare  in  Peace,  Crisis,  and  War  (see 
above),  remains  intact  in  this  book,  but  there  is  a  new  take  on  the  issue.  Instead  of  being 
about  operating  in  the  cognitive  domain,  EBO  is  now  portrayed  as  an  approach  to  warfare 
that  puts  the  “human-in-the-loop”  as  opposed  to  being  focussed  on  technology.  The 
argument  presented  in  the  aforementioned  paper  has  been  expanded  upon  to  discuss 
living  systems  theory  in  greater  detail  as  it  relates  to  complexity.  However,  the  book 
comes  across  as  a  repackaging  of  his  2003  work  to  fit  the  counter-insurgency  mould. 

Major  Robert  U instead  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  David  Denhard,  “Viewing  the  Center  of 
Gravity  through  the  Prism  of  Effects-Based  Operations,”  Military  Review  86,  no.  5 
(September-October  2006),  90-5. 

Two  US  Air  Force  officers  wrote  this  work  and  it  is  intended  to  show  that  EBO  is 
not  incompatible  with  existing  practices  such  as  “Center  of  Gravity  analysis.”  They,  with 
a  short  yet  succinct  discussion  of  systems  analysis,  suggest  that  the  concept  of  a  “Center 
of  Gravity”  can  be  meshed  with  systems  analysis.  This  article  provides  a  good  primer  for 
systems  analysis  as  described  by  US  JFCOM.  The  similarity  of  this  essay  to  published 
doctrine  is  noticeable;  however,  the  editor  of  Military  Review  describes  this  similarity  as 
coincidental. 

Control  Warfare 

Major  Jason  Barlow,  “Strategic  Paralysis:  An  Air  Power  Strategy  for  the  Present,”  Airpower  Journal  7,  no. 

4  (Winter  1993),  4-15. 


167 


This  article  was  written  by  a  serving  US  Air  Force  Officer  in  the  wake  of  the  1991 
Gulf  War.  The  article  advocates  the  adoption  of  a  new  strategy  described  as  “strategic 
paralysis,”  which,  at  the  time,  represented  a  service-specific  vision  of  victory  through  the 
massive  application  of  conventional  air  power.  This  theory,  inspired  partially  by  John 
Warden’s  Air  Campaign  and  the  1991  Gulf  War,  held  that  air  power  could  be  employed 
to  obtain  a  quick  and  relatively  inexpensive  victory.  The  lynchpin  of  this  strategy  was  to 
identify  and  target  those  sources  of  the  national  instruments  of  power,  which  the  author 
labelled  as  National  Elements  of  Value  (NEV).  Without  the  NEVs,  an  adversary  would 
be  literally  unable  to  act  effectively.  This  article  is  worth  reading  as  it  predates  Deptula’s 
works  and  offers  a  different  means  of  describing  what  has  become  known  as  “control 
warfare.” 

David  A.  Deptula,  “Parallel  Warfare:  What  Is  It?  Where  Did  It  Come  From?  Why  Is  It  Important?'’  in 
William  Head  and  Earl  H.  Tilford,  Jr.,  eds.,  The  Eagle  in  the  Desert:  Looking  Back  on  US  Involvement  in 
the  Persian  Gulf  War  (Westport:  Praeger,  1996),  127-56. 

This  was  the  first  of  several  versions  of  an  article  on  the  topic  of  “parallel 
warfare”  by  an  Air  Force  officer  who  had  served  as  one  of  the  main  planners  of  the  1991 
Gulf  War  air  campaign. 11  His  intended  audience  was  the  US  Air  Force  community  as 
well  as  the  American  joint  community.  He  argued  that  the  1991  Gulf  War  air  campaign 
was  “parallel”  as  opposed  to  “serial.”  Both  terms  were  taken  from  electrical  circuit 
designs  where  the  tenn  “parallel”  represents  simultaneous  and  “serial”  represents 
sequential.  He  noted  that  this  was  not  a  new  idea,  but  that  technological  advances,  e.g., 
precision-guided  munitions  and  stealth  technology  allowed  for  it  to  be  applied 
effectively.  Deptula  also  redefined  the  concept  of  mass  in  this  article.  And  he  argued 
that  existing  targeting  processes  support  strategies  of  annihilation  or  attrition  and 
therefore  a  strategy  of  “control”  (a  means  to  make  enemy  command  and  control 
ineffective)  was  being  ignored.  This  was  an  argument  based  on  the  principle  of  economy 
of  force.  Later  versions  of  Deptula’s  work  modified  some  of  the  concepts  presented  in 
this  paper  to  include  leveraging  all  of  the  instruments  of  national  power.  This  work  ought 
to  be  read  by  all  interested  in  EBO  as  it  is  one  of  the  seminal  works  on  the  topic. 

Gary  L.  Crowder,  “Effects-Based  Operations:  The  Impact  of  Precision  Strike  Weapons  on  Air  Warfare 
Doctrines,”  Military’  Technology  27,  no.  6  (June  2003),  16-25. 

The  author  of  this  article  was  the  Chief,  Strategy,  Concepts  and  Doctrine  of  US 
Air  Force  Air  Combat  Command.  The  article  itself  is  a  distillation  of  a  briefing  delivered 
in  March  2003.  Although  written  before  the  start  of  Operation  IRAQI  FREEDOM,  the 
article  discusses  the  concept,  first  raised  by  David  Deptula  in  this  context,  of  “parallel 
war.”  This  form  of  warfare,  the  author  argues,  can  be  used  to  achieve  cumulative  or 
cascading  effects  to  achieve  control  over  the  enemy.  Crowder  discussed  the  concept  in 
light  of  the  potential  for  a  greater  economy  of  force  offered  by  the  combination  of  stealth 
technology  and  precision- guided  munitions.  He  also  suggested  that  EBO  was  a  means  to 
reduce  possibility  of  collateral  damage. 

Colonel  Merrick  E.  Krause,  “Integrated  Coercive  Strategies  and  the  Role  of  the  Air  Component”,  JFQ: 
Joint  Force  Quarterly,  Issue  41  (Summer  2006),  pp.  68-75. 


168 


The  author  of  this  article,  a  US  Air  Force  officer  was  the  editor  of  Joint  Force 
Quarterly.  He,  like  Deptula,  argued  that  EBO  represented  a  new  type  of  war  based  on  a 
strategy  of  “control”  as  opposed  to  annihilation  or  exhaustion.  Krause,  however,  based 
his  argument  on  the  concept  of  coercion  (the  use  of  threats  and/or  discrete  uses  of  force  to 
alter  an  adversary’s  decision  calculus).  In  this  context  coercion  is  intended  to  cause 
adversaries  to  feel  a  sense  of  fear  and/or  loss,  thus  making  them  more  willing  to  comply 
with  the  coercer’s  demands.  This  introduction  of  coercion  theory  represents  a  further 
step  in  the  logic  of  the  economy  of  force. 


Harlan  Ullman,  “Slogan  or  Strategy?  Shock  and  Awe  Reassessed,”  National  Interest,  Issue  84  (Summer 
2006),  43-9. 

Harlan  Ulltnan  is  a  Washington  Times  columnist  and  senior  member  of  the  Centre 
for  Strategic  and  International  Studies.  He  was  also  one  of  the  major  contributors  to  a 
National  Defense  University-sponsored  paper  that  later  became  well  known  due  to  the 
widespread  use  by  the  media  of  the  paper’s  title:  “Shock  and  Awe.”  The  original  paper 
was  written  to  provide  an  alternative  concept  for  mission  packaging  in  order  to  defeat  an 
adversary  quickly  and  easily.  The  authors  of  the  paper  concluded  that  in  many  cases,  the 
best  means  was  to  defeat  the  adversary  before  having  to  engage  in  decisive  battle. 14  This 
concept,  like  some  found  in  Deptula’ s  writings,  provides  an  alternative  to  strategies  of 
annihilation  or  exhaustion.  In  this  2006  article,  Ullman  was  attempting  to  set  the  record 
straight  on  the  concept  of  Shock  and  Awe  after  the  media’s  use  of  it  to  describe  the 
opening  of  2003  Gulf  War.  The  concluding  paragraph  of  the  article  provides  a  rebuke  to 
the  Bush  Administration  and  argues  that  the  proper  use  of  Shock  and  Awe  would  have 
forced  them  to  think  through  the  second-  or  third-order  effects  of  the  invasion,  and 
therefore,  make  plans  to  address  them.  Ullman’s  article  represents  an  attempt  to 
disassociate  his  concept  from  the  failure  of  US  strategy  to  deal  with  the  post-invasion 
insurgency. 

Instruments  of  National  Power 

Major  H.A.  Foster,  Organizing  for  Effect:  Assessing  the  Institutional  Machinery  Needed  to  Effectively 
Conduct  Effects-Based  Operations  (Quantico,  VA:  Marine  Corps  University,  2002). 

This  academic  paper,  written  by  a  US  Air  Force  student  at  the  US  Marine  Corps 
Command  and  Staff  College,  is  an  analysis  of  EBO  in  light  of  the  requirement  to  leverage 
the  instruments  of  national  power.  Using  “control  warfare”  as  a  point  of  departure,  the 
author  argued  that  knowledge  of  all  aspects  of  the  enemy  was  necessary  and  obtainable  if 
and  only  if  all  instruments  of  national  power  shared  information  with  one  and  other.  The 
author  argued  that  the  American  intelligence  community  needed  to  reform  the 
interagency  process  with  regard  to  security  issues  and  better  prepare  the  armed  services 
for  operating  in  a  DIME  context.  Intelligence  personnel  would  benefit  from  reading  this 
paper. 


Major  David  W.  Pendall,  “Effects-Based  Operations  and  the  Exercise  of  National  Power,”  Military’  Review 
84,  no.  1  (January/February  2004),  20-31. 


169 


Major  Pendall,  at  the  time  of  the  article’s  publication,  was  a  US  Army  strategic 
planner  with  the  National  Security  Agency.  This  article  was  aimed  at  the  critics  of  EBO; 
it  sought  to  convey  the  message  that  EBO  was  the  best  means  to  leverage  all  aspects  of 
military  power.  However,  the  article  read  like  a  Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities- 
Threats  (SWOT)  analysis  briefing  and  this  approach  and  its  tone  was  unhelpful.  It  did 
not,  despite  the  article’s  title,  address  the  instruments  of  national  power  in  any 
meaningful  way. 

Major  Robert  B.  Herndon,  Chief  Warrant  Officer  3  John  A.  Robinson,  Colonel  James  L.  Creighton, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Raphael  Torres  and  Major  Louis  J.  Bello,  “Effects-Based  Operations  in  Afghanistan,” 
Field  Artillery  Journal  9,  no.  1  (January-February  2004),  26-30. 

This  article  was  a  brief  discussion  by  officers  of  the  US  Anny  of  the  application 
of  EBO  concepts  by  Combined  Joint  Task  Force  180  in  Afghanistan.  The  commander  of 
the  10th  Mountain  Division’s  Artillery  Brigade  and  members  of  the  Divisional  Artillery 
staff  wrote  the  article  to  demonstrate  the  utility  of  an  effects-based  approach  to  the 
broader  US  Army  artillery  community.  In  short,  they  argued  that  the  fire  support 
community  ought  to  expand  beyond  the  realm  of  kinetic  weapons  such  as  artillery  and  air 
assets  and  learn  to  synchronize  non-kinetic  military  assets  and  perhaps  even  non-military 
assets.  The  article  reinforces  David  Lazarus’  point  about  counter-terror  campaigns. 

Joint  Doctrine  &  Concepts  Centre,  The  UK  Military  Effects-Based  Approach,  Joint  Doctrine  Note  1/05, 
(Shrivenham,  UK:  Ministry  of  Defence,  2005). 

This  is  an  official  British  military  document  that  codifies  thoughts  on  the  effects- 
based  approach  concept  and  provides  a  guide  for  further  doctrine  development.  It  is 
based  on  the  British  Government’s  “Comprehensive  Approach”  where  all  elements  of 
government  are  used  to  deal  with  complex  emergencies.  The  effects-based  approach  is 
seen  as  a  means  to  make  the  military  arm  more  effective  within  the  “Comprehensive 
Approach.”  The  document  also  provides  an  excellent  definition  of  what  constitutes  an 
effect  from  a  planning  perspective,  e.g.,  who  is  to  be  affected,  the  desired  change  of  state, 
when  the  effect  is  to  occur,  and  the  requirement  for  effects  to  be  both  measurable  and 
realistic. 

Joint  Doctrine  &  Concepts  Centre,  The  Comprehensive  Approach ,  Joint  Doctrine  Note  4/05,  (Shrivenham, 
UK:  Ministry  of  Defence,  2005). 

This  is  another  official  British  military  document.  It  provides  an  explanation  of 
the  British  government’s  “comprehensive  approach”  and  situates  the  British  military 
instrument  of  power  within  a  broader  framework.  It  is  worth  reading  for  the  British 
perspective  on  “whole  of  government”  approaches  to  complex  emergencies.  This 
approach  explicitly  states  that  the  Ministry  of  Defence  will  often  support  other  ministries 
as  opposed  to  leading  all  efforts.  For  example,  in  Operation  FRESCO,  the  Home  Office 
led  the  efforts  that  saw  British  Army  units  serve  as  community  fire  brigades. 

David  B.  Lazarus,  “Effects  Based  Operations  and  Counter-Terrorism,”  Air  and  Space  Power  Journal  19, 
no.  3  (Fall  2005),  22-8. 


170 


David  Lazarus  was  the  Australian  National  University  intern  at  the  Australian 
Army’s  Land  Warfare  Studies  Centre  at  the  time  of  publication.  In  this  article,  he  sought 
to  compare  EBO  with  the  demands  of  the  Global  War  on  Terror  (GWOT).  In  so  doing, 
he  argued  that  an  effects-based  method  of  targeting  provides  the  “enabling  foundation” 
for  EBO,  but  effects-based  planning  exists  primarily  at  operational  level.  More 
importantly,  he  concluded  that  the  GWOT  cannot  be  won  purely  by  military  or  kinetic 
means,  and  as  a  result,  a  coherent  application  of  all  instruments  of  national  power  is 
required.  The  article  provides  worthwhile  reading  for  an  example  of  how  EBO  ought  to 
be  applied  in  a  counter-terror  campaign. 

Intelligence 

Price  T.  Bingham,  “Seeking  Synergy:  Effects  Based  Joint  Operations,”  Joint  Force 
Quarterly  30  (Spring  2002),  52-60. 

This  article  advocates  that  the  US  military  adopt  the  joint  application  of  EBO. 
This  term  represents  the  synchronized  use  of  air  and  land  assets  to  force  a  dilemma  on  the 
enemy;  for  example,  the  enemy  could  stay  and  be  subjected  to  air  and  land  attack  or  it 
could  move  and  be  subjected  to  an  even  more  damaging  air  attack.  The  author  is  a 
former  US  Air  Force  officer  who  has  written  a  number  of  other  articles  about  targeting. 15 
However,  the  author  should  not  be  considered  as  a  typical  US  Air  Force  advocate  of  all 
things  airpower  as  he  notes  that  the  adoption  of  the  concept  would  lead  to  an  increase  in 
command,  control,  communications,  computers,  intelligence,  surveillance  and 
reconnaissance  (C4ISR)  assets  while  the  requirement  for  manned  aircraft  would 
decrease.16 

Major-General  James  M.  Dubik,  “Effects  Based  Decisions  and  Actions,”  Military’  Review  83,  no.  1 
(January  /  February  2003),  33-6. 

Major-General  Dubik,  US  Army,  at  the  time  the  article  was  published,  was  the  J9 
of  US  Joint  Forces  Command.  This  article  appears  to  be  aimed  at  sceptics  of  EBO  within 
the  ranks  of  the  US  Army.  The  author  advocated  the  adoption  of  EBO  at  the  tactical 
level,  noting  that  it  focuses  on  products  as  opposed  to  processes  as  well  as  noting  the 
crucial  role  of  intelligence  gathering.  He  also  drew  explicit  links  between  commander’s 
intent,  the  definition  of  information  requirements,  and  cross-Battle  Operating  Systems 
(BOS)  infonnation  gathering.  He  argues  that  an  effects-based  approach  allows  for 
greater  integration  of  the  operations  and  intelligence  functions  and  activities  than  the 
existing  paradigm.  The  article  would  be  of  interest  to  those  interested  in  a  land-centric 
application  of  EBO. 

Colonel  Stephen  P.  Perkins  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  John  D.  Jackson,  “Effects-Based 
Operations  and  Its  Enabling  Capabilities  in  Expeditionary  Warfare,”  Military  Intelligence 
Professional  Bulletin  30,  no.  3  (July-September  2004),  11-19. 

The  authors  were  both  US  Army  intelligence  officers  stationed  at  US  Joint  Forces 
Command  in  Norfolk,  VA  when  the  article  was  written.  Their  work  was  an  attempt  to 


171 


describe  the  emerging  concept  of  EBO  and  its  potential  benefits  to  their  colleagues  in  the 
military  intelligence  community.  Not  surprisingly,  they  noted  that  intelligence  support  is 
crucial  to  EBO  at  all  levels  and  that  success  is  dependent  on  the  accurate  identification  of 
centres  of  gravity  as  well  as  the  assessment  of  enemy  systems.  They  also  argued  that 
EBO  allows  the  government  to  leverage  all  of  the  DIME  tools  to  change  the  Political, 
Military,  Economic,  Social,  Infrastructure,  and  Information  (PMESII)  situations  in  the 
battle  space  to  achieve  goals.  Lastly,  they  note  that  EBO  ought  to  connect  strategies  and 
tasks  in  a  synchronized  and  coherent  manner  that  causes  the  changes  desired  in  the 
enemy’s  behaviour.  It  is  a  good  primer  for  EBO  advocates. 

Other  Concepts 

Williamson  Murray,  ed..  Transformation  Concepts  for  National  Security >  in  the  21st  Century  (Carlisle 
Barracks,  PA:  Strategic  Studies  Institute,  2002). 

This  book,  edited  by  the  noted  historian  Williamson  Murray,  is  a  series  of  articles 
written  by  students  at  the  US  Army  War  College’s  Advanced  Strategic  Art  Program.  The 
intent  of  the  volume  was  to  explore  some  of  the  ramifications  of  concepts  like  EBO  for 
the  US  Army’s  transformation  program  and  to  raise  the  questions  surrounding  those 
concepts.  Three  of  the  papers  within  the  volume  merit  discussion.  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Brett  Williams,  US  Air  Force,  wrote  a  paper  titled  “Effects-Based  Operations:  Theory, 
Application  and  the  Role  of  Airpower”  in  which  he  sought  to  counter  the  criticisms  of 
EBO.  Williams,  like  many  US  Air  Force  officers,  argued  that  an  effects-based  approach 
naturally  led  to  an  economy  of  force.  He  then  noted  that  the  JFCOM  concept  of  Rapid 
Decisive  Operations  and  Deptula’s  “control  warfare”  were  rather  specific  and 
fundamentally  tactical  in  nature,  and  he  therefore  concluded  that  EBO  was  best  applied  at 
the  strategic  and  operational  levels.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Allan  Batschelet’s  “Effects- 
Based  Operations:  A  New  Operational  Model?”  provides  an  excellent  summary  of  the 
lineage  of  EBO,  such  as  Deptula’s  concept  of  control  warfare  and  the  Institute  of  Defense 
Analyses’  paper  linking  strategies  and  tasks.  More  importantly,  Batschelet,  a  serving  US 
Army  officer,  notes  that  the  theories  had  some  common  foundations  in  terms  of  the 
importance  of  knowledge,  the  view  of  the  enemy  as  a  complex  adaptive  system  and  the 
concept  of  commander’s  intent.  Finally,  Colonel  Gary  Cheek,  US  Army,  sought  to 
examine  the  ramifications  of  EBO  for  ground  forces.  He  sought  to  address  the  concerns 
within  the  Army  that  EBO  was  a  means  to  support  a  reallocation  of  resources  in  favour  of 
the  Air  Force  and  the  emergence  of  the  “Strategy-to-Task”  view  of  EBO. 17  In  his  paper, 
“Effects-Based  Operations:  The  End  of  Dominant  Maneuver?”  he  noted  that  the  lack  of  a 
common  lexicon  was  unhelpful  and,  despite  the  enthusiast’s  claims,  there  would  always 
be  a  role  for  ground  forces  in  future  conflict.  The  authors,  with  their  strategic 
perspective,  provided  three  papers  worth  reading. 

Air  Vice  Marshal  Iain  McNicoll,  “Effects-Based  Air  Operations:  Air  Command  and  Control  and  the  Nature 
of  the  Emerging  Battlespace,”  Jcwna/  of  the  Royal  United  Services  Institute  148,  no.  3  (June  2003),  38-44. 

This  article  is  a  reprint  of  a  presentation  made  by  the  author  to  a  RUSI  sponsored 
conference  on  the  future  of  air  power  by  a  senior  Royal  Air  Force  officer.  The  author,  at 
the  time  of  publication,  was  the  Director  General  Joint  Doctrine  and  Concepts,  which  is 


172 


the  British  military  organization  that  has  published  the  recent  joint  doctrine  notes  on  EBO 
(see  above).  The  article  contains  two  fundamental  messages  set  in  a  basic  yet  clear 
manner:  1)  it  reflects  the  emerging  British  paradigm  of  command  and  control,  and  2)  that 
recent  conflicts  (i.e.,  Operations  GRANBY  (DESERT  STORM)  and  Operation  TELIC  as 
(IRAQI  FREEDOM)  have  been  fought  using  EBO.  The  combination  of  the  forum,  author 
and  introductory  tone  of  the  article  suggests  that  the  presentation  and  subsequent  article 
may  have  been  a  “trial  balloon”  for  the  concept.  Unfortunately,  the  article  does  not 
contain  any  record  of  the  audience’s  reaction. 

Guy  Duczynski,  Effects-Based  Operations:  A  Guide  for  Practitioners  (Perth,  Australia:  Edith  Cowan 
University,  2004). 

Guy  Duczynski  is  a  fonner  Australian  Anny  member  turned  academic.  His 
paper,  produced  for  the  2004  Command  and  Control  Research  and  Technology 
Symposium,  is  an  attempt  to  translate  the  theories  of  EBO  into  a  usable  practical 
application.  While  a  laudable  goal,  the  solution  offered  in  the  paper  requires  at  least  a 
familiarity  with  game  theory  and  specific  decision-making  theories.  This  limits  its  value 
for  most  readers,  with  the  exception  of  operational  researchers. 

Air  Chief  Marshal  Brian  Burridge,  “Technical  Development  and  Effects-Based  Operations,”  Journal  of  the 
Royal  United  Services  Institute  149,  no.  5  (October  2004),  26-30. 

This  article  was  the  transcription  of  the  RUSI  2004  Trenchard  Memorial  Lecture 
given  by  a  senior  Royal  Air  Force  officer.  This  series  of  annual  lectures,  given  by  senior 
ainnen,  is  focused  on  “pertinent  issues  of  the  day  relating  to  air  power.”  In  this  case,  the 
author  was  the  Air  Officer  Commanding-in-Chief  Strike  Command.  His  lecture  (and 
associated  article)  focused  on  the  opportunities  created  by  a  Network  Enabled  Capability 
(NEC)  and  how  this  relates  to  specific  programs  for  the  RAF  Strike  Command.  The 
article  does  not  specifically  address  EBO,  but  argues  that  NEC  will  lead  to  greater 
situational  awareness,  therefore  reducing  the  risk  to  aircrews,  an  integration  of  the 
application  of  land  and  air  forces  to  a  common  goal,  and  the  ability  of  air  forces  to  seize 
opportunities  unavailable  to  ground  forces.  While  an  interesting  read,  it  does  not  bring  to 
light  anything  significant  regarding  EBO. 


Alexandre  Sergio  Da  Rocha,  “Effects-Based  Operations:  A  Military  Application  of  Pragmatical  Analysis,” 
Air  &  Space  Power  Journal  19,  no.  3  (Fall  2005),  29-38. 

The  author  was  employed  at  the  Brazilian  National  War  College  in  the  late  1980s 
and  early  1990s,  and  during  that  time  developed  a  method  called  “pragmatical  analysis.” 
This  analysis  owes  its  roots  to  the  philosophical  movement  of  pragmatism,  which  holds 
that  outcomes  of  actions  are  the  source  of  their  meaning  and  that  objectivity  is  merely  a 
social  construct.  Pragmatical  analysis  seeks  to  examine  consistency  in  actions  over  time 
to  discern  the  actor’s  purpose  and  offers  a  means  of  classification  of  such  actions.  It  is  a 
worthwhile  read  as  it  pertains  to  EBO,  but  discusses  it  in  an  abstract  and  philosophical 
manner. 


173 


Major  Jack  Sine,  “Defining  the  ‘Precision  Weapon’  in  Effects-Based  Terms,”  Air  & 

Space  Power  Journal  20,  no.  1  (Spring  2006),  81-8. 

The  author,  a  member  of  the  American  Air  Staff  Weapons  Requirements  section, 
produced  an  interesting  article  that  advocates  an  effects-based  approach  to  weapons 
development  and  procurement.  His  argument  owes  a  debt  to  the  change  in  targeting 
philosophy  for  the  1991  Gulf  War  air  campaign  where  key  nodes  were  attacked  as 
opposed  to  entire  target  sets.  Sine  notes  that  precision  is  currently  measured  in  Circular 
Error  Probable  (CEP)  relative  to  the  aim  point.  He  suggested  that  precision  ought  to  be 
measured  in  quantifiable  first  order  effects,  without  second  or  third  order  effects, 
because:  “Weapons  employment  produces  first-order  effects  and  relies  on  a  system  of 
cause  and  effect  for  second-  and  third-order  effects.  Target  development  includes 
responsibility  to  ensuring  second-  and  third-order  effects  by  determining  enemy-system 
characteristics  and  targeting  appropriate  points  within  the  system  to  achieve  desired 
effects.”  This  approach  seeks  to  reconcile  CEP  with  targeting  processes,  and  it  is  an 
excellent  example  of  how  difficult  it  is  to  move  from  a  quantitative  to  a  qualitative 
measure. 

Critics 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Antulio  J.  Echevarria  II,  “Rapid  Decisive  Operations:  US  Operational  Assumptions 
Regarding  Future  Warfare,”  Defence  Studies  2,  no.  1  (Spring  2002),  127-38. 

At  the  time,  the  author  was  a  US  Anny  officer  who  was  the  Director  of  National 
Security  Affairs  at  the  US  Anny  War  College.  This  article,  published  in  a  British  journal, 
was  a  public  critique  of  the  US  Joint  Force  Command’s  2001  operational  concept  based 
around  the  concept  of  “Rapid  Decisive  Operations”  (RDO).  This  article  could  be  taken  as 
a  public  criticism  of  US  DoD  transfonnation.  While  no  mention  is  made  of  the  1996 
paper  written  by  Ullman  and  Wade  on  RDO,  Echevarria  notes  that  an  operational  concept 
ought  to  inform  doctrine  and  research  and  development  efforts,  but  in  the  case  of  RDO, 
the  concept  is  too  ambitious  and  may  lead  to  interoperability  issues  with  major  allies.  He 
also  argued  that  the  inclusion  of  “systems”  thinking  (e.g.,  complex  adaptive  systems)  is 
flawed  in  that  the  language  describing  such  systems  implies  that  they  are  reactive, 
waiting  for  the  US  to  stimulate  them  into  action.  Furthermore,  warfare  is  fundamentally 
an  open  (as  opposed  to  a  closed)  system,  which  renders  systems  analysis  unhelpful.  The 
article  is  worth  reading  as  it  provides  a  snapshot  into  the  evolution  of  EBO-like  concepts 
five  year  ago. 

Timothy  R.  Reese,  “Precision  Firepower:  Smart  Bombs,  Dumb  Strategy,”  Military’  Review  83,  no.  4  (July  / 
August  2003),  46-53. 

The  author  of  the  article,  a  serving  US  Army  Lieutenant-Colonel,  criticizes  the 
enthusiastic  advocacy  in  some  circles  of  precision-guided  munitions  (PGMs).  He  notes 
that  the  precision  firepower  advocates  suggest  the  widespread  use  of  PGMs  to  make  war 
more  efficient  and  compress  the  levels  of  war.  He  argues  that,  while  precision  firepower 
is  a  decisive  shaper  of  the  battlefield,  it  is  not  a  singular  war-winner.  He  accuses 
advocates  of  PGMs  of  “sloppy”  strategic  thinking,  because,  for  them,  military  strategy 


174 


becomes  a  mere  exercise  in  targeting  and  destruction  focusing  on  infrastructure  as 
opposed  to  forces. 

Brigadier  Justin  Kelly  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  David  Kilcullen,  “Chaos  versus  Predictability:  A  Critique  of 
Effects-Based  Operations,”  Australian  Army  Journal  2,  no.  1  (Winter  2004),  87-98 

The  authors  are  serving  Australian  Army  officers  with  academic  backgrounds 
based  on  education  and  employment.  Their  argument  is  that  EBO  may  not  be  suitable  to 
a  land  environment  due  to  the  political  process  and  its  relationship  with  strategy.  The 
political  process  within  any  western  democracy  is  based  on  compromises,  they  argue,  and 
this  makes  it  difficult  if  not  impossible  to  obtain  clear  direction  from  government  on  what 
effects  are  to  be  achieved.  This  article  addresses  the  co-ordination  problem  inherent  in 
the  whole  of  government-type  approaches  very  well  and  clearly. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Jim  Storr,  “A  Critique  of  Effects-Based  Thinking,”  Journal  of  the  Royal  United 
Services  Institute  150,  no.  6  (December  2005),  32-5. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Storr,  then  a  British  Army  officer  serving  with  US  European 
Command  in  Gennany,  wrote  this  article  that  examined  effects-based  thinking  in  a 
critical  light.  His  audience  is  primarily  British,  although  the  RUSI  Journal  has  a  wide 
international  audience,  and  he  appears  to  be  offering  a  public  caution  to  the  British  armed 
forces  to  consider  whether  or  not  the  concept  has  utility  before  adopting  it.  Storr  notes 
that  effects-based  thinking  is  founded  on  the  logic  of  stealth  bombers  and  precision 
guided  munitions  reducing  the  requirement  for  mass,  the  adoption  of  mission  command, 
and  the  process  of  tracking  activity  as  opposed  to  effect.  He  did  not  see  anything  new  in 
the  literature  and  wondered  if  EBO  was  really  an  issue  of  semantics.  Although  the  article 
was  rather  short,  his  point  about  semantics  should  not  be  overlooked  and  EBO  advocates 
would  do  well  to  address  his  observations. 

Milan  N.  Vego,  “Effects-Based  Operations:  A  Critique,”  JFQ:  Joint  Force  Quarterly  41  (Spring  2006),  51-7. 

Milan  N.  Vego  is  a  Professor  of  Operations  in  the  Joint  Military  Operations 
department  of  the  US  Naval  War  College.  His  article  is  a  well-considered  critique  of  the 
arguments  provided  by  EBO  advocates  and  enthusiasts,  and  his  article  is  aimed  at 
providing  an  alternative  to  their  view  of  the  concept.  Vego  states  that  EBO  descended 
from  Network  Centric  Warfare  (NCW),  and  both  were  flawed  concepts  as  they  took  a 
mathematical  approach  to  war  where  war  is  considered  as  a  science  only  as  opposed  to  an 
art  and  a  science.  Furthermore,  he  argued  that,  despite  claims  to  the  contrary,  EBO  is 
antithetical  to  operational  art.  18  His  final  point  is  that  the  American  military 
establishment  does  not  need  to  adopt  EBO  because  the  existing  military  planning 
processes  are  suitable.  All  interested  in  the  topic  must  read  this  article  as  it  provides  a 
clear  and  lucid  series  of  arguments  against  the  adoption  of  the  concept  that  merit 
consideration. 

Conclusion 

The  sources  in  this  bibliography  show  that  EBO  is  a  synthesis  of  a  number  of  ideas  and 
that  the  nature  of  EBO  continues  to  evolve  over  time.  While  debates  over  its  utility  and 


175 


applicability  to  all  levels  of  war  continue,  there  is  a  general  consensus  on  the  utility  in  the 
EBO  approach  of  leveraging  all  instruments  of  national  power  and  the  importance  of 
intelligence  to  EBO.  On  the  other  hand  the  immaturity  EBO  as  a  concept  means  that  there 
is  still  much  work  to  be  done  before  draw. 


1  This  term  covers  the  various  terms  in  use  associated  with  the  coordinated  application  of  all  of  the 
Diplomatic,  Informational,  Military  and  Economic  (DIME)  instruments  of  national  powers.  It  includes  the 
Canadian  Defence-Diplomacy-Development  (3D)  or  whole  of  government  approach  and  the  British 
“Comprehensive  Approach.” 

2  For  the  origins  of  this  concept,  see:  Leslie  Lewis  and  C.  Robert  Roll,  Strategy-to-Tasks:  A  Methodology’ 
for  Resource  Allocation  and  Management,  P-7839,  (Santa  Monica,  CA:  RAND,  1993). 

3  For  a  discussion  of  PMESII,  see  Joint  Warfighting  Center,  US  Joint  Forces  Command,  Joint  Doctrine 
Series:  Pamphlet  7,  “Operational  Implications  of  Effects-Based  Operations,”  dated  17  November  2004. 

4  The  terms  ‘strategy  of  annihilation’  ( Niederwerfungsstrategie )  and  ‘strategy  of  exhaustion’ 

( Ermattungsstrategie )  originated  with  the  German  military  historian  Hans  Delbriick.  See  Gordon  A.  Craig, 
“Hans  Delbriick:  The  Military  Historian,”  in  Peter  Paret,  ed.,  Makers  of  Modern  Strategy’:  from  Machiavelli 
to  the  Nuclear  Age  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  1986),  341-4. 

5  See  Lieutenant  Colonel  Joshua  Ho,  Singapore  Navy,  “The  Dimensions  of  Effects-Based  Operations:  The 
View  from  Singapore,”  Australian  Army  Journal  2,  no.  1  (Winter  2004),  99-106. 

6  For  example,  see  Benjamin  Lambeth,  Letter  on  “Five  Propositions  Regarding  Effects-Based 
Operations, &  Space  Power  Journal  20,  no.  2  (Summer  2006),  5-6. 

7  J.  P.  Hunerwadel,  “Overpromising  and  Underestimating:  A  Response  to  “Five  Propositions  Regarding 
Effects-Based  Operations,”  Air  &  Space  Power  Journal  20,  no.  1,  (Spring  2006),  75-80. 

8  See  John  Warden,  The  Air  Campaign:  Planning  for  Combat  (Washington,  DC:  National  Defense 
University,  1988). 

9  See  the  entries  on  David  Deptula’s  articles. 

10  See  Roger  W.  Barnett,  “Effects  Based  Operations:  Applying  Network  Centric  Warfare  in  Peace,  Crisis, 
and  War,  Book  Review,”  Naval  War  College  Review  57,  no.  2  (Spring  2004),  180-1. 

11  Subsequent  versions  include  David  A.  Deptula,  Effects-Based  Operations:  Change  in  the  Nature  of 
Warfare  ((Arlington,  VA:  Aerospace  Education  Foundation,  2001).  Available  at 

http://www.aef.org/pub/psbook.pdf.  Accessed  27  Jul  2007;  and  David  Deptula,  “Foreword:  Effects  Based 
Operations,”  Air  &  Space  Power  Journal  20,  no.  1  (Spring  2006),  4-5. 

12  See  Buster  S.  Glosson,  “Impact  of  Precision  Weapons  on  Air  Combat  Operations  fAirpower  Journal  7, 
no.  2  (Summer  1993),  4-11;  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Edward  Mann,  “One  Target,  One  Bomb:  Is  The 
Principle  of  Mass  Dead T’  Airpower  Journal  7,  no.  1  (Spring  1993),  35-43. 

13  Major  works  in  the  coercion  literature  include  Lawrence  Freedman,  ed.,  Strategic  Coercion:  Concepts 
and  Cases  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1998);  Robert  Pape,  Bombing  to  Win:  Air  Power  and 
Coercion  in  War  (Ithaca:  Cornell  University  Press,  1996);  and  Thomas  Schelling,  Arms  and  Influence 
(London:  Yale  University  Press,  1966). 

14  See  Harlan  Ullman  and  James  Wade,  Shock  and  Awe:  Achieving  Rapid  Dominance  (Washington,  DC: 
National  Defense  University,  1996). 

15  For  example  Price  T.  Bingham,  “Air  Power  Targeting  Theory:  A  Key  Elements  in  Transformation,” 
Military  Review  82,  no.  3  (May/June  2002),  34-9;  and  Price  T.  Bingham,  “Ground  Radar  Surveillance  and 
Targeting,”  Joint  Force  Quarterly  35  (Autumn  2004),  88-94. 

16  This  argument  is  similar  to  the  one  made  in  another  of  his  articles  Price  T.  Bingham,  “Transforming 
Warfare  with  Effects-Based  Joint  Operations,”  Aerospace  Power  Journal  15,  no.  1  (Spring  2001),  58-66. 

17  This  expression  was  attributed  to  the  Gleeson,  et  ah.  New  Perspectives  on  Effects-Based  Operations: 
Annotated  Briefing  200 1  IDA  paper  (see  above). 

18  This  had  led  others  to  react  to  this  argument.  For  example,  see  James  B.  Ellsworth,  Letter  to  the  Editor, 
Joint  Force  Quarterly  42  (Fall  2006),  6. 


176 


Annex  B  -  Land  Force  Doctrine  and  Training  System  Directorate  of  Army  Doctrine 
Conduct  of  Land  Operations  -  Operational  Level  Doctrine  for  the  Canadian  Army  (B- 
GL-300-001/FP-000)  “Chapter  5  -  Application  of  Combat  Power”  DRAFT 


CHAPTER  5 
THE  APPLICATION  OF  COMBAT  POWER 
section  1 
INTRODUCTION 

1.  Combat  power  is  applied  as  part  of  a  campaign  plan  in  order  to  reach  a  desired  end- 
state.  In  planning  the  campaign,  the  application  of  combat  power  must  be  considered  with 
the  aim  of  reaching  enduring  objectives  and  end-states  that  address  the  root  causes  of  a 
conflict.  Whilst  the  application  of  violence  against  an  adversary  will  always  be  the 
purview  of  the  military  and  other  security  forces,  it  must  be  done  in  combination  with  a 
range  of  activities  and  other  agencies  to  reach  those  enduring  outcomes. 

2.  Combat  power  is  applied  in  a  harmonised  and  complementary  manner  across  all 
levels  of  command  in  order  to  achieve  operational  objectives  and  in  turn  strategic  end- 
states.  It  is  applied  through  a  comprehensive  approach  that  sees  the  engagement  of  a 
wide  variety  of  targets  and  systems  that  influence  the  environment  and  are  key  to 
achieving  the  overall  end-state  and  lasting  solutions.  Planning  focuses  on  identifying  and 
articulating  desired  effects  that  will  lead  to  the  required  objectives  and  end-states. 
Activities  are  then  directed,  through  plans,  to  create  those  desired  effects.  Activities  that 
lead  to  enduring  end-states  are  created  by  a  wide  range  of  agencies,  in  addition  to  military 
forces,  and  together  they  address  a  wide  range  of  systems  and  entities  that  affect  the 
environment  and  the  conclusion  of  the  campaign. 

3.  This  effects  based  planning  is  applied  through  a  manoeuvrist  approach.  This  includes 
physical  activities  that  create  obvious  effects  on  a  target’s  capability  and  thus  affects  the 
target’s  behaviour.  It  also  includes  activities  that  seek  to  influence  a  target  to  affect 
understanding,  perception,  will  and  ultimately  behaviour.  Often  these  will  seek  to 
influence  target  audiences  other  than  an  adversary  to  support  operations,  objectives  and 
end-states.  Thus,  this  manoeuvrist  approach  is  applied  on  both  the  physical  and  cognitive 
planes.  This  focus  on  effects  and  their  realisation  through  a  manoeuvrist  approach  are 
guided  by  the  principle  of  mission  command. 

4.  This  chapter  will  explain  in  detail  the  substance  of  each  of  these  concepts  and  how, 
when  applied  in  unison,  they  apply  combat  power  in  a  holistic,  comprehensive  and 
complementary  fashion  that  leads  to  enduring  end-states. 

5.  In  order  to  understand  the  concepts  discussed  herein,  it  is  necessary  to  discipline  the 
use  of  the  term  “effects”.  Effects  are  defined  as:  changes  as  a  result  or  consequence  of 
actions,  circumstances  or  other  causes.  An  effect  is  the  consequence  of  one  or  more 
activities  that  contribute  to  one  or  more  objectives.  Effects  are  the  physical,  functional  or 


177 


psychological  outcome,  result,  or  consequence  that  results  from  military  or  non-military 
activities  at  the  tactical,  operational  and  strategic  levels.  They  occur  on  the  physical  and 
cognitive  planes.  Whilst  understanding  this,  it  must  be  remembered  that  an  effect  may  be 
caused  by  inaction  as  well 1 .  At  the  tactical  level,  those  activities  normally  constitute 
tactical  level  operations  and  are  assigned  in  mission  statements  and  tasks.  In  simplest 
tenns,  an  effect  is  a  result,  be  it  physical  or  cognitive,  of  an  activity  or  a  series  of 
activities. 

SECTION  2 

ACTIVITIES  and  EFFECTS  ON  THE  PHYSICAL  AND  COGNITIVE  PLANES 
GENERAL 

6.  The  object  of  conflict  is  the  imposition  of  one's  will  on  an  opponent.  The  organised 
application  of  violence  by  physical  force  is  one  means  to  that  end  and  may  be  seen  as  a 
traditional  application  of  power.  However,  other  activities  may  be  undertaken  that  target 
and  affect  an  opponent’s  or  other’s  will  to  fight  or  to  support  a  particular  activity.  These 
may  include,  for  example,  psychological  operations  in  the  form  of  flyers  aimed  at 
convincing  enemy  conscripts  to  dessert  or  a  target  population  not  to  support  an  insurgent 
element.  Thus,  there  are  both  physical  and  influence  activities  that  may  be  undertaken  in 
the  prosecution  of  conflict.  Seen  from  this  perspective,  activities  and  their  effects  exist 
on  two  planes,  the  physical  and  the  cognitive,  and  activities  fall  into  two  categories, 
physical  effects  activities  and  influence  activities. 

THE  PHYSICAL  PLANE 

7.  The  physical  plane  comprises  the  physical  objects,  actions  and  effects  in  the 
operational  area.  It  includes  military  forces,  the  electromagnetic  spectrum,  civilian 
populations,  armed  factions,  logistical  resources  and  infrastructure  as  well  as  the 
geography,  oceanography,  and  meteorology. 

8.  On  the  physical  plane  conflict  is  often  a  clash  between  armed  combatants.  Activities 
on  the  physical  plane  and  their  direct  effects2  are  tangible  and  measurable.  The  physical 
plane  and  related  activities  have  the  following  attributes: 

a.  each  party  in  a  conflict  expends  quantities  of  munitions  and  other  combat 
supplies,  and  each  is  supported  by  the  industrial  and  economic  power  of 
their  respective  sides;  and 

b.  activities  and  effects  on  the  physical  plane  can  generally  be  easily 
observed,  understood,  estimated  and  measured  with  a  degree  of  certainty. 
Of  primary  concern  are  the  material  support  requirements  for  manoeuvre 
and  firepower.  It  is  on  this  plane  that  the  science  of  conflict  predominates, 
including  those  activities  directly  subject  to  the  laws  of  physics,  chemistry 
and  like  discipline. 


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THE  COGNITIVE  PLANE 

9.  The  cognitive  plane  constitutes  the  motivation,  conviction  and  commitment  of 
individuals  and  groups  to  pursue  their  objective.  It  may  be  referred  to  as  the  moral 
plane3.  It  represents  the  will  that  enables  them  to  overcome  fear  and  adversity  as  well  as 
the  cohesion  that  holds  them  together.  It  includes  cognitive  aspects  such  as  belief  in  a 
cause,  indoctrination  and  judgement  as  well  as  emotive  responses  such  as  patriotism, 
ethnicity,  religious  zeal  and  esprit  de  corps. 

10.  On  the  moral/cognitive  plane,  conflict  is  a  struggle  between  opposing  wills  or  a 
struggle  for  moral  and  intellectual  support  from  a  target  audience.  The  tenn  moral  used 
here  is  not  restricted  to  ethics  but  pertains  to  those  forces  of  psychological  rather  than 
physical  nature,  including  the  mental  aspects  of  conflict.  These  are  difficult  to  grasp  and 
impossible  to  quantify.  They  are  manifest  in  such  intangibles  as  the  national  resolve  of 
adversaries,  their  military  plans  and  tactics,  the  quality  of  leadership  and  the 
determination  of  the  individual  combatants  to  achieve  victory.  It  also  includes  to  the 
manner  in  which  forces  and  their  commanders  perceive  and  understand  an  environment 
and  situation.  Activities  on  the  cognitive  plane  and  their  resulting  effects  will  seek  to 
undermine  an  threat’s  will,  influence  his  perception  of  a  situation  and/or  influence  the 
will  of  a  populace  or  other  target  audience.  The  cognitive  plane  and  related  activities 
have  the  following  attributes: 

a.  activities  and  effects  on  the  cognitive  plane  should  follow  a  targeting 
process  identical  to  that  of  used  for  activities  on  the  physical  plane.  This 
targeting  should  be  done  simultaneously  with  targeting  for  activities  on  the 
physical  plane  to  ensure  activities  and  effects  are  comprehensive  and 
complementary; 

b.  activities  on  the  cognitive  plane  are  more  difficult  and  require  the  greater 
investment  in  combat  development  and  training,  however  they  are  more 
flexible.  On  this  plane  the  quality  of  military  leadership,  the  morale  of  the 
fighting  troops,  their  cohesion  and  sense  of  purpose  are  of  primary 
importance.  Here  the  art  of  conflict  is  dominant; 

c.  activities  and  their  effects  on  the  cognitive  plane  may  have  subsequent 
effects  on  the  physical  plane.  For  example,  leaflets  convincing  threat 
conscripts  to  dessert  will  lesson  the  strength  of  threat  forces. 

11.  Although  much  has  been  written  regarding  elements  on  an  “informational  plane”,  this 
level  of  existence  has  yet  to  be  truly  identified  and  defined  as  being  distinct  from  either 
the  physical  or  cognitive  planes.  Infonnation  that  exists  on  infonnation  systems,  on 
computer  systems  or  even  in  the  form  of  electrons  belong  to  the  physical  plane,  for  they 
can  be  blocked,  destroyed  or  otherwise  physically  altered.  Information  that  resides  in  an 
individual’s  mind  or  in  the  collective  opinion  of  a  group  of  people,  and  thus  affects  their 
perceptions,  will  and  behaviour,  exist  on  the  cognitive  plane.  They  too  can  be  altered,  but 
through  non-lethal  activities  that  seek  to  influence. 


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PHYSICAL  EFFECTS  ACTIVITIES 

12.  Physical  effects  activities  are  those  tangible  undertakings  that  consume  resources  and 
produce  immediate  effects  through  motion  and  force.  They  may  be  lethal  or  non-lethal 
and  applied  to  create  first  order  effects  on  the  physical  plane,  and  second  order  effects  on 
the  cognitive  plane.4 

13.  Physical  effects  activities  will  focus  on  the  physical  destruction,  attrition,  disruption 
or  denial  of  those  things  essential  to  adversaries  through  the  application  of  lethal  and  non- 
lethal  fires  and  manoeuvre  throughout  the  depth  of  the  joint  operations  area.  They 
include  all  physical  activities  such  as  electronic  warfare  (EW).  Physical  activities  affect 
capability  in  order  to  affect  an  adversary’s  behaviour.5  The  goal  is  to  contribute  to  the 
defeat  of  opposing  forces  and  to  undermine  their  will  and  cohesion,  by  denying  them  the 
physical  means  or  opportunities  they  require  to  carry  out  their  intentions  and  achieve 
their  objective. 

14.  Physical  effects  activities  may  have  second  order  effects  on  the  cognitive  plane,  that 
is,  on  the  perceptions,  will  and  ultimately  on  the  behaviour  of  a  target.  For  example, 
defeat  of  a  portion  of  the  enemy’s  force  from  an  unexpected  direction  or  timing  will 
undermine  his  confidence  and  morale. 

INFLUENCE  ACTIVITIES 

15.  Influence  activities  non-lethal  activities  that  target  and  affect  the  perceptions  and  will 
of  a  target  and  thus  the  behaviour  of  the  target.  They  may  be  physical  or  cognitive 
activities: 

a.  Physical  (influence)  activities  are  non-lethal  and  create  cognitive  effects 
as  a  first  order  and  are  demonstrative  in  nature.  They  include  such 
undertakings  as  a  feint  to  deceive  enemy  commanders  or  the 
demonstration  of  capabilities  (eg,  crowd  control  or  firepower)  to  persuade 
individuals  or  groups  to  act  in  a  certain  manner.  They  will  include 
physical  demonstrations  of  commitment  and  credibility  as  reflected  in  the 
CIMIC  supported  reconstruction  of  infrastructure  and  social  development, 
which  in  turn  engender  support  from  political/social  leaders  and  local 
populations. 

b.  Cognitive  (influence)  activities  are  those  intellectual,  perception  related 
activities  undertaken  to  shape  perceptions,  understanding,  will  and 
ultimately  behaviour,  by  using  or  affecting  information.  They  seek  to 
influence  target  audiences  and  are  exemplified  by  such  activities  as 
broadcast  of  radio  announcement  to  a  local  populace  advertising  the 
benefits  of  the  ongoing  operation  or  the  issue  of  flyers  to  enemy  conscripts 
encouraging  them  to  surrender.  Cognitive  activities  include  activities  such 
as  public  affairs,  psychological  operations,  the  profile  and  posture  of 
troops  interacting  with  a  local  populace6,  and  civil-military  cooperation 
(CIMIC),  as  realised  through  support  to  infrastructure  and  social 
development  activities.  It  will  include  such  disparate  activities  as  the  issue 
of  flyers  to  persuade  enemy  conscripts  to  flee,  and  the  development  of 
public  infrastructure  to  engender  support  from  a  populace 


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16.  These  activities  focus  on  promoting  perceptions  and  attitudes,  influencing  will  and 
affecting  behaviour  of  governments,  organizations,  groups  and  individuals,  including 
those  that  are  opponents,  friends  and  neutral,  to  support  the  achievement  of  the  objective 
and  ultimately  the  end- state. 

17.  The  activities  convey  selected  information  as  well  as  physical  evidence  and 
indications  to  target  groups  and  individuals  with  the  aim  of  influencing  their  emotions, 
attitudes,  motives,  perceptions,  reasoning  and  ultimately  their  behaviour.  Although 
influence  activities  are  conducted  on  the  cognitive  plane  only,  they  may  have  secondary 
results  on  the  physical  plane.  For  example,  flyers  that  convince  enemy  conscripts  to  flee 
will  have  the  first  order  cognitive  effect  of  causing  them  to  flee  and  the  second  order 
effect  on  the  physical  plane  of  reducing  the  enemy  commander’s  combat  power.  It  will 
thus  likely  have  a  third  order  effect  on  the  cognitive  plane  of  undennining  the 
commander’s  confidence. 

18.  The  need  to  influence  a  target  audience  may  be  key  to  the  long-term  success  of  a 
mission.  Commanders  at  the  lowest  levels  must  be  made  to  understand  the  importance  of 
such  influence  activities  and  the  effects,  positive  and  negative,  that  may  be  gained  from 
them.  The  conduct  of  individual  soldiers  will  influence  the  perceptions  and  support  of 
local  populations  and  one  incident  of  poor  conduct  can  rapidly  undennine,  in  an 
exponential  manner,  many  positive  influences. 

19.  Influence  activities  have  been,  in  the  recent  past,  classified  as  part  of  Information 
Operations.  However,  Information  Operations  are  being  redefined  to  apply  solely  to 
these  influence  activities.  (See  Section  4.) 

EFFECTS  THROUGH  PHYSICAE  EFFECTS  ACTIVITIES 

20.  Physical  activities  will  create  first  order  effects  on  the  physical  plane  and  often 
second  order  effects  on  the  cognitive  plane. 

21.  Physical  activities  that  lead  to  the  destruction  of  the  threat’s  capacity  to  fight  will  be 
but  one  of  a  number  of  ways  to  defeat  him.  Selective  physical  destruction  can  be  aimed 
at  isolating  components  of  the  force  or  breaking  the  threat  physically  into  smaller  groups. 
Destruction  may  be  pursued  to  undermine  an  adversary's  ability  to  conduct  operations, 
but  is  often  most  effective  when  it  is  used  to  damage  the  adversary's  morale,  and  increase 
his  feelings  of  fear,  desperation  and  hopelessness.  That  is,  physical  activities  are  most 
effective  in  creating  second  order  effects  on  the  cognitive  plane.  Thus,  physical  activities 
affect  an  adversary’s  behaviour  by  attacking  capability  as  a  first  order,  and  by  affecting 
perception  and  will,  and  ultimately  behaviour  as  a  second  order.7 

22.  Physical  destruction  may  not  in  itself  lead  to  success.  The  destruction,  for  example,  of 
a  large  number  of  insurgents  will  not  solve  the  underlying  causes  of  an  insurgency  and 
may  create  new  recruits  to  the  movement.  This  would  be  a  physical  activity  that  leads  to 
an  undesired  second  order  effect  on  the  cognitive  plane.  Additionally,  targeting  the 
adversary  could  cause  unnecessary  collateral  damage  that  in  turn  undermines  the  support 
of  a  neutral  populace  and  the  legitimacy  of  a  campaign  and  creates  new  opposition. 
Success  criteria  that  rely  on  destruction  must  take  into  account  the  risk  to  public  and 
political  support  that  protracted  and  inconclusive  battles  and  engagements  entail.  Physical 
destruction  of  the  adversary,  by  itself,  is  not  therefore  a  wholly  reliable  means  of 


181 


achieving  lasting  success  even  if  it  is  aimed  at  the  secondary  effects  against  will  and 
behaviour  on  the  cognitive  plane. 

EFFECTS  THROUGH  INFEUENCE  ACTIVITIES 

23.  Since  defeating  an  adversary  by  physical  activity  and  its  related  effects,  be  they  on 
the  physical  or  cognitive  planes,  alone  has  limitations  and  rarely  leads  to  a  campaign  end- 
state,  land  operations  doctrine  also  encompasses  activities  that  seek  to  create  a  direct,  first 
order  effect  of  influencing  target  audiences.  Thus,  influence  activities  create  first  order 
effects  on  the  cognitive  plane  and  possibly  second  order  effects  on  the  physical  plane. 

24.  These  target  audiences  are  wide  in  scope.  They  may  be  elements  of  the  adversary, 
such  as  weak  willed  conscripts  that  can  be  encouraged  to  flee  the  battlefield.  They  may 
include  individual  power  holders,  religious  leaders  and  segments  of  a  populace  in  order  to 
influence  perceptions  and  gain  support  for  the  campaign  and  its  objectives.  They  may 
also  include  allies  and  friendly  troops  in  order  to  counter  adversary  propaganda  and 

o 

biased  media  coverage.  In  short,  these  target  audiences  will  include  adversary,  friendly 
and  neutral  individuals  and  groups. 

25.  The  key  to  employing  influence  activities  is  to  decide  the  effect  that  is  to  be  created. 
Activities  can  then  be  assigned  to  create  those  desired  effects  or  to  avoid  undesired 
effects.  A  wide  range  of  activities  will  be  used  to  influence  a  target.  They  include: 
deception;  psychological  operations;  CIMIC  activities;  selected  posture  and  profile  of 
troops;  and  public  affairs  to  name  the  most  pervasive  means.  Examples  are  given  as 
follows: 

a.  A  feint  by  forces  will  affect  the  enemy  commander’s  perception,  influence 
him  to  incorrectly  identify  the  main  effort  and  move  his  forces  away  from 
the  true  intended  area  of  attack,  thus  affecting  his  behaviour; 

b.  A  firepower  demonstration  during  a  peace  support  campaign  may 
convince  a  belligerent  commander  not  to  manoeuvre  his  forces. 

c.  Psychological  operations  may  be  used  in  the  fonn  of  a  public  radio  station 
to  bring  accurate  news  to  a  local  populace  and  to  encourage  their  support 
for  a  counter-insurgency  campaign; 

d.  CIMIC  activities  may  assist  in  civil  reconstruction  in  order  to  engender 
moral  support  from  a  government  and  its  populace  and  to  enhance  the 
perception  of  the  campaign  by  an  local  populace. 

e.  Public  affairs  messages  may  be  issued  in  order  to  counter  enemy 
propaganda  and  ensure  local  and  international  support  for  the  campaign 
and  its  operations. 

26.  Influence  activities  may  be  conducted  to  create  their  own  effects  or  they  may  be 
conducted  to  support  physical  activities.  For  example,  prior  to  a  deliberate  attack  on  an 
enemy  position,  PsyOps  flyers  may  be  dropped  informing  enemy  soldiers  of  the  means  to 
surrender  and  giving  a  promise  of  fair  treatment. 

27.  Influence  activities  are  a  key  part  of  the  concept  of  full-spectrum  operations. 


182 


28.  In  order  to  understand  what  activities  are  required  to  create  influences  and  thus  the 
desired  cognitive  effects  and  behaviour,  a  commander  must  understand  the  target 
audience  and  the  cultural  and  environmental  influences  that  affect  the  target’s  cognitive 
reasoning.  Unintended  effects  may  occur  and  do  enormous  damage  to  the  campaign.  For 
example,  the  firepower  demonstration  conduct  to  convince  a  belligerent  commander  not 
to  manoeuvre  his  forces  may  only  serve  to  embarrassment  him  in  front  of  his  supports 
and  thus  cause  him  to  actually  manoeuvre  his  forces.  Likewise,  activities  taken  to  instil 
fear  or  dissuasion  in  a  target  audience,  for  example,  may  only  create  hatred  instead.9 

THE  INTERACTION  AND  BALANCE  OF  ACTIVITIES  ON  THE  TWO  PLANES 

29.  Each  episode  in  a  conflict  is  a  unique  product  of  the  dynamic  interaction  of  a 
multitude  of  moral  and  physical  forces.  Whereas  the  physical  activities  and  effects  on  the 
physical  plane  may  be  quantified  with  some  measure  of  effectiveness,  influence  activities 
and  effects  on  the  cognitive  plane  are  difficult  to  qualify  and  measure.  Notwithstanding 
the  difficulty  in  assessing  effects  on  the  cognitive  plane,  it  is  ultimately  these  effects  that 
will  achieve  the  lasting  objectives  and  end-state  of  a  campaign.  An  adversary  force  with 
a  strong  will  and  moral  fibre  may  continue  to  fight  even  asymmetrically  once  its  material 
forces  have  been  depleted;  but,  they  will  not  continue  to  fight  effectively  once  their 
morale  and  will  have  been  destroyed. 

30.  To  attack  the  threat's  will  to  resist,  an  understanding  of  the  nature  of  human  will  is 
necessary.  When  an  individual  faces  combat,  the  primary  responses  are  to  fight,  flee,  or 
surrender.  In  most  cases,  an  attack  on  the  adversary's  will  to  fight  should  be  accompanied 
by  measures  that  encourage  the  threat  to  surrender  or  flee. 

31.  This  can  be  accomplished  not  only  through  fear  generated  by  violent  physical  actions 
such  as  massive  firepower  but  also  by  surprising  him  with  unexpected  threats.  It  can  also 
be  supported  by  offering  fair  treatment  for  prisoners  and  wounded,  showing  respect  for 
the  law  of  armed  conflict,  offering  honourable  surrender  terms  or  pursuing  other  methods 
that  legitimize  and  encourage  his  surrender.  If  desirable,  flight  can  be  encouraged  by 
offering  an  open  avenue  of  escape,  such  as  when  dispersing  a  riot.  These  can  be  seen  to 
be  activities  that  create  effects  on  the  cognitive  plane. 

32.  An  individual's  will  to  resist  is  built  on  internal  influences,  those  of  the  group,  and 
those  of  the  leader.  Internal  influences  include  personal  motivation  and  emotions,  such  as 
hatred  or  revenge,  that  motivate  the  individual  to  continue  fighting  even  if  alone.  Often 
more  dominant  are  the  influences  of  the  small  group.  Battlefield  studies,  notably  the  work 
of  S.L.A.  Marshall,  have  shown  that  the  primary  reason  men  fight  is  the  feeling  of  group 
loyalty  or  the  fear  of  letting  down  other  members  of  the  group.  The  individual,  and  in  fact 
the  group,  are  also  affected  by  the  influence  of  leaders  who  can  provide  motivation  and 
compulsion  to  fight  and  legitimize  the  efforts  of  individuals. 

33.  It  is  difficult  to  alter  strongly  held  personal  beliefs,  and  closely-knit  small  groups  are 
difficult  to  break  up.  Therefore,  efforts  aimed  at  attacking  the  threat's  will  to  fight  should 
focus  on  two  areas.  The  first  is  to  attack  the  leaders'  will  to  fight  and  the  second  is  to 
disrupt  the  bonds  between  larger  groups,  and  shattering  the  links  between  leaders  and 
followers.  In  other  words  the  preferred  method  of  attacking  the  will  to  fight  is  to  render 
the  threat  incapable  of  resisting  by  shattering  the  physical  and  moral  cohesion  of  his 
force. 


183 


34.  Even  when  an  adversary  force  is  defeated  in  a  physical  sense,  lasting  peace  will  not 
result  unless  there  is  a  moral  will  to  support  it  and  the  means  for  sustaining  it.  Thus  much 
effort,  from  the  military  and  from  other  agencies,  will  be  expended  seeking  those  lasting 
effects.  Firstly,  there  will  be  a  great  deal  of  influence  activity  to  engender  support  for  the 
campaign  and  its  objectives.  Secondly,  there  will  be  much  activity,  by  the  military  but 
ideally  by  other  agencies,  to  build  institutions  and  capabilities  amongst  the  indigenous 
society  to  secure  a  lasting  stability  and  peace. 

35.  This  comprehensive  construct  can  be  summarised  as  follows: 

a.  Physical  activities  will  help  defeat  an  enemy  through  destruction  of  his 
capability  on  the  physical  plane.  This  will  alter  his  behaviour.  On  the 
cognitive  plane,  well  planned  physical  activities  that  destroy  capability 
will,  as  a  second  order  effect,  alter  perceptions  and  will  of  an  enemy  and 
thus  affect  his  behaviour. 

b.  Influence  activities,  be  they  physical  or  cognitive,  will  have  a  first  order 
effect  on  the  cognitive  plane  that  will  influence  perceptions,  affect  will 
and  thus  behaviour  of  a  target  audience  that  will  include  individuals  and 
groups,  be  they  friendly,  adversarial  or  neutral.  When  aimed  at  leaders  and 
local  populaces,  they  generally  seek  to  engender  support  for  a  campaign 
and  its  long-tenn  objectives. 

c.  Many  of  the  influence  activities  will  be  undertaken  by  agencies  other  than 
the  military,  but  ideally  in  close  cooperation  with  the  military.  These  will 
seek  to  create  the  institutions  and  capabilities  for  long-term  stability  and 
peace. 


184 


Behaviour 


Figure  5-1:  Interaction  of  Physical-Effects  Activities  and  Influence  Activities 

36.  Therefore,  conflict  remains  ultimately  an  activity  of  human  creativity  and  intuition 
powered  by  the  strength  of  human  will.  It  requires  intuition  to  grasp  the  essence  of  unique 
situations,  creativity  to  devise  innovative  solutions  and  the  strength  of  purpose  to  act. 
Conflict  is  above  all  a  moral  undertaking.  As  a  result,  moral/cognitive  forces  exert  a  more 
significant  influence  on  the  nature  and  outcome  of  conflict  than  do  physical.  This  point  is 
fundamental  to  understanding  Canadian  Land  Force  doctrine. 

37.  In  considering  these  activities  together,  a  taxonomy  can  be  summarised.  This  is  not 
new  terminology,  but  simply  a  better  method  of  articulating  all  the  activities  and 
operations  that  military  forces  have  undertaken  to  create  desired,  lasting  effects. 


Physical  Plane 

Cognitive  Plane 

Lethal  and  Non-lethal  Activities 

Non-Lethal  Activities 

Physical  Activities 

Influence  Activities:  Physical  &  Cognitive 

Physical  Effects  -  First  order 

Cognitive  Effects  -  First  Order 

Figure  5-2:  Taxonomy  for  Activities  on  the  Physical  and  Cognitive  Planes 


185 


38.  This  concept  is  not  new.  Competent  military  commanders  have  always  understood 
the  need  to  balance  their  activities  to  create  desired  effects  on  the  physical  and  cognitive 
planes  and  history  is  full  of  examples  of  such  campaigns.  The  commander  will  decide 
upon  the  balance  between  his  capabilities  and  activities  based  on  the  campaign  theme  and 
its  guiding  principles.  For  example,  whilst  a  major  combat  campaign  against  a 
conventional  adversary  will  require  mainly  physical  activities  supported  by  some 
influence  activities  such  as  deception  and  PsyOps,  a  COIN  campaign  may  require  only 
enough  physical  activity  to  neutralise  the  insurgents  whilst  the  military  and  other 
agencies  work  to  gain  the  confidence  and  support  of  the  local  populace  through  influence 
activities,  such  as  infrastructure  and  economic  development. 

39.  The  figure  below  illustrates  the  conduct  of  activities  on  the  physical  and  cognitive 
planes. 


END-STATE 


t 

OBJECTIVES 

z\ 


Tgtis 

Physically 

Altered 

(Cannot 

Act) 

◄ 

l 

i 

Physical  Effects 
Activity 

/ 

X 

Lethal  | 

Non- 

Lethal 

Physical  Plane 

- 

Tgtis 

Cognitively 
Altered 
(Acts  the 
Way  You 
Want) 

A  \ 

Influence  Activity 

Physical  Cognitive 

\/ 

Non-Lethal 

Cognitive  Plane 

Figure  5-3:  Activities  and  Effects  on  the  Physical  and  Cognitive  Planes 


DEFINING  SUCCESS  THROUGH  THE  APPLICATION  OF  COMBAT  POWER 


186 


40.  In  order  to  reach  the  desired  end-state  and  thus  successful  conclusion  of  a  campaign, 
a  number  of  agencies  will  be  involved  in  addition  to  the  military.  This  will  ensure  that  all 
the  elements  of  a  situation  that  led  to  military  intervention  are  addressed  in  order  to 
establish  a  lasting  stability  and  peace. 

41.  The  primary  role  of  the  military  will  to  be  to  employ  its  monopoly  on  force  and  to 
counter  threats  of  violence  and  military  power  posed  by  an  adversary.  The  object  of  the 
use  of  force  or  threat  of  force  is  to  impose  the  force’s  will  upon  specific  targets.  In  many 
campaigns  military  capabilities  will  be  employed  to  neutralise  an  enemy  threat  in  order  to 
allow  other  agencies  to  undertake  their  activities  in  a  secure  environment  that  will 
address  long  term  solutions  to  the  situation.  In  addition  to  this,  military  capabilities,  in 
conjunction  with  those  of  other  agencies  and  elements,  will  be  used  to  create  effects  and 
support  objectives,  in  relation  to  a  local  populace  and  supported  government.  For 
example,  military  forces  may  be  used  to  build  infrastructure  or  to  support  other  agencies 
in  such  efforts.  These  will  be  done  to  create  a  better,  more  stable  environment  and  to 
engender  support  and  stability  from  a  populace  and  local  authority;  that  is,  they  will 
create  effects  on  the  cognitive  plane.  Thus  the  campaign  will  employ  a  comprehensive 
approach  that  deals  with  an  enemy  or  potential  adversary  and  supports  a  government  or 
population  segment  using  a  combination  of  physical  and  influence  activities  to  create 
lasting  effects  on  the  physical  and  cognitive  planes. 

42.  Success  is  measured  against  predetermined  criteria  that  support  the  decided  end-state. 
The  end-state  is  the  result  that  must  be  achieved  at  the  end  of  a  campaign  to  conclude  the 
conflict  on  favourable  terms.  The  end-state  will  likely  have  political,  diplomatic, 
economic  and  psychological,  as  well  as  military  aspects,  and  hence  will  require  the  multi¬ 
agency,  comprehensive  approach. 

43.  Victory  in  a  campaign,  in  military  terms,  may  not  see  the  outright  surrender  of  an 
opposing  force.  Rather  than  a  pure  military  victory,  the  end-state  may  often  be  defined  in 
tenns  such  as  reconciliation,  acceptance  of  the  status  quo,  or  agreement  to  a  peace  plan. 

In  many  campaigns  such  as  counter-insurgency,  there  may  be  no  outright  victory,  but 
only  a  concession  by  the  insurgents  to  pursue  peaceful  means  to  reach  their  political  goals 
or  the  development  of  an  indigenous  capacity  (physically  and  intellectually)  to  deal 
decisively  with  the  insurgency  on  their  own.  Success,  in  short,  will  occur  through 
activities  on  both  the  physical  and  cognitive  planes. 

MAINTAINING  COHESION  AND  ATTACKING  THE  THREAT’S  COHESION 

44.  Cohesion  is  unity  and  it  is  derived  from  all  three  components  of  combat  power:  the 
physical;  the  conceptual;  and  the  moral.  It  is  the  quality  that  binds  together  constituent 
parts  of  a  military  organisation  and  brings  a  measure  of  quality  to  its  combat  power. 

With  a  cohesive  force,  a  commander  can  maintain  unity  of  effort  in  imposing  his  will  on 
the  adversary  or  other  target  audiences.  Cohesion  comprises  the  general  identification 
with  a  common  aim  or  purpose  (conceptual  component),  the  means  to  concentrate  force 
in  a  coordinated  and  timely  manner  (physical  component)  and  the  maintenance  of  high 
morale  (moral  component). 

45.  Cohesion  reflects  the  unity  of  effort  in  the  force.  It  includes  the  influence  of  a 
commander's  intent  focussed  at  a  common  objective,  the  motivation  and  esprit  de  corps 


187 


of  the  force  and  also  the  physical  components  necessary  to  integrate  and  apply  combat 
power.  Cohesion  therefore  has  both  moral  and  physical  components. 

46.  The  adversary's  cohesion  can  be  attacked  by  making  his  overall  aim,  or  the  missions 
of  his  component  parts,  increasingly  inappropriate  or  irrelevant,  by  forcing  him  to 
dissipate  his  forces  in  both  time  and  space  and  by  targeting  the  moral  and  material  pillars 
of  his  morale.  The  adversary’s  cohesion  may  also  be  attacked  on  the  purely  on  the 
cognitive  plane  but  undermining  his  moral  justification  and  his  legitimacy  in  this  own 
eyes  and  in  the  eyes  of  potential  supporters. 

47.  Cohesion  is  an  intangible  but  potent  force.  A  breakdown  in  cohesion  will  lead  to 
isolation,  fear,  confusion,  and  loss  of  the  will  to  fight.  The  threat  will  be  unable  to  apply 
his  full  combat  power  and  his  component  parts  can  be  defeated  in  detail.  Ideally,  the 
result  is  an  adversary  made  up  of  a  collection  of  individuals  and  small  groups  lacking 
motivation,  direction  and  purpose.  This  loose  collection  can  be  more  easily  defeated 
because  the  ability  to  fight  effectively  as  a  force  has  been  eliminated,  that  is,  they  have 
been  affected  on  the  physical  and  cogntive  planes. 

48.  Breaking  the  threat's  cohesion,  however,  may  only  be  a  temporary  or  transitory  effect, 
and  the  threat  could  regroup  and  recover  if  pressure  is  not  maintained.  Where  physical 
and  moral  cohesion  is  shattered  and  resistance  continues,  such  as  by  fanatical  individuals 
or  groups,  physical  destruction  may  be  the  only  alternative.  This  however  should  be  seen 
as  a  last  resort. 

49.  In  summary  combat  power  must  be  created  and  applied  through  activities,  with  a 
view  to  shattering  the  threat’s  moral  and  physical  cohesion,  while  bolstering  that  of  the 
allies  and  neutral  elements.  In  order  to  accomplish  this  activities  must  be  undertaken  on 
both  the  physical  and  moral/cognitive  planes  in  a  complementary  and  synchronised 
fashion. 


SECTION  3 

A  COMPREHENSIVE  APPROACH  AND  FOCUS  ON  EFFECTS 

There  are  only  two  forces  in  the  world,  the  sword  and  the  mind.  In  the  end  the  sword  is 

always  beaten  by  the  mind. 

Napoleon 

GENERAL 

50.  Rarely  will  a  campaign  meet  with  success  through  military  action  only.  Campaigns 
occur  in  complex  situations  that  involve  local  populations,  urban  areas,  complicated 
social  and  political  structures  and  extensive,  inter-related  problems  that  led  to  the  need 
for  military  intervention.  Long  term  success  and  stability  will  only  occur  with  the  support 
of  the  majority  of  an  indigenous  population.  Thus,  in  order  to  address  all  facets  of  a 
complex  environment,  most  military  campaigns  must  involve  the  employment  of  other 
government  agencies,  such  as  those  with  expertise  in  social  and  political  development 
and  economic  development.  Only  such  an  approach  will  create  the  conditions  for  a 
sustainable  stability. 


188 


A  COMPREHENSIVE  APPROACH 

51.  The  Land  Force  follows  an  effects-based  approach  to  the  conduct  of  campaigns  and 
operations,  in  order  to  deal  with  the  conditions  in  the  modern  battlespace  and  to  reach 
successful,  lasting  conclusions  to  those  campaigns.  The  successful,  lasting,  conclusion  to 
a  campaign  will  likely  require  more  than  just  a  military  solution.  The  causes  of  the 
situation  that  required  the  military  intervention  in  the  first  place  will  likely  include  a  wide 
range,  from  the  economic,  to  the  political,  to  the  social,  and  thus  require  the  application 
of  other  agencies  and  elements  of  power  in  order  to  address  all  of  these  interconnected 
systems. 

52.  To  that  end,  the  military  must  work  in  hannony  with  the  diplomatic,  economic  and 
various  other  instruments  of  power  so  that  all  elements  of  an  environment  are  addressed 
in  the  most  appropriate  and  effective  fashion,  in  order  to  reach  those  lasting  end  states. 
This  approach  recognises  that  a  lasting  end-state  requires  effects  and  objectives  on  both 
the  physical  and  cognitive  planes  and  therefore  requires  the  resources  and  work  of  more 
than  simply  the  military.  This  approach  to  a  campaign  may  be  termed  a  comprehensive 
approach  and  begins  at  the  strategic  level  of  planning. 

53.  This  comprehensive  approach  may  be  defined  as:  commonly  understood  principles 
and  collaborative  processes  that  enhance  the  likelihood  of  favourable  and  enduring 
outcomes  within  a  particular  environment.  A  comprehensive  approach  seeks  to 
incorporate  all  the  elements  of  power  working  to  reach  the  strategic  end-state  and 
harmonise  them,  their  capabilities  and  activities  in  order  to  address  the  elements  and 
complexities  present  in  an  environment. 

54.  It  does  not  mean  to  imply  that  a  military  authority  is  overall  in  charge  of  a  campaign 
but  only  seeks  to  ensure  that  military  activities,  effects  and  objectives  lead  to  the  strategic 
end-state  and  are  complementary  to  those  of  the  lead  agency  and  of  other  elements  of 
power.  This  approach  brings  together  not  only  other  government  agencies,  but  also  other 
organisations,  be  they  international  or  indigenous. 

55.  Whilst  the  military  will  focus  on  security  and  defeating,  or  at  least  neutralising,  an 
adversary,  other  elements  of  power  will  address  those  elements  and  systems  of  the 
environment  that  ensure  lasting  security  for  a  populace  -  the  political,  social  and 
economic  elements.  Although  this  is  done  to  meet  the  long-tenn  objectives  of  a 
campaign,  it  is  also  undertaken  to  ensure  support  from  local  populations  and  leaders  who 
are  key  to  long-term  success  and  stability. 

56.  During  the  early  stages  of  a  campaign  the  security  situation  may  only  allow  for  the 
military  to  undertake  all  aspects  of  the  campaign.  Hence  the  military  may  undertake  the 
initial  reconstruction  and  economic  and  political  development  and  refonn  of  security 
services.  Once  the  security  situation  improves,  other  agencies  should  be  able  to  assume 
the  lead  in  these  non-martial  responsibilities.  Eventually,  the  campaign  may  reach  such  a 
state  that  the  military’s  role  will  be  reduced  to  an  minimum  and  indigenous  forces  will  be 
able  to  handle  any  residual  threat  to  security. 

57.  The  campaign  design  may  involve  a  formal  unified  structure  with  a  lead  agency  and 
commander,  and  all  agencies,  be  they  military  or  civil,  working  within  a  single  chain  of 
command.  Such  constructs  are  ideal  and  work  to  ensure  excellent  harmony  and 


189 


cooperation  between  agencies.  Such  situations  will  be  rare  however. 10  Usually,  informal 
arrangements  will  have  to  be  designed  in  order  to  ensure  that  all  agencies  work  in  a 
complementary  manner  in  the  attainment  of  agreed  objectives  and  end-states.  Often  there 
will  be  a  major  onus  on  the  military  commander  to  ensure  that  genuine,  cooperative  and 
collaborative  working  environments  are  developed  between  the  military  and  other 
agencies,  be  they  national,  international,  local  or  unaligned  NGOs.  Participants  must 
work  proactively  by  sharing  understanding  of  situations  and  conducting  planning  and 
activities  on  the  basis  of  agreed  favourable  outcomes  in  the  short,  medium  and  long  tenn. 
Hence,  the  comprehensive  approach  will  rely  as  much  on  personal  relationships  as  on 
formal  arrangements.  Processes  and  structures  may  need  to  be  adapted  to  reflect  specific 
circumstances  and  situations.  For  example,  a  military  headquarters  may  have  to 
accommodate  the  interface  with  non-military  organisations  and  take  the  lead  in 
coordinating  objectives  and  efforts.  The  comprehensive  approach  must  also  consider 
actors  and  agencies  beyond  the  government,  such  as  non-government  organisations 
(NGOs),  international  organisations  (IOs),  local  agencies  and  leaders  and  others,  all  of 
which  conduct  activity  and  pursuer  objectives  that  have  a  bearing  on  the  successful 
conclusion  of  the  campaign. 

58.  Although  the  comprehensive  approach  begins  at  the  strategic  level,  it  should  be 
viewed  and  implemented  pervasively  throughout  all  levels  of  command.  Hence,  it  will 
be  envisioned,  designed  and  ideally  empowered  at  the  strategic  level  in  order  create 
strategic  end-states,  but  implemented  and  practised  at  both  the  operational  and  tactical 
level.  At  the  operational  level,  commanders  will  endeavour  to  ensure  a  holistic  and 
complementary  integration  of  military  and  non-military  agencies  in  order  to  address  all 
systems  and  elements  within  the  environment,  thus  creating  physical  and  cognitive 
effects  that  support  operational  objectives.  This  comprehensive  approach  should  be 
replicated  as  appropriate  at  the  tactical  level  where  unit  and  even  sub-unit  commanders 
will  work  with  other  agencies  to  create  effects  that  support  enduring  objectives. 

59.  Through  this  comprehensive  approach,  the  influence  activities  that  create  enduring 
effects  on  the  cognitive  plane  will  be  created  by  both  the  military  and  other  agencies. 

This  comprehensive  approach  uses  all  instruments  of  power  to  address  all  the  systems 
that  influence  an  environment  and  the  need  for  the  intervention  and  campaign.  Activities 
within  an  environment  must  be  considered  against  more  than  simply  an  adversary.  All 
systems  -  political,  military,  economic,  social,  infrastructure  and  infonnational  -  within 
the  environment  must  be  identified  and  considered  in  terms  of  their  power  structures, 
inter-relationships  and  influences  on  the  desired  objectives  and  end-states.  Activities 
planned  and  taken  by  all  agencies  including  the  military  must  be  considered  in  tenns  of 
their  effects  on  each  of  these  systems  in  relation  to  the  desired  outcomes.  Only  in  this 
comprehensive  manner  -  using  multiple  agencies  in  addition  to  the  military  to 
address  all  the  systems  and  elements  in  an  environment  -  will  long  term  solutions  to 
campaigns  be  reached. 

60.  The  comprehensive  approach  consists  of  three  elements: 

a.  Unifying  Theme.  In  striving  towards  a  strategic  end-state,  the  lead 
agency  should  issue  a  unifying  theme  that  is  focused  on  long-term 
outcomes  and  end  states.  For  the  military,  this  should  be  pervasive 


190 


throughout  the  campaign  design.  It  should  be  developed  in  the 
commander’s  visualization  of  the  campaign  and  articulated  in  his  intent. 

b.  Collaborative  Working.  An  effort  is  made  to  harmonise  the  activities, 
effects  and  objectives  of  all  the  elements  of  power  in  the  JIMP 1 1 
framework  so  that  all  efforts  are  complementary  and  integrated  towards 
common  objectives  and  end-states.  This  may  occur  under  formal 
arrangements  or  informal  arrangements. 

c.  Comprehensive  Response.  The  activities  and  effects  of  all  the  elements 
of  the  JIMP  framework  are  to  be  applied  to  all  the  relevant  elements, 
systems  and  entities  that  are  at  work  in  the  environment,  be  they  political, 
social,  military,  economic,  etc,  in  a  holistic  approach  to  the  situation. 12 
Furthermore,  there  occurs  continuous  assessment  as  to  how  campaign 
activities  will  affect  each  of  these  systems  and  entities  and  how  they  will 
in  turn  affect  one  another. 

61.  Within  the  campaign  environment  different  groups  will  co-exist  either  peacefully  or 
in  competition  with  each  other  based  on  religious,  ethnic,  political,  ideological  or 
clan/tribal  lines.  Human  perceptions  of  issues  of  economy  and  security  will  affect  the 
behaviour  and  thinking  of  the  population.  Cultural  factors  are  dynamic  and  present  both 
obstacles  and  opportunities.  Knowing  the  groups,  what  relationships  exist  between  them, 
how  they  relate  to  the  infrastructure  and  how  each  group  will  respond  to  an  activity  is 
critical  to  success. 

62.  In  general,  four  fundamentals  should  be  considered  in  applying  a  comprehensive 
approach: 

a.  A  Proactive  Approach.  Ad-hoc  relationships  formed  at  short  notice  in 
response  to  a  developing  crisis  prove  problematic  and  although  at  times 
unavoidable,  do  not  produce  the  best  results  in  the  shortest  order  and 
prove  difficult  in  overcoming  prejudices  and  previously  held 
misconceptions.  Rather,  a  comprehensive  approach  should  be  supported 
by  standing  agreements  and  strong  personal  and  institutional  relationships 
and  early,  shared  analysis  of  an  environment  and  battlespace. 

b.  Shared  Understanding.  A  shared  understanding  of  the  strengths, 
limitations,  aims  and  cultures  of  each  element  within  the  comprehensive 
approach  to  a  campaign  will  allow  a  harmonised  and  complementary 
application  of  capabilities.  Secondly,  a  share  understanding  of  the 
operating  environment  and  the  threats  to  lasting  stability  security  will 
again  help  ensure  a  harmonised  and  complementary  approach  to  the 
campaign  across  the  various  elements  of  power. 

c.  Outcome  or  End-State  Based  Thinking.  The  unifying  theme  should 
serve  to  focus  the  elements  within  the  comprehensive  approach  and  ensure 
that  activities  conducted  by  all  elements  within  the  comprehensive 
approach  are  based  on,  and  judged  on,  the  achievement  of  progress 
towards  the  agreed  objectives  and  end-state.  Each  undertaking  by  an 


191 


element  of  power  should  be  considered  against  how  it  might  further 
progress  towards  the  end-state. 

d.  Collaborative  Working.  The  comprehensive  approach  demands  that 
military  and  non-military  institutions  -  be  they  national  or  indigenous  - 
work  together  with  trust,  transparency  and  personal  investment  in  order  to 
be  successful.  This  must  be  fostered  at  all  levels.  Whilst  some  elements 
and  their  leaders,  particularly  those  not  familiar  with  the  military,  will  not 
be  comfortable  with  a  collaborative  or  highly  cooperative  relationship, 
effort  must  be  made  to  insure,  at  the  very  least,  a  coordinated  and  de- 
conflicted  coexistence  is  established  vice  a  mutually  exclusive 
relationship.  In  such  circumstances,  the  onus  may  fall  upon  the  military 
commander  to  foster  and  engender,  through  dynamic,  engaging  and 
generous  personality,  an  atmosphere  of  cooperation. 

63.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  levels  of  authority,  experience,  technical  ability  and 
understanding  of  the  personnel  within  these,  largely  civilian,  organisations  might  not 
always  correspond  to  that  of  the  land  force.  This  will  inevitably  introduce  frictions,  and 
uncertainties,  which  may  exacerbate  personality  and  institutional  difficulties.  Nor  will  a 
formal  command  relationship  likely  exist  between  military  and  non-military  agencies. 

The  commander  has  a  key  role  to  play  in  harmonizing  these  relationships.  When 
collaboration  is  achieved,  significant  advantages  will  include  to: 

a.  more  accurate,  shared  situational  awareness; 

b.  easier  identification  of,  and  agreement  about,  outcomes; 

c.  earlier  identification  of  emerging  opportunities  as  an  operation  progresses; 

d.  improved  capacity  for  mitigating  undesirable  consequences;  and 

e.  more  efficient  use  of  resources. 

UNDERSTANDING  EFFECTS 

64.  General.  To  succeed  in  this  environment  commanders  must  recognize  that  the 
activities  they  undertake  will  create  effects  that  cannot  be  viewed  in  isolation.  Applying 
physical  force  requires  an  increasingly  precise  ability  to  find,  fix  and  strike  targets,  while 
at  the  same  time  avoiding  unintended  consequences  that  may  be  counter-productive,  such 
as  collateral  damages.  Many  campaigns  require  military  commanders  to  consider 
activities  in  relation  to  more  than  simply  an  enemy  force.  Success  in  a  complex 
environment  requires  that  they  understand  the  creation  of  effects  and  the  range  of 
elements  and  systems  within  the  environment  that  affect  the  successful  conclusion  of  a 
campaign. 

65.  End-States  and  Objectives.  At  all  levels,  activities  create  effects  that  in  turn  support 
desired  objectives  and  thus  end-states: 

a.  Strategic  End-state.  The  desired  situation  derived  from  Policy  direction. 

It  is  realised  by  the  achievement  of  strategic  objectives.  A  strategic  end- 
state  will  be  multi-faceted  and  a  military  objective  and  end-state  will  only 
be  a  part  of  it. 


192 


b.  Strategic  Objective.  A  constituent  of  the  desired  strategic  end-state 
realised  through  the  aggregation  of  agreed  circumstances  and  conditions, 
specific  to  a  particular  element  of  power  involved  in  meeting  the  strategic 
end-state.  Once  all  objectives  are  realised,  the  strategic  end-state  will  have 
been  achieved. 

c.  Military  Operational  End-state.  The  desired  and  enduring  military 
situation  derived  from  strategic  direction,  brought  about  by  the  campaign, 
taking  into  account  the  end-state  and  objectives  of  the  other  instruments  of 
power.  It  may  be  reached  before  the  strategic  end-state  is  reached.  Upon 
achieving  it,  the  military  involvement  in  a  campaign  may  cease  or  be 
reduced  substantially. 

d.  Operational  Objective.  A  constituent  of  the  desired  operational  end-state 
realised  through  the  aggregation  of  one  or  a  number  of  inter-related 
effects. 

e.  Tactical  End-State.  The  tactical  situation  once  a  tactical  mission  has 
been  completed.  It  is  described  in  the  concept  of  operations  paragraph  of 
an  tactical  order  for  a  specific  mission. 

f.  Tactical  Objective.  A  constituent  part  of  the  tactical  end-state  and  the 
immediate  aim  of  a  tactical  mission  as  described  by  the  mission  statement. 
They  result  from  the  achievement  of  a  tactical  effect  or  group  of  effects 
resulting  from  tactical  activities  (see  below). 

66.  Effects.  Effects  are  defined  as:  changes  as  a  result  or  consequence  of  actions, 
circumstances  or  other  causes.  An  effect  may  be  a  physical  or  cognitive  result  of  an 
activity  or  series  of  activities,  that  may  be  military  or  non-military.  Effects  can  be 
categorized  as  follows: 

a.  Direct  Effects.  Direct  effects  are  the  consequence  of  activities  (weapons 
employment  results,  populace  informed  through  leaflets,  etc.),  unaltered 
by  intervening  events  or  mechanisms.  They  are  usually  immediate  and 
easily  recognisable.  Direct  effects  occur  within  the  same  system  or  group 
targeted. 

b.  Indirect  Effects  are  the  consequences  of  an  activity  that  occur  as  a  result 
of  the  application  of  a  direct  effect  that  is  removed  in  time  or  purpose  from 
the  initial  point  of  application  and  target.  They  occur  in  a  target  that  was 
not  the  object  of  the  activity.  For  example,  if  a  successful  attack  on  a 
village  occupied  by  insurgents  convinces  insurgents  in  another  village  to 
withdrawal,  the  latter  is  an  indirect  effect.  Indirect  effects  may  be  difficult 
to  recognize,  due  to  subtle  changes  in  behaviour  that  may  hide  their  extent 
or  their  unanticipated  nature. 

c.  Intended  and  Unintended  Effects.  Intended  effects  are  those  that  are 
planned  in  relation  to  the  activities  conducted  and  support  the  desired 
objective.  They  may  be  direct  or  indirect.  Unintended  effects  are  those  that 
were  not  foreseen  and/or  desired  by  the  related  activities.  They  may  be 


193 


direct  or  indirect  and  will  likely  undermine  the  attainment  of  the  desired 
objective. 

d.  Second,  third  and  subsequent  order  effects.  These  are  the  intended 
effects  that  relate  to  consequences  of  a  direct  effect.  As  an  example, 
dropping  leaflets  has  the  direct  effect  of  causing  enemy  soldiers  to  desert. 
The  intended  second  order  effect  is  that  their  unit’s  combat  power  is 
reduced  or  becomes  ineffective  and  a  third  order  effect  that  the 
commander’s  loose  confidence  and  morale.  Note  that  these  subsequent 
effects  cross  between  the  cognitive  and  physical  planes. 

67.  Actions.  Actions  are  assigned  by  the  joint/operational  level  of  command  to  the 
component  level  command  in  order  to  create  the  desired  operational  level  effects.  They 
are  issued  as  missions  and  are  conducted  through  a  series  of  planned  activities. 

68.  Activities.  Once  an  action/mission  is  assigned  to  a  component,  it  issues  activities. 
Activities  are  tactical  level  undertakings,  that  is,  missions,  assigned  to  formations  and 
units  and  are  realised  through  tactical  tasks  and  effects.  In  line  with  the  Continuum  of 
Operations  construct,  activities  are  classified  as  offensive,  defensive,  stability  and 
enabling.  The  construct  of  a  mission  statement  clearly  articulates  the  tactical  level  effects 

13 

that  are  required  by  an  activity. 

69.  Unpredictability  of  Effects.  Note  that  effects  are  at  times  caused  by  circumstances 
that  are  beyond  the  foresight  or  control  of  a  military  commander  and  result  from  the 
unpredictable  dynamics  of  systems  within  the  environment.  Thus,  in  such  situations,  an 
effects-based  approach  demands  that  a  commander  simply  work  through  the  situation  and 
mitigate  the  undesired  effects  that  could  not  be  foreseen  or  avoided. 

EFFECTS  TAXONOMY  AND  PLANNING  AN  EFFECTS  BASED  APPROACH 

70.  An  effects-based  approach  to  operations  may  be  defined  as:  The  way  of  thinking 
combined  with  specific  processes  that  enable  the  realisation  of  strategic  objectives 
through  the  integration  and  effectiveness  of  the  military  contribution  within  a 
comprehensive  approach.  It  plans  activities  to  create  desired  effects  in  support  of 
objectives,  and  complements  military  activities  with  those  of  other  elements  of power,  in 
consideration  of  the  complexities  of  the  given  environment.  It  is  a  process  that  focuses  on 
outcomes,  objectives  and  end-states,  and  the  effects,  created  through  activities,  need  to 
realise  them.  It  is  a  philosophy  supported  by  methodology. 

71.  In  order  to  properly  apply  effects  there  is  a  requirement  for  an  analytical  approach 
using  the  coordinated  application  of  the  full  range  of  military  and  non-military 
capabilities,  to  undertake  activities  and  create  effects.  These  effects  are  assessed  and 
adjusted  against  pre-detennined  measures  of  effectiveness  (MoE),  which  ask  the 
question,  “Are  we  doing  the  right  things  to  create  the  desired  effects ”.  The  effects  in  turn 
lead  to  objectives,  achieving  the  desired  end-state.  Adjusting  the  effects  and  the  activities 
used  to  create  those  effects,  based  on  the  assessment  feedback,  is  vital  to  the 
implementation  of  this  approach. 

72.  In  planning  operations  and  articulating  outcomes,  commanders  must  clearly 
understand  and  express:  the  end-state;  the  conditions  needed  to  achieve  it,  that  is,  their 
objective(s);  the  effect(s)  required  to  achieve  the  objective(s);  and  those  activities 


194 


required  to  create  the  effect(s).  (See  figure  below).  Thus,  in  execution,  activities  are 
conducted  to  create  desired  effects  that  realise  objectives,  which  in  turn,  support  desired 
end-states. 


Figure  5-4.  The  Effects  Based  Approach 


73.  Although  the  construct  of  activities  creating  effects  leading  to  objectives  is  applicable 
at  all  levels  of  command,  the  link  between  its  application  at  operational  and  tactical  levels 
is  through  allocated  missions.  At  the  joint  and  operational  level,  the  following  taxonomy 
will  be  applied: 

a.  operational  objectives  that  support  the  end-state  will  be  identified; 

b.  effects  will  be  articulated  in  order  to  support  these  objectives; 

c.  these  effects  will  be  allocated  to  the  component  commands  (eg,  to  the  land 
component  of  the  joint  force)  as  actions  to  be  undertaken.  These  will  be 
issued  as  missions; 

d.  the  missions  will  be  executed  through  a  series  of  activities  assigned  to 
subordinate  elements  of  the  component  command. 


195 


Figure  5-5.  The  Effects  Based  Approach  Applied  Between  Operational  and  Tactical 
Levels 


74.  At  the  tactical  level,  an  effects-based  approach  is  practised  through  the  manoeuvrist 
approach  (see  below),  applied  on  both  the  physical  and  moral/cognitive  planes,  so  that  a 
combination  of  complementary  physical-effects  activities  and  influence  activities  are 
used  to  achieve  desired  objectives.  Furthermore,  the  standard  orders  process  and  the 
principle  of  Mission  Command  remain  relevant  and  the  expression  of  effects  is  already  a 
constituent  part  of  a  well-constructed  mission  statement.  Indeed,  an  effects  approach 


196 


helps  to  more  clearly  define  the  commander’s  intent  and  to  focus  the  force  on  achieving 
it. 

KEY  ELEMENTS  OF  AN  EFFECTS-BASED  APPROACH 

75.  An  effects  based-approach  to  operations  acknowledges  that  conflicts  and  campaigns 
in  the  contemporary  operating  environment  involve  a  wide  variety  of  sources  and  issues, 
and  require  a  wide  range  of  capabilities  and  activities  in  order  to  influence  and  affect 
their  causes  and  actors,  including  the  indigenous  population.  In  order  to  consider  and 
incorporate  all  elements  and  entities  that  influence  the  operational  situation,  the  following 
are  key  elements  for  an  effects-  based  approach: 

a.  Knowledge  Base.  An  effects-based  approach  to  operations  is  predicated 
on  a  sound  understanding  of  the  battlespace  and  the  actors,  factors  and 
influences  within  it.  Information  and  intelligence  collection  must  be 
expanded  in  order  to  incorporate  and  assess  the  various  elements  and 
entities  that  inter-relate  within  an  environment  -  the  political,  military, 
economic,  social  (including  cultural  and  religious  factors),  infrastructure 
and  infonnational  entities14. 

b.  Comprehensive  Approach.  A  comprehensive  approach  seeks  to 
incorporate  all  the  elements  of  power  working  to  reach  the  strategic  end- 
state  and  hannonise  them,  their  capabilities  and  their  activities.  It  seeks  to 
address  all  the  systems  and  influences  within  an  environment  that  may 
have  in  impact  upon  long  term  stability.  It  comprises  of:  a  unifying  theme; 
collaborative  working;  and,  comprehensive  response. 

c.  Measures  of  Effectiveness15.  A  measure  of  effectiveness  is  defined  as:  a 
criterion  used  to  evaluate  how  a  task  has  affected  selected  system 
behaviour  or  capabilities  over  time.  Measures  of  effectiveness  indicate  if 
the  right  things  are  being  done  in  order  to  create  the  desired  effects.  They 
are  generally  subjective  and  depend  upon  the  situation  and  campaign. 

They  are  used  to  confirm  that  the  correct  activities  are  being  undertaken 
and  to  adjust  activities  as  necessary  to  achieve  desired  objectives. 

76.  Application  of  an  effects-based  approach  to  operations  simply  expands  the  current 
operational  planning  process  and  campaign  prosecution  in  order  to  incorporate  a  broader 
scope  of  information,  elements  of  power,  capabilities,  application  and  assessment  in  order 
to  reach  operational  and  strategic  end-states  in  complex  environments. 

APPLYING  AN  EFFECTS  BASED  APPROACH 

77.  The  methodology  for  an  effects  based  approach  to  planning,  execution  and 
assessment  continues  to  develop.  However,  the  philosophy  is  widely  understood  and  the 
concept  is  not  a  new  one.  Good  commanders  have  intuitively  understood  and  applied  a 
wide  range  of  effects  against  all  the  elements  in  an  environment  that  impact  the  overall 
objective.  The  Land  Force  effects-based  approach  is  exercised  through  a  number  of 
means: 

a.  the  adoption  of  campaign  themes  as  articulated  in  the  Continuum  of 

Operations,  that  acts  to  focus  operations  on  long  term  outcomes  and  end 
states.  The  campaign  theme,  along  with  the  guiding  principles  for  that 


197 


particular  type  of  campaign,  inform  the  commander  as  to  the  balance 
required  between  physical-effects  activities  and  influence  activities,  that 
is,  between  effects  on  the  physical  plane  and  effects  on  the  cognitive 
plane; 

b.  the  Joint,  Inter-agency,  Multi-national,  Public  (JIMP)  framework,  that 
harnesses  the  efforts  and  capabilities  of  other  players  within  the  operating 
environment  in  order  to  reach  common  end-states; 

c.  consideration  of  all  the  systems  or  entities  that  exist  in  a  complex 
environment  that  impact  upon  the  overall  situation  and  successful 
conclusion  to  the  campaign.  These  systems  and  entities,  or  at  their  general 
classifications,  will  help  identify  lines  of  operation  for  the  campaign  (eg, 
economic  development); 

d.  a  comprehensive  targeting  the  considers  the  whole  range  of  targets  and 
target  audiences  within  an  environment  together  and  plans  their 
engagement  using  the  full  range  of  lethal  and  non- lethal  capabilities  to 
create  complementary  effects  on  the  physical  and  cognitive  planes;  and 

e.  the  adoption  of  measures  of  effectiveness,  that  allow  continuous 
assessment  of  progress  across  a  wider  range  of  campaign  lines  of 
operation. 

With  these  tools  the  commander  conducts  his  operations  in  a  more  comprehensive 
manner  using  the  full  resources  available  across  the  full  breath  of  lines  of  operation. 

78.  This  concept  of  comprehensiveness  in  all  aspects  of  the  plan  and  its  enables 
commanders  to  more  effectively  address  all  aspects  and  influences  of  their  battlespace 
and  environment  by  incorporating  in  a  synchronised  and  complementary  fashion 
operations  on  both  the  cognitive  and  physical  planes. 

EFFECTS  BASED  APPROACH  AS  PART  OF  CAMPAIGN  PLANNING 

79.  In  incorporating  an  effects-based  approach  to  the  extent  that  operational  outcomes 
can  be  translated  into  coherent  tactical  activity,  existing  tactical  procedures,  terminology 
and  practice  can  be  seen  as  complementary  to  effects-based  practice  at  all  levels  of 
command.  The  significance  of  the  Commander’s  unifying  theme  continues  and  it  is  this 
theme  that  provides  the  focus  for  the  campaign  plan,  which  in  turn  enables  operational 
design.  Operational  art,  intuition  and  command  will  still  have  a  major  part  to  play, 
especially  in  uncertain  conditions  and  in  those  situations  where  there  is  a  compelling 
need  to  act.  In  all  circumstances,  it  is  anticipated  that  operational  freedom  of  action  will 
be  preserved  and  this  is  necessary  for  there  will  always  be  gaps  in  knowledge  and  a 
commander’s  intuition  will  still  be  required.  Indeed,  regardless  of  the  lengths  to  which 
commanders  and  staff  may  go  to  anticipate  all  the  actions  and  reactions  of  the  systems  in 
an  environment,  there  remain  too  many  variables,  not  the  least  of  which  are  individual 
personalities  and  motives,  to  allow  an  accurate  prediction  of  all  cause-and-effect 
relationships.  Thus,  commander’s  intuition  and  responsiveness  to  the  unforeseen  will 
remain  key  to  successful  operations. 

80.  The  application  of  an  effects-based  approach  is  pervasive  at  all  levels  throughout  the 
planning  and  execution  of  operations,  from  the  campaign  plan  downwards.  Whilst  the 


198 


strategic  direction  gives  the  long-term  perspective,  the  campaign  plan  will  provide  the 
medium-term  framework,  focusing  on  an  operational  end-state,  constituent  operational 
objectives  and  required  effects.  The  near  term  to  medium  term  gap  is  covered  through 
operation  plans  that  issue  the  activities  that  create  the  desired  effects. 

81.  An  effects-based  approach  to  campaigns  and  operations  will  not  alter  the  process  of 
campaign  design  and  planning  but  only  provide  it  with  better  focus  and  measurable 
progress.  Terminology  for  campaign  design  will  remain  extant,  but  the  application  of  it, 
on  both  the  physical  and  cognitive  planes,  will  have  to  be  conceptually  expanded.  The 
steps  involved  in  an  effects-based  approach  are  the  same  as  those  in  campaign  planning 
and  the  operational  planning  process,  however  the  scope  of  these  planning  processes  will 
need  to  broadened,  in  order  to  fully  encompass  all  the  disparate,  yet  inter-connected 
components  pertinent  to  the  situation.  In  other  words,  they  will  have  to  be 
comprehensive  and  plan  for  both  physical  and  cognitive  effects,  in  a  simultaneous  and 
complementary  fashion,  as  required  by  the  campaign  and  its  environment. 

82.  Once  the  commander  has  conducted  his  visualization  of  the  operation  and  developed 
a  unifying  theme  in  his  intent,  and  confirmed  his  end-state,  he  can  identify  the  objectives 
to  achieve  the  operational  end-state  and  then  decide  required  effects  that  must  be  applied 
to  realise  those  objectives.  The  identification  of  the  objectives  will  then  determine  the 
lines  of  operation  required  that  will  lead  to  each  of  the  objectives.  Effects  will  then  be 
decided  along  each  line  of  operation,  possibly  described  as  decisive  points16.  These  may 
be  issued  to  staff  or  subordinates  as  either  planning  guidance  or  in  orders. 

83.  A  campaign  design  will  include  a  number  of  lines  of  operation  that  lead  from  the 
current  state  of  affairs  and  disposition  -  physically  and  conceptually  -  to  the  operational 
end  states.  The  lines  of  operation  will  link  assign  activities  that  create  the  desired  effects, 
that  lead  to  objectives  that  together  constitute  the  end-state.  Effects  along  these  lines  of 
operation  may  be  described  as  decisive  points  that  must  be  reached  en  route  to  their 
respective  objectives.  Since  they  support  an  objective,  they  may  also  be  termed, 
supporting  effects.  A  centre  of  gravity  analysis  remains  important  in  campaign  planning, 
but  it  must  be  assessed  with  a  greater  understanding  of  the  nature  of  the  complexities  of 
the  environment.  In  assessing  a  centre  of  gravity  at  each  level  of  command,  it  must  be 
remembered  that  they  may  be  physical  or  moral  centres  of  gravity,  and  they  are  based  on 
people,  be  they  groups  or  individuals.17  While  centres  of  gravity  may  be  identified  and 
targeted  in  due  course,  lines  of  operation  should  focus  on  achieving  the  desired  end-state 
through  the  attainment  of  key  objectives. 

84.  In  the  early  stages  of  a  campaign,  the  military  may  assume  a  role  in  each  or  at  least 
most,  lines  of  operation.  As  a  security  situation  improves,  the  responsibilities  for  non¬ 
security  related  lines  of  operation  should  be  passed  to  those  other  agencies  best  suited  to 
conduct  them.  For  example,  initial  reconstruction  of  infrastructure  may  fall  to  the 
military.  However,  as  the  security  situation  improves  and  other  government  agencies  and 
NGOs  arrive  in  theatre,  such  responsibilities  should  be  assumed  by  them. 

85.  Lines  of  operation  in  many  campaigns  in  a  complex  operating  environment  will 
incorporate  a  large  array  of  objectives,  effects  and  activities.  They  will  include  diverse, 
but  inter-related  aspects  such  as  security,  governance  and  development.  Some  will  be 


199 


prosecuted  by  a  single  element  of  power  whilst  others,  such  as  governance,  will  be  shared 
by  several  agencies,  none  of  which  may  be  military. 


Line  of  Operation 
Theme  2: 
Security 


Op  Objective  3:  Secure  Environment 
Maintained 


Op  Objective  4:  Self-Sustaining  Security 
Established 


Line  of  Operation 
Theme  3: 
Political  Process 


Op  Objective  5:  Electoral  Process  Reformed 


Op  Objective  6:  Elected  Government 
Empowered 


Line  of  Operation 

Op  Objective  7:  Key  Infrastructure 

Restored 

Ineme  4: 

Reconstruction 

Op  Objective  8:  Sustained  Infrastructure 
Established 

OPERATIONAL 

END-STATE 

A  lasting  peace  in 
which  the  threat  of 
violence  and  civil 
war  has  been 
removed  and  Nation 
X  has  stable  political 
structures, 
supported  by 
reliable 
infrastructure, 
governance  and 
regional  leaders, 
providing  prosperity 
and  security  for  all 
of  its  people. 


Current  Situation 
Near  Civil  War 


Operational 
Centre  of  Gravity 


Favourable  Situation 
Enduring  Peace 


Clan  Y  &  Their  Support  for  Central 
Government 


Figure  5-6:  An  example  of  lines  of  operation  as  part  of  a  Campaign  plan. 


Governance 

Security 

Political  Process 

Reconstruction 

Interim 

Governance 

Provided 

Self- 

Governance 

Established 

Secure 

Environment 

Maintained 

Self- 

Sustaining 

Security 

Electoral 

Process 

Reformed 

Elected 

Government 

Empowered 

Key 

Restoration 

Sustained 

Infrastructure 

Established 

Transitional 

government 

is 

established 

Military 

control 

reformed 

Provincial 

capitals 

secured 

Militia  B 
repatriated 

Electoral 

process 

designed 

Government 

structures 

reformed 

Essential 
services  re¬ 
established 
in  all  areas 

Equitable 

control 

achieved 

Provincial 

governments 

re¬ 

established 

Police 

control 

reformed 

Border 

crossings 

secured 

Military 
trg  re¬ 
established 

Ethnic 

leaders 

engaged 

Political 
oversight  of 
security 
institutions 

Resource 

infrastructure 

secured 

Accountability 
procedures  in 
place 

Economic 
reforms  for 
distribution 

Militia  B 
deterred 

Police  trg 
re¬ 
established 

Interim 
control  of 

resources 

Enduring 

infrastructure 

re-built 

200 


achieved 

Militia  B 
defeated 

Sustained 

growth 

Figure  5.7:  Sample  Supporting  Effects  for  Operational  Objectives  and  Lines  of 
Operations 

86.  Commanders  may  not  necessarily  have  all  the  integral  resources  required  to  generate 
the  effects  they  envision.  By  leveraging  and  synchronizing  the  resources  and  capabilities 
across  the  JIMP  framework,  they  can  produce  the  right  combination  of  effects  on  the 
right  lines  of  operation  to  lead  to  the  desired  end  state.  This  places  particular  emphasis  on 
the  collaboration  required  at  all  levels  with  JIMP  participants.  Some  lines  of  operation 
may  be  conducted  by  only  the  military,  others  will  be  the  sole  responsibility  of  other 
agencies,  and  others  may  be  shared  between  the  military  and  others.  In  either  case,  a 
campaign  seeking  to  establish  enduring  solutions  for  conflicts  in  complex  environments 
must  accept  a  long-term  view  and  the  requirement  for  a  range  of  instruments  of  power  to 
be  employed. 

EFFECTS-BASED  APPROACH  AT  THE  TACTICAL  LEVEL:  THE 
MANOEUVRIST  APPROACH 

87.  In  practical  terms,  activities  are  conducted  to  generate  effects  aimed  at  achieving 
objectives.  These  activities,  assigned  as  tasks,  may  be  physical  or  influencing  in  nature  to 
produce  effects  on  the  physical  or  cognitive  planes.  While  the  term  objective  has 
commonly  been  used  to  refer  to  a  physical  object  against  which  action  is  taken,  in  an 
effects-based  approach  an  objective  may  be  something  far  more  abstract,  particularly  if 
the  it  is  on  the  cognitive  plane. 

88.  At  the  tactical  level,  the  standard  orders  process  and  the  principle  of  mission 
command  will  remain  relevant.  The  desired  “effect”  of  a  mission  statement  is  issued  in 
the  tactical  task  (often  as  a  first  order  effect,  eg  seize)  and  in  the  purpose  of  the  tactical 
task  (in  order  to. . . .),  which  may  be  a  second  order  effect.  Mission  command  allows  a 
subordinate  commander  to  assume  tasks  in  support  of  achieving  the  desired  effects. 

89.  The  principles  underlying  the  manoeuvrist  approach  remain  appropriate  at  all  levels 
and  dovetail  neatly  within  an  effects-based  approach.  The  effects  based  approach  is 
applied  at  the  tactical  level  through  the  manoeuvrist  approach.  The  manoeuvrist 
approach  traditionally  incorporates  three  core  activities  and  effects:  attacking  will; 
shattering  cohesion;  and  shaping  understanding.  In  applying  the  manoeuvrist  approach  to 
both  the  physical  and  cognitive  plane,  a  wider  conceptualisation  must  occur.  In 
understanding  this  application,  it  must  be  remembered  that  when  applied  to  certain  target 
audiences,  such  as  a  friendly  or  neutral  audience,  activities  may  be  undertaken  to  shape 
understanding,  but  in  an  effort  to  strengthen  will  and  enhance  cohesion.  It  sees  idea  of 
manoeuvre  applied  on  both  the  physical  and  moral/cognitive  planes.  Thus,  for  example, 

a  COIN  campaign  plan  may  envision  attacking  key  insurgent  strongholds  in  order  to 
undermine  his  will  and  cohesion  (manoeuvrist  approach  on  the  physical  plane)  while 
providing  better  economic  and  social  development  for  the  local  populace,  and  advertising 
these  activities  quickly  in  the  local  media  (manoeuvre  on  the  cognitive  plane  to  shape 
understanding  and  engender  support  from  the  populace). 


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2 

ST 

B 

5' 

CTO 


Figure  5-8:  Activities  and  Effects  on  the  Physical  and  Cognitive  Planes  Leading  to 
Objectives 

90.  It  is  important  to  note  that  activities  on  the  physical  plane  may  have  an  impact  on  the 
cognitive  plane  and  vice  versa.  This  emphasises  the  need  to  understand  both  the  first  and 
subsequent  orders  of  effects  and  to  be  aware  of  the  possibility  of  undesired  effects  and 
the  need  to  work  to  avoid  them.  For  example,  while  an  assault  on  an  insurgent  element 
in  village  X  has  a  first  order  effect  on  the  physical  plane  of  the  destruction  of  that  force, 
the  second  order  effect,  on  the  cognitive  plane,  is  the  increase  in  security  of  the  local 
populace  and  the  increase  in  their  confidence  and  sense  of  legitimacy  of  the  campaign.  If 
however,  the  attack  resulted  in  civilian  deaths  and  significant  destruction,  then  the 
undesired  effect,  on  the  cognitive  plane,  will  be  the  loss  of  support  for  the  campaign 
amongst  the  local  populace  and  a  loss  of  legitimacy  for  the  campaign. 

91.  The  degree  of  risk  acceptance  imposed  upon  the  commander  or  that  which  he 
considers  acceptable,  will  in  some  cases  determine  the  types  of  activities  the  commander 


202 


will  apply  to  achieve  his  desired  end  state.  For  example  the  best  means  to  defeat  an 
opposing  actor  in  area  X  may  be  to  improve  the  economic  conditions  of  the  local 
population.  However,  the  risk  to  agencies  that  can  best  affect  this  may  currently  be  too 
high.  Therefore,  physical-effects  activities  aimed  at  the  opposing  force  may  have  to 
precede  actions  by  other  agencies.  In  making  this  decision,  the  commander  must  weigh 
the  potential  adverse  effect  of  any  collateral  damage  in  conducting  lethal,  physical-effects 
activity  against  the  risk  of  casualties  among  the  other  agencies  should  they  be  employed 
first.  Sequencing  and  synchronization  of  activities  and  effects  will  be  critical  to  the 
overall  establishment  of  the  desired  end  state. 

THE  KNOWLEDGE  BASE  AND  THE  SPECTRUM  OF  RELATIVE  INTEREST 

92.  As  discussed  above,  a  broad  knowledge  base  that  defines  and  assesses  all  the 
elements,  actors  and  systems  within  an  environment  that  may  influence  the  outcomes,  is  a 
key  aspect  of  an  effects-based  approach  to  operations. 

93.  An  effects-based  approach  is  predicated  on  a  sound  understanding  of  the  battlespace 
and  the  actors  and  influences  within  it.  It  must  be  guided  by  an  IPB  process  designed  for 
the  complexity  of  the  operating  environment  and  includes  modifying  the  way  a  campaign 
planner  and  tactical  commanders  look  at  the  adversary  and  all  other  factors,  systems  and 
entities  that  affect  the  environment  and  a  successful  conclusion  to  the  campaign.  Hence, 
it  requires  a  broader  classification  of  all  the  actors,  that  ranges  from  the  adversary, 
through  hostile  and  neutral  to  friendly  and  allies,  within  the  battlespace  as  they  relate  to 
the  interests  and  objectives  of  the  friendly  force.  This  has  been  labelled  the  spectrum  of 
relative  interest  and  where  these  actors  fit  on  it  in  relation  to  the  desired  end-state  will 
weigh  heavily  on  the  commander’s  consideration  of  what  effects  he  will  apply  to  modify 
their  position  on  the  continuum  to  align  them  with  our  interests.  Some  of  these  effects 
will  be  physical,  but  many  others,  specifically  those  seeking  to  engender  support  from  the 
target,  will  be  cognitive  effects.  They  are  all  targets  or  target  audiences  for  engagement, 
either  on  the  physical  plane,  the  cognitive  plane  or  both. 19 

94.  The  increasing  emphasis  within  the  Land  Force  on  cultural  understanding,  stemming 
from  the  need  to  engender  support  from  local  populations  and  to  engage  other  elements 
of  an  environment,  is  a  recognition  that  there  is  a  requirement  to  gain  insight  into  the 
cognitive  plane,  and  the  intent,  motivations  and  relationships  of  actors  and  groups  in  the 
battlespace,  in  order  to  out  manoeuvre  them  or  to  move  them,  through  an  effect  of 
influence,  to  a  position  of  acceptance,  cooperation  and  even  support.  The  assessment  that 
leads  to  this  categorisation  supports  the  targeting  process,  for  each  of  the  audiences  on 
the  spectrum  of  relative  interest  is  assessed  with  respect  to  how  they  may  be  influenced 
and  moved  to  a  position  of  support  or  acceptance. 


203 


SPECTRUM  OF  RELATIVE  INTEREST 


NEUTRALS 


ALLIES 


INACTIVE 

HOSTILE 


SUPPORTIVE 


ENEMY 


UNSUPPORTIVE 


FRIENDLY 


MORE 


SUPPORT  FOR  THE 
-  CAMPAIGN  - 


LESS 


Figure  5-9.  The  Spectrum  of  Relative  Interest 

95.  Each  of  the  groups  within  an  environment  may  be  plotted  along  the  spectrum  of 
relative  interest,  and  an  assessment  may  be  made  as  to  what  activities  are  required  to 
either  maintain  their  support  or  to  move  them  to  a  position  of  support,  that  is,  to  produce 
cognitive  effects  in  support  of  the  end-states  of  the  campaign. 

96.  This  approach  must  also  recognize  the  paradigm  shift  in  information  acquisition. 
While  in  major  combat  operations  a  significant  part  of  the  information  required  to 
establish  understanding  by  the  commander  may  flow  from  national  or  higher  echelon 
sources,  in  peace  support  and  counter-insurgency  operations,  this  shifts  toward  a  model 
that  is  more  bottom  up,  with  soldiers  in  direct  contact  as  the  key  source  of  information.  In 
many  such  circumstances,  actionable  intelligence  regarding  adversary  targets  and  the 
motivations  for  their  support  will  come  from  contact  with  the  local  populace. 
Furthermore,  such  contact  will  provide  useful  input  for  measures  of  effectiveness, 
particularly  in  terms  of  gauging  the  reaction  of  the  local  populace  to  the  campaign’s 
activities  and  conduct.  Thus,  an  understanding  and  application  of  an  effects-based 
approach  down  to  the  lower  tactical  level  is  critical  to  its  overall  success. 

FUNDAMENTALS  FOR  AN  EFFECTS  BASED  APPROACH 

97.  The  fundaments  that  guide  an  effects-based  approach  to  campaigns  and  operations 
are: 

a.  Long-term  View.  Commanders  and  planners  must  take  a  long-term  view 
of  the  campaign  and  the  situation,  to  deal  with  the  symptoms,  and  more 
importantly,  the  underlying  causes  of  the  conflict  and  crisis.  The  solution 


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to  the  base  causes  will  usually  take  a  long  time  to  create  and  secure.  It  is 
important  that  political  leaders  understand  this  requirement  as  well. 

b.  Whole  Environment.  It  must  be  realised  that  the  environment  in  which  a 
situation  and  conflict  occur  is  complex,  adaptive  and  often  unpredictable. 
The  environment  must  be  viewed  holistically  and  the  influence  of  all 
systems  and  actors  with  respect  to  resolving  the  conflict  must  be  assessed 
and  considered  in  planning.  The  inter-related  nature  of  the  environment  in 
which  the  adversary,  neutral  and  friendly  elements  interact  must  be 
considered.  Commanders  must  comprehend  the  relationships  between 
activities  and  effects  particularly  in  relation  to  the  elements  and  systems  of 
the  environment. 

c.  Focus  on  End-state.  Planning  must  focus  on  strategic  end-state  and 
objectives,  and  operational  objectives  and  the  conditions  needed  to  realise 
them. 

d.  Collaboration.  All  levels  of  command  must  work  to  create 
complementary  effects  that  work  towards  operational  objectives. 

e.  Complementary  Application  of  the  Instruments  of  Power.  The 

military  activities  must  be  harmonised  with  the  contributions  of  different 
instruments  of  power  (JIMP)  and  agencies  within  the  battlespace  and 
environment  in  order  to  reach  agreed  objectives  and  end-states.  Planning 
and  execution  must  be  done  within  the  context  of  the  comprehensive 
approach. 

f.  Continuous  Analysis  and  Assessment.  Continuous  analysis  and 
assessment  must  be  done  in  a  holistic,  interative  fashion  to  deepen 
understanding  of  the  environment  and  to  modify  the  plan  and  execution  as 
necessary  to  reach  the  operational  objectives.  Staff  and  commanders  must 
continually  assess  the  effectiveness  of  activities  in  creating  the  desired 
effects,  and  adapt  accordingly. 

ASSESSMENT 

98.  The  assessment  element  is  a  key  component  in  an  effects-based  approach  and  in  the 
achievement  of  enduring  end-states.  Assessment  remains  the  responsibility  of  intelligence 
staffs,  however  resources  and  time  must  be  dedicated  to  assessing  the  effect  of  operations 
on  all  systems  and  entities  within  an  environment.  Assessment  of  effects  on  the 
cognitive  plane  take  time  to  measure  and  changes  may  be  incremental. 

99.  Assessment  assists  the  commander  during  execution  in  determining  measures  of 
performance  (MoP  -  are  things  being  done  right),  and  measures  of  effectiveness  (MoE  - 
are  the  right  things  being  done  to  achieve  desired  effects)20.  Even  if  activities  are  done 
correctly  and  measures  of  performance  indicate  successful  completion  of  those  activities, 
it  will  be  for  nought  in  terms  of  achieving  objectives  if  those  activities  are  not  creating 
the  desired  effects  necessary  to  realise  objectives.  The  requirement  of  both  types  of 
assessment  leads  to  the  requirement  to  establish  a  deliberate  process,  designed  to  assess 
progress  in: 

a.  achieving  end-state  conditions; 


205 


b.  accomplishment  of  operational  objectives;  and 

c.  accomplishment  of  activities. 

100.  Assessment  is  described  in  detail  in  Chapter  7,  under  targeting. 


SECTION  4 

INFORMATION  OPERATIONS 


INTRODUCTION 

101.  Information  operations  are  defined  as:  Co-ordinated  actions  to  create  desired  effects 
on  the  will,  understanding  and  capability  of  adversaries,  potential  adversaries  and  other 
approved  parties  in  support  of  overall  objectives  by  affecting  their  information, 
information-based  processes  and  systems  while  exploiting  and  protecting  one ’s  own21 . 

102.  Information  operations  (Info  Ops)  are  not  an  operation  unto  itself.  Rather,  the 
doctrinal  construct  is  a  collection  of  capabilities  related  to  infonnation.  It  includes  a  wide 
range  of  activities,  both  physical  and  cognitive.  Both  seek  to  affect  the  understanding, 
capabilities  and  ultimately,  the  attitude  and  will  of  a  target  audience.  Thus  information 
operations  includes  a  wide  range  of  activities  spanning,  for  example,  from  physical 
attacks  against  enemy  command  posts,  to  building  schools,  to  issuing  media  statements  to 
running  a  public  radio  station,  ah  in  order  to  affect  information,  capability,  perceptions, 
will  and  eventually  behaviour. 

103.  Info  Ops  doctrine  developed  in  the  latter  part  of  the  20th  century  to  include  a  wide 
and  disparate  collection  of  capabilities,  loosely  linked  by  a  concept  of  information 
control.  It  was  motivated  by  rapid  technological  advances  in  infonnation  processes  but 
lacked  a  fathering  and  guiding  holistic  philosophy  and  set  of  principles.  Reconsideration 
of  the  doctrine  has  allowed  it  to  be  refined  and  disciplined,  with  the  focus  on  those 
activities  that  influence  perceptions  and  affect  motivations  and  behaviours.  This  section 
outlines  the  broad  Info  Ops  doctrine  accepted  across  the  NATO  Alliance,  but  then  refines 
it  to  focus  on  activities  that  create  effects  on  the  cognitive  plane.22 

CORE  ACTIVITY  AREAS 

104.  Info  Ops  are  conducted  in  three  core  activity  areas:  Influence  Activity,  which  is  the 
primary  means  of  influencing  will;  Counter  command  activity  (CCA),  which  counters 
information  and  command  related  capability;  and  infonnation  protection  activity  (IPA), 
which  safeguards  friendly  information,  thereby  affecting  an  adversary’s  understanding. 
There  is  no  clear  delineation  between  the  three  elements  and  each  will  impact  on  the 
others  and  therefore  must  not  be  considered  exclusive. 

a.  Influence  Activity.  Influence  activity  comprises  any  activity  for  which 
the  primary  purpose  is  to  influence  the  perception  and  will  of  the  target 
audience,  be  it  friendly  or  hostile.  It  may  include  the  use  of  physical 
means  such  as  demonstrative  fires  to  indicate  intent  and  cognitive  means, 
such  as  psychological  operations  (PsyOps).  In  either  case,  their  effects  are 
cognitive.  Influence  activities  may  be  stand-alone  activities  seeking  a 


206 


particular  effect  or  they  may  be  supporting  other  activities.  In  short,  these 
activities  affect  the  infonnation  and  perception  of  adversaries  and  others, 
and  thus  affect  their  will  and  behaviour. 

b.  Counter-Command  Activity.  Counter-Command  Activity  (CCA)  seeks 
to  physically  alter  an  adversary’s  C2  capability.  It  affects  the  flow  of 
information  to  and  from  a  decision-maker,  thereby  affecting  understanding 
or  influencing  will.  CCA  seeks,  within  ROE,  to  disrupt,  degrade,  usurp, 
deny,  deceive  or  destroy  an  adversary’s  information,  command, 
propaganda  and  associated  systems,  processes  and  networks.  In  targeting 
such  systems,  commanders  must  assess  the  secondary  and  long-term 
effects  .  In  short,  these  activities  affect  the  adversary’s  information 
capabilities  and  thus  his  understanding.  In  targeting  such  systems 
commanders  must  assess  the  secondary  and  long-term  effects.  It  may  be 
better  to  simply  exploit  information  gained  from  a  C4  system  rather  than 
destroy  it.  Secondly,  the  impact  of  destruction  of  C4  systems  must  be 
considered  in  relation  to  the  long-tenn,  adverse  effects  on  civilian  systems 
being  used  by  the  adversary. 

c.  Information  Protection  Activity.  Information  Protection  Activity  (IP A) 
comprises  any  activity  that  prevents  an  adversary  from  gaining 
information  relating  to  friendly  operations.  IPA  includes  Operations 
Security  (OPSEC),  counter-intelligence,  information  security  (INFOSEC) 
and  counter-  intelligence,  surveillance,  targeting,  acquisition  and 
reconnaissance  (ISTAR).  The  counter-ISTAR  function  includes  the 
technical  and  non-technical  elements  of  an  adversary’s  information 
gathering  capability  and  may  include  preventing  a  third  party  from 
receiving  or  relaying  essential  elements  of  friendly  information  (EEFI).  In 
short,  these  activities  deny  the  adversary  information  and  thus  affect  his 
understanding  and  capabilities.  They  thus  may  affect  will  as  a  second 
order  effect. 

KEY  ACTIVITIES  WITHIN  INFORMATION  OPERATIONS 

105.  Info  Ops  coordinates  activity  and  is  not  a  capability  in  its  own  right.  The  three  core 
Info  Ops  activity  areas  can  make  use  of  all  or  any  capability  or  activity  that  can  exert 
influence,  affect  understanding  or  have  a  counter-command  effect.  However,  there  are 
several  capabilities,  tools  and  techniques  that  form  the  basis  of  most  Info  Ops  activity. 
They  include  Psychological  Operations  (PsyOps),  presence  posture  and  profde  (PPP), 
OPSEC,  Infonnation  Security  (INFOSEC),  deception,  Electronic  Warfare  (EW),  physical 
destruction  and  Computer  Network  Operations  (CNO).  Clearly,  many  of  these  tools  and 
techniques,  such  as  physical  destruction,  have  a  much  wider  application  than  Info  Ops 
(and  when  not  used  to  support  Info  Ops  the  potential  unintended  effects  of  such  activity 
must  be  considered),  but  can  be  drawn  upon  by  Info  Ops.  It  is  important  to  note  that  only 
when  tools  and  techniques  are  used  directly  to  influence  will,  affect  understanding  or 
affect  a  decision-maker’s  C4ISR  capability,  they  can  be  deemed  part  of  Info  Ops  activity. 
Furthermore,  the  activities  are  conducted  based  on  the  desired  effect.  Not  every 
campaign  will  utilise  all  the  tools  available. 


207 


a.  Psychological  Operations.  The  primary  purpose  of  PsyOps  is  to 
influence  the  perceptions,  attitudes  and  behaviour  of  selected  individuals 
or  groups  in  accordance  with  Info  Ops  objectives.  Unlike  Public  Affairs 
(PA),  PsyOps  retains  direct  control  over  contents,  dissemination  and 
focuses  on  a  specific  audience(s).  Effective  PsyOps  requires  timely 
provision  of  resources,  analysis  and  planning.  PsyOps  products  will  utilise 
a  wide  variety  of  means  including  print,  radio,  television,  loudspeakers, 
face-to-face  contact,  the  Internet,  faxes,  pagers  and  mobile  telephones. 

b.  Presence,  Posture  and  Profile.  The  appearance,  presence  and  attitude  of 
a  force  may  have  significant  impact  on  perceptions  and  attitudes, 
particularly  on  neutral  or  potentially  adversarial  audiences.  This  concept  is 
applicable  at  all  command  levels  and  all  elements  of  the  force  contribute 
to  it.  It  seeks  to  send  or  support  a  message  and  thus  create  a  perception 
that  supports  that  overall  objective.  For  example,  the  decision  to  wear 
berets  instead  of  combat  helmets  and  body  armour  can  make  a 
considerable  difference  to  the  perceptions  of  both  the  adversary  and  local 
people.  The  public  profile  of  commanders  at  all  levels  will  impact  on 
perceptions  and  therefore  the  public  role  of  the  commander  must  be 
carefully  analysed  and  opportunities  used  to  transmit  key  messages. 
Commanders  must  understand  and  assess  the  attendant  risk  that 
accompanies  any  decision  regarding  posture  and  profile  against  the  need 
to  send  a  particular  message. 

c.  Operations  Security.  OPSEC  is  used  to  identify  and  protect  infonnation 
that  is  critical  to  the  success  of  the  campaign  and  is  described  as  essential 
elements  of  friendly  information.  (EEFI).  It  aims  to  deny  the  identified 
EEFI  to  the  adversary  decision-maker,  thereby  affecting  understanding. 
EEFI  will  need  to  be  protected  throughout  its  lifecycle  and  throughout  the 
range  of  military  activities.  Adversarial  understanding  and  capability  are 
targeted  to  maintain  the  security  of  EEFI,  using  a  combination  of  passive 
and  active  techniques. 

d.  Information  Security.  The  goal  of  INFOSEC  is  to  protect  the 
confidentiality,  integrity  and  availability  of  information  through  a  variety 
of  procedural,  technical  and  administrative  controls.  INFOSEC  includes  a 
range  of  measures  that  are  applied  on  a  routine  basis  under  the  auspices  of 
security  policy  to  protect  infonnation.  INFOSEC  encompasses  elements 
of  physical  security,  such  as  personnel  and  document  security,  and 
Information  Assurance  (IA)  measures.  INFOSEC  includes  elements  of 
physical  security,  such  as  personnel  and  document  security,  and 
Information  Assurance  (IA).  IA  includes  a  range  of  electronic  techniques, 
such  as  Computer  Network  Defence  (CND)  and  Communications  Security 
(COMSEC)  incorporating  Emission  Control  (EMCON),  defensive 
monitoring  and  technical  inspection  techniques,  counter-eavesdropping, 
limited  electronic  sweeps  and  vulnerability  analysis. 

e.  Deception.  Deception  involves  measures  designed  to  mislead  adversaries 
by  manipulation,  distortion  or  falsification.  Deception  is  a  complex  art, 


208 


which  demands  considerable  effort,  a  high  level  of  security  and 
coordination,  and  a  sound  understanding  of  an  adversary's  way  of 
thinking.  It  is  normally  used  to  dislocate  the  attention  and  combat  power 
of  an  adversary  but  may  be  used  as  part  of  information  protection,  that  is, 
to  conceal  friendly  force  intentions  and  capabilities.  Deception  will  likely 
use  a  combination  of  physical  means  (such  as  a  feint  or  demonstration) 
supported  by  other  information  cues. 

f.  Physical  Destruction.  There  are  two  main  aspects  to  the  use  of  physical 
attack  for  10  purposes.  First,  attacks  on  command  and  control  systems 
will  affect  the  capability  of  an  adversary  and  thus  his  ability  to  apply  will. 
Secondly,  the  use  of  force  in  certain  situations  sends  a  strong  cognitive 
message  and  consequently  will  have  significant  psychological  impact. 
Carefully  applied  force  can  play  a  major  role  in  coercion  and  deterrence 
and  in  reducing  an  adversary’s  ability  to  exercise  command.  However, 
undue  collateral  damage  and  unnecessary  casualties  will  have  an  adverse 
effect  on  public  support.  This  must  particularly  be  considered  if  the  enemy 
is  using  civilian  infrastructure  to  support  his  C2  requirements.  If  physical 
destruction  is  required  to  achieve  the  desired  effect  the  Commander  must 
consider  and  balance  the  potential  negative  impact  that  it  may  cause  with 
the  expected  benefits. 

g.  Electronic  Warfare.  Electronic  Warfare  (EW)  has  wide  application  in 
military  operations.  The  effect  of  EW  activity  can  be  temporary  or 
permanent  and  it  has  the  potential  to  minimise  the  use  of  force,  hence 
avoiding  unnecessary  casualties  and  collateral  damage.  EW  will  be  used 
to  affect  critical  information  or  the  systems  by  which  it  is  transmitted. 
Electronic  attack  enables  CCA  and  attacks  on  Information  Technology 
(IT).  It  also  supports  influence  activity  by  enabling  deception  and 
PsyOps,  including  broadcasts  to  target  audiences.  Conversely,  EW  can  be 
used  to  defend  systems  and  infonnation.  Electronic  defence,  in 
conjunction  with  spectrum  management,  contributes  by  helping  to  counter 
an  adversary’s  CCA  and  protecting  friendly  use  of  the  electromagnetic 
spectrum. 

h.  Computer  Network  Operations.  The  opportunity  for,  and  effectiveness 
of,  CNO  is  proportional  to  the  adversary’s  dependence  on  Information 
Technology  (IT).  CNO  comprise  attack,  exploitation  and  defence: 

(1)  Computer  Network  Attack.  Computer  Network  Attack  (CNA) 
includes  means  to  attack  computer  systems.  Software  and 
hardware  vulnerabilities  allow  computers,  storage  devices  and 
networking  equipments  to  be  attacked  through  insertion  of 
malicious  codes,  such  as  viruses,  or  through  more  subtle 
manipulation  of  data,  all  in  order  to  affect  the  understanding  and 
ultimately  the  actions  of  the  adversary. 

(2)  Computer  Network  Exploitation.  Computer  Network 
Exploitation  (CNE)  supports  Info  Ops  by  the  ability  to  get 


209 


information  about  computers  and  computer  networks,  by  gaining 
access  to  infonnation  hosted  on  those  and  the  ability  to  make  use 
of  the  information  and  the  computers/computer  network  itself. 

(3)  Computer  Network  Defence.  The  purpose  of  Computer  Network 
Defence  (CND)  is  to  protect  against  adversary  CNA  and  CNE. 
CND  is  action  taken  to  protect  against  disruption,  denial,  theft, 
degradation  or  destruction  of  information  resident  in  computers 
and  computer  networks,  or  of  the  computers  and  networks 
themselves.  CND  is  essential  to  maintain  decision-making 
capability  and  confidence. 

i.  Civil-Military  Cooperation  (CIMIC).  ).  CIMIC24  is  a  coordination 
and  liaison  function  that  facilitates  operations  in  relation  to  civil 
authorities  and  non-military  organisations  and  leads  to  activities  that 
support  local  authorities.  Because  of  their  ability  to  inform,  demonstrate, 
influence  and  compel,  CIMIC  related  activities  are  a  key  aspect  to  the  Info 
Ops  plan.  It  provides  information  in  the  fonn  of  physical  evidence  of 
cognitive  issues  such  as  commitment  and  situational  improvement  and 
thus  engenders  support  from  target  audiences.  CIMIC  related  activities 
therefore  need  to  be  coordinated  within  the  overall  Info  Ops  plan,  in  terms 
of  impacts  upon  civil  audiences,  their  leaders  and  their  infonnation 
systems  in  order  to  ensure  that  activities  work  to  support  overall 
objectives. 

j .  Public  Information.  The  aim  of  public  affairs  (PA)  or  media  operations 
is  to  protect  the  credibility  and  legitimacy  of  operations  and  promote 
widespread  understanding,  thereby  gaining  support  for  military  operations 
while  not  compromising  EEFI.  It  communicates  infonnation  to  audiences, 
through  the  medium  of  local,  national  and  international  media  and  other 
communication  means.  Although  PA  is  primarily  focused  on  informing 
and  educating  audiences,  its  impact  is  much  wider.  It  is  therefore  essential 
that  PA  staff  and  those  of  other  10  capabilities  work  closely  together  to 
ensure  that  a  coordinated  message  is  delivered  to  the  intended  audiences. 
To  avoid  giving  the  false  impression  that  the  media  are  being  manipulated 
in  any  way,  a  distinction  must  be  maintained  between  PsyOps  and  PA  . 

TARGETS  FOR  INFORMATION  OPERATIONS 

106.  Based  on  the  above,  the  activities  listed  under  Info  Ops  may  be  classified  as  either: 
influence  activities;  counter-command  activities;  or,  as  infonnation  protection  activities. 
In  order  words,  they  are  activities  that  create  effects  on  the  cognitive  plane  or  the  physical 
plane.  Influence  activities  use  either  physical  means  and/or  cognitive  means  to  create 
effects  amongst  target  audiences  on  the  cognitive  plane  in  order  to  influence  perception, 
attitudes,  will  and  behaviour.  Activities  classified  as  either  counter-command  activities 
or  information  protection  activities  are  physical-effects  activities  that  create  effects  on  the 
physical  plane  . 

107.  Targets  for  Info  Ops  may  thus  be  grouped  in  accordance  with  the  following  table: 


210 


Influence  Activities: 

Targets  on  the  Cognitive  Plane 

Counter-Command  Activities  and 
Information  Protection  Activities: 

Targets  on  the  Physical  Plane 

Human: 

Links: 

Political  Leaders 

Couriers  and  Dispatch 

Religious  and  Social 

Riders 

Leaders 

Land  Line 

Groups  of  a  population, 

Radio  and  Other 

such  as  tribes,  clans 

Informational  Links 

Adversary 

Nodes: 

Leaders/Commanders 

C2  Centres  and 

Adversary  troops  and 

Command  Posts 

sub-groups  such  as 
conscripts 

Physical  Plant 

Satellites 

Figure  5-10:  Targets  for  Information  Operations 


REVISED  DOCTRINE  FOR  INFORMATION  OPERATIONS 

108.  An  analysis  of  Info  Ops  doctrine,  its  justification  and  its  origins,  conducted  from  a 
historical  perspective,  indicates  significant  problems  with  the  construct,  its  logic  and  its 
application.  Firstly,  within  the  Info  Ops  construct  as  it  developed,  nothing,  other  than  the 
technological  support  of  information  processes  and  the  types  of  nodes  and  links 
composing  command  and  control  (C2)  systems,  was  actually  new.  The  idea  of  attacking 
and  defending  C2  systems  or  the  idea  of  influencing  individuals  or  groups  in  order  to 
alter  perceptions,  will  and  behaviour,  are  not  new  concepts  that  developed  only  through 
information  technology.  Many  of  the  best  examples  of  “information  operations” 
occurred  before  the  doctrine  developed  or  were  conducted  by  militaries  and  adversary 
groups  that  lacked  any  such  doctrine'  . 


211 


109.  Secondly,  those  physical  activities  that  are  classified  as  counter-command  and 
information  protection  are,  at  their  very  essence,  nothing  more  than  offensive  and 
defensive  activities,  that  is,  attack  and  defence.  Whether  information  if  being  denied  to 
the  enemy  through  counter-reconnaissance  activities,  defence  and  security  platoons 
deployed  around  an  HQ,  or  through  computer  firewalls  and  anti-virus  software,  it  can  all 
be  classified  as  defensive  activities.  Likewise,  an  attack  against  a  courier,  that  is,  a  link 
in  a  C2  system,  an  fighting  patrol  against  a  command  post,  that  is,  a  node,  an  EW  attack 
or  a  computer  virus  launched  to  neutralise  enemy  C2  systems,  may  all  be  classified  as, 
planned  as,  and  conducted  as,  offensive  operations.  Their  subsequent  classification  as 
information  operations  was  unnecessary. 

110.  Finally,  those  capabilities  and  activities  meant  to  influence  cannot  be  considered 
separately  from  other  operations,  for  they  themselves  are  operations,  that  is,  they  are 
tactical  activities  undertaken  to  create  desired  effects.  The  deception  of  an  enemy 
commander,  the  use  of  flyers  to  convince  conscripts  to  flee,  the  building  of  civilian 
infrastructure  to  counter  an  insurgency  and  win  the  support  of  a  populace,  and  other  such 
activities  seeking  cognitive  effects  are  tactical  activities  that  must  be  conceived,  planned 
and  targeted  as  part  of  an  overall  plan,  simultaneous  with  and  complementary  to,  physical 
activities.  Like  physical  activities,  they  may  be  classified  in  the  operational  framework 
and  described  by  their  effects  of  shaping,  decisive  or  sustaining  .  In  other  words,  they 
will  be  conducting  manoeuvre  on  the  cognitive  plane. 

111.  In  light  of  this  re-assessment  of  Info  Ops  doctrine,  the  following  outline  construct 
shall  be  considered  Info  Ops  for  Cdn  Land  Forces29: 

a.  Info  Ops  activities  be  considered  only  those  that  fall  into  the  category  of 
influence  activities:  PsyOps;  presence,  profile  and  posture;  deception; 
CIMIC;  and  public  affairs.  That  is,  Info  Ops  are  physical  and  cognitive 
activities  that  create  first  order  effects  on  the  cognitive  plane. 

b.  Those  activities  previously  considered  counter-command  and  infonnation 
protection  activities  are  to  be  considered  simply  as  elements  of  offensive 
and  defensive  operations  and  planned  and  conducted  as  required. 

c.  Info  Ops,  that  is,  activities  that  influence,  are  to  be  part  of  a  G3  staff 
branch  for  conduct  and  part  of  G5  staff  branch  for  planning.  Each  staff 
branch  may  contain  specialist  advisors,  in  such  areas  as  CIMIC,  PsyOPs 
and  PA,  for  operations  and  planning,  but  no  staff  branch  should  be 
specifically  designated  as  an  Info  Ops  staff.  All  staff  functions  other  than 
G3/G5  support  and  enable  operations,  but  do  not  conduct  them.  Thus,  no 
specific  staff  branch  other  than  G3/G5  have  Info  Ops  responsibilities.  The 
G9  CIMIC  staff  branch  may  be  deleted  unless  used  for  purely  liaison  and 
information  support  functions.  Specialist  advice  to  the  commander  will 
either  be  through  the  G3/G5  functions  or  come  from  the  commanders  of 
those  units  and  detachments  conducting  the  operations,  for  example,  from 
a  PsyOps  detachment  commander. 

d.  Influence  activities  are  to  be  conceived,  planned  and  conducted  in  unison 
with  physical-effects  activities.  In  some  ways  they  will  be  shaping,  such  as 
the  issue  of  PsyOps  flyers  to  enemy  forces,  just  prior  to  an  assault, 


212 


encouraging  them  to  surrender  or  the  conduct  of  a  feint  to  deceive  the 
enemy.  In  other  aspects,  they  may  be  decisive,  such  as  the  re¬ 
establishment  of  key  infrastructure  to  secure  the  support  of  a  populace. 

e.  Just  as  combat  arms  units  manoeuvre  on  the  physical  plane,  influence 
activities  will  be  considered  part  of  the  manoeuvrist  approach  on  the 
cognitive  plane.  Although  all  units  will  play  a  role  in  creating  influences 
(eg,  the  posture  of  troops  conducting  framework  patrolling  or  the  use  of 
EW  to  create  deception),  the  manoeuvre  units  for  specific  influence  effects 
may  be  considered  PsyOps,  CIMIC  resources  and  PA.  Manoeuvre  on 
both  planes  must  be  considered  together  in  the  creation  of 
complementary  effects  and  achievement  of  tactical  and  operational 
objectives. 

INFORMATION  OPERATIONS  (INFLUENCE  ACTIVITY)  PHILOSOPHY30 

1 12.  Land  forces  conduct  activities  to  create  effects  in  order  to  achieve  military 
objectives  assigned.  Info  Ops  incorporate  influence  activities  that  focus  on  achieving  a 
cognitive  effect  on  key  local  decision-makers  and  groups  by  affecting  their  perception, 
will,  decision-making  processes  and  behaviour.  Although  they  create  effects  on  the 
cognitive  plane,  they  are  considered  operations,  in  the  same  context  as  activities  that 
create  effects  on  the  physical  plane.  They  may  be  classified  using  the  same  taxonomy: 
offensive;  defensive;  stability;  and  enabling.  They  are  conceived,  planned  and  conducted 
simultaneously  with  activities  that  create  physical  effects.  Together  they  may  be 
considered  comprehensive  operations  that  consider  the  whole  environment.  As 
operations,  they  come  under  the  direct  responsibility  of  the  commander.  This  is 
fundamental  to  an  effects-based  approach  to  operations  and  a  comprehensive  approach  to 
operations. 

113.  Failure  to  incorporate  physical-effects  activities  and  influence  activities  together, 
that  is,  effects  on  both  the  physical  and  cognitive  planes,  will  preclude  the  conduct  of 
full-spectrum  operations. 

1 14.  Many  of  the  influence  effects  sought  by  influence  activities  will  be  beyond  the 
capability  and  capacity  of  military  forces,  at  least  for  an  extended  period.  Thus,  the 
military  will  seek  to  conduct  influence  activities  within  the  JIMP  framework  so  that 
activities  such  as  reconstruction  and  economic  development  and  the  long-tenn  solutions 
to  a  conflict  may  be  fully  realised. 


213 


End-State 


Effects  « 


Activities. 


Tgtis 

Physically 

Altered 

(Cannot 

Act) 

X' 

< 

i 

k 

Physical  Effects 
Activity 

/ 

AN 

Lethal  | 

Non- 

Lethal 

Physical  Plane 

COMPREHENSIVE 
OPERATIONS 


Figure  5-11:  Operations  that  Consider  the  Whole  Environment 


PRINCIPLES  IN  THE  APPLICATION  OF  INFORMATION  OPERATIONS 
(INFLUENCE  ACTIVITIES) 

115.  As  with  all  types  of  military  activities,  information  operations  should  be  planned  and 
conducted  based  on  certain  key  principles: 

a.  Commander’s  Direction  and  Personal  Involvement.  The  commander’s 
personal  involvement  drives  Info  Ops  and  exercises  control  over  all  Info 
Ops  activity,  within  a  framework  of  timely  decision-making  and 
consultation  up  and  down  the  chain  of  command.  Without  the  clear 
guidance  of  the  commander’s  unifying  theme  and  intent,  the  Info  Ops 
effort  will  lack  focus  and  will  not  achieve  the  desired  effects  in  hannony 
with  other  activities. 

b.  Close  Co-ordination  and  Sequencing.  The  very  nature  of  Info  Ops  and 
the  large,  diverse  target  set  means  that  there  needs  to  be  very  close 
integration,  vertically  and  horizontally,  within  a  command  in  terms  of 
creating  complementary  effects  in  support  of  common  objectives.  The 
issue  of  contradictory  messages  or  inaccurate  information  will  undermine 
credibility  and  legitimacy.  All  Info  Ops  plans  and  activities  must  be 
closely  coordinated  throughout  the  echelons  and  ideally  across  multiple 
agencies.  This  is  the  responsibility  of  the  commander,  assisted  by  targeting 
staff,  advisors  and  subordinate  commanders. 

c.  Accurate  Intelligence  and  Information.  Successful  Info  Ops  must  be 
founded  on  good  intelligence  support  and  the  development  of  a  deep  and 


214 


broad  knowledge  base  in  which  all  elements,  systems  and  entities  within 
an  environment  may  be  assessed.  This  intelligence  must  include  timely, 
accurate,  and  relevant  information  about  potential  adversaries,  the  other 
approved  parties,  and  the  operating  environment.  The  Info  Ops  staff 
should  work  closely  with  the  intelligence  staff  to  define  requirements 
necessary  to  plan,  execute,  and  assess  the  effectiveness  of  Info  Ops. 
Intelligence  preparation  of  the  battlespace  (IPB)  should  include  analysis  of 
human  factors  (including  culture,  religion,  languages,  etc.),  decision¬ 
making  infrastructure  and  power  structures. 

d.  Centralised  Planning  and  Decentralised  Execution.  Due  to  the 

requirement  for  close  coordination  of  Info  Ops  activity,  the  principle  of 
centralised  planning  and  decentralised  execution  applies  to  Info  Ops  at  all 
command  levels.  However,  centralised  execution  may  be  required  for 
certain  types  of  targeted  information  activities,  when  all  involved  force 
elements  are  required  to  adhere  rigidly  to  a  plan,  or  when  strategic  assets 
are  used.  The  approval  level  and  process  for  PsyOps  messages  must  be  as 
low  and  streamlined  as  possible  in  order  to  ensure  messages  are  timely  and 
relevant  to  the  environment  at  hand. 

e.  Comprehensive  and  Integrated  Targeting.  At  the  operational  level, 
targeting  starts  with  a  detailed  understanding  of  the  operational 
environment,  its  constituent  systems  and  entities,  and  the  commander’s 
objectives.  Commanders  and  targeting  staff  identify  Info  Ops  effects 
required  to  achieve  the  desired  objectives  and  a  range  of  activities  that, 
when  integrated  into  the  overall  operation  plan,  will  achieve  those  effects. 
It  is  important  to  realise  that  any  element  of  targeting  activity  may 
influence  a  range  of  target  audiences  and  create  unintended  effects.  The 
targeting  staff  therefore  has  to  analyse  the  impact  of  such  activity  and 
propose  appropriate  measures  to  avoid  or  mitigate  unintended  effects. 

Info  Ops  targeting  must  not  be  planned  separately  from  the  targeting  of 
physical  effects  ,  but  in  conjunction  with  it  so  that  effects  are 
complementary. 

f.  Early  Involvement  and  Timely  Preparation.  Info  Ops  planning  must 
start  early,  because  both  planning  and  execution  take  time  and  results  can 
be  slow  to  emerge.  Hence,  a  Commander’s  intent  and  direction  must  be 
viewed  right  from  the  start  in  relation  to  Info  Ops  capabilities  and 
maintained  throughout  the  planning  process.  Planning  and  targeting  staff 
and  advisors  need  to  be  fully  involved  in  the  planning  process  to  integrate 
Info  Ops  within  the  overall  plan. 

g.  Monitoring  and  Effects  Assessment.  The  successful  prosecution  of  Info 
Ops  relies  on  continuous  monitoring  and  assessment  of  the  short  and  long¬ 
term  effects  of  inter-related  activities.  This  is  achieved  by  the  collection  of 
all-source  intelligence  and  other  feedback  on  the  Info  Ops  activities. 
Measures  of  Effectiveness  (MoE)  must  be  included  in  the  Info  Ops  plan 
and  are  integrated  in  the  intelligence  collection  activities. 


215 


h.  Establishing  and  Maintaining  Credibility.  In  order  for  Info  Ops  to  be 
successful  in  creating  influences  on  the  cognitive  plane,  the  source  of  the 
Info  Ops  must  have  significant  credibility  in  the  eyes  of  the  target 
audience.  The  credibility  of  a  force  may  have  to  be  established  in  a 
planned,  incremental  fashion.  If  lacking  credibility,  a  force  will  require 
the  engagement  of  indigenous  proxies  such  as  social  or  religious  leaders 
who  have  established  credibility  with  target  audiences,  in  order  to 
broadcast  the  desired  messages. 

i.  Timely  Counter-Information  Operations.  Even  the  most  effective  Info 
Ops  plans  will  be  frustrated  in  execution  if  deliberate  actions  are  not  taken 
to  counter  the  Info  Ops  actions  of  the  adversary  and  neutral  parties.  This 
includes  the  passive  and  active  measures  used  to  protect  friendly 
information  and  information  systems.  With  respect  to  influence  activities, 
the  advent  of  real-time  communications  technologies  forces  the 
commander  to  constantly  observe  and  counter  the  enemy’s  attempts  to 
influence  target  audiences,  locally  and  internationally.  There  are  numerous 
examples,  from  Kosovo  to  Lebanon  to  Afghanistan,  of  a  militarily  weaker 
opponent  effectively  conducting  an  Info  Ops  campaign  that  has  influenced 
foreign  and  indigenous  populations.  Failure  to  adequately  counter  the 
contrived  story  in  a  timely  and  credible  fashion  can  undermine  not  only  a 
public’s  morale,  but  it  can  also  bolster  an  adversary’s  popularity,  and  rally 
public  opinion  against  the  mission.  Info  Ops  planning  must  dedicate 
resources  to  monitoring  adversary  Info  Ops  and  remain  flexible  enough  to 
counter  erroneous  information.  Timeliness  is  paramount  and  in  terms  of 
PA,  the  first  side  to  get  their  story  out  into  the  public  domain  often  holds 
the  public  high  ground. 

INFLUENCE  ACTIVITIES  AND  THEIR  TARGETS  -  THE  CAUSAL 
RELATIONSHIP  OF  FILTERS  AND  PERCEPTIONS 

External  Influences  and  Internal  Perceptions 

116.  To  create  effects  on  target  audiences  in  terms  of  understanding,  will  and  behaviour, 
there  is  a  need  to  understand  the  target  audiences  on  the  cognitive  plane32.  This  includes 
their  personal  perceptions,  their  filters  and  how  to  affect  them.  This  is  referred  to  as  the 
causal  relationship-  or  cause  and  effect  -  which  is  understanding  how  to  contribute  to  an 
effect(s),  and  is  far  more  difficult  on  the  cognitive  plane  than  on  the  physical  plane. 

117.  t  is  important  to  appreciate  that  targets  on  the  cognitive  plane  will  act  according  to 
their  own  interests,  shaped  by  perspectives  and  values,  which  may  be  significantly 
different  from  one’s  own.  As  well,  every  activity  on  the  cognitive  plane  will  have  a 
different  response  time  and  a  different  set  of  information  filters  that  can  (potentially)  alter 
the  interpretation  of  the  message  (see  table  below).  These  filters  will  differ  with  each 
situation  and  target  and  will  be  a  result  of  the  target’s  external  influences  and  internalised 
traits  and  perceptions. 


216 


INFORMATION  FILTERS 

External  Influences: 

Internal  Perceptions: 

Cultural  Bias  &  Values 

Values 

Social  Pressures 

Beliefs 

Family 

Experiences 

Religious  Institution  &  Constructs 

Hopes 

Media 

Group  Dynamics 

Government  Institutions 

Political  Influences 

Decision-Making  Processes 

o  Individual 

o  Group 

Emotions 

Figure  5-12:  Information  Filters  for  a  Target:  Individual  and  Collective. 

118.  External  filter  variables  include  culture,  society,  family,  media,  government 
institutions,  and  decision-making  processes.  External  filters,  therefore,  include 
variables  that  limit  behaviour  to  what  is  socially,  culturally,  and  legally  acceptable, 
informed  by  information  sources  such  as  media,  government,  group,  and  informal 
communications  networks.  Internal  filter  variables  include  personal  values,  beliefs, 
hopes,  fears,  and  experiences.  Without  an  understanding  of  these  filters  and  their  effects, 
messages  or  activities  may  provoke  unintended  actions. 

119.  Additionally,  a  decision-making  process  may  be  unique  to  an  individual  or  group. 
What  appears  to  be  a  rational  process  to  one  person  may  seem  irrational  to  another.  The 
rationale  may  have  a  cultural  or  religious  basis  or  it  may  be  unique  to  that  one  particular 
personality  trait,  whether  it  is  individual  or  shared. 

120.  All  the  filters  modify  information  input  to  the  target  audience.  Targeting  must  be 
sophisticated  enough  to  understand  and  manipulate,  or  at  least  work  through,  these 
variables  to  achieve  the  desired  effect  on  the  intended  target.  They  are  a  key 
consideration  for  Red  Teaming34  during  the  planning  and  war  gaming  process.  Activities 
seeking  to  influence  must  specifically  focus  on  what  and  how  the  target  perceives 
something  within  the  environment  and  be  adjusted  to  suit  it  and  achieve  the  desired  effect. 
For  example,  a  message  delivered  or  action  taken  by  a  military  leader  in  a  society 
distrustful  of  those  in  unifonn  may  not  be  effective.  However,  the  same  message, 
delivered  by  a  religious  leader  or  a  civilian  of  similar  cultural  background  may  gain  the 
desired  effect.  Therefore,  a  significant  effort  should  focus  on  altering  that  environment 
or  influencing  perception  through  means  specifically  tailored  to  the  environment.  The 
impact  of  influence  activities  is  their  effect  on  decision-making  processes.35 


217 


121.  Care  must  be  taken  in  deciding  the  activities  to  be  undertaken  to  create  desired 
effects.  Measures  taken  to  intimidate,  for  example,  may  simply  result  in  animosity  and 
hatred  by  leaders  or  local  populations.  Such  reactions  will  be  difficult  to  gauge,  but  a 
study  of  both  external  and  internal  filters  may  help  predict  and  mitigate  such  reactions. 

122.  In  order  to  commanders  and  staff  to  plan  activities  to  create  the  desired  effects,  it  is 
important  that  they  make  use  of  cultural  advisors  and  experts.  Just  as  commanders  have 
employed  in  the  past  political  advisors  (POLADs),  they  must  consider  the  employment  of 
experts  in  social,  cultural  and  economic  fields  as  well. 

Spectrum  of  Relative  Interest 

123.  As  discussed  in  an  earlier  section  target  types  on  the  cognitive  plane  can  be  defined 
along  a  spectrum  of  relative  interest  as  it  relates  to  achieving  the  end-state.  This 
spectrum  can  be  broadly  broken  down  into  any  number  of  groups  that  may  be  generally 
described  along  the  following  lines:  the  adversaries;  the  inactive  hostile;  the 
unsupportive;  the  neutral;  the  friendly  but  uncommitted;  the  supportive;  and  allies.  The 
boundaries  between  these  groups  may  be  blurred.  Each  group  may  be  influenced  in 
different  ways  using  different  activities.  The  amount  of  effort  and  type  of  activity  needed 
to  influence  them  will  depend  upon  the  situation,  the  relative  size  of  the  target  audience, 
the  disposition  of  the  audience  on  the  spectrum  (supportive  to  hostile),  and  the 
importance  of  ensuring  popular  support  for  the  success  of  the  campaign. 

124.  In  addition  to  the  normal  targeting  process  there  is  a  requirement  for  additional 
information  when  determining  a  target  on  the  cognitive  plane.  These  have  been  derived 

36 

from  the  CARVER  targeting  matrix  as  follows: 

a.  Criticality  -  criticality  or  target  value,  is  the  primary  consideration.  It 
refers  to  how  much  its  execution  will  alter  the  target  attitudes,  beliefs  and 
behaviour. 

b.  Accessibility  -  how  accessible  is  the  target?  Does  the  target  require  a 
direct  or  indirect  attack?  If  indirect,  through  what  or  who  must  the  target 
be  accessed?  What  method,  medium  and  delivery  means  will  be  more 
effective? 

c.  “Recuperabilty”  -  If  changed,  how  long  can  the  attitude,  belief,  or 
behaviour  be  expected  to  remain  consistent  without  reinforcement?  What 
reinforcement  will  be  required? 

d.  Vulnerability  -  What  is  the  degree  of  vulnerability?  Will  the  objective  be 
achieved? 

e.  Effect  -  the  target  should  only  be  attacked  if  the  desired  cognitive  effect 
will  be  achieved.  The  likely  unintended  consequences  must  be  calculated 
and  weighed  against  the  benefits.  Will  the  attack  be  awful  under  current 
ROE? 

f.  Recognisable-  Can  the  target  be  easily  accessed  and  not  confused  with 
other  targets  or  neutral  elements?  Will  the  desired  effect  of  the  attack  be 
readily  apparent?  Will  the  targeting  efforts  be  transparent  or  easily 


218 


recognized  by  the  target  or  other  audiences?  Will  this  recognition  affect 
the  credibility  and  legitimacy  of  the  mission? 


T 


OFFENSIVE  INFORMATION  OPERATIONS:  OP  ARCHER,  AFGHANISTAN, 

2006 

A  crucial  component  of  COIN  efforts  in  Afghanistan  is  persuading  local  populations  that  the 
authority  of  the  Central  government  is  legitimate  and  that  the  role  of  coalition  forces  is  one  of 
security,  not  occupation.  Islam  plays  a  pivotal  role  in  Afghan  culture  and  society. 

Furthermore,  tribal  and  village  elders  occupy  a  central  cultural  and  religious  leadership 
position  in  Afghan  society  and  power  structures.  Thus,  offensive  information  operations  in 
Afghanistan  must  target  tribal  and  village  elders  while  being  mindful  of  the  role  of  Islam  in 
the  day-to-day  lives  of  the  local  populace. 

In  the  spring  of  2006  the  CF  incorporated  a  Muslim  imam  who  is  also  a  member  of  the  CF  in 
select  meetings  with  village  and  tribal  leaders.  Through  recitation  of  Koranic  verse  and 
Islamic  prayers,  the  military  imam  used  religious  language  to  persuade  Afghans  that  the 
Taliban  do  not  hold  the  moral  high  ground,  that  the  Islamic  government  in  Kabul  is  worthy  of 
support,  and  that  the  Western  forces  in  their  midst  are  not  occupiers,  but  operate  with  the  goal 
of  establishing  security  and  peace  within  the  parameters  of  an  Islamic  society. 

The  unique  use  of  an  imam  to  influence  societal  and  religious  leaders  in  Afghanistan  by  the 
CF  is  a  superb  example  of  an  offensive  information  operation  conducted  on  the  cognitive 
plane.  Undermining  Taliban  claims  of  moral  superiority  based  on  religious  piety  was  assessed 
by  many  as  a  critical  step  in  defeating  the  insurgency,  particularly  in  the  Taliban’s  former 
strongholds  in  Southern  Afghanistan. 

Source:  Graeme  Smith,  The  Globe  and  Mail,  p.A13,  12  June  2006. 


125. The  following  points  should  be  considered  with  regard  to  the  way  information 
operations  are  conducted  : 


a.  influencing  a  target  audience  requires  “delivering  the  goods”  not  simply 
sending  the  message.  Thus,  if  a  promise  is  made  it  must  be  kept.  If  a 
message  is  sent,  it  must  be  fulfdled. 

b.  cultural  awareness  is  vital,  and  the  threat  often  has  more  cultural 
credibility.  Ideally,  key  individuals  or  groups  within  a  target  audience 
receive  the  message,  accept  it,  and  then  deliver  it  or  spread  it  through  the 
larger  audience.  This  will  add  credibility  to  the  message. 

c.  maintain  message  discipline  and  do  not  be  thrown  off  by  erratic  media 
reports.  In  short,  the  message  has  to  be  sustained  to  be  believed  and  must 
be  consistent  over  time  and  across  different  levels  of  command. 


d.  central  strategic  theme  is  essential,  however,  subordinate  themes  and 
messages  (and  deeds  that  reflect  the  message  content)  must  be 
categorized,  assigned,  and  tracked  against  different  target  audiences.  In 
the  ubiquitous  media  environment  at  least  two  cultures  must  be  addressed: 


219 


that  of  the  threat/indigenous  population,  and  that  of  committed  friendly 
forces. 

e.  mounting  casualties  put  additional  stress  on  troops  and  may  lead  to 
information  operation  mistakes.  They  must  be  anticipated  and  proactively 
handled.  Risks  may  have  to  be  taken  in  order  to  support  messages  and  to 
keep  them  constant. 

f.  whichever  news  story  breaks  first  will  be  pre-eminent,  at  least  initially; 
therefore  publicize  anything  that  lends  credence  to  our  operations. 

ASSESSMENT  -  MEASURES  OF  PERFORMANCE  AND  EFFECTIVENESS 

126.  As  with  any  military  activity,  the  results  of  Info  Ops  are  assessed  using  measures  of 
performance  (MoP)  (are  things  done  right?)  and  measures  of  effectiveness  (MoE)  (are  the 
right  things  being  done,  to  create  the  desired  effects?). 

127.  MoP  for  Info  Ops  refer  to  the  mechanisms  of  planning  and  implementation.  They 
can  be  viewed  in  the  same  manner  as  the  delivery  of  indirect  fire:  reaction  times;  quality 
of  product;  correct  identification  and  assessment  of  target;  and  suitability  of  engagement 
means,  to  name  a  few. 

128.  MoE  refer  to  the  desired  effects  and  whether  or  not  the  activities  conducted  have 
created  those  effects.  All  three  types  of  Info  Ops  activity  areas  contribute  to  the 
achievement  of  effects.  Some  of  the  activities  of  CCA  and  IPA  are  objective  and 
measurable.  Others,  particularly  for  influence  activities,  are  more  subjective  and  difficult 
to  evaluate. 

129.  In  influence  activities,  MoE  are  applied  to  activities  and  changes  on  the  cognitive 
plane.  Given  all  of  the  individual  and  environmental  variables  in  the  human  decision¬ 
making  process,  developing  MoE  for  Info  Ops  on  the  cognitive  plane  may  be  one  of  the 
most  daunting  intellectual  tasks  facing  a  commander.  Influence  activities  seek  to  work 
through  external  and  internal  filters  in  order  to  either  persuade  or  dissuade  and  thus  affect 
behaviour  and  action.  Hence,  the  planning  and  conduct  of  these  activities  is  an  art 
requiring  the  commander’s  subjective  feel  for  their  affect.  The  results  of  these  influence 
activities  require  as  defined  a  set  of  indicators  as  possible,  in  order  to  detect  changes  in 
perceptions,  attitudes  and  behaviours.  These  indicators  need  to  account  for  the  effect  of 
the  infonnation  filters. 

130.  MoE  will  vary  significantly  between  missions  and  even  within  missions. 
Commanders  must  clearly  state  the  end-state  and  ideally  any  milestones  on  the  path  to 
that  end-state.  MoE,  using  whatever  means  are  most  appropriate,  measure  and  indicate 
progress  in  the  target  audience  towards  that  end-state.  MoEs  must  be  tailored  to  the 
specifics  of  not  only  the  overall  change  desired,  but  to  the  environment,  that  is,  the 
commander’s  AOO.  Because  of  the  intangible  factors  involved  and  the  subjective  nature 
of  influencing,  the  MoE  will  almost  certainly  be  subjective,  and  because  behaviour 
influence  is  the  aim,  they  require  a  significant  amount  of  time  to  determine  effectiveness. 
Therefore,  they  must  be  assessed  as  a  set  routine  to  attempt  to  recognise  changes,  trends 
and  slight  yet  significant  indicators.  The  commander  exercises  judgement  as  to  when  an 
adjustment  or  change  to  an  activity  against  a  target  must  be  made  in  reaction  to  the 
measured  effectiveness. 


220 


131.  In  order  to  overcome  the  difficulties  in  selecting  and  applying  MoE  for  Info  Ops, 
some  basic  fundamentals  exist  that  can  aid  in  the  development  of  useful  MoEs: 

a.  Causality.  A  definitive  cause  and  effect  relationship  must  be  established 
between  the  activity  and  the  effect  attempting  to  be  measured.  Given  the 
cultural  and  other  variables/filters  present,  there  has  to  be  a  reasonable 
likelihood  that  the  planned  activity  will  create  the  desired  effect. 

Secondly,  commanders  and  Info  Ops  staff  must  be  able  to  assess  any  other 
extant  factors  that  may  be  causing  the  effect  other  than  their  own 
activities.  Likewise,  they  must  ascertain  if  the  measured  effect  is  merely 
coincidental. 

b.  Quantifiable/  A  MoE  that  can  be  counted  helps  to  remove  some  of  the 
subjectivity  that  plagues  MoEs  on  the  cognitive  plane.  Quantification 
allows  accurate  trend  measurement.40 

c.  Observable  and  Attributable.  When  drafting  MoEs,  consideration 
should  be  given  to  the  possibility  that  all  of  the  variables  influencing  an 
activity  and  change  in  behaviour  cannot  be  observed.  The  MoE  must  be 
able  to  recognise  a  trend  or  change  and  confirm  the  connection  or 
attribution  to  the  activity.  For  example,  if  the  presence  or  absence  of 
negative  graffiti  is  being  used  as  an  informal  indicator  of  support  for  a 
campaign  and  military  force  in  an  urban  area,  observers  will  ideally  be 
able  to  ascertain:  its  timing,  that  is,  when  it  was  done;  its  attribution  to  a 
particular  group  (political,  criminal,  military)  and  their  motive,  and 
whether  it  represents  a  minority  or  majority  viewpoint;  its  attribution  in 
terms  of  cause,  particularly  if  it  appears  as  a  reaction  to  a  specific  event  or 
action;  and,  its  location  in  relation  to  the  cultural  make-up  of  the  local 
environment. 

d.  Correlated  to  Effects,  Objectives  and  End-States.  Just  as  activities  are 
planned  to  support  effects  and  objectives  along  a  line  of  operation,  MoEs 
should  be  selected  to  correlate  to  the  achievement  of  each  effect  and 
should  be  reflective  of  the  level  of  employment.  Strategic  Info  Ops 
require  measures  that  occur  throughout  the  length  of  a  campaign  and  many 
MoEs  at  the  operational  and  tactical  level  will  measure  the  incremental 
progress  through  effects  and  objectives. 

e.  Flexibility.  Although  MoEs  should  be  drafted  at  the  planning  stage  they 
should  remain  under  regular  review  and  commanders  must  be  prepared  to 
adjust  them  as  required.  They  must  evolve  as  a  mission  progresses, 
particularly  as  the  consequence  of  their  activities  leads  to  the  attainment  of 
operational  effects.  Similarly,  MoEs  are  likely  not  transferable  from 
mission  to  mission.  Even  if  a  mission  takes  place  in  the  same  AOO  the 
passage  of  time  will  force  reconsideration  of  MoEs  previously  employed. 

f.  Collection.  The  commander  must  possess  the  capabilities  to  collect  the 
intelligence  necessary  to  employ  an  MoE  and  provide  the  direction  and 
guidance  to  do  so.  Plans  must  be  made  to  collect  and  assess  MoEs 
through  all  units  in  the  AOO.  Collection  may  be  assisted  by  other 


221 


agencies,  however,  without  a  fonnal  command  relationship,  this  may  have 
to  be  done  informally.  Notwithstanding  this,  other,  non-military  agencies 
may  prove  to  be  an  effective  gauge  of  progress  through  Info  Ops. 

g.  Relativity.  Improvements  sought  in  a  given  environment  must  be  relative 
to  the  specific  environment  and  to  what  is  considered  nonnal  for  that 
particular  environment  and  culture.  Expectations  for  situational 
improvement  must  be  reasonable  given  the  starting  state  and  the  normal 
state  of  that  particular  environment.  Improvements  to  a  situation  that  will 
make  it  relatively  normal  for  that  environment  may  come  quickly; 
however,  systemic  improvements  in  absolute  terms  may  require  cultural 
changes  over  a  very  long  period  of  time.  Expectations  for  change  and  the 
related  MoE  should  be  set  as  incremental  milestones  so  that  improvement 
can  be  measured  and  demonstrated  as  tangible  progress  over  time. 

132.  Developing  appropriate  MoE  to  assess  Info  Ops  on  the  cognitive  plane  is  a  very 
difficult  task.  Willpower,  perceptions,  and  beliefs  are  all  less-than-completely-tangible 
variables  that  defy  simple  measurement.  Observing  and  measuring  trends  is  one  of  the 
surest  ways  of  gauging  a  target’s  attitude.  Trends,  however,  require  a  definable  baseline 
and  this  may  be  impossible  to  identify. 


INFORMATION  OPERATIONS:  OP  ARCHER,  AFGHANISTAN,  2006 

The  absence  of  domestic  or  international  support  for  a  mission  can  undermine  both  the 
legitimacy  of  a  mission  as  well  as  the  morale  of  CF  personnel.  Therefore,  one  of  the  tasks  in¬ 
theatre  commanders  may  be  called  upon  to  undertake  is  the  education  of  the  domestic  and 
international  publics,  most  likely  through  the  media.  It  may  become  necessary  to  clarify  policy  or 
inform  the  public  about  a  mission  or  a  specific  component  of  that  mission  in  order  to  explain  its 
reasoning  and  to  bolster  support  for  the  desired  end-state. 

One  of  the  dilemmas  that  confronted  the  Canadian  government  and  military  from  the  outset  of 
operations  in  Afghanistan  was  the  disposition  and  disposal  of  enemy  personnel  captured  during 
combat.  The  typical  foe  encountered  by  the  CF  in  Afghanistan  does  not  meet  the  definition  of 
“members  of  armed  forces”  as  established  by  the  1 949  Geneva  Conventions,  in  that  most  do  not 
carry  arms  openly,  do  not  abide  international  laws  and  customs  of  war,  and  are  not  readily 
identifiable  by  the  wearing  of  a  uniform  or  distinctive  insignia. 

On  1 8  December  2005  the  Government  of  Canada  signed  an  agreement  with  the  Government  of 
Afghanistan  concerning  the  transfer  of  enemy  captured  in  Afghanistan  by  the  CF.  Five  months 
later,  Ottawa  declared  that  captured  al-Qaeda  and  Taliban  fighters  would  not  be  afforded  formal 
PW  status  as  defined  by  the  1949  conventions. 

This  policy,  combined  with  concerns  that  detainees  transferred  to  Afghan  custody  would  not 
always  be  treated  in  accordance  with  international  human  rights  standards,  caused  the  Canadian 
media,  some  experts,  and  members  of  the  general  public  to  express  concern  that  Canada’s 
policies  abrogated  international  law. 

Despite  declarations  in  parliament  and  in  the  media  by  the  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  of 
Defence,  Brigadier-General  David  Fraser,  Commander  Multi-National  Brigade  for  Regional 
Command  South  in  Afghanistan,  felt  compelled  to  clarify  government  policy  by  granting  an 
interview  to  a  member  of  the  Canadian  media  only  days  after  the  detainee  policy  was  announced. 
Brigadier  Fraser  covered  all  aspects  of  the  Canadian  detainee  policy  to  include:  the  role  of  the 
Afghan  government;  the  fact  that  the  spirit  of  the  1949  Conventions  was  to  be  followed  in 
dealing  with  detainees;  and,  the  role  of  respected  international  organisations  such  as  the  ICRC  to 
oversee  the  handling.  All  this  reinforced  that  Canadian  policy  conformed  to  international  law. 

The  actions  of  General  Fraser  involved  a  complex  legal,  policy,  and  moral  issue,  targeted  both 
the  undecided  and  friendly  components  of  the  influence  spectrum,  and  simultaneously 
emphasised  the  sovereignty  of  the  nascent  democratic  government  of  Afghanistan. 

Cr\nropc  • 


INFORMATION  OPERATIONS:  OPERATION  IRAQI  FREEDOM,  BAGHDAD, 

IRAQ  2003-2004 

To  be  effective,  offensive  Info  Ops  must  target  an  appropriate  audience,  be  focused  on  a  limited 
number  of  themes,  and  be  timely.  Technology  allows  almost  immediate  diffusion  of  information 
and  minutes  can  make  a  difference  in  countering  or  pre-empting  enemy  Info  Ops. 

Colonel  Ralph  Baker,  USA,  commanded  the  2nd  Brigade  Combat  Team  of  the  1st  Armored 
Division  in  2003-2004.  2  BCT’s  AO  encompassed  the  Karkh  and  Karada  districts  of  Baghdad. 
The  operational  environment  in  this  AO  was  extremely  complex,  given  that  the  resident 
population  is  an  amalgam  of  Shiite,  Sunni,  Christian,  secular  business  and  academic  elites,  and 
the  diplomatic  district  of  the  Iraqi  capital.  Moreover,  the  AO  encompassed  Saddam  Hussein’s 
hometown  of  Kaddamiya,  where  a  sizable  pro-Baathist  element  continued  to  lurk.  A  final 
complicating  variable  was  the  rumour-centric  nature  of  Iraqi  society. 

Once  it  became  apparent  that  US  forces  were  facing  a  full-blown  insurgency,  Col.  Baker  quickly 
realized  that  “IO  (sic)  is  critical  to  successfully  combating  an  insurgency.  It  fights  with  words, 
symbols,  and  ideas,  and  it  operates  under  the  same  dynamics  as  all  combat  operations.”  The _ 


223 


greatest  problem  facing  2  BCT  with  regards  to  Info  Ops  was  that  the  insurgents  consistently 
dominated  activities  on  the  cognitive  plane,  successfully  shaping  the  environment  before  US 
elements  could  respond.  Without  fail,  the  various  insurgent  groups  were  able  to  engage  the  most 
important  mediums  (television  &  internet)  through  the  most  important  media  outlets  in  a  rapid 
and  effective  manner,  often  before  US  or  coalition  Info  Ops  teams  could  even  begin  to  respond. 
The  Info  Ops  staff  of  2  BCT  took  a  number  of  steps  to  rectify  the  Info  Ops  deficiency  in  the  AO. 
In  the  first  place,  three  broad  categories  of  Iraqi  citizens  were  identified  to  lend  greater  focus  to 
targeting.  The  groups  were:  those  who  would  never  accept  the  coalition’s  presence;  those  who 
accepted  the  coalition’s  presence;  and,  “the  vast  majority  of  Iraqi’s  who  were  undecided.”  It  was 
this  last  group  that  was  the  specific  target  of  the  majority  of  2  BCT  Info  Ops,  firstly  because  those 
in  this  group  were  generally  more  susceptible  to  influence,  and  secondly,  because  a  successful 
insurgency  only  requires  the  acquiescence  of  a  population,  not  outright  support.  A  final  group  that 
was  targeted  was  2  BCT’s  own  personnel,  who  were  at  times  demoralized  by  “inaccurate  [and] 
slanted  news”  from  US  media  outlets. 

Once  targets  were  identified  and  prioritised,  two  broad  themes  were  adopted  to  focus  the 
information  and  messages  that  were  critical  to  a  successful  mission  outcome:  discredit  insurgents 
and  terrorists,  and  highlight  the  economic,  political,  social,  and  security  efforts  of  the  coalition 
forces.  Next,  synchronization  of  all  available  brigade  Info  Ops  assets  was  pursued  to  end  counter¬ 
productive  and  often  conflicting  messages  (Info  Ops  fratricide). 

Specific  groups  of  targets  within  the  “undecided”  catagory  of  Iraqis  were  identified  so  that  they 
would  in  turn  spread  the  message.  These  groups  were  the  local  and  international  media,  local 
imams  and  religious  leaders,  tribal  and  clan  leaders,  governmental  officials,  and  university  and 
lower-level  school  leadership.  This  last  point  is  particularly  important,  for  it  is  far  more  effective 
that  someone  from  the  target  audience  spread  the  desired  message  because  it  is  much  more  likely 
to  be  accepted  and  trusted. 

Finally,  2  BCT  identified  a  number  of  measures  of  effectiveness  (MoE)  by  which  the  progress  of 
brigade  Info  Ops  could  be  evaluated.  The  MoEs  are  necessarily  subjective  and  lack  rigorous 
quantification.  Given  that  Info  Ops  on  the  cognitive  plane  seek  to  influence  people’s  attitudes, 
this  should  not  be  surprising.  Nevertheless,  some  MoE  is  required.  For  2  BCT,  these  included  the 
number  of  accurate/positive  stories  published  or  aired  by  all  media  sources,  the  number  of 
negative  press,  the  number  of  tips  provided  by  the  local  populace,  the  “wave”  factor  (who  and 
how  many  local  residents  waved  to  coalition  troops  during  patrols),  observance  of  the  tone  of 
graffiti  in  the  AO,  the  tenor  of  sermons  at  local  mosques,  and  the  willingness  of  the  local 
populace  to  openly  work  with  coalition  forces. 

Although  lacking  an  effective  Info  Ops  doctrine,  Col.  Baker  and  his  brigade  Info  Ops  team 
quickly  developed  an  effective  plan  to  counter  and  pre-empt  enemy  Info  Ops.  Understanding  that 
an  effective  Info  Ops  plan  was  critical  to  a  successful  COIN  operation,  Baker  and  2  BCT  rapidly 
implemented  Info  Ops  doctrine  that  enabled  the  tactical  leader,  by  providing  a  clear  commander’s 
intent  and  end-state  goals.  From  their  experiences,  Col.  Baker  drew  a  number  of  essential 
observations  relevant  to  all  Info  Ops: 

•  Info  Ops  must  tailor  themes  and  messages  to  a  specific  target 

•  The  press  must  be  engaged;  you  have  no  influence  if  you  do  not  talk  to  them 

•  Credibility  and  the  ability  to  improve  the  quality  of  life  of  the  local  residents  is  directly 
related 

•  Developing  trust  and  confidence  between  your  forces  and  local  residents  should  be  a 
primary  Info  Ops  goal.  Hence,  messages  must  be  based  on  the  truth. 

•  Commander’s  vision  and  intent  must  be  clear  and  concise. 


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•  Messages  must  be  few,  simple,  and  repetitive 

Source:  Colonel  Ralph  Baker,  “The  Decisive  Weapon:  A  Brigade  Commander’s  Perspective  on 
Information  Operations,” Military  Review,  May-June  2006,  pp. 13-32. 


SECTION  5 


MANOEUVRE  WARFARE 

MANOEUVRE  DOCTRINE  AND  ITS  APPLICATION 
Definition 

133.  The  concept  of  manoeuvre  warfare  is  defined  as: 

A  war  fighting  philosophy  and  approach  to  operations  that  seeks  to  defeat  the 
enemy  by  shattering  his  moral  and  physical  cohesion  -  his  ability  to  fight  as  an 
effective,  coordinated  whole  -  rather  than  by  destroying  him  physically  through 
incremental  attrition.  (AAP  39). 

134.  The  manoeuvrist  approach  is  realised  through  the  following  activities  and  effects: 

a.  Attacking  will; 

b.  Shattering  cohesion;  and 

c.  Shaping  understanding. 

135.  Cohesion  is  seen  as  the  glue  that  solidifies  individual  and  group  will  under  the 
command  of  leaders.  Cohesion  allows  military  forces  to  endure  hardship  and  retain  the 
physical  and  moral  strength  to  continue  fighting  to  accomplish  their  mission. 

136.  This  manoeuvrist  approach41  to  operations  seeks  to  attack  the  adversary’s  will  to 
fight,  and  thus  undermine  and  even  shatter  his  cohesion,  usually,  but  not  necessarily,  by 
avoiding  trials  of  strength,  and  targeting  weakness.  An  adversary’s  will  and  thus 
cohesion  may  also  be  affected  by  the  shaping  of  his  understanding.  If  the  adversary’s  C2 
ability  is  neutralised,  he  will  fail  to  understand  his  environment  or  misunderstand  his 
environment  and  thus  lose  his  will  and  cohesion.  Likewise,  if  conscripts  are  convinced  to 
surrender  or  flee,  the  will  and  cohesion  of  the  entire  adversary  force  are  affected. 

137.  As  a  result,  the  focus  is  to  defeat  the  threat  by  shattering  his  moral  and  physical 
cohesion,  his  ability  to  fight  as  an  effective  coordinated  whole,  rather  than  by  destroying 
him  physically  through  incremental  attrition.  It  is  equally  applicable  to  all  types  of 
campaigns  from  peace  support  through  major  combat. 

13 8. In  short,  the  manoeuvrist  approach  is  applied  across  the  physical  and  moral/cognitive 
planes  with  effects  occurring  on  both  planes. 

139. Attacking  the  adversary’s  cohesion,  on  both  the  physical  and  moral/cognitive  planes, 
is  the  key  to  manoeuvre  warfare.  It  is  done  using  both  physical-effects  and  influence 


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activities.  There  are  three  approaches  to  attacking  will  and  cohesion.  These  are,  in  order 
of  preference:  pre-emption,  dislocation  and  disruption. 

Pre-emption 

140.  To  pre-empt  the  threat  is  to  seize  an  opportunity,  often  fleeting,  before  he  does,  to 
deny  him  an  advantageous  course  of  action.  Pre-emption  relies  on  surprise  above  all  and 
requires  good  intelligence  and  an  ability  to  understand  and  anticipate  the  opponent’s 
actions.  Its  success  lies  in  the  speed  with  which  the  situation  can  subsequently  be 
exploited.  Pre-emption  is  used  to  produce  a  sufficient  and  suitably  located  threat  that: 
causes  confusion  and  doubt;  destroys  confidence  by  foiling  the  threat's  plans;  and  makes 
his  intended  course  of  action  irrelevant.  Pre-emption  denies  initiative  to  the  threat. 

141.  Whether  offensive  or  defensive,  pre-emption  demands  a  keen  awareness  of  time  and  a 
willingness  to  take  calculated  risks  that  offer  a  high  payoff.  These  risks  may  be  reduced 
with  the  benefit  of  intelligence  derived  from  real  time  sensors  that  provide  a  more 
accurate  assessment  of  the  threat's  true  situation.  Pre-emption  can  also  be  achieved  by 
allowing  subordinates  at  all  levels  the  initiative,  consistent  with  the  commander’s  intent, 
to  seize  opportunities  as  they  arise. 

142.  Establishing  air  superiority  or  establishing  control  of  the  electromagnetic  spectrum  at 
the  start  of  operations  can  achieve  pre-emption.  On  the  cognitive  plane,  the  threat  can  be 
pre-empted  by  use  of  a  proactive  public  affairs  programme.  This  may  also  include  actions 
to  secure  the  support  or  neutrality  of  third  parties  before  the  opposition  can  do  so. 

Dislocation 

143.  To  dislocate  the  threat  is  to  deny  him  the  ability  to  bring  his  strength  to  bear.  Its 
purpose  is  much  wider  than  disruption  and  goes  beyond  the  frustration  of  the  threat's 
plans.  To  dislocate  is  to  render  the  strength  of  elements  of  the  force  irrelevant.  It  seeks  to 
avoid  fighting  the  threat  on  his  terms.  This  is  done  by  avoiding  his  strengths  and 
neutralizing  them  so  they  cannot  be  used  effectively.  A  dislocating  move  is  usually 
preceded  by  actions  to  distract  the  threat  and  fix  his  attention. 

“It  is  through  ‘distraction  ’  of  the  commander ’s  mind  that  the  distraction 
of  his  forces  follows.  The  loss  of freedom  of  action  is  the  sequel  to  the  loss 
of  his  freedom  of  conception.  ” 

Captain  Liddell-Hart 

144.  Envelopments  or  deep  penetrations  into  the  operational  depth  of  a  threat,  even  by 
small  military  forces,  may  cause  dislocation  of  elements  of  the  force  by  attacking 
reserves,  lines  of  communications  and  command  and  control  networks.  Deception  can 
also  be  used  to  lure  the  threat  into  making  incorrect  deployments,  inappropriate  use  of 
reserves,  and  inadequate  preparations  for  operations. 

Disruption 

145.  To  disrupt  is  to  attack  the  threat  selectively  in  order  to  break  apart  and  throw  into 
confusion  the  assets  that  are  critical  to  the  employment  and  coherence  of  his  fighting 
power.  It  is  a  deliberate  act  that  requires  sound  intelligence.  Its  purpose  is  to  rupture  the 
integrity  of  the  threat's  combat  power  and  to  reduce  it  to  less  than  the  total  of  its 
constituent  parts.  Identifying  and  locating  the  most  critical  assets  may  not  be  easy.  Key 


226 


strategic  and  military  targets  might  include  command  centres,  high-value  base  facilities, 
air  defence  systems,  weapons  of  mass  destruction,  choke  points  and  critical  logistics  and 
industrial  facilities.  This  can  be  done  by  getting  into  his  rear  areas  (normally  considered 
secure),  seizing  or  neutralizing  what  is  important  to  him,  surprising  and  deceiving  him, 
presenting  him  with  unexpected  situations,  using  psychological  operations,  and  attacking 
his  plans  and  preparations. 

146.  To  attack  moral  cohesion,  components  of  the  threat  force  should  be  isolated  from 
their  command  and  control.  Opposing  commanders  should  be  cut  off  from  their  sources 
of  information.  The  lack  of  information  will  force  bad  decisions  and  cause  loss  of 
credibility,  motivation,  and  the  will  to  fight  for  a  “losing”  commander.  This  creates  a  lack 
of  faith  in  threat  leaders,  so  that  their  effectiveness  and  competence,  as  well  as  the 
legitimacy  of  their  cause  will  come  into  question.  This  takes  away  the  threat’s  sense  of 
purpose  and  induces  fear.  The  ultimate  goal  is  to  produce  panic  and  paralysis  by 
presenting  the  opponent  with  sudden  unexpected  and  dangerous  change  or  a  series  of 
such  changes  to  which  he  cannot  adjust. 

147.  Physical  cohesion  can  be  attacked  by  separating  commanders  from  their  subordinates 
by  severing,  disrupting  or  jamming  communications,  attacking  lines  of  communications, 
destroying  elements  of  the  force  and  interfering  with  control  measures. 


HISTORICAL  PERSPECTIVE 
Operation  Overlord,  6  June  1944 

During  the  initial  stages  of  the  landings  in  Normandy,  the  Allies'  main  fear  was  a  rapid  and 
concentrated  German  counter-attack  before  the  beachhead  was  secured.  Actions  were  taken  to 
break  the  cohesion  of  the  German  response  by  pre-emption,  disruption  and  dislocation. 

Pre-emption 

Allied  troops  were  parachuted  into  German  rear  areas  and  on  the  flanks  of  the  landings  to  seize 
bridges  and  other  points  vital  to  both  sides.  This  denied  mobility  to  the  German  troops  moving 
to  repel  the  invaders.  At  the  same  time,  Ranger  and  Commando  units  were  employed  to  seize 
key  emplacements  that  dominated  the  landings. 

Dislocation 

Part  of  Operation  Overlord  was  the  construction  of  the  First  United  States  Army  Group 
(FUSAG)  under  Gen  George  S.  Patton.  This  army,  an  elaborate  fake,  helped  deceive  the 
Germans  into  believing  that  the  Normandy  landings  were  a  feint.  The  plan  used  a  minimal 
number  of  Allied  troops  to  hold  German  reserves  in  the  Pas  de  Calais  region.  This  dislocated 
the  main  component  of  the 

Axis  reserves  so  that  their  full  strength  was  not  brought  to  bear  against  the  Allied  invasion. 

Disruption 

French  resistance  forces,  carefully  coordinated  with  Operation  Overlord,  destroyed  key  portions 
of  the  railway  net  in  France.  At  the  same  time,  Allied  air  forces  bombed  other  targets  on  the 
lines  of  communications.  This  disrupted  the  German  transport  system,  and  damaged  the  ability 
Applica  °f  the  Axis  commanders  to  redeploy  their  forces  to  meet  the  Allied  invasion,  and  to  supply  their 
forces  in  the  field. 


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148.  Manoeuvre  warfare  plays  as  much  upon  the  adversary’s  will  to  fight  and  his  ability  to 
react  to  a  changing  situation,  as  upon  his  material  ability  to  do  so.  It  is  an  indirect 
approach  that  emphasises  a  targeting  of  the  adversary’s  moral  component  of  his  combat 
power  rather  than  the  physical  component. 

149.  It  requires  a  flexible  and  positive  attitude  of  mind  by  commanders  who  must  seek 
opportunities  to  exploit  threat  vulnerabilities  while  maximizing  their  own  strengths.  The 
focus  is  the  threat’s  Centre(s)  of  Gravity,  the  source  of  his  freedom  of  action ,  physical 
strength  or  will  to  fight,  and  how  best  to  attack,  neutralize  or  destroy  it.  It  focuses  on 
objectives  and  end-states  rather  than  actions  and  their  immediate  physical  results. 

150.  The  physical  application  of  violence  is  still  critical,  but  is  conducted  selectively. 
Rather  than  conducting  an  operation  as  a  toe-to-toe  slugging  match  between  two  boxers, 
it  should  be  fought  like  a  bullfight  where  a  stronger  opponent  can  be  worn  down, 
confused,  and  disoriented  by  the  picadors  and  the  elusive  and  flexible  cape  of  the 
matador  until  the  latter  delivers  the  final  blow  with  a  thrust  to  the  heart: 

a.  Operations  should  be  dynamic  and  multidimensional.  It  requires  a  balance 
between  mass,  time  and  space.  By  speed  of  action  we  attempt  to  pre-empt 
threat  plans,  dislocate  threat  forces,  disrupt  his  movement  and  his  means 
of  command  and  control.  Our  combat  forces  are  pitted  against  the  threat's 
strength  only  if  this  is  required  to  hold  and  neutralize  the  opponent's 
forces,  or  to  set  up  the  conditions  for  decisive  action  against  a  critical 
vulnerability.  Normally  our  combat  power  is  directed  against  threat 
weakness,  particularly  against  his  cohesion; 

b.  Where  possible,  existing  weak  points  are  exploited.  Failing  that,  they  must 
be  created.  Weak  points  may  be  physical,  for  example,  an  undefended 
boundary.  They  may  also  be  less  tangible,  such  as  vulnerability  in  passage 
of  information.  They  are  often  produced  when  a  threat  is  over-extended  or 
suffering  the  effects  of  a  high  tempo  of  operations.  Exploiting  weak  points 
requires  agility,  flexibility  and  anticipation,  and  low  level  freedom  of 
action; 

c.  Threat  strength  is  avoided  and  combat  power  targeted  through  his 
weakness  to  strike  at  his  critical  assets  (lines  of  communications, 
headquarters,  rear  areas,  reserve  forces  etc.)  directly.  The  image  of  water 
flowing  over  surfaces  and  gaps  is  useful  to  understand  the  notion.  Water 
runs  off  surfaces  -  threat  strengths  -  and  pours  through  gaps  -  threat 
weaknesses  to  follow  the  path  of  least  resistance.  This  relates  to  the 
concept  of  gathering  intelligence  and  searching  and  probing  with 
reconnaissance  elements  to  find  gaps  to  “pull”  combat  power  towards 
weakness  rather  than  “pushing”  based  exclusively  on  centralised  direction 
from  the  commander; 

d.  Tactical  battles  are  not  an  end  in  themselves,  but  only  a  building  block 
within  the  framework  of  a  larger  campaign  that  uses  surprise,  deception, 
manoeuvre  and  firepower  to  break  the  threat's  will  to  fight,  primarily 
through  attacking  moral  and  physical  cohesion. 


228 


151.  The  concepts  of  manoeuvre  warfare  apply  equally  to  activities,  effects  and  objectives 
on  the  cognitive  plane.  The  effects  should  shape  an  adversary’s  understanding, 
undermine  his  will  and  shatter  his  cohesion.  Manoeuvre  through  information  operations, 
for  example,  may  undennine  the  support  an  insurgent  or  belligerent  military  commander 
receives  from  the  local  populace  or  media.  This  will  in  turn  affect  the  adversary’s  will 
and  cohesion. 

MANOEUVRE  ON  THE  COGNITIVE  PLANE:  AFFECTS  ON  THE  WILL, 
COHESION  AND  UNDERSTANDING  OF  OTHER  TARGETS 

152.  In  a  conventional  sense,  the  manoeuvrist  approach  sees  the  attacking  of  will  and 
cohesion  of  an  enemy  force.  In  many  campaigns,  there  will  be  other  audiences  whose 
understanding,  will  and  cohesion  will  be  vital  for  long  term  success  of  the  campaign. 
These  will  include  local  leaders,  influential  members  of  a  society  and  the  populace  as  a 
whole,  or  key  segments  of  it. 

153.  The  will,  cohesion  and  understanding  of  these  groups  and  individuals  must  be 
“targeted”  as  well  in  order  to  create  desired  effects.  This  may  seek  to  undennine  the  will 
of  leaders  opposing  the  campaign,  or  they  may  seek  to  enhance  the  understanding  and 
will  and  cohesion  of  neutral  audiences  or  those  supporting  a  campaign.  Certainly  during 
counter-insurgency,  a  key  aim  will  be  to  enhance  the  understanding  of  the  local  and 
international  audiences  in  order  to  reinforce  their  will  to  support  the  campaign  and  to 
counter  the  propaganda  of  the  insurgents. 

154.  Therefore,  while  commanders  are  adopting  a  manoeuvrist  approach  to  attack  the  will 
and  cohesion  of  an  adversary,  they  must  understand  that  efforts  must  be  made  to  shape 
the  perceptions,  understanding  and  will  of  other  audiences  or  targets.  In  other  words,  they 
will  manoeuvre  on  the  cognitive  plane.  This  must  be  done  in  a  complementary  fashion  to 
all  other  activities  and  the  operations  planned  and  targeted  together  in  a  harmonised, 
simultaneous  fashion. 

155.  As  mentioned  in  previous  sections,  commanders  therefore  manoeuvre 
simultaneously  against  a  wide  range  of  targets  on  both  the  physical  and  cognitive  planes. 
Much  of  the  manoeuvre  on  the  cognitive  plane  will  be  conducted  through  information 
operations  that  seek  to  influence  target  audiences  and  create  desired  cognitive  effects. 

This  cognitive  manoeuvre  will  be  used  to  pre-empt,  dislocate  and  disrupt  the  Info  Ops 
and  cognitive  manoeuvre  of  the  adversary. 

156.  All  fonns  of  manoeuvre,  physical  and  cognitive,  are  considered  operations  and  are 
therefore  the  direct  responsibility  of  the  commander  and  his  G3  staff  branch.  The 
commander  will  strike  the  correct  balance  between  physical-effects  activities  and 
influence  activities,  that  is,  between  manoeuvre  on  the  two  planes,  based  on  the  campaign 
theme,  its  guiding  principles  and  the  need  to  create  effects  that  will  realise  enduring 
objectives  and  end-states. 

157.  Thus  this  concept  of  a  comprehensive  approach  to  operations  becomes  pervasive.  It 
begins  at  the  strategic  level  with  the  JIMP  framework  being  enabled,  moves  to  campaign 
planning  using  all  instruments  of  power  and  focussing  on  enduring  outcomes  throughout 
the  whole  environment  and  moves  throughout  all  levels  of  command  to  manoeuvre  at  the 


229 


tactical  level,  creating  physical  and  cognitive  effects  in  support  of  the  operational 
objectives. 

ENABLERS  FOR  THE  MANOEUVRIST  APPROACH 

158. The  manoeuvrist  approach  to  operations  is  enabled  through: 

a.  a  comprehensive  effects  based  approach  to  operations  that  provides  a 
unifying  theme  and  purpose  (expressed  in  the  commander’s  intent)  to  all 
the  elements  in  a  JIMP  framework  in  order  to  address  all  the  threats  and 
consider  all  influences  faced  in  the  operating  environment  (such  as 
political,  military,  economic,  social  to  name  a  few),  a  clear  articulation  of 
the  end-state  and  the  objectives  required  to  realise  that  end-state; 

b.  identification  of  the  weaknesses  and  vulnerabilities  of  the  threat; 

c.  identification  of  the  adversary’s  centre(s)  of  gravity  and  its/their  relative 
importance  to  reaching  the  desired  end-state; 

d.  the  commander’s  ability  to  conceptualise  and  direct  the  harmonisation  of 
the  operational  functions  to  create  combat  power  on  both  the  moral  and 
physical  planes  in  a  mutually  complementary  and  supporting  manner;  that 
is,  the  actions  on  the  cognitive  plane  seek  the  same  objective  as  actions  on 
the  physical  plane; 

e.  in  support  of  the  above,  hannonised  targeting  the  considers  the 
complementary  and  synchronised  application  of  physical-effects  and 
influence  activities 

f.  mission  command;  and 

g.  a  unity  of  effort  across  all  forces  created  through  the  shared  understanding 
of  superior  commanders’  intent,  two  levels  higher;  and 


FUNDAMENTALS  OF  MANOEUVRE  WARFARE 

159. Manoeuvre  warfare  is  a  mindset  for  applying  combat  power  and  resources  to  defeat 
threats  and  address  sources  of  conflict.  There  is  no  prescribed  formula,  however  certain 
fundamentals  can  provide  guidance: 

a.  Concentrate  on  the  Adversary’s  Vulnerabilities.  With  the  objective 
being  to  attack  the  threat’s  will  to  fight  and  cohesion,  activities  and  their 
effects  should  be  planned  along  these  lines.  Plans  should  focus  on 
exploiting  the  threat's  vulnerabilities  and  not  on  seizing  and  holding  the 
ground.  The  purist  application  of  manoeuvre  warfare  is  to  disann  or 
neutralize  an  threat  before  the  fight; 

b.  Mission  Type  Orders.  This  involves  de-centralising  decision-making  and 
letting  decisions  be  taken  at  the  lowest  possible  level.  It  is  essential  that 
commanders  know  and  fully  understand  their  commanders'  intent  two 
levels  up.  Subordinates  must  understand  what  is  on  their  commander's 
mind,  his  vision  of  the  battlefield  and  what  end  state  is  desired.  Mission 


230 


orders  allow  commanders,  at  all  levels,  to  react  to  situations  and  to 
capitalize  as  they  arise.  The  commander  directs  and  controls  his  operation 
through  clear  intent  and  tasks  rather  than  detailed  supervision  and  control 
measures  or  restriction; 

c.  Agility.  enables  us  to  seize  the  initiative  and  dictate  the  course  of 
operations  that  is  acting  quicker  than  the  threat  can  react.  Eventually,  the 
threat  is  overcome  by  events  and  his  cohesion  and  ability  to  influence  the 
situation  are  destroyed.  Agility  is  the  liability  of  the  commander  to  change 
faster  than  the  threat  can  anticipate.  Quickness  and  intellectual  acuity  are 
the  keys  to  effective  agility.  Commanders  must  be  quick  to  make  good 
decisions  and  to  exploit  developments  on  both  the  physical  and  cognitive 
planes.  Commanders  and  units  must  be  able  to  respond  quickly  to  physical 
developments,  and  to  cognitive  developments.  Just  as  a  unit  will  move  to 
exploit  a  sudden  gap  on  the  battlefield  before  the  threat  can  re-position  to 
close  it,  a  commander  must  be  quick  to  exploit  through  information 
operations  a  public  relations  error  by  an  insurgent  force.  Getting  inside  the 
threat's  decision  cycle  is  the  essence  of  tempo.  Well  rehearsed  battle  drills, 
standard  operating  procedure  enhance  the  agility  of  a  formation; 

d.  Focus  on  Main  Effort.  Main  Effort  focuses  combat  power  and  resources 
on  the  vital  element  of  the  plan  and  allows  subordinates  to  make  decisions 
that  will  support  the  commander's  intent  without  constantly  seeking 
advice.  This  way,  the  commander  is  successful  in  achieving  his  goal  and 
each  subordinate  ensures  his  actions  support  the  main  effort.  It  is  the  focus 
of  all,  generally  expressed  in  tenns  of  a  particular  friendly  unit.  While 
each  unit  is  granted  the  freedom  to  operate  independently,  everyone  serves 
the  ultimate  goal,  which  unifies  their  efforts.  In  certain  campaigns,  the 
main  effort  may  be  focused  on  influence  activities  in  the  cognitive  plane 
while  activities  on  the  physical  plane  are  supporting  and  may  seek  only  to 
maintain  a  secure  environment  for  other  elements  and  forces; 

e.  Exploit  Tactical  Opportunities.  Commanders  continually  assess  the 
situation  (mission  analysis)  and  then  have  the  necessary  freedom  of  action 
to  be  able  to  react  to  changes  more  quickly  than  the  threat.  Rigid  control 
measures  that  are  interchangeable  and  unlikely  to  survive  first  contact  are 
avoided.  Reserves  are  created,  correctly  positioned  and  grouped  to  exploit 
situations  that  have  been  created  by  shaping  the  battle  to  confonn  to 
friendly  concepts  of  operations; 

f.  Act  Boldly  and  Decisively.  Commanders  at  all  levels  are  able  to  deal 
with  uncertainty  and  act  with  audacity,  initiative  and  inventiveness  in 
order  to  seize  fleeting  opportunities  within  their  higher  commanders' 
intent.  They  not  only  accept  confusion  and  disorder,  they  generate  it  for 
the  threat.  Failure  to  make  a  decision  surrenders  the  initiative  to  the  threat. 
Risk  is  calculated,  understood  and  accepted.  In  doing  so,  commanders 
must  keep  in  the  foremost  of  their  minds,  the  overall  objective. 
Notwithstanding  this  need,  at  times,  tactical  success  may  have  to  be 
sacrificed  in  order  to  meet  the  overarching  operational  objective;  and 


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g.  Command  from  the  front.  Commanders  place  themselves  where  they 

can  influence  the  main  effort  and  ensure  that  the  desired  effects  are  created 
to  realise  the  desired  objectives. 


SECTION  6 


MISSION  COMMAND42 

DEFINITION  AND  TENETS 

160.  Mission  command  is  defined  as: 

The  philosophy  of  command  that  promotes  unity  of  effort,  the  duty  and  authority 
to  act,  and  initiative  to  subordinate  commanders . 

161.  It  focuses  on  decentralised  command  and  is  intended  for  situations  that  are  complex, 
dynamic  and  adversarial.  It  allows  for  and  accepts  that  the  successful  application  of 
surprise,  shock  and  high  operational  tempo  against  an  threat  is  best  executed  through 
rapid  and  timely  decision-making  at  all  levels  of  command  in  response  to  the  unexpected 
or  fortuitous  occurrence  of  both  threats  and  opportunities.  In  practical  terms,  activities  are 
conducted  to  generate  effects  aimed  at  achieving  objectives.  These  activities,  assigned  as 
tasks,  may  be  physical  or  cognitive  in  nature  to  produce  effects  on  the  physical  or 
cognitive  planes.  While  the  term  objective  has  commonly  been  used  to  refer  to  a  physical 
object  against  which  action  is  taken,  in  an  effects  based  approach  an  objective  may  be 
something  far  more  abstract,  particularly  if  the  it  is  on  the  cognitive  plane. 

162.  It  underpins  manoeuvre  warfare  and  the  effects  based  approach  with  four  tenets: 

a.  timely  decision  making; 

b.  the  importance  of  understanding  a  superior  commander’s  intention; 

c.  a  clear  responsibility  on  the  part  of  subordinates  to  fulfil  that  intent;  and 

d.  determination  on  the  part  of  the  commander  to  see  a  plan  through  to  a 
successful  conclusion. 

CREATING  A  MISSION  COMMAND  ATMOSPHERE 

163.  Under  the  Mission  Command  philosophy,  commanders  must: 

a.  give  orders  in  a  manner  that  ensures  that  subordinates  understand  intent, 
their  own  tasks  and  the  context  of  those  tasks; 

b.  provide  those  orders  and  tasks  within  the  context  of  a  unity  of  effort  that  is 
shared  horizontally  and  vertically  within  the  formation; 

c.  tell  subordinates  what  effect(s)  they  are  to  achieve  and  the  reason  why  or 
purpose,  which  may  be  a  second  order  effect  or  objective.  (Examples 
include,  “seize  in  order  to  ....”,  or,  “conduct  security  patrols  in  order 

to . ); 

d.  allocate  appropriate  resources  to  carry  out  missions  and  tasks; 


232 


e.  use  a  minimum  of  control  measures  so  as  not  to  limit  unnecessarily  the 
freedom  of  action  of  subordinates;  and 

f.  allow  subordinates  to  decide  within  their  delegated  freedom  of  action  how 
best  to  achieve  their  missions  and  tasks. 

164.  Mission  command  applies  to  activities  on  both  the  physical  and  cognitive  planes.  At 
its  essence  is  freedom  of  action,  trust  and  confidence.  When  all  else  goes  awry  and 
subordinates  cannot  obtain  new  direction  for  the  changing  situation,  they  can  always  use 
the  commander’s  clearly  stated  intent,  with  the  desired  end-state,  to  guide  their  decisions 
and  actions. 

UNITY  OF  EFFORT  AND  COMMON  INTENT 

165.  Balanced  against  the  tenets  of  freedom  of  action  and  decentralised  decision-making, 
is  the  requirement  to  harmonise  all  activities  and  effects  within  a  unity  of  effort.  Unity  of 
effort  is  vital  for  a  force  as  it  brings  harmonises  the  actions  of  the  constituent  elements  of 
forces,  at  times  both  military  and  non-military. 

166.  Unity  of  effort  stems  from  a  number  of  inter-related  means:  the  commander’s  ability 
to  articulate  a  clear  intent  and  mission  statements;  the  use  of  common  doctrine,  tactics, 
techniques  and  procedures;  a  common  language  of  command;  a  high  standard  of 
collective  training  and  teamwork;  and  the  designation  of  main  effort43 .  In  short,  they 
together  generate  a  common  understanding  across  a  force  and  harmonise  and  coordinate 
their  actions,  particularly  at  times  of  confusion  and  disorientation. 

167.  Within  an  operation,  unity  of  effort  is  enhanced  by  subordinates  understanding  the 
intentions  both  of  their  immediate  superiors  and  of  those  two  levels  up.  This  vertical 
integration  allows  subordinates  to  nest  their  own  plans  and  activities  within  those  of  their 
superiors.  The  unity  of  effort  shared  amongst  subordinates  gives  horizontal  integration 
and  allows  subordinates  to  understand  how  their  missions  interact  with  those  of  others.  A 
well-established  unity  of  effort  also  supports  the  manoeuvrist  approach  to  operations. 

168.  Unity  of  effort  is  largely  based  on  a  commander’s  explicit  (stated)  intent.  It  is 
understood  in  the  context  of  a  common  doctrine,  language  and  training.  However,  a 
complete  unity  of  effort  and  mission  command  implementation  must  be  based  on  the 
establishment  and  maintenance  of  common  intent :  the  sum  of  shared  explicit  intent  as 
expressed  in  a  commander’s  verbal  or  written  statement,  plus  operationally  relevant 
shared  implicit  intent. 

169.  Implicit  intent  is  understood  through  a  web  of  shared  connotations,  that  is,  a  common 
understanding  of  doctrine,  shared  values  and  beliefs  [culture],  social  norms  and 
expectations.  In  other  words,  it  stems  from  the  conceptual  and  moral  components  of 
combat  power  and  should  enhance  the  unity  of  effort  binding  activities  on  both  the 
physical  and  cognitive  planes. 

Summary 

110. An  effects  based  approach  complements  the  manoeuvrist  approach  and  enables 
commanders  to  more  effectively  operate  on  both  the  moral  and  physical  planes.  The 
principles  underlying  the  manoeuvrist  approach  remain  appropriate  at  all  levels  and 
dovetail  neatly  within  an  effects-based  approach.  As  such,  in  incorporating  an  effects 


233 


based  approach  to  the  extent  that  operational  outcomes  can  be  translated  into  coherent 
tactical  activity,  existing  tactical  procedures,  tenninology  and  practice  can  be  seen  as 
complementary  to  effects-based  practice  at  the  higher  levels  of  command. 

171.  As  a  result,  the  standard  orders  process  and  the  principle  of  mission  command  remain 
relevant.  The  significance  of  the  Commander’s  unifying  theme  continues  and  it  is  this 
theme  that  provides  the  focus  for  the  campaign  plan,  which  in  turn  enables  operational 
design.  Operational  art,  intuition  and  command  still  have  a  major  part  to  play,  especially 
in  uncertain  conditions  and  in  those  situations  where  there  is  a  compelling  need  to  act.  In 
all  circumstances,  it  is  anticipated  that  operational  freedom  of  action  is  preserved. 


1  For  example,  the  failure  to  protect  a  civilian  populace  from  exploitation  or  targeting  will  result  in  a  loss  of 
legitimacy  and  loss  of  popular  support  for  the  mission  and  force. 

2  The  term  effects  is  used  widely  throughout  this  publication  and  doctrine  in  general.  For  purposes  of 
Canadian  Land  Force  doctrine,  the  term  effects  is  SYNONYMOUS  with  results. 

3  Moral  plane  and  cognitive  plan  may  be  used  interchangeably  as  long  as  the  use  speaks  to  affecting  a 
target’s  will  and  in  turn  behaviour  and  actions.  The  use  of  the  term  “moral  plane”  may  cause  some 
conceptual  or  intellectual  challenges  when  dealing  with  cultures,  societies  and  individuals  that  do  not  stem 
from  or  practise  a  Judeo-Christian  tradition. 

4  For  example,  an  artillery  attack  will  reduce  an  adversary’s  capability  and  thus  have  an  effect  on  the 
physical  plane.  It  may  have  a  secondary  effect  on  the  cognitive  plane  by  reducing  the  morale  and  will  of  the 
adversary  and  thus  affect  his  behaviour. 

5  In  UK  doctrine,  physical  activities  are  referred  to  as  “Joint  Fires”  and  include  any  physical  activity 
applied  to  create  physical  or  cognitive  effects.  (See  JDN  7/06)  In  US  Army  doctrine  no  distinction  is  made 
however  the  doctrine  supports  similar  concepts  of  undertaking  activities  to  affect  both  capability  and  will  of 
an  adversary.  (See  FM  3-0). 

6  The  posture  and  profde  adopted  by  troops  interacting  with  a  local  populace  will  have  cognitive  effects. 
Their  mere  presence  will  show  commitment  to  public  security.  Their  conduct  on  patrols  and  at  checkpoints 
and  their  state  of  dress  will  provide  certain  signals  that  may  engender  or  undermine  support  from  a 
populace. 

7  This  is  the  essence  of  the  manoeuvrist  approach  to  operations,  that  is,  the  attacking  of  will,  shaping  of 
understanding  and  shattering  of  cohesion. 

s  Although  forces  would  be  unlikely  to  use  psychological  operations  on  their  own  troops,  they  may  launch 
internal  public  affairs  campaigns  in  order  to  counter  biased  media  reports  and  adversary  propaganda. 

9  An  observation  from  the  USMC  Joint  Urban  Warrior  2005  noted  that  when  insurgents  are  killed  or 
captured,  local  media  coverage  should  be  maximised  in  order  to  dissuade  members  of  the  local  populace 
from  joining  the  insurgency  in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan.  However,  consideration  of  the  issue  would  lead  one  to 
believe  that  such  a  tactic  could  probably  instil  hatred  vice  fear  in  many  members  of  the  local  population 
and  thus  undermine  support  for  the  campaign  and  even  encourage  more  to  join  the  insurgents. 

10  Despite  the  rarity  of  such  situations  examples  of  successful  models  include  the  British  campaign  in  the 
1950s/1960s  Malaya,  and  the  Australian  experience  in  the  Solomon  Islands. 

11  Joint,  Inter-agency,  Multinational,  Public  framework  incorporates  all  actors  whose  power  and  influence 
will  be  involved  in  reached  the  strategic  end-state.  They  involve  other  government  departments  and 
agencies,  NGOs,  media  and  private  enterprises.  See  Chapter  1 . 

12  The  systems  and  entities  that  exist  in  an  environment  and  that  will  interact  and  affect  the  situation  are 
often  described  by  the  acronym  PMESI:  Political,  Military,  Economic,  Social  (including  religious). 
Infrastructure,  and  Informational. 

13  For  example:  in  the  mission  statement,  “A  Coy  will  attack  to  seize  Objective  DOG  by  1300  hrs  in  order 
to  secure  a  Line  of  Departure  for  B  Coy”,  the  activity  is  to  “attack”,  the  first  and  second  order  effects  are  to 
“seize”  and  “secure”.  Thus,  the  objective  is  to  secure  a  line  of  departure  and  the  tactical  end-state  will  see 
A  Coy  prepared  to  support  B  Coy  and  to  support  a  fwd  passage  of  lines.  For  more  details  see,  B-GL-331- 
002/FP-000  Staff  Duties  in  the  Field. 


234 


14  Some  allied  doctrine  refers  to  the  environment  as  a  collection  of  systems,  identified  by  the  acronym 
PMESI1.  While  all  these  elements  represented  in  the  acronym  certainly  exist  in  a  society  or  environment, 
and  they  do  inter-relate  and  affect  one  another,  it  is  believed  that  there  are  too  many  variables,  including 
individual  personalities,  to  allow  a  scientific  “systems  approach”  to  constantly  and  accurately  predict 
exactly  how  they  will  react. 

15  Measures  of  Effectiveness  are  done  in  conjunction  with  Measures  of  Performance.  The  latter  measures 
task  accomplishment,  that  is,  an  assessment  of  whether  or  not  the  activity  was  done  right. 

16  The  strict  definition  of  decisive  points  as  points  from  which  to  attack  a  centre  of  gravity  must  be 
expanded  so  that  they  are  viewed  as  stepping  stones  to  reaching  an  objective  along  a  specific  line  of 
operation.  In  other  words,  the  decisive  points  must  be  viewed  as  effects  to  be  created  that  lead  to  the 
realisation  of  an  objective.  In  the  UK  JDN  7/06,  the  concept  of  decisive  points  has  been  removed  and 
replaced  with  Supporting  Effects. 

17  Despite  the  AAP  6  definition  of  a  centre  of  gravity,  recent  re-evaluation  of  the  concept  has  clarified  the 
meaning  in  the  original  constructs,  that  is  to  say,  centres  of  gravity  are  either  moral  or  physical  and  are 
based  on  an  individual  or  group,  for  example  a  leader  or  an  armoured  reserve  force.  They  may  have 
capabilities,  characteristics  and  locations,  but  a  centre  of  gravity  is  a  tangle  element  based  on  people,  not  a 
characteristic. 

18  For  a  more  detailed  discussion  on  the  construction  of  a  mission  statement,  see  B-GL-331-002/FP-000. 

19  With  respect  to  the  term  “targets”,  a  broader  understanding  the  term  must  be  used.  Targets  will  include 
adversary  elements,  friendly  and  allied  elements  and  neutral  audiences.  Nothing  nefarious  is  meant  by  the 
term,  but  it  seen  in  the  sense  of  a  business  advertisement  “targeting”  a  particular  audience.  Thus  all  target 
engagements  are  considered  together  in  a  complementary  and  comprehensive  fashion. 

20  This  in  itself  provides  a  basis  for  considering  adjustments  to  the  overall  plan.  This  distils  itself  into  the 
paraphrase,  doing  the  right  thing  as  opposed  to  doing  the  thing  right  (we  will  ideally  like  to  achieve  both): 

a.  Measure(s)  of  Effectiveness  (MOE)  -  The  criteria  used  to  evaluate  how  activities  have  affected 
system  behaviour  or  capabilities  (Are  we  doing  the  right  things?),  MOE  are  tied  to  effects  and  effects 
assessment,  and 

b.  Measure(s)  of  Performance  (MOP)  -  Criteria  used  to  evaluate  accomplishment  of  friendly  force 
actions  (Are  we  doing  things  right?),  MOP  are  tied  to  task  and  task  assessment. 

21  AAP  3.10  Allied  Joint  Doctrine  for  Information  Operations.  Ratified  by  NATO  nations  in  2007.  This 
definition  replaces  all  other  previous  definitions  of  information  operations  for  Cdn  land  forces. 

22  US  doctrine  has  focused  Info  Ops  on  the  concept  of  Information  Engagement  and  places  responsibility 
for  the  cognitive  effects  of  PsyOps,  public  affairs  and  CIMIC  under  the  G7  and  G9  staff  branches.  UK 
doctrine  has  disposed  of  the  concept  of  Info  Ops  and  has  placed  the  concept  of  Joint  Influence  under  the 
Commander  and  G3,  in  combination  with  Joint  Fires  (that  is,  cognitive  effects  and  physical  effects 
activities  all  under  the  G3  staff  branch). 

23  Long  term  effects  may  include  the  removal  of  a  C2  system  that  will  be  required  by  coalition  forces  later 
or  by  civilian  populations. 

24  Civil-Military  Cooperation  is  defined  as:  The  coordination  and  cooperation,  in  support  of  the  mission, 
between  commanders  and  civil  actors,  including  the  national  population  and  local  authorities,  as  well  as 
international,  national  and  non-governmental  organizations  and  agencies.  AAP  6. 

25  In  order  to  counter  adversary  propaganda  and  other  influence  activity,  internal  public  affairs  may  be 
used. 

26  Although  some  debate  has  occurred  regarding  the  “information  plane”  and  some  segments  of  allied 
doctrine  refer  to  such  a  level  of  existence,  all  elements  that  may  be  considered  under  such  a  description, 
actually  fall  to  either  the  physical  or  cognitive  planes.  Information  itself  exists  on  the  physical  plane  if  it 
can  be  attacked  or  physically  affected  (attacked,  blocked  by  EW,  etc)  or  on  the  cognitive  plane  if  it  rests  in 
an  individual’s  mind  and  thus  affects  perception  and  behaviour. 

27  ABCA  Armies  Program  Information  Operations  Project  Team  paper,  November  2007 

~8  Activities  that  create  cognitive  effects  may  be  viewed  as  sustaining  when  they  seek  to  maintain 
perceptions  and  opinions,  such  as  the  use  of  public  affairs  to  inform  domestic  audiences  and  friendly  forces 
and  to  counter  enemy  propaganda  or  negative,  biased  media  coverage. 

29  This  refinement  of  Info  Ops  doctrine  and  the  alignment  of  influence  activities  are  operations  under  a  G3 
branch  is  akin  to  the  doctrinal  developments  of  UK  and  US  land  forces. 


235 


30  All  doctrinal  concepts  begin  with  a  philosophy,  then  broaden  to  a  set  of  guiding  principles,  and  then 
develop  as  practices  and  procedures. 

31  These  physical  effects  may  be  termed  “fires”,  defined  as  the  deliberate  use  of  physical  means  to  support 
the  realisation  of  primarily  physical  effects.  They  include  lethal  and  non-lethal  physical  means  to  engage  a 
target,  such  as  EW. 

32  On  the  cognitive  plane,  targets  are  people,  either  individuals  or  groups.  They  include  national  and 
regional  leaders,  military  commanders,  social  and  religious  leader,  troops  and  segments  of  a  population. 

33  Dragon,  Randal  A.,  Wielding  the  Cyber  Sword:  Exploiting  the  Power  of  Information  Operations.  Carlisle 
PA:  USAWC,  March  2001  .p.  1 1 . 

34  Red  Teaming  is  utilised  to  provide  counter-intuitive  or  counter-factual  perspectives  in  campaign  analysis 
and  war  gaming,  regarding  the  reactions  of  neutrals,  aligned  and  non-aligned  actors,  as  well  as  the 
traditional  focus  on  the  adversary. 

35  Adopted  from  Randal  A.  Dragon,  Wielding  the  Cyber  Sword:  Exploiting  the  Power  of  Information 
Operations.  Strategy  Research  Project  13  March  2001,  USAWC,  Carlisle  PA,  page  18 

36  Briand,  Maj  Noelle  J.  How  to  win  friends  and  Influence  People:  Planning  Perception  \management  at 
the  Division  and  Corps  level.  School  of  advanced  \military  Studies,  USA  Command  and  General  Staff 
College,  Fort  Leavenworth  ,  Kansas,  AY  03-04.  p  42-43. 

37  Murphy,  Prof  Dennis.  Information  Operations  and  Winning  the  Peace:  Wilding  the  Information  Element 
of  power  in  the  global  War  on  Terrorism.  Centre  for  Strategic  leadership  Issue  Paper,  U.S.  Amy  War,  Vol 
14-05  December  2005  College 

38  For  a  detailed  discussion  of  causality  see  William  S.  Murray,  “A  Will  to  Measure,”  Parameters,  Vol. 31, 
No. 3,  Autumn  2001.  Carlisle  PA:  USAWC.  Pp.134-147. 

39  The  quantifiable,  observable,  and  timeliness  principles  are  adapted  from  LtCol.  David  Grohoski,  Steven 
Seybert,  and  Marc  Romanych,  “Measures  of  Effectiveness  in  the  Information  Environment,”  Military 
Intelligence  Professional  Bulletin,  Vol. 29,  No. 3,  july-September  2003.  Fort  Huachuca  AZ:  US  Army 
Intelligence  Center,  pp.  12-16. 

40  Baker.  For  example,  during  a  tour  in  Iraq,  2  BCT,  1st  Armored  Division  monitored  and  counted  local  and 
international  media  coverage  of  events  in  2  BCT’s  AOO  as  a  MoE.  This  allowed  positive  and  negative 
trends  to  be  identified  which  contributed  to  discerning  the  effectiveness  of  ongoing  IO. 

41  The  manoeuvrist  approach  must  not  be  confused  with  tactical  or  operational  manoeuvre,  which  is  an 
element  of  the  Act  operational  function  and  is  defined  as:  employment  of  forces  through  movement 
combined  with  speed,  firepower,  or  fire  potential,  to  achieve  a  position  of  advantage  in  respect  to  the  threat 
in  order  to  achieve  the  mission  (AAP  6). 

42  For  a  full  discussion  of  mission  command,  see  B-G1-300-003/FP-000  Command. 

43  Main  effort  is  defined  as:  a  concentration  of  forces  or  means,  in  a  particular  area,  where  a  commander 
seeks  to  bring  about  a  decision.  It  works  to  achieve  a  unity  of  effort  across  all  subordinate  and  supporting 
forces  and  maximises  combat  power. 


236 


Annex  C  -  Abbreviations 


3-D+C 

3D+T 


ACTS 

ACSC 

ADM  (Pol) 

AEF 

AO 

AOR 

AWPD-1 

C2 

C3I 

C4ISR 

CA 

CANCOM 

CAS 

CDS 

CF 

CFC 

CFD 

CFAWC 

CFOPP 

CIACG 

CIDA 

CIE 

CIMIC 

CJSOH 

COA 

CoG 

CONOPS 

CROP 

CTF 

CTFHQ 

DFAIT 

DGLCD 

DIME 

DoD 


Diplomacy,  Defence,  Development  and  Commerce  (often  abbreviated 
as  3-D) 

Defence,  Diplomacy,  Development  and  Trade  (often  abbreviated 
as  3-D) 

Air  Corps  Tactical  School 

Air  Command  and  Staff  College  (US  Air  Force) 

Assistant  Deputy  Minister  (Policy) 

American  Expeditionary  Force 

Area  of  Operations 

Area  of  Responsibility 

Air  War  Plans  Division’s  Plan  No.  1 

command  and  control 

Command,  Control,  Communications  and  Intelligence 
Command,  Control,  Communications,  Computers,  Intelligence 
Surveillance  and  Reconnaissance 
Comprehensive  Approach 
Canada  Command 
complex  adaptive  system 
Chief  of  the  Defence  Staff 
Canadian  Forces 
Canadian  Forces  College 
Chief  of  Force  Development 
Canadian  Forces  Aerospace  Warfare  Centre 

Canadian  Forces  Operational  Planning  Process  (sometimes  abbreviated  as 
Operational  Planning  Process  or  OPP) 

Coalition  Inter-agency  Coordination  Group 

Canadian  International  Development  Agency 

collaborative  information  environment 

Civil-Military  Cooperation 

Combined  and  Joint  Staff  Officer’s  Handbook 

course(s)  of  action 

Centre  of  Gravity 

concept(s)  of  operations 

common  relevant  operational  picture 

Coalition  Task  Force 

Coalition  Task  Force  Headquarters 

Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  International  Trade 
Director  General  Land  Combat  Development 
Diplomatic,  Informational,  Military  and  Economic 
Department  of  Defense  (United  States) 


237 


DND 

Department  of  National  Defence  (Canada) 

DRDC 

Defence  Research  and  Development  Canada 

DSAB 

Defence  Science  Advisory  Board 

EBA 

Effects  Based  Approach 

EBAO 

Effects-Based  Approach(es)  to  Operations 

EBO 

Effects  Based  Operations 

EBP 

Effect-Based  Planning 

ETO 

Effects  Tasking  Order 

HAZMAT 

Hazardous  Material 

HR 

Human  Resource 

IDA 

Institute  for  Defense  Analysis 

IDC 

Imperial  Defence  College 

IGO 

inter-governmental  organization 

10 

Information  Operation(s)  or  international  organization(s) 

ISR 

Intelligence,  Surveillance  and  Reconnaissance 

JFC 

Joint  Force  Commander 

JIACG 

Joint  Inter-Agency  Coordination  Group 

JIMP 

Joint,  Interagency,  Multinational  and  Public 

JNEPI 

Joint  NGO  Emergency  Preparedness  Initiative 

JTF 

Joint  Task  Force 

LOE 

Limited  Objective  Experiment 

MIC 

Multinational  Interoperability  Council 

MNE 

Multinational  Experiment 

MOE 

measure  of  effectiveness 

MOP 

measure  of  performance 

NATO 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 

NCW 

Network  Centric  Warfare 

NDC 

National  Defence  College 

NDHQ 

National  Defence  Headquarters 

NEO 

Net  Enabled  Operation 

NEOps 

Network  Enabled  Operations 

NEV 

national  elements  of  value 

NGO 

non-governmental  organization(s) 

NMO 

non-military  organization(s) 

NSC 

National  Security  College 

NVA 

North  Vietnamese  Army 

OA 

Operational  Analysis 

OGD 

other  government  department(s) 

238 


ONA 

Operational  Net  Assessment 

OODA 

Observe,  Orient,  Decide  and  Act  (loop) 

OPP 

(see  CFOPP) 

PCO 

Privy  Council  Office 

PGM 

Precision  Guided  Munition 

PMESII 

Political,  Military,  Economic,  Social,  Infrastructure,  and  Information 

PME 

professional  military  education 

PMO 

Prime  Minister’s  Office 

POGG 

Peace,  Order  and  Good  Government 

PRT 

Provincial  Reconstruction  Team 

PSYOPS 

Physiological  Operations 

QDR 

Quadrennial  Defense  Review 

RAF 

Royal  Air  Force 

RCC 

Regional  Combatant  Command 

RCMP 

Royal  Canadian  Mounted  Police 

RDO 

rapid  decisive  operations 

RFC 

Royal  Flying  Corps 

RMA 

revolution  in  military  affairs 

RMC 

Royal  Military  College  (of  Canada) 

RNAS 

Royal  Naval  Air  Service 

SA 

Situational  Awareness 

SAM 

surface-to-air  missile 

SDF 

Security  and  Defence  Forum 

SJFHQ 

Standing  Joint  Forces  Headquarters 

SME 

Subject  Matter  Expert 

soc 

sector  operating  centre 

SOD 

Systemic  Operational  Design 

TTCP 

The  Technical  Cooperation  Program 

UN 

United  Nations 

UK 

United  Kingdom 

USAAF 

US  Army  Air  Forces 

USAF 

United  States  Air  Force 

USAID 

US  Agency  for  International  Development 

USJFCOM 

United  States  Joint  Forces  Command 

USMC 

United  States  Marine  Corps 

WMD 

Weapons  of  Mass  Destruction 

239 


Annex  D  -  Contributors 


Howard  G.  Coombs  retired  from  active  duty  with  the  Canadian  Forces  in  2002.  He  is  a 
graduate  of  the  United  States  Army  Command  and  General  Staff  College,  where  he  was 
one  of  eleven  students  who  earned  the  designation  US  Army  Master  Strategist  in  2001, 
and  the  US  Army  School  of  Advanced  Military  Studies,  which  awarded  his  Master's 
degree.  He  is  currently  a  doctoral  candidate  at  Queen’s  University  in  Kingston,  Ontario, 
in  addition  to  being  a  Teaching  Fellow  at  Queen’s,  Research  Associate  of  the  Canadian 
Forces  Leadership  Institute,  Kingston,  a  part-time  Instructor  at  the  Canadian  Forces 
College,  Toronto,  Ontario  and  a  reserve  officer  commanding  the  Princess  of  Wales’  Own 
Regiment,  an  infantry  unit  based  in  Kingston. 

Colonel  Jim  Cottingham  joined  the  CF  anny  reserve  in  1971  as  a  radio  operator.  After 
commissioning  under  the  Reserve  Officer  University  Training  Plan  (ROUTP)  in  1973,  he 
was  trained  as  a  Communications  and  Electronics  Officer.  He  transferred  to  the  regular 
force  in  1978  and,  after  receiving  his  Air  Navigator  wings,  began  his  operational  flying 
career  in  1980  as  a  Tactical  Coordinator  on  the  Sea  King  helicopters.  He  has  served  in 
numerous  operational  and  staff  positions  since  then. 

He  served  as  a  member  of  the  Directing  Staff  at  the  Canadian  Forces  Staff  College  in 
Toronto,  and  in  August  2005,  he  was  appointed  Commanding  Officer  Canadian  Forces 
Aerospace  Warfare  Centre. 

Colonel  Cottingham  is  a  graduate  of  the  CF  Staff  School,  the  Royal  Australian  Air  Force 
Staff  College  and  is  a  distinguished  graduate  of  the  United  States  Air  Force  Air  War 
College.  He  holds  a  Diploma  in  Electronics  Engineering  Technology,  a  Bachelor  of 
Military  Arts  and  Science,  a  Graduate  Diploma  in  Management,  a  Master  of  Strategic 
Studies  and  a  Master  of  Arts  in  War  Studies. 


Lieutenant-Colonel  Craig  Dalton  was  commissioned  into  the  Royal  Regiment  of 
Canadian  Artillery  and  commenced  regimental  duty  with  the  2nd  Regiment  Royal 
Canadian  Horse  Artillery  in  1990.  Since  that  time,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Dalton  has  been 
employed  alternatively  on  regimental  duty,  including  operational  deployments  to  both 
Cyprus  and  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  and  a  variety  of  staff  positions  including  his  current 
assignment  as  an  international  planner  on  the  Strategic  Joint  Staff. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Dalton  is  a  graduate  of  the  Instructor-in-Gunnery  Course  (Field),  the 
Canadian  Land  Force  Command  and  Staff  College,  the  United  States  Army  Command 
and  General  Staff  College  and  the  United  States  Army  School  of  Advance  Military 
Studies.  He  holds  a  BMASc  from  The  Royal  Military  College  of  Canada,  a  MMAS  from 
the  United  States  Army  School  of  Advanced  Military  Studies  and  a  MSc  in 
Administration  from  Central  Michigan  University. 

Allan  English  was  the  lead  academic  for  the  Advanced  Military  Studies  Course  from  its 
inception  in  1998  to  2004  and  he  was  Co-chair  of  the  Aerospace  Studies  Department 


240 


from  2001  to  2005  at  the  Canadian  Forces  College.  He  is  an  Adjunct  Associate  Professor 
of  History  at  Queen’s  University  where  he  teaches  a  graduate  course  in  Canadian  military 
history.  In  the  fall  of  2005  the  Canadian  Defence  Academy  (CD A)  Press  published  The 
Operational  Art  -  Canadian  Perspectives:  Context  and  Concepts  edited  by  Dr  English, 
now  Major-General  Daniel  Gosselin,  Howard  Coombs,  and  Capt  (Navy)  Laurence  M. 
Hickey.  The  next  book  in  the  series,  edited  by  Dr  English,  The  Operational  Art  - 
Canadian  Perspectives:  Leadership  and  Command  was  published  by  CDA  Press  in  the 
summer  of  2006.  The  final  book  in  the  series,  edited  with  Colonel  James  Taylor,  The 
Operational  Art  -  Canadian  Perspectives:  Health  Sendee  Support  was  published  by  CDA 
Press  in  the  winter  of  2006.  His  latest  book,  co-authored  with  Richard  Gimblett  and 
Howard  Coombs,  Networked  Operations  and  Transformation:  Context  and  Canadian 
Contributions  will  be  published  by  McGill-Queen's  University  Press  in  early  2008. 

Robert  Grossman- Vermaas  is  currently  serving  with  the  Operational  Experimentation 
branch,  Joint  Experimentation,  Exercises  &  Assessment,  NATO  Allied  Command 
Transformation  (ACT).  Prior  to  this  assignment,  he  served  as  an  Effects-based 
Assessment  and  Planning  analyst  to  COMISAF  (Commander  International  Security 
Assistance  Force),  NATO  ISAF  HQ,  Kabul,  as  a  member  of  the  Operational  Analysis 
branch.  In  Afghanistan  he  was  also  analytical  liaison  to  Combined  Forces  Command- 
Afghanistan  (CFC-A)  and  CJTF-76  and  traveled  extensively  throughout  the  country. 

From  2002-2006  he  served  as  a  strategic  analyst  with  the  Department  of  National 
Defence  (Canada)  and  with  the  Advanced  Concept  Development  cell,  Directorate  of 
Defence  Analysis  and  Canadian  Forces  Experimentation  Centre.  He  was,  from  2002- 
2006,  the  Canadian  concept  lead  for  the  multinational  and  national  Effects-based  concept, 
and  has  presented  and  published  extensively  on  the  topic.  He  was  a  Canadian  Effects- 
based  concept  liaison  to  US  Joint  Forces  Command  (JFCOM),  Joint  Experimentation 
(J9),  and  served  as  a  core  concept  development  contributor  to  the  Multinational 
Experimentation  (MNE)  series.  Previous  assignments  have  included  the  US  Department 
of  Defense  and  the  UK  Defence  Science  and  Technology  Laboratory  (Dstl).  He  has  been 
awarded  a  MacArthur  Fellowship  and  is  a  PhD  candidate  at  the  Department  of  War 
Studies,  King’s  College,  London. 

Commander  Ken  Hansen  graduated  from  the  University  of  Alberta  in  1976  and 
enrolled  in  the  CF  1977  through  the  Direct  Entry  Programme.  He  has  served  at  sea  and 
ashore  in  number  of  different  operational  and  staff  positions.  He  completed  the 
Command  and  Staff  Course  in  1996  and,  on  completion,  was  posted  to  the  Canadian 
Forces  College  as  the  Staff  Officer  Naval  Doctrine.  His  subsequent  appointments  at  CFC 
have  included  Senior  Staff  Officer  Joint  and  Combined  Warfare  and  Military  Co-Chair  of 
the  Maritime  Studies  Program. 

Commander  Hansen  completed  a  Master  of  Arts  in  War  Studies  at  the  Royal  Military 
College  of  Canada  in  2005,  winning  the  Barry  D.  Hunt  Memorial  Prize  as  the  top 
graduate  student.  He  has  published  a  number  of  articles  on  naval  and  defence  issues  and 
he  is  currently  the  Defence  Fellow  at  the  Centre  for  Foreign  Policy  Studies,  Dalhousie 
University,  Halifax,  NS. 


241 


Lieutenant-Colonel  Colin  Magee  joined  the  Canadian  Forces  in  July  1980.  He 
completed  training  as  an  infantry  officer  in  August  of  1981  and  joined  Third  Battalion, 
The  Royal  Canadian  Regiment  in  Gennany.  He  has  served  in  numerous  line  and  staff 
positions  since  then.  More  recently,  he  served  as  the  Canadian  Exchange  officer  at  the 
United  States  Army  Command  and  General  Staff  College  in  Fort  Leavenworth  Kansas 
from  2002  until  2006.  In  addition  to  his  duties  as  an  instructor  he  was  the  subject  matter 
expert  for  peace  operations  and  joint  urban  operations.  He  assumed  the  position  as  the 
Chair  of  the  Department  of  Military  Planning  and  Operations  at  the  Canadian  Forces 
Staff  College  in  Toronto,  Ontario  in  July  2006. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Magee  has  completed  his  staff  college  courses  in  Kingston  and 
Toronto.  He  has  a  Masters  in  War  Studies,  with  a  focus  on  command  and  leadership  from 
the  Royal  Military  College  of  Canada,  and  a  Masters  in  Military  Arts  and  Science  from 
the  United  States  Army  Command  and  General  Staff  College  focusing  on  Peace 
Operations. 

Bob  Vokac  enrolled  in  the  United  States  Army  Reserve  Officer  Training  Corps  at  the 
University  of  Michigan  in  September  1974.  He  graduated  from  the  University  of 
Michigan  in  1978  with  a  Bachelor  of  Business  Administration  and  was  commissioned  as 
a  Second  Lieutenant  of  Field  Artillery.  He  then  served  in  the  United  States  Army  for  the 
next  25  years  in  a  wide  variety  of  progressive  command  and  staff  positions.  He 
completed  his  MSc  in  Operations  Management  at  the  University  of  Arkansas  in  1990. 
Following  completion  of  the  United  States  Anny  Command  and  General  Staff  Officer 
Course  in  1991,  Mr.  Vokac  had  the  rare  privilege  of  attending  the  Advanced  Military 
Studies  Program,  School  of  Advanced  Military  Studies,  United  States  Army  Command 
and  General  Staff  College,  where  he  received  a  Master  of  Military  Arts  and  Sciences  in 
Theatre  Operations  in  1992.  In  1999  he  was  posted  as  the  United  States  Army  Exchange 
Officer  to  the  Canadian  Forces  College  in  Toronto,  Ontario  where  he  served  as  a  member 
of  the  Directing  Staff,  Deputy  Director  Land  Studies,  and  Deputy  Director  Course. 
Following  his  retirement  from  the  United  States  Army  in  2003  he  co-founded  Wolverine 
Consulting,  a  small  business  dedicated  to  the  development  and  delivery  of  professional 
military  education  curriculum  throughout  the  Canadian  Forces.  Since  2004  he  has  served 
as  a  Joint  and  Combined  Warfare  Coordinator  for  the  Joint  Reserve  Command  and  Staff 
Course  while  continuing  to  work  with  a  number  of  defence-related  clients.  Mr.  Vokac  is  a 
Senior  Research  Fellow  for  the  Canadian  Institute  of  Strategic  Studies  (CISS)  where,  in 
his  spare  time,  he  serves  as  the  Executive  Secretary  representing  CISS  to  local  and 
national  media. 


Colonel  Randall  T.  Wakelam  retired  from  the  Canadian  Forces  in  2005  after  36  years  of 
service.  Between  1977  and  1987  he  flew  Twin  Hueys,  amassing  some  3,000  flying  hours 
and  holding  appointments  as  Flight  Safety  Officer,  Tactical  Instructor  Pilot,  Operations 
Officer  and  Flight  Commander.  He  commanded  408  Tactical  Helicopter  Squadron  from 
1991  to  1993.  From  1993  until  2002  he  served  at  the  Canadian  Forces  College  holding  a 
variety  of  appointments  including  Director  of  Warfare  Studies.  While  at  the  College  he 
was  a  lead  designer  for  the  Advanced  Military  Studies  and  National  Security  Studies 


242 


Courses.  After  retirement  he  retained  his  links  to  the  College  as  a  part  time  instructor  and 
returned  to  the  College  as  Director  of  Curriculum  (a  full  time  Reserve  position)  in  2006. 
He  is  a  graduate  of  the  Canadian  Land  Forces  Command  and  Staff  Course  and  the 
Canadian  Forces  Command  and  Staff  Course,  and  completed  his  PhD  in  History  at 
Wilfrid  Laurier  University  in  2006.  His  research  interests  include  air  warfare,  command 
and  leadership,  and  military  education. 


243 


UNCLASSIFIED 


DOCUMENT  CONTROL  DATA 

(Security  classification  of  the  title,  body  of  abstract  and  indexing  annotation  must  be  entered  when  the  overall  document  is  classified) 


3.  TITLE  (The  complete  document  title  as  indicated  on  the  title  page.  Its  classification  is  indicated  by  the  appropriate  abbreviation  (S,  C,  R,  or  U)  in  parenthesis  at 
the  end  of  the  title) 

EFFECTS-BASED  APPROACHES  TO  OPERATIONS:  CANADIAN  PERSPECTIVES 

(U) 

APPROCHES  DES  OPERATIONS  BASEES  SUR  LES  EFFETS  :  PERSPECTIVES 
CANADIENNES  (U) 

4.  AUTHORS  (First  name,  middle  initial  and  last  name.  If  military,  show  rank,  e.g.  Maj.  John  E.  Doe.) 

Allan  English  ;  Howard  Coombs 

6a  NO.  OF  PAGES 

(Total  containing  information,  including 
Annexes,  Appendices,  etc.) 

251 

7.  DESCRIPTIVE  NOTES  (The  category  of  the  document,  e.g.  technical  report,  technical  note  or  memorandum.  If  appropriate,  enter  the  type  of  document, 
e.g.  interim,  progress,  summary,  annual  or  final.  Give  the  inclusive  dates  when  a  specific  reporting  period  is  covered.) 

Contract  Report  published  as  a  book  by  the  CF  Aerospace  Warfare  Centre 

8.  SPONSORING  ACTIVITY  (The  names  of  the  department  project  office  or  laboratory  sponsoring  the  research  and  development  -  include  address.) 

Sponsoring: 

Tasking: 


1 1 .  DOCUMENT  AVAILABILITY  (Any  limitations  on  the  dissemination  of  the  document,  other  than  those  imposed  by  security  classification.) 

Unlimited  distribution 

1 2.  DOCUMENT  ANNOUNCEMENT  (Any  limitation  to  the  bibliographic  announcement  of  this  document.  This  will  normally  correspond  to  the  Document 
Availability  (11),  However,  when  further  distribution  (beyond  the  audience  specified  in  (1 1)  is  possible,  a  wider  announcement  audience  may  be  selected.)) 

Unlimited  announcement 


9a.  PROJECT  OR  GRANT  NO.  (If  appropriate,  the  applicable 

research  and  development  project  or  grant  under  which  the  document  was 
written.  Please  specify  whether  project  or  grant.) 


10a.  ORIGINATOR'S  DOCUMENT  NUMBER  (The official 

document  number  by  which  the  document  is  identified  by  the  originating 
activity.  This  number  must  be  unique  to  this  document) 

DRDC  Toronto  CR  2008-01 9 


9b.  CONTRACT  NO.  (If  appropriate,  the  applicable  number  under  which 
the  document  was  written.) 

W771 1-04-7908 


10b.  OTHER  DOCUMENT  NO(s).  (Any  other  numbers  under  which 
may  be  assigned  this  document  either  by  the  originator  or  by  the 
sponsor.) 


6b.  NO.  OF  REFS 

(Total  cited  in  document.) 


5.  DATE  OF  PUBLICATION 

(Month  and  year  of  publication  of  document.) 

April  2008 


2.  SECURITY  CLASSIFICATION 

(Overall  security  classification  of  the  document 
including  special  warning  terms  if  applicable.) 

UNCLASSIFIED 


1.  ORIGINATOR  (The  name  and  address  of  the  organization  preparing  the  document,  Organizations 
for  whom  the  document  was  prepared,  e.g.  Centre  sponsoring  a  contractor's  document,  or  tasking 
agency,  are  entered  in  section  8.) 

Publishing:  DRDC  Toronto 

Performing:  KMG  Associates,  83  Gore  Street,  Kingston,  ON  K7L  2L4 
Monitoring: 

Contracting:  DRDC  Toronto 


UNCLASSIFIED 


UNCLASSIFIED 


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(Security  classification  of  the  title,  body  of  abstract  and  indexing  annotation  must  be  entered  when  the  overall  document  is  classified) 

1 3.  ABSTRACT  (A  brief  and  factual  summary  of  the  document.  It  may  also  appear  elsewhere  in  the  body  of  the  document  itself.  It  is  highly  desirable  that  the  abstract 
of  classified  documents  be  unclassified.  Each  paragraph  of  the  abstract  shall  begin  with  an  indication  of  the  security  classification  of  the  information  in  the  paragraph 
(unless  the  document  itself  is  unclassified)  represented  as  (S),  (C),  (R),  or  (U).  It  is  not  necessary  to  include  here  abstracts  in  both  official  languages  unless  the  text  is 
bilingual.) 

(U)  There  are  currently  three  major  theoretical  approaches  that  dominate  analyses  and 
descriptions  of  military  operations.  They  are  Operational  Art,  Network  Centric  Warfare 
(NCW)  (or  Network  Enabled  Operations  (NEOps)  in  the  Canadian  context),  and  Effects 
Based  Operations  (EBO).  The  concept  of  EBO  is  currently  having  a  significant  influence 
on  Operational  Art  and  NCW,  as  well  as  how  operations  are  conceptualized  in  the  new 
security  environment.  The  EBO  concept  is  emerging  through  discussions  and  papers 
within  Defence  Research  and  Development  Canada  (DRDC)  jointly  with  other 
stakeholders  in  the  Department  of  National  Defence  (DND);  however,  there  are  many 
ways  of  describing  EBO  in  the  literature  and  in  practice.  In  order  to  fully  understand  the 
nature  of  EBO  today  and  how  it  might  evolve  in  the  future,  it  is  essential  to  understand  the 
theoretical  and  historical  origins  of  this  subject,  as  well  as  how  EBO  is  conceptualized  and 
practiced  by  the  CF.  Since  there  has  been  no  comprehensive  examination  of  these 
concepts  in  a  Canadian  context,  the  Command  Effectiveness  and  Behaviour  Section  at 
DRDC  Toronto  co-sponsored  with  the  Canadian  Forces  Aerospace  Warfare  Centre 
(CFAWC)  a  two-day  workshop  to  identify  the  issues  related  to  EBO  and  to  begin  to 
establish  the  agenda  for  better  understanding  EBO.  This  report  is  the  product  of  that 
workshop  and  it  includes  not  only  the  main  conclusions  of  the  workshop,  but  also  essays 
on  EBO  by  workshop  participants,  and  others. 

(U)  Ilya  actuellement  trois  approches  theoriques  principales  qui  dominent  les  analyses  et  les 
descriptions  d’operations  militaires.  II  s’agit  de  I’art  operationnel,  de  la  guerre 
reseaucentrique  (GR)  (ou  Operations  facilities  par  reseaux  [OFR]  au  Canada)  et  des 
operations  basees  sur  les  effets  (OBE).  Le  concept  des  OBE  a  actuellement  une 
incidence  importante  sur  I’art  operationnel  et  la  GR,  ainsi  que  sur  la  maniere  dont  on 
congoit  les  operations  dans  le  nouvel  environnement  de  securite.  Le  concept  des  OBE 
apparait  dans  le  cadre  de  discussions  qui  ont  eu  lieu  entre  Recherche  et  developpement 
pour  la  defense  Canada  (RDDC)  et  d’autres  intervenants  du  ministere  de  la  Defense 
nationale,  ainsi  que  de  documents  rediges  en  collaboration  avec  ces  derniers;  cependant, 
il  y  a  de  nombreuses  fagons  de  decrire  les  OBE  dans  la  documentation  et  la  pratique.  Afin 
de  comprendre  la  nature  des  OBE  aujourd’hui  et  la  fagon  dont  elles  peuvent  evoluer  a 
I’avenir,  il  est  essentiel  de  comprendre  les  origines  theoriques  et  historiques  du  sujet,  ainsi 
que  la  maniere  dont  les  OBE  sont  congues  et  menees  par  les  FC.  Puisqu’il  n’y  a  pas  eu 
d’examen  exhaustif  de  ces  concepts  dans  un  contexte  canadien,  la  Section  de  I'efficacite 
du  commandement  et  du  comportement  de  RDDC  Toronto  a  coparraine  avec  le  Centre  de 
guerre  aerospatial  des  Forces  canadiennes  (CGAFC)  un  atelier  de  deux  jours  en  vue  de 
cerner  les  questions  liees  aux  OBE  et  de  commencer  a  etablir  le  programme  pour  mieux 
comprendre  les  OBE.  Le  present  rapport  est  le  produit  de  cet  atelier  et  comprend  non 
seulement  les  conclusions  principales  de  I’atelier,  mais  aussi  des  essais  sur  les  OBE  par 
des  participants  a  I’atelier  et  d’autres  personnes. 

14.  KEYWORDS  DESCRIPTORS  or  IDENTIFIERS  (Technically  meaningful  terms  or  short  phrases  that  characterize  a  document  and  could  be  helpful  in 
cataloguing  the  document.  They  should  be  selected  so  that  no  security  classification  is  required.  Identifiers,  such  as  equipment  model  designation,  trade  name, 
military  project  code  name,  geographic  location  may  also  be  included.  If  possible  keywords  should  be  selected  from  a  published  thesaurus,  e.g.  Thesaurus  of 
Engineering  and  Scientific  Terms  (TEST)  and  that  thesaurus  identified.  If  it  is  not  possible  to  select  indexing  terms  which  are  Unclassified,  the  classification  of  each 
should  be  indicated  as  with  the  title.) 

(U)  Effects  Based  Operations  (EBO),  effects-based  approaches,  Network  Centric  Warfare, 
Operational  Art